Sarfo Victoria and Another v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 2097/2020

[2026] HKCFI 4267

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2097 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 1 June 2026 (“the Summons”), the 1^st applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 20 March 2026, which dismissed the 1^st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 30 June 2020.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 20 March 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 3 April 2026. However, 3 April 2026 was a public holiday. By virtue of section 71(1)(b) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1, when the last day of the period in question is a public holiday, the period shall include the next following day, not being a public holiday or a gale warning day or black rainstorm warning day. As 4 to 7 April 2026 were also public holidays, the next following day was 8 April 2026. In any event, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the 1^st applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons, the 1^st applicant mentioned that she had an accompanying affirmation which set out several reasons for why her application to appeal was being filed late. However, there was no such accompanying affirmation filed by the 1^st applicant at all, but she did explain her delay in lodging the appeal in the Summons.

8.What the 1^st applicant said in the Summons were that she had knowledge of the refusal around the week of 11 May 2026, she did not receive any mail correspondence and she depended on the assistance of others to help her to pursue her appeal.

9.At the hearing of the Summons on 14 July 2026, the 1^st applicant explained her delay by saying that she did not receive the letter in time because her letter box was outside, but she did receive the letter from the letter box around June 2026 and she said that someone could have put the letter somewhere else.

10.The 1^st applicant’s explanations in the Summons and at the oral hearing are clearly not satisfactory, as they do not tally with each other. In the Summons, she said that she did not receive the mail correspondence, but at the oral hearing, she said that she did receive the letter around June 2026. In the Summons, she said that she had knowledge of the refusal around the week of 11 May 2026, but at the oral hearing, she suggested that she only knew about the decision around June 2026 when she received the letter. Even if she had knowledge of the refusal around the week of 11 May 2026 without receiving the court’s letter first, there was no reason for her to delay the application further until 1 June 2026 when she filed the Summons.

11.Moreover, the 1^st applicant did not give any valid ground for her intended appeal at all. She only stated in the Summons that she had reasonable grounds to bring the proceedings, but she did not specify what grounds she had. At the oral hearing, when I asked the 1^st applicant for her grounds of appeal, she simply said that her case back home was still pending and she wanted to stay here until everything was “okay”. She also said that she wanted to stay here with her son, ie the 2^nd applicant. These clearly cannot be grounds for her intended appeal.

12.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.The 1^st applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

14.As there is no satisfactory explanation for the 1^st applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the 1^st applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.

The 1^st applicant appearing in person