Abbas Syed Manzar v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1189/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 September 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 August 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1092 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 1189/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2769 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1189 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 August 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1092 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Pakistan. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 31 July 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 24 February 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). By its Decision dated 4 April 2018, the Board rejected his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 15 February 2019. 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 21 June 2019. 8.He applied by notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 22 August 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 3 February 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for subsequent claim by letter dated 31 March 2021 and was rejected by the Director’s Decision. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his original claim is that if he is refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the terrorists because he belonged to Shia Sect and PML(Q). 12.The Director found that the risks were not real as there was no indication or information that he had been harmed or injured by any terrorist group; that if he returned to Pakistan, state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board further found that he was not a witness of truth and that he had fabricated his claims in relation to his high profile as a Shia poet, scholar and activist fighting for the rights of the Shia minority. The Board also found that there is no real risk that he would face any of the proscribed forms of harm should he return to Pakistan. 14.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.The applicant relies upon the fact that he could not return to Pakistan because the terrorists in Pakistan still pose a serious threat to his life. He had submitted a number of documents to the Director. 16.The immigration officer has considered his materials and disagrees that those are the changed circumstances since his original claim was finally determined. They are the update of his situation in his original claim. This means he is re-litigating his original claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He attached to his affirmation the Director’s Decision and a medical chit saying he was suffering from generalized anxiety and disorder and other documents showing that he is poet. 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he agreed with the Director’s Decision. 20.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the fact. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. According to the Director, the incidents after the determination of the original claim are the update of the facts in the original claim. I agree. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had some more documents for the Court’s consideration. I have explained to the applicant that the Court is to supervise the Director’s assessment of his application. The Court has no power to make investigation into the facts of his case. See In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 28th day of September 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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