Case Document

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HCAL 437/2022

[2026] HKCFI 4608

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 437 OF 2022

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BETWEEN

	Stanners Nanthana	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

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Before:

Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	6 August 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision:	19 August 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 23 June 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 27 May 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 12 April 2022.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 27 May 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 10 June 2026. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons, the applicant explained her delay in lodging the appeal by saying that she received the court’s letter very late. At the hearing of the Summons on 6 August 2026, the applicant further explained her delay by saying that she received the letter on 27 May 2026, but she had to wait for her landlord to open the mail box for her to get the letter and hence she only received the letter on 18 June 2026 when the landlord opened the mail box for her. The applicant’s explanation seems to be reasonable and hence I am not going to take issue on her delay.

8.However, the applicant did not provide any valid ground for her intended appeal. In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 23 June 2026, the applicant merely reiterated the danger she had in her home country, and alleged that the decisions of the Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board, as well as my decision, were unlawful, but she did not give any particulars as to why the said decisions were unlawful.

9.At the hearing of the Summons on 6 August 2026, when I asked the applicant what was wrong with my decision, she said that if she moved back to Thailand, it was completely not safe and very dangerous for her, and she just wanted to have more time because right now her situation and problem could not be resolved. Thus, the applicant did not explain why the said decisions were unlawful.

10.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

11.The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

12.In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

13.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.