HKSAR v. Lam Chi Hong Patrick
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 496/2011 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 November 2011.
1. The appellant was convicted by the magistrate on his own plea of one count of criminal intimidation, contrary to section 24(a)(ii) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), and was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed against sentence.
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[English Translation - 英譯本] IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Appellate Jurisdiction) MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2011 (ON APPEAL FROM STCC 2952 OF 2011) __________________
__________________ Before: Hon Barnes J in Court Date of Hearing: 16 November 2011 Date of Judgment: 16 November 2011 Date of Reasons for Judgment: 21 November 2011 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1.The appellant was convicted by the magistrate on his own plea of one count of criminal intimidation, contrary to section 24(a)(ii) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), and was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed against sentence. 2.At the conclusion of the hearing, I allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment and substituted therefor a sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment. I now provide the reasons for my judgment. Admitted facts 3.The magistrate set out the following facts which had been admitted by the appellant:
Ground of appeal 4.The ground of appeal advanced by Mr. Lawrence Lok, SC and Mr. Caesar Lo for the appellant was that the starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment adopted by the magistrate was manifestly excessive. “Dashed hope” 5.The main argument put forward on behalf of the appellant was that he was a victim of “dashed hope”, which provided a basis on which the court could reduce the sentence (see HKSAR v Lui Kin Hong, Jerry, CACC 378/1998). 6.It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that he had no conviction record prior to the present offence, and that, after arrest, he admitted the offence and also fully cooperated with the police. The police took statements from the appellant on 28 February 2011 (i.e. the day after his arrest) and 14 May 2011 respectively for the purpose of applying to the court for a Bind Over Order. The appellant agreed to accept a Bind Over Order and maintained his admission of guilt and remorseful attitude. 7.In the end, even though the police took a statement from Miss X on 22 June 2011 and obtained her consent for the police to conclude the matter by way of a Bind Over Order, the appellant was formally charged on 26 June 2011. When the case was first brought to court on 30 June 2011, the appellant pleaded guilty at first opportunity and agreed to the facts, which fully reflected his remorse. 8.As to why the defence did not bring to the magistrate’s attention the proposal of the Bind Over Order, I was told by the appellant that the appellant, who had pleaded guilty at his first appearance in court, was then represented by a duty lawyer who was unaware of the relevant information and hence did not mention it to the court. 9.I was indeed surprised by the fact that the police had taken two statements from the appellant. Mr. Francis Lo, Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions, appearing for the respondent, told me that it was the detective police constable responsible for the investigation of the present case who took the statements from the appellant and the victim. Subsequently, the officer in charge of the case considered that, in view of the gravity of the matter, a Bind Over Order was inappropriate. Consequently, the police preferred a charge despite agreement by both the appellant and the victim to have the matter concluded by way of a Bind Over Order. It was asserted on behalf of the respondent that the detective police constable’s approach in the present case was not the “usual practice”. 10.I emphasize here that it would not have been right, on the facts of the present case, to substitute a Bind Over Order for prosecution. I am sure that the magistrate would not have allowed any formal application by the police for a Bind Over Order. I hope that the relevant authority will give proper directions to the police officers concerned in order not to commit the same error of giving hope to an accused which is subsequently dashed. Excessive starting point 11.In addition to the “dashed hope” argument above, the appellant contended by written submission that, on the facts of the present case, the starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment adopted by the magistrate was manifestly excessive. However, Mr. Lok, SC did not place further emphasis on this contention in his oral submission. 12.In sentencing, the magistrate considered the three judicial authorities cited by the prosecution and the defence. He succinctly summarized and reviewed these authorities and then proceeded to sentence the appellant. This is what he said: ‘Sentencing authorities
13.The complaint made on behalf of the appellant against the magistrate’s analysis was that, in adopting the 18-month starting point, the magistrate failed to properly consider the relevant authorities. 14.Referring to the cases of HKSAR v Tang Siu Cheong (transliteration) HCMA1002/2007 and HKSAR v Tang Wai Hung (transliteration) HCMA757/2009, the appellant submitted that the appropriate starting point should be 6 to 9 months. 15.The magistrate had set out the facts of the three authorities he considered, and I shall not repeat them here. I respectfully agree with the magistrate’s views. In Wong Chak-man, the defendant threatened the victim when love had turned into hatred. Without doubt, the Internet was not popular in those days. The view expressed by Bewley J (as he then was), that the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment was appropriate, is beyond reproach. Further, it was on account of the defendant’s mental condition that Bewley J substituted a probation order for a term of as long as three years. 16.Cheung Pui Man is different in nature from the present case. In his judgment, Wright J mainly dealt with the appeal against conviction; on the appeal against sentence, Wright J simply said that he considered the sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment appropriate (see paragraph 19 of the judgment), without explaining why the 18-month sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly excessive. With respect, I do not think that an 18-month custodial sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of that case. 17.As for Chan Ting Yip, the magistrate was well aware that the case, which involved a 13-year-old girl, was more serious than the present case. On the other hand, the magistrate considered the present case more serious in that the appellant threatened the victim to have sex with him whereas in Chan Ting Yip the defendant merely threatened the victim to strip and masturbate. With respect, I see nothing wrong with this view. 18.In respect of the two authorities cited by the appellant, I shall adopt the following summary of the facts set out by the appellant:
19.In Tang Siu Cheong, the defendant only appealed his conviction, and Nguyen J made no criticism on the 6-month custodial sentence. 20.In Tang Wai Hung, Pang J held that the magistrate could not be faulted for imposing a total sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment. 21.In my judgment, that Pang J took the above view does not mean that, on the facts of the present case, the starting point should be 6 to 9 months. 22.What the appellant did was despicable. That the victim was, at first, willing to provide “compensated dating” service to the appellant did not mean that she should not be protected. The reason why the victim stripped herself for the appellant to watch was that she was prepared to do “compensated dating” with the appellant thereafter. She was not aware that the appellant not only captured nude photographs of her, but also saved 36 nude photographs of her on his computer. 23.The appellant’s subsequent act of threatening the victim showed that he did not act in the heat of the moment because he not only went on to send the nude photographs to the victim by email, but also made a “follow-up” phone call to her. It was only after she received the phone call that she discussed the matter with her boyfriend and decided to make a report to the police. 24.On the facts of the present case, the starting point of 18 months may appear to be on the high side but is not manifestly excessive. Furthermore, the magistrate, having given the appellant the one-third discount, reduced the sentence by another two months for the reason that the appellant was a first offender. This particularly lenient approach taken by the magistrate was in fact unjustified (see Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan Fun [2007] 1 HKC 423). The one-third discount for guilty plea is normally the full extent of the discount that can be given. There was nothing in the present case to show that the appellant was of such positive good character that he should be given more than one-third discount. 25.The reduction by the magistrate of the term of imprisonment from 12 months to 10 months suggests, in effect, a starting point of 15 months. In my view, on the facts of the present case, a starting point of 15 months can be considered appropriate (although 18 months is not manifestly excessive). Taking into account the fact that the appellant was a victim of dashed hope, I would exercise my discretion to reduce the sentence by another 2 months. 26.For these reasons, I have allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment and substituted therefor a sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment.
Mr. Francis Lo, Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. Mr. Lawrence Lok, SC, and Mr. Caesar Lo, instructed by Messrs Cheung, Chan & Chung, for the Appellant. Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Mr. Edmund Cham, Solicitor. |
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