Or Yam Yeung v. Hung Sai Sze t/a 明港工程
Read the full judgment text of DCEC 386/2006 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment.
1. By an Application filed on 20 March 2006, the Applicant claims against the Respondent for employees' compensation under Sections 9, 10 and 10A of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance ("the Ordinance"). Section references hereafter are references to the Ordinance, unless otherwise stated.
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DCEC 386/2006 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO. 386 OF 2006 ------------------------ BETWEEN
------------------------ Coram: Deputy District Judge R. Cheung in Court Date of Hearing: 5th March 2007 Date of Handing down Assessment of Compensation: 30th March 2007 --------------------------------------------------- ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION --------------------------------------------------- The Applicant's case and the Respondent's case 1.By an Application filed on 20 March 2006, the Applicant claims against the Respondent for employees' compensation under Sections 9, 10 and 10A of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance ("the Ordinance"). Section references hereafter are references to the Ordinance, unless otherwise stated. 2.By a Notice of Appeal filed on 14 September 2006, the Applicant also appeals against the assessment made by the Ordinary Board under a Certificate (Form 7) dated 8 May 2006. 3.On 7 July 2006, after a hearing, Judgment on liability was entered against the Respondent for the Applicant. 4.On 1 September 2006, after a hearing, the parties were ordered to file and exchange their witness statements within 35 days. The Applicant filed and served his 1st witness statement on about 10 October 2006. The Respondent filed and served his witness statement on about 13 October 2006. 5.On 20 October 2006, after a hearing, the Applicant was ordered to file and serve a comparative schedule setting out all payments made to and/or received by the Applicant as alleged. It does not appear that the Applicant had complied with the Order. However, without applying for leave of the Court, the Applicant had prepared a 2nd witness statement on about 7 February 2007 and included the same in the trial bundle. The trial bundle was served on the Respondent. I note that the 2nd witness statement of the Applicant served the purpose of the comparative schedule to an extent, but not in full. The Applicant had not previously applied for leave to file the 2nd witness statement. 6.The Applicant was legally represented at the trial. The Respondent appeared in person. 7.Since the Respondent has not filed an Answer, before evidence is heard, the Respondent's case appears by what is said in his witness statement, by the documents which he said he would adduce as evidence, and by what he then told the Court. 8.There is a trial bundle prepared by the Applicant but no agreed bundle. Enquiry was made of the Respondent as to the documents that he intended to adduce as evidence in the trial. Nothing of significance concerning the Respondent's case turns on that. 9.The Respondent had agreed that the Applicant's monthly earning to be reckoned as $12,250 for the purpose of these proceedings. 10.The Respondent's case is that he had already paid the Applicant the sum of $42,000 in relation to the Applicant's sick leave and under the employment related laws (see the Respondent's witness statement at Section B, page 29 of the Trial Bundle prepared by the Applicant, hereafter "B29", mutatis mutandis). 11.The Applicant agrees that he had received the sum of $42,000 from the Respondent. The Applicant's case is that the entire sum of $42,000 represents periodical payments paid to him under Section 10 and that such periodical payments relate to the period from 10 November 2004 to 1 March 2005 (i.e. about 112 days) when the Applicant was temporarily incapacitated from work. 12.There is accordingly no issue on the fact of the payment of $42,000 by the Respondent and receipt of the same by the Applicant. 13.At the commencement of the trial, the Applicant indicated that he would not proceed with his claim under Section 10 of the Ordinance (compensation in case of temporary incapacity). Of this, more will be said later. 14.In answer to the Court's enquiry, the Respondent stated that he would not be contending that there was an overpayment in respect of the $42,000 paid to the Applicant nor would he seek to set off such overpayment (if any) against other monies that he is liable to pay to the Applicant. Of this, more will be said later. 15.The Respondent, of course, has not pleaded any set off. 16.The Respondent's case is that he had already paid the Applicant medical expenses in the sum of $3,162. The Applicant agrees that the Respondent had paid him medical expenses in the sum of $3,162 but says that the actual amount of medical expenses that he has incurred is $3,692 so that the Respondent is still liable to make up the shortfall of $530. 17.The Respondent's case is that subsequent to the making of the abovementioned payments, he had paid the Applicant an additional sum of $8,400. This is denied by the Applicant. 18.The solicitor acting for the Applicant in her opening address submitted that the issues for trial were (1) whether the Court should substitute its own assessment in lieu of the assessment of the Ordinary Board pursuant to Section 18 of the Ordinance, (2) what should be the correct assessment of the amount of compensation payable under Section 9 of the Ordinance (compensation in case of permanent partial incapacity), and (3) what should be the correct assessment of the compensation payable under Section 10A of the Ordinance (medical expenses). 19.The alleged payment of $8,400 by the Respondent to the Applicant was however noted to be and accepted as a live issue at the trial. If proven, the Applicant must give credit for this amount received. 20.The trial thus proceeded and was conducted on the above basis. 21.The Applicant and the Respondent had given evidence. There was no other witness called to give evidence. The Applicant 22.The Applicant said that when he was sent to the hospital after the accident, the Respondent had paid him $2,000 out of compassion, on a gratuitous basis. 23.The Applicant said that he had so far received from the Respondent the sum of $42,000 by way of periodical payments and the sum of $3,162 by way of medical expenses. 24.The Applicant said that he was granted sick leave after the accident from 10 November 2004 up to 1 March 2005. The Respondent had paid him periodical payments during the period of sick leave. Payments were made either by cash or cash cheques. The Applicant did not hold any bank accounts at the time. He did not issue receipts to the Respondent as and when he received such payments. He however had written down the dates and the amounts of some of the periodical payments that he had received from the Respondent before 3 March 2005, on certain sick leave certificates. He had given the originals of the sick leave certificates to the Respondent but he had kept the copies. He produced 3 copy sick leave certificates at B17 (a medical certificate issued on 11 November 2004), B18 (a medical certificate issued probably on about 23 November 2004) and B19 (a medical certificate issued on 21 December 2004) showing his receipt of $8,000 from the Respondent on 1 December 2004, $8,000 on 21 December 2004 and $10,000 on 1 February 2005 respectively. The total is $26,000. 25.The Applicant said that of the medical expenses of $3,162 that he had received from the Respondent prior to 3 March 2005, the sum of $1,422 was the medical expenses that he had incurred from 10 November 2004 to 31 December 2004 whereas the balance in the sum of $1,740 was the medical expenses that he had incurred during the period from 1 January 2005 to 3 March 2005. 26.The Applicant had given evidence on two memos relating to the payments that he had received from the Respondent. The two memos were included in the trial bundle as D9 and D10. The Applicant was not in possession of the originals of these documents. D9 and D10 in the trial bundle were copies made from copies supplied to the Applicant by the Respondent. The contents of the two memos are in Chinese but I have rendered parts of the contents in English herein. 27.The original of the handwritten memo appearing at D9 has been produced and marked as an exhibit (Exhibit D1). I would refer to it as the 1st memo. 28.The Applicant said that the handwriting on the 1st memo is his handwriting except the part which reads "the entire sum of $53,562 has been received". It was not there when he wrote out the memo. He wrote out the memo on 3 March 2005 and gave it to the Respondent without keeping a copy. 29.The original of the 1st memo is made up by two pieces of paper glued together to form one sheet of paper of about 6 inches wide and 7 inches long. The sheet of paper is further glued onto another piece of paper of A4 size. At the top of the A4 size sheet of paper there is some handwriting which reads "already paid (Mr. Or Yam Yeung) sick leave, medical expenses and nutrition fee". The Applicant said that that is not his handwriting either. 30.In effect, the Applicant said that he had on 3 March 2005 written out the 1st memo and the 2nd memo at the Respondent's request to acknowledge receipt of the previous payments made by the Respondent to him and which comprised (1) $27,000 which was related to his sick leave and (2) $3,162 which was related to his medical expenses. 31.The original of the handwritten memo appearing at D10 has been produced and marked as an exhibit (Exhibit D2). I would refer to it as the 2nd memo. 32.The Applicant said that the handwriting on the 2nd memo which reads "10 November 2004", "31 December 2004", "total of $1,422", "Received", "Or Yam Yeung" is his handwriting. The 2nd memo also contains his signature in English. He wrote out the 2nd memo on 3 March 2005 and gave it to the Respondent. The other handwritings on the 2nd memo were not his and they were not there when he gave it to the Respondent. 33.According to the Applicant, the Respondent had telephoned him and said that he wanted written receipts of the monies that he had already paid to the Applicant. An appointment was thus made. The two of them met at a noodle shop at Kowloon City on 3 March 2005 in the evening. The Applicant brought with him pen and paper and also certain sick leave certificates. They stayed there for about an hour. They chatted. The Applicant made out the receipts (i.e. the 1st memo and the 2nd memo) and gave them to the Respondent. Nothing unpleasant occurred on that occasion. 34.The Applicant said that when he gave the 1st memo and the 2nd memo to the Respondent on 3 March 2005, he had only received $27,000 by way of periodical payments and $3,162 by way of medical expenses from the Respondent, totalling $30,162, not $53,562 as shown in D9. 35.The Applicant said that from March to June 2005, the Respondent paid him further sums totalling $15,000 by way of periodical payments. The earlier periodical payments of $27,000 together with these further periodical payments come to $42,000. 36.It will be apparent that the sum of $53,562 less the sum of $42,000 and the sum of $3,162 gives $8,400. 37.The Applicant said that after 3 March 2005, he had incurred further medical expenses in the sum of $530 of which the Respondent had not yet paid him. The Respondent 38.The Respondent was cross examined on the Form submitted to the Labour Department by way of notice of the accident in question at D3 to D8 ("the Notice"). His evidence was rather vague in this regard. It appears that he had submitted the Notice to the Labour Department on about 21 December 2004 but it was not then completed nor affixed with his company chop. The Notice was completed on 9 May 2006 and submitted to the Labour Department then. The Respondent said that he did not quite remember which part of the Notice was filled out on the 1st occasion and which part on the 2nd occasion though he later agreed that certain parts were filled out on the 2nd occasion. I do not consider this part of his evidence to be of any significant impact towards his credibility. 39.The Respondent did not dispute the Applicant's evidence concerning the making of the 1st memo (exhibit D1). He did not dispute that it was made on 3 March 2005. The Respondent said that he did not then have enough money to pay the Applicant in full. The Respondent told the Applicant that he would pay him when he had the money and the Respondent did in fact made further payments to the Applicant after 3 March 2005. 40.The Respondent said that he had made an appointment with the Applicant to meet at a park at Ta Ku Leng Road in the evening on 14 June 2005. He told the Applicant that he had a cheque to give to the Applicant. The cheque stub dated 14 June 2005 is exhibited as D3 and shows that a sum of $5,000 was paid to the Applicant for his sick leave. The Respondent told the Applicant that all the payments would be settled on that occasion. 41.On the appointed day and time, the two of them did meet at the appointed place. There were seats inside the park. The two of them met and stayed there for about 15 minutes. They were not in a rush. The Respondent had brought along with him the 1st memo (exhibit D1) but not the 2nd memo (exhibit D2) on that occasion in order to show to the Applicant what payments the Applicant had already received in the past. It was on 14 June 2005 in the presence of the Applicant that the Respondent wrote down on the 1st memo the words "the entire sum of $53,562 has been received". 42.The Respondent said that on 14 June 2005, he did not ask the Applicant to sign on the 1st memo against the words "the entire sum of $53,562 has been received" as they were trusting of each other all along. He wrote the above words instead of asking the Applicant to write the above words for the same reason. I find it rather odd. 43.The Respondent said in effect that he wrote on the A4 size sheet of paper on which the 1st memo was glued onto the words which reads "already paid (Mr. Or Yam Yeung) sick leave, medical expenses and nutrition fee" as he was not aware that it would be misleading to do so, as he was not having the benefit of any legal advice. I find it a bit odd. 44.The Respondent admitted that the employees' compensation insurance policy that he had taken out had expired at the material time and could not cover the accident that had occurred to the Applicant. 45.The Respondent was also cross examined on a letter dated 22 May 2006 (see D12) in which he offered an explanation to the Labour Department as to why he was late in the submission of the Notice above to the Labour Department. In the letter, the Respondent alluded to the Applicant's demand of a further payment of $80,000 from him. The demand was said to be made on 13 July 2006. Again, I do not consider this to be of much significance. Finding 46.I have considered all the evidence and I prefer the evidence of the Applicant to that of the Respondent on the amounts of payments made and received. 47.I find that the Respondent had paid the Applicant the sums of $42,000 which the Applicant considers to be periodical payments under Section 10 of the Ordinance. Of this amount, $27,000 was paid before 3 March 2005 and another $15,000 was paid after 3 March 2005. 48.I also find that the Respondent had paid the Applicant medical expenses in the sum of $3,162 before 3 March 2005. 49.I specifically reject the Respondent's evidence that he had paid the Applicant a further sum of $8,400 after 3 March 2005. Section 10 compensation and the payment of $42,000 by the Respondent 50.Despite what the Respondent said before the commencement of the trial, it transpired in the course of his testimony that he was concerned as to whether there was an overpayment in relation to the abovementioned sum of $42,000. 51.In this trial, the question of whether there was an overpayment to the Applicant in respect of the sum of $42,000 was not engaged. The trial was conducted on the basis that even if there were an overpayment, no account would be taken of such overpayment towards diminution of the compensation payable. 52.If there were in fact an overpayment, the Respondent may or may not wish to pursue a claim for the refund of the amount overpaid (i.e. for money had and received) in the Small Claims Tribunal. The Res Judicata principles (in the wider sense) may or may not preclude the Respondent from so doing. It is not something for me to decide although on my part, taking into account of the fact that the Respondent is unrepresented, I would probably not hold that he is disentitled to pursue his remedies in a subsequent claim, if I were called upon to make that decision. The procedures in the Small Claims Tribunal are informal and costs would be minimal, whereas the Applicant is legally represented in these proceedings. 53.I considered whether I should make a finding as to the Applicant's entitlement under Section 10. I appreciate that it is not entirely satisfactory to do so without hearing the parties' submissions on this point. Further, if the issue of Section 10 compensation was engaged in the trial, the Applicant might have given further evidence. 54.On the evidence before me, the Applicant was granted sick leave from 10 November 2004 to 1 March 2005, and that comes to about 112 days or 3.73 months. His monthly earnings was agreed to be $12,250. His Section 10 entitlement might be taken to be $12,250 x 3.73 x 80% = $36,554. That would be less than the sum of $42,000, the receipt of which the Applicant has acknowledged and which he took to be his Section 10 entitlement. I appreciate that if I do not make a finding on this point, the parties would be left in a state of uncertainty on this point. 55.Nevertheless, everything considered, I am of the view that I should not be making such a finding for the reasons that I have stated above. I also consider that the Respondent's case should not change in the middle of the trial. Quantum matters 56.I would now turn to the matters concerning quantum. The accident and the treatment 57.The following matters are essentially not in dispute and I find the facts accordingly. 58.On 10 November 2004, the Applicant suffered personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Respondent. At the time of the accident, the Applicant was 26 years old. 59.He was employed by the Respondent as a renovation worker cum driver. On 10 November 2004 at about 10 a.m., the Applicant was carrying out renovation works at a house situate at No. 111 Repulse Bay Road, Hong Kong. He was using a hammer to strike at a glass wall about 6 feet in height when the broken glass fell down and cut his right wrist. 60.He sought treatment from the Accident and Emergency Department of Ruttonjee & Tang Siu Kin Hospital ("Ruttonjee Hospital") immediately after the accident. He was diagnosed to have suffered two 3 cm cut wounds over his right wrist with possible cut of the flexor tendon. He was referred to the orthopaedic ward for further management on the same date. Clinical assessment found a cut on the volar side of his right wrist. Surgery was arranged and performed on the same date. He was discharged on 11 November 2004. 61.When he was discharged from the Ruttonjee Hospital, he was put on a wrist splint. The splint was removed on 21 December 2004. He was referred to receive physiotherapy and occupational treatment at the Ruttonjee Hospital from November 2004 to March 2005. He also continued to seek follow-up treatment at the orthopaedic clinic of the Ruttonjee Hospital after his discharge. 62.The Applicant was granted sick leave from 10 November 2004 to 1 March 2005. Section 9 compensation 63.The Applicant claims for compensation under Section 9. What should be the basis of assessment? 64.The injury suffered by the Applicant is a non-scheduled injury. There is no exact match with any of the items of injuries listed in the First Schedule of the Ordinance. Item 15 however provides that the loss of a preferred hand at wrist is to be reckoned as 75% loss of the employee's earning capacity. Section 9(1)(b) effectively puts a cap on the amount of compensation recoverable by the Applicant such that it cannot exceed 75% of the amount recoverable for permanent total incapacity under Section 7. Section 9(1)(b)(ii) effectively enjoins this Court to look for an item of injury listed in the First Schedule that bears closest resemblance to the Applicant's injury, and use the percentage loss of earning capacity designated for that item as a reference point to determine the Applicant's loss of earning capacity as a percentage. Section 9(1)(b)(ii) requires this Court to have regard to the percentages specified in the First Schedule and the Note thereto in the process. 65.I considered whether it is open for me to rely on what has been accepted as the common practice in judicial authorities. In dealing with Section 9(1)(b) claims, it is common practice to rely on the formula commonly known as the Hong Kong Paper Mills formula, as corrected in the case of Lui Kwong Yan (see Hong Kong Paper Mills Ltd. v. Chan Hin Wu, CACV 45/1981, 18 June 1981 and Lui Kwong Yan v. Shui Hing Decoration Works & Another, CACV 62/1992, 15 December 1992). See also in general paragraphs 1555-1652 of Butterworth's’ Hong Kong Personal Injury Service, Issue 14. 66.However, the Hong Kong Paper Mills formula is workable only when there is evidence to show that the Applicant is no longer able to resume his pre-accident job. Is he? The Applicant's version 67.The Applicant is right handed. He said that after the expiration of his sick leave on 1 March 2005, he had tried to resume work as a technician for an electrical company to install air-conditioners. He said that he worked for only about 2 weeks and then he stopped because his right hand power grip was weak and there was limited range of motion in his right wrist. He said that there was a scar adhesion over his right wrist and he felt numb in his right hand after heavy weight lifting. He said that the residual disabilities that he suffered as a result of the accident had precluded him from carrying out the work duties of a technician which required frequent weight lifting. 68.The Applicant also said that his pre-accident job as a renovation worker required heavy physical demand and much weight lifting. He said therefore he was unable to return to his pre-accident job. He said that he was at present working as a casual worker carrying out welding work, the nature of which required only a lighter manual duty. 69.In Court, the Applicant testified that he could not handle the air-conditioner installation work in March 2005 because he did not have the strength to carry the air-conditioners. He said that he had to use the strength of his right wrist to lift up the air-conditioners to the right position for installation. The scars on his right wrist caused him some pain in the process. He said that prior to the accident, he used to work as a renovation worker, air-conditioner installation worker and transportation worker. In doing such work, he had to carry heavy objects from time to time. The medical reports 70.The Respondent has made very little challenge to the medical evidence adduced by the Applicant. 71.The Applicant has put in a number of medical reports as evidence. The Order made herein on 20 October 2006 provides that either party may only rely on the medical evidence of one orthopaedic expert. The Applicant's orthopaedic expert is Dr. Tsoi Chi Wah, Danny. The Respondent has no orthopaedic expert. The Order of 20 October 2006 also provides that the expert report of Dr. Tsoi may be received as evidence without calling him to testify. The said Order did not provide for the admission of the other medical reports. However, the other medical reports were referred to in the medical report of Dr. Tsoi. I consider that I should receive the other medical reports as evidence also. 72.The Applicant's stance is that he disagrees with the opinion of Dr. Tsoi. 73.The physiotherapy report dated 29 September 2005 contains a finding of the Applicant's condition on the final assessment of the Applicant made on 25 February 2005. The occupational therapy report dated 20 October 2005 contains a finding of the final assessment of the Applicant made on 22 February 2005. None of these two reports opined that the Applicant had attained maximal recovery by the time of the final assessment. 74.Dr. Tsoi examined the Applicant on 29 August 2006 and rendered a detailed report on 4 September 2006. He had regard to the previous medical reports. 75.Dr. Tsoi said the following at page 3 of his report: "During his last orthopaedic follow up on 23 June 2005, Mr. Or was told that his right wrist injury has recovered to a stable stage and no further treatment or follow up was required". 76.At page 4, Dr. Tsoi listed the complaints made by the Applicant as follows: "1. There is right wrist stiffness on mornings. 2. There is soreness over right wrist after vigorous manual work. 3. The endurance in holding objects for long duration is impaired e.g. unable to hold four bottles of beer for long time. 4. The right hand grip is weak". 77.On examination of the Applicant's right wrist, Dr. Tsoi found that among other things there was normal alignment and the range of motion of the right wrist and the left wrist to be the same. There was normal strength to all directions. 78.On the examination of the Applicant's right hand, Dr. Tsoi found that among other things there was full range of motion of all fingers. There was no sensory deficit. The grip strength was normal. There was also normal fine co-ordination of all fingers. 79.Dr. Tsoi's comments include the following:
Finding 80.I accept that the accident has left the Applicant with permanent partial incapacity. I am not satisfied that the Applicant cannot return to his pre-accident job. I find that he can. In other words, I shall not employ the use of the Hong Kong Paper Mill formula. Percentage loss of earning capacity 81.The Applicant was assessed by the Ordinary Board on 24 April 2006 and found to have suffered a loss of earning capacity of 0.5%. 82.As between the 0.5% assessment made by the Ordinary Board and the 2% assessment made by Dr. Tsoi, I would have to decide whose assessment I should prefer. The Ordinary Board is of course presided by members who are professionally qualified and well experienced to give such an opinion. It is a statutory creature since 1982. It is charged with the duty to make assessments of the percentage loss of earning capacity of injured employees under Section 16D. I have had regard to what is said in paragraph 1701 of Butterworths' Hong Kong Personal Injury Service, Issue 14 (December 2006). 83.Dr. Tsoi is also obviously conversant with employees' compensation and personal injury matters. He had examined the Applicant on 29 August 2006, closer in time to the trial. That said, the Ordinary Board's assessment was made only a few months before that. 84.It is tempting to consider that the applicable percentage should be somewhere in the middle between the assessment made by the Ordinary Board and Dr. Tsoi respectively. It should be (0.5% + 2%) divided by 2 = $1.25%. However, in the end, I have decided to accept Dr. Tsoi's assessment instead of that made by the Ordinary Board. I consider that Dr. Tsoi is likely to have been able to devote more time and focused attention to the assessment of the Applicant's condition. I also consider that Dr. Tsoi in his report does provide the background details against which he has made his assessment, whereas the Certificate (Form 7) in question contains nothing more than the Ordinary Board's finding. 85.I find that the Applicant is entitled to compensation under Section 9(1)(b) of the Ordinance calculated as 2% of his entitlement under Section 7. 86.There is no room for the operation of Section 9(1A). There were no special circumstances. Computation 87.The Applicant's monthly earnings have been agreed at $12,250. 88.The amount of compensation for permanent total incapacity under Section 7 of the Ordinance has to be ascertained first. The Applicant was aged 26 at the time of the accident. Section 7(1)(a) therefore applies. A lump sum that equals 96 months' earnings of the Applicant would be $12,250 x 96 = $1,176,000. 89.The amount of compensation under Section 9 should be $1,176,000 x 2% = $23,520. Section 10A (medical expenses) 90.The Applicant said that after he was discharged from the Ruttonjee Hospital after the accident, he received a course of physiotherapy treatment and a course of occupational therapy treatment. Such treatment spanned from November 2004 to March 2005. He received both kinds of treatment twice a week. He paid $100 for the first session and thereafter $60 for each subsequent session of treatment. 91.The Applicant also said that he incurred expenses for the dressing to his wound after the accident and it cost $17 each time. 92.The physiotherapist's report says that he had received 25 sessions of physiotherapy treatment (see C4). The occupational therapist's report says that he received such treatment twice a week but does not give the total number of treatment sessions. 93.The solicitor for the Applicant did not assist the Court in working out the arithmetic in accordance with the receipts adduced as evidence in D18 to D48. I have endeavoured to do so and a summary is set out in the Appendix attached hereto. The receipts show a total of $3,132. Of this amount, $130 was medical expenses incurred after 3 March 2005. The Applicant said that prior to 3 March 2005, he had incurred and was paid medical expenses in the sum of $3,162, I accept that to be the fact notwithstanding the receipts adduced do not add up to the full amount. I also find that he has incurred further medical expenses in the sum of $130 after 3 March 2005, as borne out by the medical receipts adduced. 94.I would assess the Applicant's Section 10A entitlement to be $3,162 + $130 = $3,292. Appeal under Section 18 95.I would allow the appeal and substitute my above finding of a 2% permanent loss of earning capacity in lieu of the 0.5% assessment made by the Ordinary Board. The period of absence of duty necessary as a result of the injury is left undisturbed. The period would be from 10 November 2004 to 1 March 2005. Orders 96.The Applicant is entitled to be paid compensation in the sum of $23,520 under Section 9. 97.The Applicant is also entitled to be paid compensation under Section 10A in the sum of $3,292. He has agreed to give credit for the sum of $3,162 that he has already been paid. The balance is $130. 98.I would make the following orders accordingly:
Representation: Miss Kathy Chui, of Messrs. Vincent T.K. Cheung, Yap & Co. (assigned by D.L.A.), for the Applicant The Respondent: appearing in person
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