Lok Kar Win Kevin and Others v. HKSAR
Read the full judgment text of FAMC 27/1999 on BabelCite. This FAMC judgment was delivered on 25 November 1999.
1. We thank Counsel for their interesting and lucid arguments. Having considered these we have come to a clear view on this matter. This is the determination of the Appeal Committee.
Cited by 4 cases
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FAMC000027/1999 FAMC No. 27 of 1999 IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 27 OF 1999 (CRIMINAL) (ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM HCMA No. 501 OF 1999) _____________________
_____________________ Appeal Committee: Mr Justice Litton PJ, Mr Justice Ching PJ and Mr Justice Nazareth NPJ Date of Hearing: 25 November 1999 Date of Determination: 25 November 1999 _________________________ DETERMINATION _________________________ Mr Justice Litton PJ: 1. We thank Counsel for their interesting and lucid arguments. Having considered these we have come to a clear view on this matter. This is the determination of the Appeal Committee. 2. On 4 October 1999 Burrell J, after dismissing appeals by the applicants against their convictions by a Magistrate, certified the following points of law under s.32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484:
3. Pursuant to such certification, the applicants now seek leave to take the matter to the Court of Final Appeal. It turns upon the proper construction of s.25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance ("the Ordinance"). If it is clear that the judge had come to the right view regarding the proper construction of s.25(1) we should refuse leave; if it is arguable that the judge had erred in regard to either point as certified, we should give leave. 4. The convictions arose from the following circumstances: The applicants, professional footballers, were parties to a conspiracy to fix a match in which they were representing Hong Kong against Thailand in a World Cup qualifying game in Bangkok. The scheme was that Hong Kong would lose the match, preferably by a score of 2-0 and they would collect gambling winnings as a result. Their convictions under s.25(1) were based on the fact that they received $30,000 each as winnings upon their return to Hong Kong. 5. The Ordinance was first enacted in December 1994. The long title states:
6. Section 25 as relevant states:
7. The section aims at dealings with the proceeds of crime. "Dealing", in relation to property referred to in section 25, is defined in section 2 as including:
8. From this list, it is clear that a person deals in terms of the section whether the property represents the proceeds of his own crime or someone else's crime. There are no words of qualification in section 25 - or anywhere else - which cut down on the scope of the section. The expression "Any person's proceeds" means just that. It includes the criminal himself. The only possible answer to Question (1) in our view is Yes. The contrary is not arguable. 9. As to Question (2), it is plain from the wording of s.25 that the section aims at criminalizing dealing in Hong Kong with property derived from conduct which is indictable here, regardless of where that conduct occurred. Subsection (4), as Burrell J rightly says, makes clear that the determining factor is the conduct complained of as judged by Hong Kong law, not whether that conduct is an offence in the foreign country where the conduct took place. In our view the answer to Question (2) must be No. The contrary is not arguable. 10. Leave to appeal is refused.
Representation: Mr Lawrence Lok SC and Mr Peter Duncan instructed by Messrs Kwan & Chow and assigned by DLA for the Applicants Mr A A Bruce SC, SADPP and Mr G Di Fazio SGC of Department of Justice for the Respondent |