Toure Mariam v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1932/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 June 2026.
1. By way of summons filed on 3 March 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 16 February 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 19 August 2020.
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HCAL 1932/2020 [2026] HKCFI 3317 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1932 OF 2020 ____________ BETWEEN
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______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ Background 1.By way of summons filed on 3 March 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 16 February 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 19 August 2020. 2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”. 3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226). 4.As my order was made on 16 February 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 2 March 2026. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time. The applicable law 5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844). 6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702). Discussion 7.In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 3 March 2026, the applicant did not give any reason for her delay in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. The applicant only mentioned in the Summons that my decision was not reasonable, but she did not give any particulars as to why my decision was not reasonable. 8.At the hearing of the Summons on 28 May 2026, the applicant explained her delay in lodging the appeal by saying that she could not read my decision and she asked someone to read and explain it to her. However, that person asked her to give $10,000 to him but she did not have the money. When she had the money later, she was already one day late for lodging the appeal. 9.Since the applicant was only one day late in lodging the appeal, I am not going to take issue on this short delay. However, the applicant did not provide any valid ground for the intended appeal. When I asked the applicant for her grounds of appeal at the hearing, she simply replied that she wanted to stay in Hong Kong and she did not know what was wrong with my decision. 10.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). 11.The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review. 12.In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal. Conclusion 13.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.
The applicant appeared in person |
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