Lai Yiu Mun Susanna v. Tsang Kai Choy Paul and Others

HCA 142/2017

[2019] HKCFI 642

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 142 OF 2017

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Paul Lam SC in Court

Dates of Hearing: 26 – 28 February, 1, 4 – 5 March 2019

Date of Decision: 5 March 2019

Date of Reasons for Decision: 8 March 2019

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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Introduction

1.On the 6^th day of the trial (ie 5 March 2019), I acceded to the plaintiff’s oral application for recusal.  These are my reasons.  I must say that what happened is most unusual, unexpected and unfortunate.

What this case is about

2.The plaintiff (“P”) is a Christian, and a supporter of All Saint’s Cathedral of Sheng Kung Hui (“the Church”).  The 1^st defendant (“D1”) was the pastor of the Church who had retired in 2005.  The 2^nd defendant (“D2”) is his wife.  The 3^rd defendant (“D3”) is the younger sister of D2.

3.The parties used to have a very close relationship.  It is not in dispute that, after D1 retired on 1 January 2005 (or even shortly before that), Ds moved to live in a property owned by P at 6/F, No 60 Village Road, Happy Mansion, Hong Kong (“the Property”).  Ds did not pay any rent.  There is a dispute whether Ds had paid some of the management fees and Government rents.  More importantly, by an assignment dated 26 June 2009, the Property was transferred to Ds (“the Transfer”).  Although on the face of the documents the Transfer was made pursuant to a sale and purchase agreement, it is common ground that Ds had not paid any purchase price.  Ds have continued to live in the Property since then.  On the other hand, it is also common ground that P had also paid medical and miscellaneous expense for Ds, as well the repair costs of a property in the US owned by Ds.  P claims that the total amount was about HK$620,000 whereas Ds claim that that it was only around HK$325,000.

4.The relationship between the parties broke down as a result of incidents which were no longer in issue.  Apparently, these incidents prompted P to reflect on what had happened in the past.She takes the view that she has been deceived by Ds’ misrepresentations into, firstly, allowing Ds to live in the Property for free in the first place, and making the Transfer subsequently; and secondly, paying the medical and miscellaneous expenses for Ds.  She claims that Ds have made various misrepresentations to the effect that the amount of D1’s retirement funds would not be sufficient to support Ds’ live after D1’s retirement.  Among other things, Ds said to her from time to time in Cantonese “夠住唔夠食，夠食唔夠住”.  P also claims that Ds have broken an oral warranty that they would return the Property to her if she needs it.

5.In contrast, Ds deny that they have made any misrepresentation or committed any wrongdoing.  They maintain that the Transfer as well as the payment of medical and miscellaneous expenses were unconditional gifts given by P to them.  Their case is that P simply regretted her earlier generosity towards them.

6.What the court needs to decide is whether P is entitled to claim back the Property, as well as the medical and miscellaneous expenses, from Ds.  How the issues should be resolved depends very much on the credibility of P on the one hand, and D1 and D2 on the other hand.  Although D3 had made a witness statement, I was told at the beginning of the trial that she would not give evidence.

Progress of the trial up to 4 March 2019

7.The trial (with 8 days reserved) commenced before me on 26 February 2019.  By the afternoon on 4 March 2019 (ie the 5^th day of the trial) and before the case was adjourned, P had already completed her case: she and two other witnesses had finished giving evidence; and D1 was in the course of being cross-examined.  It appeared that his evidence would finish soon; and D2, being the last witness, would then give evidence.

8.It was virtually certain that all evidence would and could have been completed by 7 March 2019.  I have given directions for the parties to file written closing submissions, and reserved 19 March 2019 to hear oral closing submissions.  There is no doubt that the trial had already reached a very advanced stage when it was adjourned on 4 March 2019.

The Email

9.In the early morning on 5 March 2019, when I, as usual, checked my emails, I discovered an email sent to my chambers’ email address at 1:07:10 am on 5 March 2019 (“the Email”).  The sender (“the Sender”) is a barrister and a door-tenant of my set of chambers, but she has ceased active practice for a long time.  I have known her for a long time even though we are not close friends.  We only met occasionally.  I cannot recall where and when I last saw or talked to her.

10.The Email is entitled “church matters”.  For the present purpose,I need to go into the content of the Email:

(a) She started by saying that she wrote in her personal capacity sharing her thoughts after learning about this case from the newspaper and the court list.

(b) She said she felt perplexed and unhappy as she could not have done enough for her “retired pastor (who had been in the church since she was a child)” (whom I understand to be a reference to D1), and an “elderly auntie who has been a philanthropist rendering great assistance to everyone in the church over the years” (whom I understand to be a reference to P).

(c) In the 3^rd and 4^th paragraphs, she stated as follows:

“ What can I usefully do now? I was in the meeting long time ago when the church council decided against granting an interest free loan to the about-to-retire vicar as down payment for him to purchase a flat. He was quite poor and without savings, having lived frugally and ministered to the parishioners all his working life. We were then quite relieved that he could find accommodation after retirement when Mrs Leung offered to let him move into her flat.

It all started as an act of generosity and kindness, but has now been stained with accusations that hurt not only the reputation of those individuals involved, but the Church.”

(d) She then told me that:

“ I am currently Warden of All Saints’ (head of church council from lay persons’ perspective) …”

(e) While regretting that she had not intervened earlier, she expressed the hope to mediate for the parties.  She went on and said:

“ I seek your wisdom (like King Solomon being confronted with two women who claimed to be mothers of the baby)—how can I help to avoid them from further embarrassing themselves and the church?”

(f) Before she ended by saying “God have mercy on us all!”, she said this:

“ I have always enjoyed a good relationship with both, although I don’t see them coming to church in the past 2 years or so. I don’t think they need justice; they need reconciliation and respect. (They are so old already.)”

11.I cannot describe how surprised I was when I saw the Email.  I did not reply to it at all.

The application for recusal

12.When the trial resumed at 10 am on 5 March 2019 (ie the 6^th day of the trial), I immediately informed that parties that I had received the Email, and provided copies thereof to them.  I told the parties my relationship with the Sender.  I indicated that I would ignore the Email.  I granted a short adjournment to enable counsel to take instructions from their clients.  After the adjournment, Ms Lau, appearing for P, applied for an order that I should recuse myself from continuing to hear the case.

13.I heard oral submissions from Ms Lau (with Mr Fong) and also Ms Wong who appeared for Ds.  They provided me with relevant authorities and further submissions after the lunch adjournment.  I am very grateful to their assistance.

14.After considering the matter carefully and anxiously, and in order not to waste further time and costs, I declared that I had decided to accede to the application (with written reasons for my decision to be handed down as soon as possible).  I also gave directions for the future conduct of these proceedings.

Why I have decided to recuse myself

15.There is no suggestion of actual bias.  The question is whether the Email will result in apparent bias.  The relevant legal principles (summarized by Zervos J (as he then was) in Komal Patel v Chris Au [2016] 1 HKLRD 328 at 333 – 339, §§6 – 20) are not in dispute.  The apparent bias test may be stated as follows:

“ A particular judge is disqualified from sitting if the circumstances are such as would lead a reasonable, fair-minded and well-‌informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that the judge would be biased.”

(See §47, p 18, Guide to Judicial Conduct; Deacons v White & Case LLP [2004] 1 HKLRD 291 at 297I – 298D, §§20 – 21.)

16.In Tang Yau Keung v Tang Choi Yau [2014] 2 HKLRD 940 at 943 – 944, §§10 – 13, Deputy Judge Eugene Fung SC adopted a two-stage approach in deciding whether he should recuse himself because of improper disclosure of without prejudice correspondence which he had read.  At the first stage, the question is whether, subjectively, the judge considers that he is disabled from fairly continuing with the case.  But the subjective decision of the judge is inconclusive as there are circumstances, in which whatever the subjective feelings of the judge in question, he cannot continue with the case without there being a real possibility or a real danger of there being seen to be, by a fair-minded and informed observer, an unfair trial.  The second stage is, in essence, the application of the apparent bias test.

17.I must confess that, initially, I felt reluctant to abort the trial having regard to the advanced stage it had reached, and the time and costs that had already been spent.  I was worried and concerned that, if I acceded to the application, there would be an inevitable delay in these proceedings,which was most undesirable in view of the age of P, D1 and D2 as well as the fact that their credibility would depend on their ability to recollect material events which took place many years ago.  I was also worried about the additional costs that parties would need to incur.  I believed and was confident that I would be able not to allow the Email to influence how I was going to decide on the case.  However, on reflection, I am just human: I could be wrong, and I may well have overrated myself.  More importantly, Ms Lau reminded me that a judge might be affected by matters that he should ignore unconsciously (In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 at 728H – 729, §§95 – 96).  As Le Pichon JA held in Superb Quo Ltd v Lee Yuen Cheung Co Ltd & ors, HCMP 29/2011 (14 February 2011, unreported), §14, “Subconscious bias operates subtly and imperceptibly.  The process could be said to be insidious.”  It is, of course, impossible for me to predict whether I would be affected by the Email subconsciously.  I believe this is an important reason why a judge’s subjective feeling cannot be conclusive, and why the judge must apply the apparent bias test objectively and faithfully.

18.The apparent bias test requires the judge to look at the matter from the viewpoint of a “reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer”.  As Kwan JA (dissenting) held in Superb Quo, §§45 – 46, such an observer should be a member of the public who is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious; and such an observer is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until he has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument, and his approach must not be confused with that of the person who has brought the complaint.  The test is objective in nature.  It requires the judge, being the target of the complaint, to approach the matter with the requisite measure of detachment no matter how hard it may be in practice.

19.I agree with Ms Wong that the fair-minded observer “is to be taken to understand that the judge has sworn an oath to do justice”, and is prepared to assume that the judge will abide by his oath and do his best to do justice independently without being influenced by any extraneous considerations (Falcon Private Bank Ltd v Borry Bernard Edouard Charles Ltd (2014) 17 HKCFAR 281 at 292, §30).  An informed observer should also be taken to be aware of the system and how it operates (R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014] 1 WLR 415, §65).  Hence, I also agree with Ms Wong that the ability of a judge to put some facts (eg evidence ruled inadmissible, unsolicited correspondence from strangers) out of mind when reaching a decision (sometimes described as “judicial compartmentalization”) is a well-known part of the system which an informed observer would know of. Having said that, it is essential to bear in mind what Langstaff J said in Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors & ors [2014] ICR 1020 at p 1030, §36:

“ … Whereas I accept that in many cases a judge will be able to put out of his mind certain matters which he has heard, and disregard them as irrelevant, none the less his ability to do so is only one of many circumstances, to all of which a court must have regard in assessing what the informed observer would make of the situation. It would be a great pity if the theoretical observer were obliged to give greater weight to some particular features, less to others, and so on, on a sliding scale prescribed by judicial decision, for this would be to take too particular and inflexible an approach to a concept one of the great virtues of which is its adaptability to many different circumstances. Essentially, the question is whether the hypothetical observer would see in the facts a real risk to fairness. Reference to such an observer is in reality the reference to an objective standpoint,as opposed to the definition of, or the particularity of knowledge of, a given human being. It is important in taking such an objective standpoint in order to determine whether there is a risk to fairness to avoid too mechanistic and prescriptive an approach.”

He said further in §37:

“ … I do not accept that the judge’s ability to compartmentalise was any more than one of many factors in the present case. … Whilst I accept that judges will often, and perhaps usually, be able to put irrelevant considerations out of mind, this does not alter the fundamental nature of the test to be applied ….”

20.It is clear that each case must depend on its own facts.  I agree with Ms Wong that “the true test required all the circumstances having a bearing on apparent bias to be ascertained and assessed” and that “the party seeking recusal is required to ‘articulate the relevant reasoning by which the fair-minded observer would attribute a level of prejudgment justifying recusal’ (Falcon Private Bank Ltd v Borry Bernard Edouard Charles Ltd (2014) 17 HKCFAR 281 at 292, §30).”

21.The judgment of the High Court of Australia in Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 205 CLR 337 provides useful guidance on how the apparent bias test should be applied.  At p 345, §7, the majority of the Court held that:

“ The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. …”

More importantly, they held in §8:

“ The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. … Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.”

22.It is necessary to discern the meaning of “bias” in the present context.  In §23 (at p 348), they held that:

“ Bias, whether actual or apprehended, connotes the absence of impartiality. It may be an adequate term to cover all cases of the absence of independence.”

23.In Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74, Deane J identified four distinct, though overlapping, categories of case involving disqualification by reason of appearance of bias: interest; conduct; association; and extraneous information. In Ebner v Official Trustee at p 349, §24, the court acknowledged that such a categorization provides a convenient frame of reference.  What Deane J said is this:

“ The area covered by the doctrine of disqualification by reason of the appearance of bias encompasses at least four distinct, though sometimes overlapping, main categories of case. The first is disqualification by interest, that is to say, cases where some direct or indirect interest in the proceedings, whether pecuniary or otherwise, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of prejudice,partiality or prejudgment. The second is disqualification by conduct, including published statements. That category consists of cases in which conduct, either in the course of, or outside, the proceedings, gives rise to such an apprehension of bias. The third category is disqualification by association. It will often overlap the first (e.g., a case where a dependent spouse or child has a direct pecuniary interest in the proceedings) and consists of cases where the apprehension of prejudgment or other bias results from some direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or otherwise involved in, the proceedings. The fourth is disqualification by extraneous information. It will commonly overlap the third (e.g., a case where a judge is disqualified by reason of having heard some earlier cases …) and consists of cases where knowledge of some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance gives rise to the apprehension of bias.”

24.I shall first identify what has been, or could have been, said might lead me to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. Returning to the Email in this case, what is in issue is “association” and “extraneous information”.  As to “association”, the relevant factors are the personal background of the Sender, and her relationship with me as well as the parties.  As to “extraneous information”, the relevant consideration is,of course, the content of the Email itself.

25.I turn to consider whether there are logical connections between these factors and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.  My analysis is as follows:

(a) To begin with, the Sender is an experienced barrister.  She is not a lay person with no legal knowledge.  A reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer (“the Observer”) is likely to take the view that she should know what she did was inappropriate, and may question her motive.

(b) The Sender described herself as the head of the church council from lay persons’ perspective.  She expressly said that the reputation of the Church has been hurt because of the allegations made by the parties against each other.  The Observer is likely to conclude that she is an interested party; she is clearly very concerned about the reputation of the Church.  Coupled with the first point, unavoidably, the Observer would view the matter more critically and skeptically.

(c) The Observer knows that the Sender has known me for a long time; and we are still in the same set of chambers even though she is a door-tenant.  She is not a stranger to me.  Although the Observer will not know the details of our relationship and how close we are, he is likely to come to the view that, as compared to a stranger, I may take what she said more seriously.

(d) As to what she had said in the Email, the Observer would notice that she had made factual statements which are directly relevant to the issues ie the fact that the church council had rejected to give D1 an interest free loan to buy a flat; D1 was poor and without savings; and P offered to let him move into her flat.  It appears that she has personal knowledge of the circumstances which led to Ds’ family moving into the Property as well as Ds’ financial condition at the material time.  However, she is not a witness, and what she said is not admissible evidence at all.  Her own credibility cannot be tested.

(e) Moreover, she had commented on the general personal characters of the parties.  It is necessary to bear in mind that the credibility of P and D1 is critical in this case.  On the one hand, she described P as a “philanthropist rendering great assistance to everyone in the church over the years”.  On the other hand, she described D1 as a frugal person.  More importantly, when she said “It all started as an act of generosity and kindness, but has now been stained with accusations that hurt not only the reputation of those individual involved …”, the Observer may wonder whether what she meant was that some of the allegations made against D1 were unfair and unjustified.

(f) The Sender expressed the desire to be able to mediate for the parties, and asked me for advice on how she can help to avoid them from further embarrassing themselves and the Church. She also thought that what the parties need is not justice, but reconciliation and respect.  The Observer may reasonably suspect whether these are the things that the Sender also hopes or expects me to do eg to try harder to push the parties for a settlement; and if I need to decide on the case, to decide it and to write a judgment in a way that would cause less embarrassments to the parties as well as the Church.

(g) Having regard to the relationship between the Sender and me,the Observer will have a reasonable and legitimate concern whether I can really ignore subconsciously (even if not consciously) all the above-mentioned factual statements, personal opinions, and expectations made by the Sender.

26.Considering all relevant circumstances as a whole, I was driven to the conclusion that a reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer would conclude that there a real possibility (not probability) that I would be influenced subconsciously by extraneous considerations arising out of the content of the Email due to my association with the Sender.

27.Ms Wong, understandably, reminded me of the serious adverse consequences for the parties and the administration of justice in terms of inconvenience, costs and delay that would be caused if I allowed the application.  As I said earlier, I shared all her worries and concerns.  However, I believe the answer lies in what Mummery LJ said in AWG Group Ltd v Morrison [2006] 1 WLR 1163 at 1166G–H, §6:

“ Inconvenience, costs and delay do not, however, count in a case where the principle of judicial impartiality is properly invoked. This is because it is the fundamental principle of justice, both at common law and under article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. If, on an assessment of all the relevant circumstances, the conclusion is that the principle either has been, or will be, breached, the judge is automatically disqualified from hearing the case. It is not a discretionary case management decision reached by weighing relevant factors in the balance.”

And he held at p 1172, §29:

“ … In terms of time, cost and listing it might well be more efficient and convenient to proceed with the trial, but efficiency and convenience are not the determinative legal values; the paramount concern of the legal system is to administer justice, which must be, and must be seen by the litigants and fair-minded members of the public, to be fair and impartial. Anything less is not worth having.”

28.There may well be very exceptional circumstances in which the adverse consequences of a recusal may prevail.  In Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors at p 1033, §44, Langstaff J referred to Article 2.5 of the internationally accepted Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct:

“ A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially.… Provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.”

29.In this case, another judge may be assigned to conduct the trial afresh.  Although P and Ds are elderly, and I had been told by D1 that his health is not good, and that D3 is suffering from Parkinson’s disease, there are no urgent circumstances supporting that there would be a serious miscarriage of justice if I allowed the application.

30.After all, it is crucial to bear in mind the rationale behind the principles concerning apparent bias.  As the High Court of Australia held in Ebner v Official Trustee at p 344, §6:

“ … That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial.”

31.What is at stake is the rule of law.  I cannot emphasize more how important it is, at this time in Hong Kong, and indeed as is always the case, to maintain and enhance public confidence in the judiciary and the judicial system as a whole.  Public confidence depends on the public’s perception of how the system works in practice.  This is why both the reality and the appearance are equally important.  Hence, justice must not only be done, but also be seen to be done. “Justice” in this context, properly understood, is not about the outcome of a case; it is most likely that only one of the parties in a litigation will believe that justice has been done by the result of the case.  “Justice” is about the process by which the court reaches its decision.  One of the most important, if not the most important,elements in making the process just and fair is that the case must be decided by an independent and impartial tribunal in accordance with only the law and the evidence properly adduced before it: nothing more, nothing less.  If, in any particular case, a reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed person will take the view that there is a real possibility that the judge would be biased or that the trial would be unfair, it is reasonable to infer that a significant number of members of the public, who become aware of what has happened (through the parties, their legal representatives, the mass media or otherwise) will share the same feeling.  They would have a reasonable doubt in their minds whether justice will indeed be done.  Such doubt will inevitably undermine the general public’s confidence in the judiciary and the judicial system.  It will be difficult to remove such doubt once it is formed: the judge’s reassurance that he will deal with the case independently in accordance with the law and evidence only might be seen as an unconvincing self-serving statement; and subconscious bias is, by nature, incapable of being eliminated by the judge’s reassurance.  Hence, such doubt must be avoided, insofar as possible, at all costs.

32.Owing to the paramount importance of the rationale behind the apparent bias principle, it is necessary to err on the side of prudence. In Superb Quo, §19, Le Pichon JA cited with approval, firstly, what Mummery LJ said in AWG Group Ltd at 1167E, §9:

“ If, as here, the court has to predict what might happen if the hearing goes before the judge to whom objection is taken and to assess the real possibility of apparent bias arising, prudence naturally leans on the side of being safe rather than sorry.”

And, secondly, what the English Court of Appeal held in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451 at 480H, §25:

“ In most cases, we think, the answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal.”

33.Applying the well-established and indisputable legal principles,and taking into account all submissions made by both parties, for reasons stated above, I decided that I should recuse myself from continuing to hear the case.  As I said when I announced my decision, this was a difficult decision (perhaps even more than the judgment that I had to make on the merits of the case).  I was upset and frustrated because, for reasons entirely out of my control and expectation, I had lost the opportunity of doing what I wished to do the most ie to discharge the duty of helping the parties to resolve their disputes as soon as practicable.

Conclusion and order

34.As a result of my decision, I ordered that a trial de novo be fixed to be heard before another bilingual judge with 8 days reserved in consultation with counsel’s diary.

35.As to the costs of the aborted trial, the parties agreed that they should be costs in the cause of the trial de novo.

36.As to the costs of the application for recusal, P asked for costs (on the ground that costs should follow the event) whereas Ds submitted that they should form part of the costs of the aborted trial.  P submitted that, but for Ds’ opposition, the time spent on the application would be much less.  The application was not caused by anything done by Ds.  The grounds on which Ds opposed the application were not frivolous, or plainly unreasonable.  Even if there was a joint application for recusal, it would not be a rubber-stamp formal exercise, and I would have to consider the application carefully and, probably, in more or less the same way as what I have done.  In practice, I take the view the bulk of the costs incurred on 5 March 2019 (eg counsel’s daily refreshers) would have to be incurred in any event.  As a matter of discretion, I shall order that the costs of this application be part of the costs of the aborted trial ie they would also be in the cause of the trial de novo.

37.After I announced my decision, Ms Wong sought leave to appeal against my decision.  I invited her to wait for my reasons for decision first.  To avoid any unnecessary delay in case Ds elect to appeal against my decision, both parties agreed that I may give appropriate directions to deal with Ds’ potential application for leave to appeal expeditiously.  Accordingly, I direct that:

(a) Ds may, within 14 days after this reasons for decision is handed down, file and serve an application for leave to appeal(with a draft notice of appeal setting out the intended grounds of appeal, and a skeleton argument not longer than 5 pages);

(b) P may, within 14 days thereafter, file and serve a skeleton argument not longer than 5 pages in opposition; and

(c) the application shall then be disposed of on paper.

Ms Lorinda Lau and Mr Forest Fong, instructed by Alvin Cheng & Rosaline Choy, for the plaintiff

Ms Carol Wong, instructed by Chan, Wong & Lam, for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants