Doan Van Thuan v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2052/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 April 2026.

1. By way of summons filed on 3 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 11 November 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 30 October 2024.

Cited by 1 case · Cites 5 cases

Case No.HCAL 2052/2024[2026] HKCFI 2155
Court
High Court CFI
Date22 Apr 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 2052/2024

[2026] HKCFI 2155

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2052 OF 2024

____________

BETWEEN

  Doan Van Thuan Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative
    Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 April 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision: 22 April 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of summons filed on 3 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 11 November 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 30 October 2024.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 11 November 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 25 November 2025. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In the Summons, the applicant did not give any reason as to why he was late in lodging the appeal. There was also no ground given for his intended appeal in the Summons.

8.In his supporting affirmation dated 3 February 2026, the applicant merely mentioned that he thought he could solve his problems in Vietnam and hence he withdrew the application for judicial review. However, his plans were not going as expected and he could not resolve his problem. Hence, he still faced the risk of being tortured or killed if he returned to Vietnam, and he could not go back to Vietnam.

9.It is clear that the applicant did not provide any reason for his lateness in lodging the intended appeal, nor any valid ground of appeal in his supporting affirmation either. His withdrawal application was in fact refused by me and I had considered the merits of his application for leave to apply for judicial review in my decision on 11 November 2025. Thus, what the applicant mentioned in his supporting affirmation have no relevancy at all.

10.The applicant was absent at the hearing of the Summons on 10 April 2026. Hence, he did not provide any further information in support of his application for leave to appeal out of time.

11.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.

  (Michael WONG)
Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant being absent

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