HKSAR v. Lau Tai So
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 366/2006 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 June 2006.
1. The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of managing a vice establishment, contrary to section 139(1)(b) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, Laws of Hong Kong, and a charge of displaying a sign advertising prostitution, contrary to section 147A(1) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, Laws of Hong Kong. He was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment on the first charge and to 2 months’ imprisonment on the second charge, with the sentences to run concurrently.
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[English Translation – 英譯本] HCMA 366/2006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 366 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM KCCC 1669 OF 2006) _________________ BETWEEN
_________________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Poon in Court Date of Hearing: 9 June 2006 Date of Judgment: 9 June 2006
________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ 1.The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of managing a vice establishment, contrary to section 139(1)(b) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, Laws of Hong Kong, and a charge of displaying a sign advertising prostitution, contrary to section 147A(1) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, Laws of Hong Kong. He was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment on the first charge and to 2 months’ imprisonment on the second charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. 2.Today, counsel for the appellant clarified that the appeal against sentence is only in relation to the first charge. 3.The facts of the case revealed that two plain-clothed police constables, posing as customers, arrived at the premises in question separately. The appellant arranged for prostitutes to provide sexual services to each of them. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested. At the entrance to the building where the premises were situated, the police seized a plastic placard bearing words that advertised prostitutes’ service inside the building. The police also seized from the premises various items relating to the operation of vice business, such as toilet paper and a large quantity of condoms. Ground of appeal 4.Counsel for the appellant submitted that the starting point adopted by the magistrate on the first charge was excessive. Counsel conceded that, given the criminal record of the appellant, the magistrate could have imposed a higher sentence. However, Counsel submitted that there were no aggravating features in the present case that justified an increase in sentence, and that the size of the vice operation in question was comparatively small. As regards the appellant’s last conviction on a similar offence, it is not disputed that the magistrate in that case had adopted 9 months as the starting point. Counsel contended that the upward adjustment of the starting point in the present case to 15 months was manifestly excessive. The respondent’s reply 5.Counsel for the respondent cited a number of decided cases. She pointed out that section 139 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200 was amended on 22 May 1998 by increasing the maximum penalty on summary conviction from 2 years to 3 years and repealing the fine. She relied on Secretary for Justice v. Lee Cho Keung, which statedthat a sentencing court should note that the cases of R v. Kwan Wah Sang, HCMA 1324/1988 and HKSAR v. Ng Tsz Fung, HCMA 800/1998 were decided prior to the aforesaid legislative amendment, and that cases subsequent to the amendment, such as HKSAR v. Lee Tang Yau, HCMA 602/2001, were still guided by Ng Tsz Fung,as could be seen from their judgments. 6.The respondent submitted that the sentences passed in other more recent cases showed that the starting point ranging from 3 to 6 months as laid down in Kwan Wah Sang had been enhanced.Generally speaking, for a first offender, the starting point was 12 months even if the vice establishment involved was of a small scale; for a repeat offender, the starting point could be further increased pursuant to the sentencing principle in HKSAR v. Chan Pui Shi [1999] 2 HKLRD 830. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent pointed out that the court had already adopted 9 months as the starting point in respect of the previous similar conviction of the appellant. As he had now committed a similar offence, he was to be regarded as a repeat offender, and the enhancement of the starting point to 15 months was not manifestly excessive. Judgment 7.In his Reasons for Sentence, the magistrate said:
8.The following sets out, in chronological order based on the date of judgment, a summary of the cases on sentencing in relation to the first charge:
9.Having analyzed the relevant decided cases, Deputy Judge To had this to say:
10.Further, Deputy Judge Barnes pointed out in Cheung Chiu Choi (張招財) that the court could increase the sentence by reason of the growing prevalence and increased incidence of a particular crime in a particular area so as to bring home the deterrent effect. In sentencing, a magistrate could duly consider whether a particular type of cases was prevalent or common within his/her jurisdiction. 11.Stuart-Moore VP made it clear in HKSAR v. Chan Pui Chi [1999] 2 HKLRD 380 that the court had a duty to enhance the starting point in respect of a persistent offender in order to deter because, when previous sentences apparently failed to have any effect on that offender and upon taking into proper account the public interest, it was necessary to impose a deterrent sentence so as to deter the offender from committing the offence again. 12.Having considered the two sentencing principles mentioned above, I am satisfied that, in the circumstances of the present case, it is not improper to adopt a starting point of 12 months in respect of a first offender. An enhanced starting point of 15 months on account of the appellant being a repeat offender cannot be said to be excessive, let alone manifestly excessive. 13.The appeal is dismissed and the sentence affirmed.
Ms Mickey Fung, Government Counsel, for the HKSAR Mr. Ching Wan Fung, instructed by Tsang, Chan & Woo on assignment by the Legal Aid Department, for the appellant Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and approved by Mr. Edmund Cham, Solicitor. |
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