Mohammed Taj v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1435/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2433 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 1435/2022 [2023] HKCFI 536 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1435 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2433 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 11 January 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is an Indian national. He came to Hong Kong on 2 August 2014 and was allowed to stay as a visitor until 16 August 2014. He overstayed. He was arrested by police on 2 September 2014 and was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation. On 4 September 2014, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the grounds of the Torture risk[1], the BOR 2 risk[2], the BOR 3 risk[3] and the Persecution risk[4]. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 18 September 2017, the Director refused his claim on the above risks. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s Decision dated 18 October 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissed his appeal. 7.His application to the Court of the First Instance for leave to have judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 28 July 2020 (the “Court’s Order”. 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 21 May 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 24 September 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 26 May 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 13 July 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.In the applicant’s previous claim, the applicant claimed that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by Bhutta, who would take revenge for being attacked and injured by the applicant and other supporters of All India Trinamool Congress. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 15.The applicant lodged an appeal to the Board. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence. For the reasons that it set out in the Board’s Decision, it concluded that the applicant would not face any real or substantial risk of serious harm if he returned to India. This conclusion was reached on the basis that the Board accepted his account of what happened. However, it found that the dispute was essentially a personal one deriving from two men’s longstanding personal antipathy dating from childhood. The Board considered that the risk of him actually being harmed by Bhuttu or his associates was to be negligible. State protection was available to him and internal relocation was an option open to him. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer his statement, in which he said his problems with his enemies remained. He asked for free legal service. He was referred to the duty lawyer scheme, which refused his application. He was advised to seek private legal service. He asked for time to obtain documents in support of his application. He was given 3 months to obtain the documents. He did not produce any further document. He was also unable to tell what documents he intended to produce. His application was therefore considered. 18.The Director therefore found that the applicant relied upon the facts, which, when considered together with his previous claim, would not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director therefore dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in which he said he does not want to go back to his country because it is dangerous there. He asked the Court to allow him to stay in Hong Kong. DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he understands the Director’s reasons for rejecting his subsequent claim. He asked for more time to stay in Hong Kong. 22.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
23.The reasons stated in his affirmation and before the Court are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision. There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he just wants more time to stay in Hong Kong because his problems in his country are still there. 28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 3rd day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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Cases cited in this judgment