Chan Fuk Tai and Others v. Chan Wai Ming
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 3474/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 June 2020.
1. The plaintiffs, being individuals among the beneficiaries of the estate of Chan To (陳濤), deceased (“Estate”), issued the Originating Summons herein to seek an order that the defendant, in his capacity as the administrator of the Estate, exhibit on oath a just and true account and that the defendant distribute the Estate as the court may direct.
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HCMP 3474/2016 [2020] HKCFI 1041 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 3474 OF 2016 ________________________
________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Master Benny Lo in Court Date of Hearing: 19 December 2019 Date of Further Written Submissions: 18 March 2020, 20 March 2020, 2 April 2020 and 9 April 2020 Date of Decision: 10 June 2020 _________________________________ DECISION _________________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.The plaintiffs, being individuals among the beneficiaries of the estate of Chan To (陳濤), deceased (“Estate”), issued the Originating Summons herein to seek an order that the defendant, in his capacity as the administrator of the Estate, exhibit on oath a just and true account and that the defendant distribute the Estate as the court may direct. 2.Pursuant to the court’s directions, the defendant had supplied verified administration accounts. The focus of the plaintiffs has since turned to disputing certain alleged expenses as stated in those accounts. To resolve that dispute, Chung J on 20 November 2018 ordered an inquiry to be conducted. In the learned Judge’s subsequent Order dated 28 May 2019 (“May 2019 Order”), it was specifically directed that: -
3.This is my Decision upon the making of the said inquiry. The matter was heard in open court on 19 December 2019 based on affidavit evidence without cross-examination of the deponents. The parties also lodged written submissions after the hearing to address the question of burden of proof in proceedings of this nature[1]. B. RECUSAL APPLICATION REFUSED 4.At the start of the hearing, Mr Ching, of the defendant’s solicitors, made two oral applications which I disposed of after hearing submissions. It would be convenient for me to record my reasons for doing so before turning to the substance of the hearing. 5.Both of Mr Ching’s applications were based on the factual premise that Mr David Chen, counsel for the plaintiffs, and I had been members of the same set of barristers’ chambers. While acknowledging that every barrister in Hong Kong is self-employed, and that he could not point to any fact showing apparent bias on my part at that stage, Mr Ching, in his first application, requested that I make a “declaration of interest”, presumably wishing to see if any such fact existed. 6.Despite time having been given to him to conduct research, Mr Ching was unable to cite any authority in support of his application for a “declaration of interest”. He however handed up a written statement, signed in the name of his firm and entitled “Questions of Concern”, asking “whether or not it would be appropriate for the learned Master to invite on [his] own motion, another Master to hear this matter.” 7.After further exchanges with the bench, Mr Ching then shifted his emphasis to a second oral application that I recuse myself from hearing this matter on the basis of apparent bias. In particular, Mr Ching relied on the following facts or matters as grounds in support: -
8.On the other hand, in opposing Mr Ching’s application, Mr Chen reminded the court of the relevant principles as cited in a recent decision of DHCJ Paul Lam SC in Lai Yiu Mun Susanna v Tsang Kai Choy Paul [2019] 2 HKLRD 359 at §§15 and 19: -
9.On the strength of those principles, Mr Chen submitted that the mere sharing of chambers between counsel and a deputy judicial officer, and the proximity of their respective years of call to the Bar, do not support a case of apparent bias. 10.Without disputing the law, Mr Ching submitted that every case is fact sensitive and the authorities do not say that there should never be a recusal on the present circumstances. He emphasized that an observer must be well-informed and that was why he made his first application seeking a “declaration of interest” from me. 11.I was not persuaded that I ought to recuse myself from hearing this matter. 12.I did not accept that the sharing of chambers between counsel and the presiding deputy judicial officer in itself would give rise to apparent bias, in the type of system the Bar operates in Hong Kong today. Indeed Mr Ching did not appear to quarrel with this. If an authority is required, see Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd & Burnton [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45 (Rix J) in the related context of arbitration. 13.Nor did I think that the position would be affected by the mere proximity of the respective years of call to the Bar of counsel and the deputy judicial officer. Mr Ching indeed did not particularize any specific “professional collaboration and professional or personal relationship” capable of casting doubt on that conclusion either. 14.As I made clear to the parties at the hearing, there was no factual matters which would stand in the way of my hearing of the case, despite the grounds advanced by Mr Ching. I further reminded him of the fact that I had sworn a judicial oath prior to taking up this position. This, I consider, is what a fair-minded observer is to be taken to understand: see Lai Yiu Man (supra) at §19, citing Falcon Private Bank Ltd v Borry Bernard Edouard Charles Ltd (2014) 17 HKCFAR 281, 292 at §30. 15.Absent anything specific between Mr Chen and I that would lead a reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that I would be biased in the hearing of this matter, it was plain that Mr Ching had failed to make out any valid case of apparent bias on the basis of the matters put forth by him. 16.It was for the above reasons that I refused Mr Ching’s recusal application and proceeded to hear the matter substantively. C. ACCOUNTS AND INQUIRIES 17.The background to these proceedings is sufficiently set out in the Decision of Chung J herein dated 24 December 2018 [2018] HKCFI 2810 at §§4-16 and the Decision of Au-Yeung J herein dated 28 May 2020 [2020] HKCFI 981 at §§2-4, which I gratefully adopt without repeating. 18.As stated in the May 2019 Order, the subject matter of this inquiry are the expenses allegedly incurred by the defendant as set out in the Scott Schedule at Exhibit “CFT-17” to the 3rd Affirmation of Chan Fuk Tai dated 25 April 2019. 19.In the Plaintiffs’ Skeleton Argument, Mr Chen attached a coloured schedule showing all the subject items in 9 categories together with their respective amounts, whether they are disputed by the plaintiffs, and if so, their reason for disputing. These categories are: -
20.By agreement of the parties, the hearing proceeded in the order of these categories. For ease of reference, a copy of the said coloured schedule is now attached to this Decision as Annex 1. Applicable principles 21.It is common ground that the accounts and inquiries provided for in the May 2019 Order are for general accounts and not for accounts on the footing of wilful default. As explained in Snell’s Equity (34th ed) at §§20-014, 20-017 to 20-018 and 20-020: -
22.On the question whether it is the defendant who bears the burden to show the propriety of expenses or it is the plaintiffs who bear the burden to show their impropriety, both sides have helpfully referred to various authorities. Without setting them all out in full, the ones relevant for present purposes would appear to be the following: -
23.As these authorities demonstrate, there can be no doubt that, while a personal representative is entitled to an indemnity out of the estate to the costs, charges and expenses incurred by him in the course of administration, such costs, charges and expenses must be properly incurred when acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the estate. 24.Since the personal representative is the accounting party, and is normally in the best position to explain why such costs, charges and expenses were incurred by him, it is also clear that he would bear the ultimate legal burden to show that such costs, charges and expenses were properly incurred such that he could benefit from his right of indemnity. 25.Apart from the passage from Snell’s Equity quoted under §21 above on “burden of proof”, the said proposition is further supported by a couple of recent authorities: -
26.Accordingly I shall apply these principles in considering to what extent the disputed categories 2 to 9 items should be included or excluded in the administration accounts in Exhibit “CFT-17”. Preliminary observation 27.Before going through each of the categories, I note from Exhibit “CFT-17” that the alleged expenses date back to 2005, well before the defendant was granted letters of administration pending suit in February 2012 and the actual letters of administration in October 2014[4]. 28.Despite this, neither the plaintiffs nor Mr Chen have disputed the pre-February 2012 expenses on the premise that any or all of them were not incurred by the defendant qua administrator of the Estate by reason of the timing of the alleged incurrence. 29.In these circumstances, I shall disregard the timing dimension in my assessment below and shall focus on whether the expenses were properly incurred or not in the course of administration. Category 1: “Agreed” items 30.The first category comprises agreed items in the total sum of HK$175,619. 31.Since these items are not in dispute, no determination from the court is necessary and they should be included in the administration accounts by consent. Category 2: “拜山” 32.The second category comprises expenses said to have been incurred by the defendant from paying respects to the grave of the late Chan To (“the deceased”) during various Chinese festivals in the period 2005-2016. These come to a total sum of HK$118,317. 33.It is the defendant’s evidence that it was a moral duty for the beneficiaries of the Estate to pay respect to the deceased, and was the least that the beneficiaries could do to thank the deceased for leaving them the Estate. Mr Ching submitted that such expenses were not improper, and were incurred in good faith by the defendant. 34.The plaintiffs dispute these items on the ground that, honourable such deeds might be, there was no legal duty for an administrator of an estate to pay respect or visit the grave of the deceased. Mr Chen therefore submitted that the alleged expenses were not properly incurred in the course of administration of the Estate. 35.On authorities (see §§22.2 and 25.1 above), an administrator’s indemnity for expenses extends only to those properly incurred for the benefit of or in the execution of the estate. This is so whether they were “properly” or “not improperly” incurred. It is also clear that mere bona fides of the administrator is not the test. 36.Absent any specific evidence or authorities showing how these expenses can be said to have been incurred for the benefit of or in the execution of the Estate, I am not satisfied that the defendant has discharged his burden to prove that these items were proper. Mr Ching’s submission that they are proper administration expenses as the defendant genuinely believed them to be so is simply irrelevant. All category 2 items should therefore be excluded from the administration accounts. Category 3: “惠安苑有客睇樓車資” 37.The third category is said to have been incurred as travel expenses by the defendant in the period 2014-2016 in connection with the sale of two residential properties in Westlands Gardens and Chung Hing Mansion in Quarry Bay (respectively “Westlands Gardens property” and “Chung Hing Mansion property”), both of which form part of the Estate. These travel expenses come to a total sum of HK$104,006. 38.No supporting documents have been produced by the defendant to prove the incurrence of these items. But according to the Scott Schedule at Exhibit “CFT-17”, each item under this category is in the sum of just over HK$500. At the hearing, Mr Ching submitted that such sum represented a round trip taxi fare between Tai Po (where the defendant lived) and Quarry Bay (where the properties were located). 39.Exhibit “CFT-17” suggests that, in the said period, the defendant travelled to the properties for a total of 196 times to attend viewings of the properties by prospective purchasers. For ease of reference, I have set out the dates on which such trips were taken in respect of the two properties in a table attached as Annex 2 to this Decision. 40.Apart from highlighting that there is no documentary evidence showing the incurrence of such expenses, the plaintiffs dispute these items on the primary ground that it was unnecessary for the defendant to attend viewings on so many occasions personally, when he had retained estate agents to take care of the sales[5]. This point was raised by the 1st plaintiff in his 2nd Affirmation filed on 26 April 2018[6]. 41.The plaintiffs alternatively contend that it was unreasonable for the defendant to take a taxi to attend to these property viewings when he could have taken other forms of transport such as the bus or MTR. Mr Chen further highlighted the fact that the defendant has not actually claimed lost wages in this regard. He submitted that, in any event, the defendant should only be entitled to claim HK$100 per round trip. 42.On other hand, Mr Ching argued that: -
43.As I pointed out above, the plaintiffs raised their primary ground of objection on as early as 26 April 2018. Despite that, what the defendant then said on affirmation was that: -
44.There is no dispute that both properties were vacant when they were put on sale. It is unclear on the evidence what was so peculiar about the sale of these two vacant properties that required the defendant’s personal attendance at a total of 196 viewings, when professional estate agents had been engaged. Even after the plaintiffs explicitly raised this on affirmation, the defendant has given no specific explanation on this. 45.While the defendant’s decision to travel by taxi instead of bus or MTR is not by itself an issue, the sheer number of these trips, together with the lack of receipts and explanations from the defendant as to the necessity thereof, raise a serious doubt over whether the taxi fares were actually incurred for the stated purpose, and even if so, whether they were properly and reasonably incurred in the course of administration. 46.The state of the evidence is not such that I can be satisfied that these pertinent questions with respect to the taxi fares allegedly incurred should be answered in the defendant’s favour. Accordingly, save for a one-off sum of HK$500 which the plaintiffs were prepared to accept, all category 3 items should be excluded from the administration accounts. Category 4: “惠安苑維修費” 47.Category 4 comprises renovation expenses said to have been incurred by the defendant from 2011-2014 for the Westlands Gardens property and the Chung Hing Mansion property in the respective sums of HK$224,000 and HK$643,300 (i.e. HK$867,300 in total). 48.As supporting evidence, the defendant produced 6 invoices issued by Tin Hung Engineering Co (“Tin Hung”) dated 28 December 2011 to 14 May 2014. Those invoices set out the description and amount of various items of renovation works in respect of the two properties. They do not however indicate whether the amounts had been paid, in full or in part, nor do they indicate who had paid for the amounts. 49.In his Affirmation filed on 14 November 2018[8], the defendant explained that, in respect of the Chung Hing Mansion property, it was necessary to renovate the property after a fire incident that occurred in November 2012. However, the defendant has given no explanation on why it was necessary for the Westlands Gardens property to be renovated when the property was not rented out after the previous occupant, a Mr Kwong Kwok Leung, returned the keys to the property to the defendant back in around November 2011. 50.Apart from the defendant’s own Affirmations, he also filed an Affirmation of a Mr Wong Kin Man (“Mr Wong”) on 11 November 2019 (“Wong’s Affirmation”). Wong’s Affirmation was filed without leave of the court, in breach of an unless order of Master Lai dated 27 February 2019. On behalf of the defendant, Mr Ching sought leave at the hearing to file Wong’s Affirmation, which I granted after hearing submissions. 51.Mr Wong was a contractor of Tin Hung. In Wong’s Affirmation, he explained how he was engaged to conduct the relevant renovation works at the Westlands Gardens property and the Chung Hing Mansion property. Mr Wong confirmed that the renovation works were performed, and verified the amounts stated in the invoices produced by the defendant in respect thereof. Importantly, Mr Wong confirmed that the defendant paid those amounts to Tin Hung in cash by instalments. 52.For the plaintiffs, Mr Chen levelled his attack on this category purely on the basis of incredibility of Mr Wong’s evidence. In particular, he submitted that it was incredible that the entire amount of HK$867,300 would have been paid in cash, and that there was no other evidence showing that the defendant actually paid for such sum, despite the plaintiffs’ repeated prior requests for documents. He however made no suggestion that, if these renovation expenses were in fact paid, they were nevertheless improperly or unreasonably incurred in any way. 53.I am satisfied that, based on Wong’s Affirmation, the defendant did incur the renovation expenses under this category and that, in the absence of any explicit challenge, they were properly incurred. 54.While it may not be usual for one to pay for renovation expenses of such amounts in cash, it is not in my view so inherently incredible that I should reject Mr Wong’s affidavit evidence altogether, particularly given that the payments were made by way of instalments. As Mr Ching submitted, the plaintiffs had prior notice of Wong’s Affirmation (albeit served without leave) but never requested to cross-examine Mr Wong at the hearing. As it is usually impossible for the court to resolve disputes over credibility on affidavits, I am prepared to accept that the defendant has discharged his burden on the present evidence. Category 4 should thus be included in the administration accounts in full. 55.I should note, however, that had it not been for the evidence presented in Wong’s Affirmation, I would not have allowed this category. As observed above, the defendant’s own affirmation evidence in this regard is extremely scant. The copy invoices issued by Tin Hung simply do not show that the defendant has actually paid for the stated amounts, whether at all or in full. Although this is no longer relevant in terms of the inclusion or exclusion of these expenses in the accounts, this remains relevant to the question of costs which I shall turn to in Section D below. Category 5: “損失一天工資” 56.The next category comprises alleged losses in the defendant’s daily wage in the total sum of HK$132,000. I have set out the relevant entries in Exhibit “CFT-17” in a table attached as Annex 3 hereto. 57.What these entries suggest is that the defendant had allegedly lost his daily wage on various dates because, broadly speaking, he took time off work to attend to civil and criminal proceedings in connection with the Estate[9] and the maintenance of the Chung Hing Mansion property, as well as to attend to the sale of properties forming part of the Estate. 58.In terms of quantum, the defendant has produced a letter dated 21 March 2017 issued by World-Link Roadway System Co Ltd showing his employment as a Truck Service Contractor from January 2009 to May 2012 and a Platform Controller from June 2012 to August 2015. According to the letter, the defendant’s monthly wage in the former position ranged from HK$42,880.90 to HK$105,609.99 (mostly at around HK$50,000 to HK$70,000), while his monthly wage in the latter position ranged from HK$0 to HK$37,500 (mostly at around HK$15,000). The defendant has also produced a notice issued by World-Link Roadway System Co Ltd dated 31 August 2015 terminating his employment with immediate effect, citing the defendant’s frequent absence from work and refusal to attend work as the apparent reason for his termination. 59.On behalf of the defendant, Mr Ching accepted that the evidence on quantum was weak. He nevertheless submitted that, inevitably, the defendant had to take care of the relevant matters for the Estate, and it was within the court’s powers to compensate the defendant for having done such work for the benefit of the Estate. 60.I am unable to accept Mr Ching’s submissions. 61.To begin with, it is crucial to note that all category 5 items were described by the defendant as losses in his daily wage, and a uniform amount of HK$3,000/day was applied across the board in all relevant entries. Apart from the lack of evidence showing why a uniform rate should apply when the defendant was earning different monthly wages each month (and, from June 2012 onwards, only around HK$15,000/month in most of the months), there is no evidence showing that the defendant’s wage was actually deducted by his employer, or that he had taken any (paid or unpaid) leave of absence, which would result in the losses as alleged. 62.While the notice of termination issued by the defendant’s employer prima facie suggests that he was frequently absent from work, it says nothing about whether the defendant was absent from work on the specific dates as alleged, and even if so, whether and how much the defendant’s daily wage was deducted on those dates. 63.Furthermore, as Mr Chen submitted, it is wholly unclear why the defendant would have allegedly lost the entire daily wage for doing certain tasks which, on the face of them, would not require a whole day to do. Examples of this nature would include signing an affirmation, signing a statement of truth, listening to explanation of a letter given by a solicitor, signing a provisional sale and purchase agreement. 64.As to days on which the defendant claimed to have lost 7 days of wages from attending and testifying in the criminal trial in DCCC 739/2010 in November and December 2010, it is not apparent from the records in the letter dated 21 March 2017 whether any wage was deducted on those days, or whether he could have earned more if he had not attended the trial. No explanation has been given by the defendant on this. 65.Finally, despite Mr Ching’s submission that the defendant should be compensated for having done work for the Estate, items in this category are not in the nature of the defendant’s claim for remuneration. Instead, they are described as losses in his daily wages. With no evidence showing that he had incurred such losses, the defendant’s claim that these purported losses should be included in the accounts as expenses must fail. 66.All category 5 items should therefore be excluded from the administration accounts. Category 6: “Miscellaneous 車資” 67.Category 6 is said to be miscellaneous travel expenses, which in the total sum of HK$32,147[10]. I have set out the relevant entries in Exhibit “CFT-17” in a table attached as Annex 4 hereto. 68.While the defendant has produced no documentary evidence in support of these expenses, Mr Ching relied on the descriptions given by the defendant in Exhibit “CFT-17” for explanations why the defendant had to undertake those trips. Based on the descriptions, he submitted that these were inevitable expenses incurred by an administrator. 69.Mr Chen, on the other hand, submitted that there was no evidence of actual incurrence of these expenses such as receipts. He further submitted that it was unreasonable for the defendant to travel by taxi instead of by cheaper means of transport such as the MTR. 70.Based on those descriptions (which the defendant has verified) and absent any specific dispute by the plaintiffs, I am satisfied that these expenses were incurred for the benefit of the Estate, including for attending to legal proceedings in connection with the Estate. 71.Given their nature as travel expenses, the frequency they were said to have been incurred, and their relatively small amounts, I do not think that the lack of receipts is fatal in the present case. I am also not persuaded that the defendant should be criticized for taking a taxi, which is a direct and convenient but not an unreasonably expensive form of transport, when carrying out duties as the administrator of the Estate. 72.I am therefore satisfied that all category 6 items were properly incurred and should be included in the administration accounts. Category 7: “Unable to verify”; Category 8: “No evidence supplied” 73.Categories 7 and 8, in the respective total sums of HK$15,700[11] and HK$15,400, comprise miscellaneous expenses said to have been incurred in the administration of the Estate but for which the defendant has produced no documentary evidence. I have set out the relevant entries in Exhibit “CFT-17” in a table attached as Annex 5 hereto. 74.The plaintiffs’ objection is directed at the lack of evidence to demonstrate that, as a matter of fact, these expenses were incurred. Mr Ching, on the other hand, submitted that despite the lack of documentary evidence, the nature of these items is such that the court could readily form the view that they were properly incurred. 75.Taking these items in turn: -
76.For these reasons, all these items in categories 7 and 8 should be included in the administration accounts. Category 9: “Miscellaneous” 77.The final category comprises 4 items in the total sum of HK$6,020. I have set out the relevant entries in Exhibit “CFT-17” in a table attached as Annex 6 hereto. 78.On Item 24 (HK$820), Mr Chen submitted that it was unnecessary for the defendant to pay respect to the deceased for the third day in a row, when the defendant had already done so on the two preceding days. Mr Ching, on the other hand, referred to the fact that, as the deceased died in his own home, a cleaning company was engaged to clean the flat for 3 consecutive days and it was necessary to pay respect to the deceased on site before each day of cleaning. In view of this explanation, I am satisfied that this item was properly incurred. 79.Item 93 (HK$3,150) was said to be travel expenses incurred by the defendant to attend the criminal trial in DCCC 739/2010. Mr Chen submitted that attendance at the trial was not shown to be necessary and relevant to the administration of the Estate. For the reasons given in §75.3 above (Item 64), and given the reasonable amount, I however agree that such travel expenses were properly incurred and should be included. 80.As to Items 133 (HK$700) and 134 (HK$1,350), as Mr Chen pointed out, they would appear to be taxes paid in respect of the estate of Mr Chan So, but not in respect of the subject Estate. Mr Ching had not made any contrary submission in this regard. In the premises, these items were not incurred for the benefit of the Estate and should be excluded. 81.Accordingly, Items 133 and 134 in category 9 should be excluded in the accounts, and Items 24 and 94 should be included. Summary 82.In summary, of the expense items in Exhibit “CFT-17”: -
D. COSTS 83.Turning to the question of costs of this inquiry, a good starting point would be to look at the relative success of the parties. 84.The total amount of the expenses under the 9 categories is HK$1,466,509, of which the sum of HK$1,290,890 was in dispute. Of this disputed sum, the plaintiffs have succeeded in excluding the total amount of HK$356,373. 85.But as mentioned in §55 above, I would not have included category 4 (HK$867,300) if not for the evidence in Wong’s Affirmation, which had been filed by the defendant without leave in breach of an unless order and the defendant did not apply for leave to rely on Wong’s Affirmation until halfway through the hearing. It was therefore justified, in my view, for the plaintiffs to contest category 4 up to the hearing, though their eventual failure to successfully exclude these items is also relevant. 86.Taking into account the above matters, together with the fact of the defendant’s unsuccessful recusal application (for which there is no reason why the defendant should not bear the costs for the time incurred thereby), I consider that a fair and reasonable costs order would be that the plaintiffs shall be entitled to 80% of their costs of and incidental to this inquiry, including the hearing on 19 December 2019, with certificate for counsel. This is the costs order which I would make on a nisi basis. E. DISPOSITION 87.Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the May 2019 Order, I order that: -
88.Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the May 2019 Order, I shall also cause this Decision to be submitted to a Judge of the Court of First Instance via the Registrar, High Court. 89.I thank Mr Chen and Mr Ching for their assistance.
Mr David Chen, instructed by T C Foo & Co, for the plaintiffs Mr Ching Ming Yu, of Ching & Co, for the defendant [1] The lodging of submissions, which had originally been directed to be done within January 2020, was unfortunately delayed by reason of the General Adjournment Period. [2] The total amount of HK$34,187 for category 6 items as stated in Mr Chen’s schedule is likely to be mistaken for two reasons. First, item 69, which is stated to be expenses incurred to pay for a meal, is mistakenly classified under “Miscellaneous 車資” in category 6. Secondly, item 121 in the amount of HK$460 is mistakenly stated as HK$400 in the schedule. Based on what is stated in Exhibit “CFT-17”, I have re-classified item 69 under category 7 (which seems to me to be in the same nature as item 64). I have also adopted the amount of HK$460 for item 121. As a result, the adjusted total amount for category 6 should be HK$32,147, and the adjusted total amount for category 7 should be HK$15,700. [3] See footnote 2 above. [4] Mr Chan So (陳蘇), who was the deceased’s brother and the defendant’s father, originally applied for administration of the Estate in November 2006. However Mr Chan So died in May 2010. [5] It is undisputed that agency fees of HK$101,500 and HK$37,000 were respectively paid by the defendant as agency fees for the sale of the Westlands Gardens property and the Chung Hing Mansion property: see hearing bundle at [C/171] and [C/175]. [6] At §14. [7] Defendant’s Affirmation filed on 14 November 2018, at §87. [8] At §86. [9] As described in the defendant’s Affirmation filed on 14 November 2018, at §§8-11, 16-18, 42. [10] See footnote 2 above. [11] See footnote 2 above. [12] At §36. [13] At §§8-11, 14-24. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 3474/2016