Case Document

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HCAL 1153/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3861

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1153 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

	Camara Danny Maurice	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

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Before:

Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	23 July 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision:	5 August 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 8 May 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 22 April 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 4 August 2021.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 22 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 6 May 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons and his supporting affidavit dated 8 May 2026, the applicant did not give any reason for his delay in lodging the intended appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. The applicant simply alleged that he wanted to appeal against my decision, he was late to appeal and he was requesting for an extension of time to appeal.

8.At the hearing of the Summons on 2 July 2026, the applicant was absent. The applicant wrote a letter dated 6 July 2026 to this court and explain his absence by saying that he was not feeling well on 2 July 2026, and he requested for another hearing. I acceded to his request and fixed the hearing again on 23 July 2026. The applicant appeared at the hearing this time.

9.At the hearing on 23 July 2026, the applicant explained his delay in lodging the intended appeal by saying that he was struggling to find the proof to prove his case, he did not understand the legal procedures, but he asked for more time to get and bring the evidence to court. When I asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended appeal, he simply said that he wanted to appeal because he wanted to bring new evidence, he was living with his daughter and it was difficult for him to leave her.

10.It is clear that the applicant did not give any good reason for his delay, as it was not necessary to get new evidence to appeal against my decision. Getting new evidence and his desire to stay with his daughter cannot be valid grounds for his intended appeal at all.

11.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

13.As there is no good explanation for the applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.