Mohamed Ashraf, Ozair v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 942/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4898

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 942 OF 2026

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 3 July 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 10 June 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 20 April 2026.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 10 June 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 24 June 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons and the applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 3 July 2026, he explained his delay in lodging the appeal by saying that he only received the order on 26 June 2026 and it was out of time to appeal. However, he did not explain why he received this court’s order only on 26 June 2026.

8.At the hearing of the Summons on 20 August 2026, the applicant was absent and hence there was no further explanation for his delay.

9.Moreover, the applicant did not give any valid ground for his intended appeal at all. He only stated in the Summons and his supporting affirmation that his problem still existed in his home country, if he returned there, he would be killed by his enemy, and his life was not safe in his home country. As aforesaid, the applicant was absent at the hearing and hence there was no further ground of appeal advanced by him.

10.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

11.The applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

12.As there is no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

13.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.

The applicant being absent