Ibrahim v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 69/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 17 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1748 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 69/2023 [2023] HKCFI 689 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 69 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1748 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 15 February 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He arrived in Hong Kong on 13 May 2006 as a visitor and was allowed to stay until 27 May 2006. He overstayed and was arrested by police on 25 October 2007. On 5 July 2008, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on Torture risk, Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 152 (“the Ordinance”), BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 5 January 2017, the Director rejected his claim for the reason that they were not substantiated. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Having considered the applicant’s reasons, the Board dismissed his appeal by the Board’s Decision dated 10 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”). 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 26 June 2019 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14 December 2020. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 2 July 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 26 April 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 27 June 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The applicant’s previous claim is on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his enemies in Bangladesh because of a land dispute and he was charged as a murderer 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated and refused his claim. 15.The applicant appealed to the Board. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that the applicant’s evidence was not credible. It found that the applicant did not have the real intention of seeking asylum in Hong Kong. The Board also found that internal relocation was a reasonable alternative to the applicant. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.The applicant submitted his statement and some supporting documents for his subsequent claim application. Having considered the evidence, the Director found that he relied upon the same threats from his enemies, which had been considered by the Board in his previous claim. He also relied upon hearsay materials that his enemies continued to harassed his family; such hearsay materials are not subject to verification and was given no weight. The documents do not support his application as they are either hearsay evidence or irrelevant to his case. 18.The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. In his affirmation, he said that the Director’s Decision was wrong because he had not gone to his country to witness the situation himself. DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he had been convicted of criminal charges in Bangladesh and he might be killed. 22.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
23.It is unnecessary for the Director to go to the applicant’s country to understand the situation as he may rely on the country of origin information. The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim and I dismiss his application. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 17th day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment