Case Document

100%

HCAL 360/2020

[2026] HKCFI 4615

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 360 OF 2020

____________

BETWEEN

	S	1^st Applicant
	M, a minor, by his next friend and mother, S	2^nd Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

____________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	6 August 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision:	19 August 2026

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Background

1.By way of summons filed on 7 July 2026 (“the Summons”), the 1^st applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 29 April 2026, which dismissed the 1^st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 2 January 2020.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 29 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 13 May 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the 1^st applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 7 July 2026, the 1^st applicant explained her delay in lodging the appeal by saying that the documents were lost in post and she obtained the court’s order and Form CALL-1 after searching the court’s file, but by then she had already missed the deadline to appeal.

8.At the hearing of the Summons on 6 August 2026, the 1^st applicant explained her delay by saying that she received the court’s letter containing the court’s order at her correct address, but she was confused because she had too many letters including those for her case in Shatin Law Courts. She only found this court’s letter in mid-June 2026, but she did not understand the contents of the letter.

9.The 1^st applicant’s explanation in the Summons and her affirmation is clearly contradictory to what she said at the oral hearing. In the Summons and her affirmation, she said that she did not receive the court’s order because it was lost in post and she only obtained the court’s order and Form CALL-1 after searching the court’s file. At the oral hearing, she said that she did receive the court’s letter with the court’s order at her correct address but she only found the letter in mid-June 2026. The explanations given by the 1^st applicant are clearly not satisfactory, as they do not tally with each other.

10.Moreover, the 1^st applicant did not give any valid ground for her intended appeal at all. There was no ground of appeal given by her in the Summons and her affirmation. At the oral hearing, when I asked the 1^st applicant for her grounds of appeal, she simply said that she could not go back to Indonesia because her husband and son did not want her to go back, she did not have any other place to go back, she suffered financially and did not have money, her son did not speak Indonesian language and she was scared that her son would have difficulties in Indonesia because he could not understand Indonesian language.

11.When I asked the 1^st applicant what was wrong with my decision, she simply said that she did not understand the contents of my decision and hence she could not give any answer. Thus, there was simply no ground of appeal advanced by the 1^st applicant.

12.For this application to be successful, the 1^st applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.The 1^st applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

14.As there is no satisfactory explanation for the 1^st applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the 1^st applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.