香港特別行政區 訴 祥記馮祥建築有限公司

HCMA 600/2011

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

定罪上訴

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2011年第600號

(原沙田裁判法院傳票案件2011年第67至72號)

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判 案 書

1.上訴人被控6 張傳票，可分為3 組，每組涉及兩張傳票及一隻吊船。一張傳票指上訴人身為它工業經營內吊船的擁有人沒有展示吊船徹底檢驗的證明書副本（「(表格二」)，另一張傳票則指上訴人以同一身份沒有展示吊船負荷測試及徹底檢驗的證明書副本（「(表格三」)。

2.上訴人於審訊後被裁定6 張傳票皆罪名成立，每張傳票罰款1,200 元。上訴人不服定罪，提出上訴。

控方案情

3.控方的案情大部分是沒有爭議的。於2010 年7 月8 日，勞工處的安全主任巡視一個上訴人為總承建商的住宅外牆粉飾工程時，發現3 部吊船上沒有展示表格二及表格三。這工程是上訴人分判了給順盈工程有限公司（「順盈」）的，及這3 部吊船是由順盈的工人在吊船上操作的。

4.上訴人及順盈的職員在地盤辦公室內找到表格二及表格三，並解釋因為天雨而沒有將表格張貼在吊船上。

辯方案情

5.上訴人的副經理及順盈的地盤主管被傳召為辯方第一及第二證人。辯方第一證人指出有關的吊船由順盈安排及操作，而把表格二和表格三展示在吊船上是順盈的責任，及上訴人沒有責任確保證書是怎樣及有否在吊船上展示。

6.辯方第二證人指因為天雨，所以他把表格二和表格三從吊船拿起，準備在下一天早上放回吊船上展示。但到翌日早上，他因疏忽而忘了這樣做及被勞工處發覺。他指這3 部吊船是順盈向佳展工程（香港）有限公司（「佳展」）租用及實際業權是佳展所擁有。

上訴理由

7.上訴人的上訴理由如下：

（1）裁判官錯誤地裁定傳票中的罪項乃「絕對法律責任」（absolute liability）罪行而非「嚴格責任」（strict liability）罪行；

（2）縱使上訴人因為身為有關粉飾工程的承建商而符合規例中吊船擁有人的定義，但上訴人沒有控制著這些吊船，所以沒有干犯傳票的罪項；

（3）裁判官錯誤地裁定上訴人實際管理著這些吊船；

（4）裁判官錯誤地沒有經過考慮就拒絕接納辯方證人的證供。

是否絕對責任罪行

8.其實整個案件的最重要爭論事項就是這6 張傳票所涉及的罪行是否絕對責任罪行。有關的條文是香港法例第 59 章《工廠及工業經營 (吊船) 規例》第25 (2) 條 ：

「25.報告的備存及展示

(1) 吊船的擁有人須備存其所接獲的根據本規例進行的任何徹底檢驗或負荷測試及徹底檢驗的證明書或報告，自每份證明書或報告的接獲日期起計備存為期3 年。

(2) 擁有人須將最近期的證明書或報告副本一份在其吊船上顯明地展示。

(3) 如任何吊船停用，其擁有人須將最近期的證明書或報告備存於安全地方，自停用的日期起計，為期至少2 年。

(4) 擁有人須確保本條規定必須備存的證明書及報告，可於任何合理時間供職業安全主任查閱。」

9.裁判官於考慮了有關的條文和案例後裁定有關的罪行是絕對責任罪行 ：

「5）在審訊過程當中的一個重要議題是有關法律責任是否屬於嚴格責任(Strict Liability)或絕對責任(Absolute Liability)。

6）就法定語言而言，有關規例第25 (2)條的內容表明得非常清晰，即擁有人「須」展示有關文件，而法例亦不是用一些字眼例如「在合理，切實或/及可行的情況下應」的字眼。而有關被指違反的規例亦沒有提供明文的免責辯護(即statutory defence)。

7）在罪行的性質而言，工業安全是不容忽視的，因為工業安全與工友及大眾的自身實在有非常直接的密切關係。當吊船被吊到半空時，對於機件的正常運作，及其能否負荷工人的體重的保證，在情理上有非常嚴謹的要求，而公眾對工業安全亦有非常高的期望程度。

8）本席經考慮以下案例:

a) Hin Lin Yee and Another v HKSAR [2010] 3 HKC 403;

b) HKSAR v Shun Tak Properties Ltd [2009] 3 HKLRD 299;

c) Hong Kong Electric Co Ltd v R, CACC 896/1981;

d) Lo Hing Tang v R, CACC 1395/1983;及

e) Strowger v John [1974] RTR 124

和控辯雙方呈上的書面和口頭陳詞後，本席裁定傳票中的責任屬於絕對責任。」

10.上訴人指裁判官的裁定是錯誤的 ：

「16．上訴人認為暫委裁判官錯誤地裁定有關的法律責任是絕對法律責任而非嚴格法律責任。裁判官沒有考慮到該法例只是一項展示安全証書的行為而非一項確保工業安全的措施。條文上亦沒有「須確保」的字眼；所以上訴人不須確保安全証書必須在吊船上展示；上訴人如果有責任的話他是可以把展示的責任交給“順盈”去做的。（a delegable duty）。」

11.在Hin Lin Yee v HKSAR [2010] 13 HKCFAR 142一案中，終審法院就在決定法定罪行中，控方須證明犯罪意圖的推定是否已被移除（presumption of mens rea to be proved by prosecuton is displaced）所須要考慮的因素作出了全面的討論。

12.正如在這案例的提要中所指出 ：

「(2)  就法定罪行而言，假如「控方須證明被告人懷有犯罪意圖」的推定明確地被移除或因必然含意而被移除，則可能產生下列三種情況其中之一 ：

（a）首先，普通法下有一項可解除被告人罪責的抗辯理由，意思是，被告人能按相對可能性衡量標準證明該人在進行受禁行為時誠實和合理地相信相關情況存在，而假如該等情況屬實，該人便不會被判有關罪名成立（下稱「普通法抗辯理由」）。這種處理方式不會因罪行的標的物是「安全法例」而自動被禁止使用；

（b）第二，假如普通法抗辯理由顯然與關於被告人誠實和合理信念的明確法定抗辯理由不相一致，則前者將被移除，而被告人只能倚賴後者；

（c）第三，一旦關於犯罪意圖的推定被移除，以致有關法例所訂立的罪行屬於絕對法律責任罪行，則被告人將不能引用普通法抗辯珅由。」

13.第一及第二種就是一般所指的嚴格責任罪行（strict liability offence）而第三種就是絕對責任罪行（absolute liability offence）.

14.要決定這個控方須證明犯罪意圖的推定是否被移除，Ribeiro, PJ這樣說 ：

“139. As Lord Scarman (in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v AG [1985] 1 AC 1) emphasised, the presumption of mens rea ‘can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute’.

140. The first consideration is therefore the statutory language. The text may be crucial. As noted above, the statute may employ adverbs like ‘knowingly’ or ‘negligently’; or it may use verbs or nouns which may or may not have connotations of awareness or intent on the defendant’s part...

141. The nature and subject-matter of the offence are also of great importance in deciding whether mens rea is required. The more serious the offence in terms of penalty and social obloquy, the less likely it is that the presumption will be held to have been supplanted. One should be slow to attribute to the legislature the intention of inflicting severe punishment and stigmatising a person as a serious criminal unless he is proved to have acted with a guilty mind….

142. There is generally less need to feel inhibited about overriding the presumption in relation to what may compendiously be called ‘regulatory offences’. Lord Reid gave some examples of such offences which, in the English context, were held to impose absolute liability :

‘... there is a long line of cases in which it has been held with regard to less serious offences that absence of mens rea was no defence. Typical examples are offences under public health, licensing and industrial legislation. If a person sets up as say a butcher, a publican, or a manufacturer and exposes unsound meat for sale, or sells drink to a drunk man, or certain parts of his factory are unsafe, it is no defence that he could not by the exercise of reasonable care have known or discovered that the meat was unsound, or that the man was drunk or that his premises were unsafe.’

Where a halfway house option exists, displacement of the presumption might well lead to such offences being dealt with on an intermediate basis of liability instead.

143.  The legislative purpose is obviously important.  If, in the light of the nature and subject-matter of the offence, construing the provision to require full mens rea would make successful prosecution so unlikely that the statutory objectives would be frustrated, this must be given weight.  Where this is a legitimate consideration, the response should often be to consider whether the adoption of an intermediate basis of liability accords with the true legislative intention.”

15.因此，就算這個「推定」被移除了，法庭仍要決定罪行是嚴格責任或是絕對責任。

16.在本案中，沒有爭議所涉及的罪行的「推定」已被移除了，爭論點就是這些罪行是嚴格責任還是絕對責任。

17.HKSAR v Shun Tak Properties Ltd [2009] 3 HKLRD 299一案與本案一樣涉及吊船，但該案的被告人被指作為吊船的擁有人沒有確保吊船妥為維修。被告人把吊船的維修補養合約判給了合格的註冊工程師，但吊船的保養嚴重不足，致使吊船在使用時其中一邊懸臂折斷，吊船向一邊傾下，令兩工人受傷。上訴庭裁定有關罪行為絕對責任罪行，因此被告人不能引用普通法抗辯理由。

18.Ribeiro, PJ也討論了這案例 ：

“  126.  I would again emphasise, with respect, that I consider the result arrived at to be correct.  The Court unanimously held that the offence was one of absolute liability, given that it required the defendant to ‘ensure’ proper maintenance, meaning that it could not escape liability by delegating maintenance to a contractor.  …

127.  However, Stuart-Moore VP and Yeung JA, who constituted the majority, did not simply decide the case on the construction argument.  They based their decision in part on an affirmation of Deputy Judge Line’s broad rejection of any intermediate defence in respect of safety offences... 

128.  The majority stated that the statute’s object of protecting safety in factories and industrial undertakings ‘can only be promoted by making the offence in question one of strict liability’.  I do not accept that such a generalisation is warranted.  Clearly, in the context of industrial safety, there may be sound reasons for concluding that some offences are absolute, but the compelling rationale of a halfway house is that the statutory objectives may well be attainable by adopting an intermediate basis of liability in many, if not most, cases.

…

134.  In my view, Stock JA’s approach was sound and to be preferred over that of the majority.  His Lordship held that on a proper construction of the statute, the presumption of mens rea had been displaced.  He turned then to consider whether the halfway house defence embraced by Fong Chin Yue was applicable to the case at hand and concluded that it was not, stating:

‘Whether such a halfway house defence is available is a matter of instance-specific statutory construction, with keen regard to the words used and the subject matter. In the present instance, the words used and the context do not in my judgment allow of such a defence. The words used impose a non-delegable duty. To point to the negligence of others (in this case the competent person appointed by the owner) is to do no more than to contend that the duty is delegable.’ ”

19.由此可見，終審法院認為不能一刀切地把所有與工業安全有關的法定罪行視為絕對責任罪行，及認為法庭不應輕易就推論立法原意是將罪行定為絕對責任，特別是當比較中庸一些的責任形式，例如嚴格責任仍能達到立法的目的的時候。

20.Ribeiro， PJ認為就算是規管性質的罪行（regulatory offences）也不會因其性質而自動成為絕對責任的罪行。他說 ：

“149. Even though the offence may be minor, it is necessary to justify the imposition of absolute liability on the basis that this serves some useful purpose. This important principle was laid down by the Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160 where Lord Evershed (referring to absolute liability as ‘strict liability’) stated:

‘But it is not enough in their Lordships’ opinion merely to label the statute as one dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended.  It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulations. That means that there must be something he can do, directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control, which will promote the observance of the regulations.  Unless this is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature imposed strict liability merely in order to find a luckless victim.’ ”

21.但Ribeiro, PJ強調 ：

“…before concluding that the offence is one of absolute liability, the court should first determine whether the statutory purpose can sufficiently be met by construing the statute as creating an offence subject to the intermediate defence. Absolute liability should only be resorted to if the answer is in the negative.”

22.他提出兩種絕對責任罪行的情況。第一種是當法律認為相關的行為從社會角度來看並非重要或不一定為社會所接受，而與未成年少女發生性行為的罪行便是其中一個例子。

23.第二種情況與本案比較接近。他說 ：

“156.  A second class of cases where absolute liability may have a justifiable utility involves the statutory imposition of a duty on a person (which may be a corporate body) where the conduct or task which is the subject of the duty is in practice likely to be carried out by someone else, such as an employee or a contractor.  Such situations are commonplace in factories and other workplaces where the legislation places the duty on the owner of the enterprise or the employer concerned.  For convenience I shall simply speak of ‘the employer’.

157.  To construe the offence-creating provision in such a situation as requiring proof of mens rea may make little sense.  The job having been assigned to an employee or contracted out, the employer may truthfully know nothing about the conduct and circumstances constituting the breach.  The intermediate defence may not be enough to secure the statutory purpose.  The employer may plausibly say that he took all reasonable care to entrust the task to a competent employee or specialist contractor and honestly and reasonably believed that the duty was being properly discharged.

158.  The justifiable effect of imposing absolute liability in such cases is that it makes it insufficient for the employer passively to assert an honest and reasonable belief.  It promotes proactive management and diligent supervision on his part to see that the duty is in fact being properly discharged.  If the employer knows that he will be held to account, even without actual fault on his part, if his contractor or employee is slack or careless or incompetent on the job, he has every incentive to make sure that the job is properly done and to replace contractors or employees who are not up to the task.”

24.本案的控罪其實是類似Ribeiro, PJ所指的第二種情況，即有關的吊船是由上訴人的分判商所租賃回來及使用。這似乎有著可施加絕對法律責任的特徵。但正如Ribeiro, PJ多次指出，法庭不應輕易將罪行定性為絕對責任，及應先考慮其他沒有這麼嚴苛的責任形式是否仍可達到立法的目的。

25.答辯人及裁判官都指案中罪行的性質是確保工人使用的吊船安全。他們都忽略了一點就是這些罪行的同一規例的第 19及20 條才是直接確保吊船安全的條款，因為它們命令吊船擁有人須確保要由有資格的人檢查及要由合資格的檢驗員徹底檢驗及進行負苛測試才可以用以載人。相比之下本案的罪行只涉及行政上的規管。

26.本席因此認為單單觸犯本案的罪行並不會對使用吊船的工人的案全構成威脅，只會對巡查的執法人員稍為做成不便。

27.正如上訴人所指出，本案罪行的有關規例中完全沒有使用「須確保」的字眼，與上述的第 19及20 條不同。本席認為立法的原意並非對本案罪行施加絕對法律責任。

28.本席因此不同意裁判官的結論及裁定案中的罪行是嚴格責任而非絕對責任的罪行。本席認為這已足以達到立法的原意。

29.本席的結論似乎與Strowger v John [1974] RTR 124一案的裁決不一致。這案例涉及汽車須展示汽車牌照的規定。有關的法例規定汽車的牌照須展示於汽車擋風玻璃的左下方以清楚顯示出牌照上的資料。英國上訴庭裁定違反這法例的罪行是絕對責任罪行。Lord Widgery CJ這樣說 ：

“In deciding whether a particular offence falls into one category or the other, one has to have regard to the language of the statue as a whole creating the offence and one also has to have regard to the object of the penalty. In approaching the present case I have regard to those two matters. The language of the statue is simple; that the offence created is a quasi‑criminal offence with no moral stigma is obvious. The object of the penalty is to ensure that drivers do exhibit their excise discs on the motor cars in order to facilitate the checking of payment of duty by police officers and others charged with that duty.”

30.這案件及本案的罪行的相關法例中的用語是很相似的，都是用「shall exhibit」(即「須展示」)，而沒有用到「ensure」(即「確保」)的字眼。但兩件案件有著很不同的地方，就是汽車很多時都會泊在街上沒有人在車內或附近，在這情況下執法人員如果見不到汽車的牌照就很難得知汽車是否已繳納有關的稅項。這個困難在1973 年的時候就特別明顯，因為當時的電腦及通訊設備都沒有現在這樣發達及方便。因此有必要施加絕對法律責任去確保有關法例被恪守。

31.吊船的情況很不同。勞工處人員很少會在使用吊船的地盤或地方沒有人時巡查，因此就算沒有展示有關的證明書，這些人員也不會有任何困難要求他們把證明書交出檢查及核實到底吊船有沒有通過法例規定的檢查及檢驗。

32.本席認為上訴理由 (1) 是成立的。

33.本案罪行的有關規例及賦權條例（enabling ordinance）都沒有提供免責的辯護條款，因此上訴人只可依賴普通法的抗辯理由，即上訴人須在相對可能性的衡量標準證明它已採取一切合理和切實可行的步驟把證明書在吊船上明顯地展示出來。

34.基於裁判官認為本案的罪行為絕對責任罪行，自然地沒有考慮上訴人是否可以成功地使用普通法的抗辯理由。

35.這個議題會涉及案中的事實裁定，特別是有關辯方證人的可信性和可靠性。雖然裁判官裁定不接納兩位辯方證人的證供，但他給予的理由非常的簡單，只是提出他們的證供有前不一之處及多次逃避盤問的問題和答非所問。他沒有提供這些證供和問題的詳情。這其實是上訴人的上訴理由 (4)。無論如何，裁判官仍須考慮整個案件的證供來決定上訴人能否成功使用普通法的抗辯理由，而基於他裁定案中罪行為絕對責任而沒有這樣做。本席認為上訴人這6張傳票的定罪不安全及不穩妥。

36.上訴人的上訴理由 (2) 及 (3) 是誤解了問題的性質。吊船的擁有人的定義如下：

「就任何吊船而言，包括其承租人或租用人，以及該吊船的任何監工、管工、代理人或主管或控制或管理該吊船的人，以及控制涉及使用吊船的任何建築工程的進行方式的承建商；如屬建築地盤則包括負責該建築地盤的承建商。」

37.上訴人是案中建築地盤的總承建商。它要符合擁有人的定義，根本就不用涉及控制這吊船。它可以完全沒有參予控制和管理這吊船，但只要它控制這個建築地盤的工程的進行方式，而這建築地盤涉及使用吊船就足夠了。上訴人作為總承建商當然有權控制建築工程的進行方式， 及是案中吊船的擁有人，並須遵守第25 (2) 條的規定。

38.上訴理由 (2) 及 (3) 不成立。

結論

39.本席已裁定基於上訴理由 (1) ，上訴人的所有 6 張傳票的定罪不安全及不穩妥，因此判上訴得直，定罪推翻，罰款撤銷。

答辯人：由律政司署理高級檢控官黃俊賢代表香港特別行政區。

上訴人：由歐永潔律師事務所延聘王寶榮大律師代表。