Ta Quang Vinh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1384/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 February 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 August 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 976 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 1384/2022 [2023] HKCFI 376 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1384 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 August 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 976 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 4 January 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. He sneaked into Hong Kong illegally from Mainland China on 21 May 2014. He surrendered to the Immigration Department on 26 May 2014. He was charged and convicted of the offence and sentenced to 2 months’ imprisonment. He lodged non-refoulement claim by written signification of 26 May 2014 on the applicable grounds of the BOR 2 risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the torture risk[4]. 5.By notice of decision dated 25 July 2016 and notice of further decision dated 26 May 2017 (“the Director’s Decisions”), the Director refused his claim on all applicable risks. 6.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s Decision dated 28 February 2018, dismissed his appeal on all applicable grounds of his claim. 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was late and his application for extension of time was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 22 October 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 May 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 27 September 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 13 May 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 2 June 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The applicant’s previous claim was based on the fears that, if he returned to Vietnam, he would be harmed by his ex-employer named Phuong because he failed to compensate for her financial loss resulted from the destruction of her pawn shop by fire. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 15.The applicant lodged an appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decisions. The Board found that there is no merit in the applicant’s claim as the applicant and his family members had never been inflicted with any injury and there was no evidence to show that his former employer had any intention to cause any harm to him. The Board further considered that state protection and internal relocation are reasonable and available to him upon his return to Vietnam. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer his statement together with some documents. The immigration officer found that his current problem, which is the financial dispute with Phuong, is the same as raised in his previous claim that has already been considered and rejected by the Board. 18.The Director therefore found that the applicant relied upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, would not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in which he said:
DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he understood the Director’s reasons for rejecting his application. He said he has a baby of 5 months’ old and he will return to Vietnam when his baby is a bit older. 22.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
23.There is no valid reason from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. Therefore, there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 15th day of February 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
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Cases cited in this judgment