Warnakulasuriya Mariya Indika and Another v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 948/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 July 2026.

1. By way of two summonses filed on 27 April 2026 and 26 May 2026 respectively (“the Summonses”), the 1 st applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 1 April 2026, which dismissed the 1 st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 7 May 2020.

Cites 5 cases

Case No.HCAL 948/2020[2026] HKCFI 4007
Court
High Court CFI
Date15 Jul 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 948/2020

[2026] HKCFI 4007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 948 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

  Warnakulasuriya Mariya Indika 1st Applicant
  Warnakulasooriya Bless Greyna (a minor) by
Warnakulasuriya Mariya Indika, her next friend
2nd Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative
    Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 2 July 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision: 15 July 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.By way of two summonses filed on 27 April 2026 and 26 May 2026 respectively (“the Summonses”), the 1st applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 1 April 2026, which dismissed the 1st applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 7 May 2020.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 1 April 2026, the last day for the 1st applicant to lodge an appeal was on 15 April 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the 1st applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.The 1st applicant did not file any affirmation in support of her application for extension of time to appeal. Instead, the 1st applicant filed two summonses as aforesaid. In the summons dated 26 May 2026, the 1st applicant explained her delay by saying that her address was wrong in the High Court. At the hearing of the Summonses on 2 July 2026, the 1st applicant explained further by saying that her landlord gave her the court’s letter late because the landlord went to China and could only give her the letter after returning to Hong Kong. Thereafter, she was informed by Justice Centre that it was late for her to appeal. As the 1st applicant’s explanation seems to be reasonable, I am not going to take issue on her delay.

8.However, the 1st applicant did not give any ground of appeal in the Summonses. At the hearing of the Summonses, when I asked the 1st applicant for her grounds of appeal, she simply said that she appealed to ask for protection for some time until the situation in Sri Lanka was fit for her to go home. This is not a ground of appeal at all.

9.For this application to be successful, the 1st applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

10.The 1st applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

11.As there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the 1st applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

12.For reasons aforesaid, the Summonses are dismissed.

  (Michael WONG)
Deputy High Court Judge

The 1st applicant appearing in person

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 948/2020