Ake Robert v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1078/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3678

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1078 OF 2021

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 21 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 1 April 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 17 June 2021.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 1 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 15 April 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons, the applicant explained the delay in appealing by saying that it was due to the late delivery of the decision by his landlord. At the hearing of the Summons on 22 June 2026, the applicant further explained his delay in appealing by saying that the landlord dropped the decision in a box where he was asked to collect letters, but he had forgotten the date when he received the decision.

8.As the delay was not very long, I am prepared to accept the applicant’s explanation as aforesaid. However, there is no merit of the intended appeal at all. The applicant only mentioned in his supporting affidavit dated 21 April 2026 that his life was in danger and everything he said was true.

9.At the hearing of the Summons, when I asked the applicant for the grounds of appeal, he said that he could not go back to Nigeria as he was afraid that his life was in danger, and as he belonged to the Indigenous People of Biafra, he would be imprisoned by the government of Nigeria. However, the applicant admitted that he did not see anything wrong with my decision, but he claimed that the Torture Claims Appeal Board and the Director of Immigration did not know anything until they went to Nigeria. He wanted this court to consider the situation he would face if he went back and he wanted to stay in Hong Kong to save his life.

10.What the applicant said in his affidavit and at the hearing cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal against my decision, nor for the intended judicial review, as it is not for this court to re-assess his non-refoulement claim.

11.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

13.In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal. Thus, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.

The applicant appearing in person