Ali Abu Bakar v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1592/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5965

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1592 OF 2024

____________

BETWEEN

____________

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Background

1.By way of summons filed on 24 September 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 19 August 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 26 August 2024.

2.Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.As my order was made on 19 August 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 2 September 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.In his supporting affirmation dated 24 September 2026, the applicant explained his delay in lodging the appeal by saying that he was detained in a detention centre by the Immigration Department and the welfare department did not give him the appeal form in time because he was told that he did not have enough money and documents. Hence, he was arranging money and documents from outside. However, he was then sent to another detention centre and could not appeal on time.

8.However, at the hearing of the Summons on 15 October 2026, the applicant simply blamed the officer at the detention centre for giving him the appeal form 2 to 3 weeks late. He did not mention that he needed to arrange money and documents from outside.

9.The applicant’s explanation in his supporting affirmation is inconsistent with the explanation given at the hearing. If he needed to arrange money and documents from outside, it was not the welfare department causing the delay, and he could not blame the welfare department. In any event, I do not see any reason why the welfare department would have delayed in giving him the appeal form. Thus, I do not find the applicant’s explanations satisfactory.

10.Moreover, the applicant did not give any valid ground for his intended appeal in the Summons or his supporting affirmation (including the 14 pages of grounds attached to his supporting affirmation), nor at the oral hearing of the Summons. The applicant only made general allegations against my decision without giving any particulars. He alleged that I did not consider his risks, investigate about his country, consider and search about state protection, consider and check about “Origin” of his country, and my decision was unfair, irrational, unreasonable and wrong, and that I should have considered the Wednesbury test. None of these general allegations could raise a viable ground of appeal against my decision when they could not identify any error on my part.

11.The applicant also alleged that he did not know about the hearing before me and was not prepared for it. However, I have already dealt with this matter in my decision (see paragraphs 14 and 17 of Form CALL-1). There is absolutely no merit in this allegation.

12.Moreover, it is wrong for the applicant to allege that I acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by showing too much trust and reliance on country of origin information which was collected from Wikipedia and television media, as I did not do that at all. As pointed out in paragraph 20 of my decision in Form CALL-1, it was not for me to re-assess the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Hence, it was not for me to show trust and reliance on country of origin information at all.

13.For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). The applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above.

14.As there is no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.

The applicant appearing in person