朱文蘭 對 李志榮及另一人

LDBM 33/2022

[2024] HKLdT 30

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號2022年第33宗

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判決書[1]

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1.引言

1.1A於2024年4月18日針對本席於2024年3月25日頒下的判案書 (“該判案書”) 提出上訴許可申請 (“本上訴許可申請”)。

1.2A存檔了以下誓詞支持本上訴許可申請：

(1) A於2024年4月18日存檔的誓詞 (“A(I)”)；

(2) A於2024年4月22日存檔的誓詞 (“A(II)”)；

(3) A於2024年5月21日存檔的誓詞 (“A(III)”)；

(4) A於2024年6月7日存檔的誓詞 (“A(IV”)”)；及

(5) 關先生於2024年6月24日存檔的誓詞 (“Kwan (I)”) 。

1.3在審訊階段，A由其兒子關先生代表：該判案書§1.12。在本申請中，A繼續由關先生代表。本席已考慮關先生於2024年6月24日及25日向審裁處提供的兩份陳詞 (分別為37頁及6頁)。

1.4第二答辯人 (“R2”) 於2024年6月19日為R存檔一份誓詞，反對本上訴許可申請。

2.該判案書[2]

2.1該判案書§3.10指出，本訴訟牽涉一村屋的兩名業主互相投訴對方違反公契 (包括佔用公用地方)。

2.2簡單而言：

(1) A分別於90年代初及中期成為該屋苑第8座地下Al室及A室單位的業主 (該判案書 §1.2)；

(2) R於2010年購入該屋苑第8座的1樓A室及Al室及1樓A室及A1室之天台 (該判案書§1.3)；

(3) 本席在該判案書中同意A的立場，即R於2010年購買的業權之專屬享用的部份為一份註冊摘要編號為TM270341的轉易契之附件中的1^st Floor Plan及Roof Plan中的粉紅色部份，並沒有顯示R專屬享用的業權包括第8座天台Roof Plan的白色部份及第8座的地下一層及其牆壁 (該判案書§§1.4及2.6)；

(4) 於 2016至2017 年間，R委託工程人員在R物業作出加建及改建工程 (該判案書 §1.5)，即“該工程”；

(5) 本席在該判案書中接納R的立場，即不論在該工程前或後，R一直與A相安無事。本申請於2022年4 月提出，事緣為A和R於2021年下半年至2022污水渠事件結怨 (該判案書 §§2.11-2.13)；

(6) 本席在該判案書裁定該工程違反該公契及該條例 (該判案書§§3.1-3.6 及4.1-4.2)；

(7) 但基於該判案書§4.7闡述的事項，本席拒絕頒布NOA第9A(1)-(8) 段要求審裁處作出的強制命令，即作出一系列的清拆或還原工程；

(8) 該判決書§§4.9-4.11解釋為何本席拒絕就NOA第9A(10)-(11)段作出強制命令，即清除該工程期間遺留的石屎及工程物料或更換及維修些渠管部份外牆；

(9) 由於本席拒絕就NOA 第9A段作出強制命令，該判決書§§4.12-4.15 解釋為何本席認為不需要就NOA第9B段作出任何命令 (即作出一系列命令規定R如何進行NOA第9A段的工程)。本席亦進一步解釋，即使本席就NOA第9A段作出強制令，本席認為不適宜就NOA第9B段作出任何命令；及

(10) 雖然本席拒絕作出任何強制命令，但本席按NOA第9C段頒下禁制令，命令R不可再違反限制性契約 (negative covenant)，即禁止R 在涉案建築物再次建設或維修任何違規或不合法的僭建物/構築物/渠管/結構。

3.本上訴許可申請

3.1根據本席理解，A現就本席拒絕根據NOA第9A(1)-(8) 頒下強制命令提出本上訴許可申請(A(II) §5)[3]。A大致依賴以下16項上訴理由 (闡述於關先生的第一份陳詞)：

(1) 在該判案書 §4.6中錯誤地及不合理地歸納A認為該工程只導致了 §§4.6(1) 及 (2) 的滋擾或損害；

(2) 該判案書錯誤地及不合理地沒有考量到公用部份或地方被大肆不合法佔用之損害所構成的長遠負面影響是損害賠償不能夠替代；

(3) 該判案書中未能恰當地運用頒發強制令之酌情權的法律原則；

(4) 該判案書中未能恰當地就該工程佔用公用部分及大肆改變樓宇外觀之損害的實質負面影響的證據及供詞給予恰當的比重；

(5) 該判案書沒有合理地考量該工程的違規工程所招致的大量樓宇外觀的改變必然是損害賠償所不能補救的；

(6) 該判案書就行使頒發強制令與否之酌情權的法律原則時，不合理地或錯誤地考量了無關的因素；

(7) 該判案書沒有恰當地考量R曾表示願意作出清拆及還原工程事項審裁處默示遵守強制令的成本對其而言並非巨大；

(8) 該判案書中不合理地及或錯誤地以該屋苑的總體外觀作為考量；

(9) 該判案書中鐠誤地沒有就該工程違反公契第5(f)及(h) 條作出裁斷；

(10) 該判案書錯誤地或不合理地以A沒有就該工程後提出需跟進的事項而拒絕頒發強制令；

(11) 該判案書錯誤地及不合理地沒有裁斷該工程作出圍封及佔用位於第八座地下之正面的外牆為公用部份或公用地方，便拒絕A的強制令申請；

(12) 在沒有專家證據下，該判案書錯誤地或不合理地裁定外牆油漆脫落或污水痕可以損害賠償替代強制命令；

(13) 該判案書以A的申請之緣由是基於污水渠事件及裁定A在污水渠事件之前沒有作出投訴作為拒絕頒發強制令的基礎錯誤地或不合理地沒有就A的案情和訴因給予適當的比重及錯誤地及不合理地考量了無關因素和沒有考量相關因素；

(14) 該判案書以沒有專家報告證明結構上的危險而作為拒絕頒發強制令的原因，錯誤地及不合理地考量該工程所招致的一連串毋須專家報告證明的重大滋擾及永久性的損害而給予恰當的比重；

(15) 該判案書在考量行使其酌情權時，不合理地沒有考量所引用之案例與本案的差異；及

(16) 有關頒發強制令的法律原則上，該判案書沒有考量到該工程是完全沒有顧及倫理的權益。

3.2由於A(I)-A(IV) 及 Kwan (I)主要是闡述陳詞，本席只會聚焦於關先生提供的書面陳詞及在聆訊中作出的口頭陳述。

4.適用法律原則

4.1《土地審裁處條例》第11(2) 條規定：除第11AA條 及任何條例中關於就審裁處的決定而提出上訴的條文另有規定外，在審裁處席前進行的法律程序的任何一方，均可以審裁處的判決、命令或決定在法律論點上有錯誤為理由，而針對該項判決、命令或決定向上訴法庭提出上訴。第11AA(1) 條規定：除第 (2) 款另有規定外，除非審裁處或上訴法庭已批予上訴許可，否則任何人不得根據第11(2) 條提出上訴。

4.2第11AA(6)條規定：除非聆訊有關許可申請的審裁處、上訴法庭或司法常務官信納 (a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直；或 (b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由，因而該上訴應進行聆訊，否則不得批予上訴許可。

4.3正如上訴庭在溫燕芬 v 差餉物業估價署署長 [2021] HKCA 1638 一案中指出 (§12)：

「有關土地審裁處的裁決，只有存在法律的錯誤才可向上訴法庭提出上訴。如上訴人只是重複之前向土地審裁處提出的論點，但完全沒有顯示土地審裁處的判決存有任何錯誤的法律觀點的話，上訴法庭是不會給予上訴許可。」

4.4本上訴許可申請涉及本席經行使酌情權後拒絕就NOA 第9A(1)-(8) 段頒發強制命令。正如上訴庭在嘉泰大樓業主立案法團 v 羅華泉，HCMP 104/2016，2016年3月1日一案中重申 (§18，引用 Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016第59/0/54段)，上訴法庭只會在既定情況下，干預下級法庭行使酌情權而頒布 (或就本案而言，拒絕頒布) 強制令。Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024 第59/0/54段述明：

「There are many authorities for the proposition than an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law, or under a misapprehension as to the facts; or that he took into account irrelevant matters or failed to exercise his discretion or the conclusion which the judge reached was “outside the generous ambit which a reasonable disagreement is possible…」

5.分析

5.1本席現就以上16項上訴理由作出分析。

(i) 上訴理由一

5.2A引用 Grand Power International Limited v Chan Sing Hoi Enterprises Limited & Ors [2020] HKCA 133(“Grand Power (1)”)。與本案相似，該案牽涉第一答辯人佔用公共外牆：

「 [12] Notwithstanding the judge held that the Glass Wall and the 3 Signages were conversion or unauthorised alterations of parts of the common area, he dismissed all the applicant’s claims against the 1st respondent…

…

[52] [The judge] took into account the matters he mentioned earlier in holding that 1st respondent is entitled to a proprietary interest in the Glass Wall. There was no evidence that nuisance or inconvenience has been caused by the Glass Wall to the applicant or other co-owners, or that any of them has suffered real loss and damage. The demolition and reinstatement of the Glass Wall will cause disproportionate hardship to the 1st respondent in view of the expenses. The approval of the Buildings Department has been obtained for the works, there is no imminent danger or urgency to order demolition. In light of the acquisition campaign, the Building is likely to be demolished one day. If the mandatory injunction is granted, it will not be enforced by the applicant prior to 31 December 2022 or until the 2nd respondent ceases to be the 1st respondent’s tenant, whichever is sooner. By that time, the applicant may be able to acquire sufficient ownership of units in the Building to initiate a compulsory sale and it will be redundant to order the Glass Wall to be reinstated. There is no evidence and no submission from counsel as to any useful purpose of the declarations sought.

[53] We are satisfied that the judge has erred in law and principle in exercising his discretion in the way he did. Relevant principles and guidance in this context have been given in two decisions: Incorporated Owners of Dragon View v Nalpak Ltd [1989] 1 HKC 549; and Billion Star Development Ltd v Wong Tak Chuen [2012] 2 HKLRD 85.

[54] In Incorporated Owners of Dragon View v Nalpak Ltd, having declined to grant a mandatory injunction, and it was not necessary to grant a prohibitive injunction in light of the voluntary undertakings given by the defendant, Godfrey J (as he then was) had this to say as to whether a declaration should be made at 553C, F to H:

‘ What, then, is the court now to do? In my judgment, the correct course is for the court to declare that in respect of each of the matters complained of by the plaintiff, the defendant is in breach of the relevant provisions of the deed of mutual covenant. … I wish this judgment to be read as vindicating the plaintiff to the extent that it comes to the court in order to establish the principle. It has failed … to obtain the mandatory injunctions for which it has asked. But since it may be generally believed in Hong Kong (as the defendant suggested) that deeds of mutual covenant are meant to be honoured more in the breach than in the observance, it is, I think, important that all parties to such deeds should know that its provisions are there to be observed, not flouted.’

[55] In Billion Star Development Ltd v Wong Tak Chuen at §38, Au J (as he then was) set out these pertinent principles relating to the granting of an injunction in the context of unlawful interference of a right of way and trespass[31]:

‘ (3) The injunction (permanent or interlocutory) will be prima facie granted and will be denied only if special circumstances exist (which may include circumstances that damages are an adequate remedy for the wrong, in that where the expected injury to land is small and the grant of an injunction would cause disproportionate hardship to the defendant).

(4) However, damage suffered is not a prerequisite to the grant of an injunction in such a case, nor is the triviality of the interference alone sufficient reason to justify a departure from the general rule of granting injunctions. In a case concerning trespass to land (in particular for threats of trespass and acts of trespass in the future), the court is concerned with the protection of a property right, which, if not protected by an adequate remedy, becomes diminished.’

[56] It seems to us the judge has taken irrelevant and speculative matters into consideration, and failed to take into account relevant matters. His exercise of discretion is in error and it falls on us to exercise the discretion afresh.

[57] The vindication and protection of property right is an important consideration. That nuisance or inconvenience has not been caused by the unauthorised alterations to the applicant and other co-owners is not in itself sufficient to justify a departure from the prima facie entitlement to relief where there is unlawful interference with a property right. The judge did not find on the evidence any improper motive of the applicant in commencing these proceedings, even though the 1st respondent has accused the applicant of dirty tactics in the acquisition campaign.

[58] As for the expenses incurred in the construction of the unauthorised alterations and the expenses to be incurred by the 1st respondent if a mandatory injunction is granted requiring demolition and reinstatement in respect of the Glass Wall and the 3 Signages, it was accepted by the witness of the 1st respondent that such expenses would be more than offset by the benefit the 1st respondent has reaped from the use of the Glass Wall and the 3 Signages over the years (from 2009 to 2018, and up to December 2022)[33]. Disproportionate hardship is not made out.」

5.3A 認為在該判案書 §4.6 的錯誤及不合理的歸納下，本席在行使酌情權時，沒有考慮到A的財產權，而該權利屬法律上必要、重要及合理的考量因素及事宜。

5.4首先，本席不接納A認為該判案書 §4.6 作出錯誤及不合理的歸納。該判案書 §4.6 是參照及基於A的開案陳詞第11段。該判決書 §4.6 指出：

「縱使R違反該公契或該條例，在頒發強制令的問題上法庭可以行使酌情權：上文第3.8 至 3.9 段。在本案中，A 認為該工程導致以下的滋擾或損害 …」 (強調後加)

5.5無論如何，本席亦不接納A認為該判案書沒有考慮財產權的事宜。該判案書明顯指出該工程違反公契及該條例，即R因該工程而佔用了共用地方。

5.6若果A認為因本案涉及財產權所以審裁處理應 (或導致一可反駁的推定 (give rise to a rebuttable presumption) 頒布強制命令，這並不是正確的法律原則。Grand Power 中的第一答辯人其後申請批准上訴至終審法院 ([2020 HKCA 704] (“Grand Power (2)”) )。上訴庭在Grand Power (2) 述明：

「 [9] As for the narrower questions in the latter part (“whether the claimant has a prima facie entitlement to any equitable relief, in particular, a mandatory injunction” and “whether to vindicate the claimant constitutes a sufficient practical purpose justifying the grant of a declaration”), it seems to us that these considerations are to be taken into account with regard to the context of a particular fact situation, and the same goes to the proper weight to be attached to them in particular circumstances so as to produce a fair result. They are not legal principles to be applied in a rigid manner without careful consideration in the balancing exercise to be carried out for the discretion in granting equitable remedies, as have been repeatedly emphasised by the courts (Charrington v Simons & Co [1970] 1 WLR 725 at 730D to F; Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340 at 351A to G; Incorporated Owners of Dragon View v Nalpak Ltd [1989] 1 HKC 549 at 552A to C; Chiu Hung Shun Paul & Anr v So Ka Tai & Anr, CACV 136/2005, 5 December 2002, at §16(5); Singh v Rainbow Court Townhouses Ltd [2019] 1 P. & C.R. 9 at §§29 to 30). Nor have we done so in deciding that it would be appropriate to grant the injunctions and declarations sought.

[10] As pointed out by Mr Man, in holding that the Lands Tribunal has taken into account irrelevant and speculative matters and that we should exercise the discretion afresh, we have addressed the arguments then raised on behalf of the 1st respondent including disproportionate hardship, arbitrary enforcement and sufficiency of declaratory relief. It was upon rejecting all of the 1st respondent’s arguments that we concluded it was appropriate to grant the reliefs sought with the alterations we indicated to the parties. In short, we have not approached the exercise of discretion on the basis that the principles referred to in Billion Star Development Ltd v Wong Tak Chuen at §§38(3) and (4) were tantamount to a “rebuttable legal presumption that such remedies will be given”, as contended by the 1st respondent.

…

[13] The propositions under challenge go to the prima facie entitlement of a plaintiff to injunctive relief. So long as it is borne in mind they are not rebuttable presumptions of law that equitable remedies will be granted and should not be applied mechanically but tempered by judicial discretion consonant with the basic concept of producing a fair result, it does not seem to be a fruitful exercise to attempt to reconcile statements of guidance given over the years in a rather different context (Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 322 to 323; Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] AC 822 at §§119, 121 to 123, 159 to 161, 170 to 171, 239; both are concerned with nuisance in respect of noise and the power to award damages in lieu of an injunction under Lord Cairns’ Act). Further, the doubts expressed as to Lord Cairns’ statements in Doherty v Allman only go to the court having no discretion at all to exercise and caution against applying those statements in too absolute and inflexible a manner. And there can be a clear case for an injunction without the need to show substantial damage (Singh v Rainbow Court Townhouses Ltd at §32).

[14] We doubt if it would be feasible to lay down precise legal principles for the exercise of judicial discretion in this context to address the queries raised by Mr Lam on the burden of proof and exceptional circumstances to “rebut” the prima facie entitlement to injunctive relief. How the discretion is to be exercised must be decided on a case by case basis and needless to say each case depends on its own facts.」(強調後加)

5.7正如Grand Power (1) §57 指出，審裁處可考慮A提出申請的動機。Grand Power (1) 繼而指出審裁處可考慮A的申請是否肆意或獨斷 (arbitrary)：

「 [59] Mr Fan pointed out that notwithstanding that the applicant’s solicitors had issued a batch of pre-action letters in March 2014 to “all the then signage users” including the 2nd respondent, the applicant did not sue occupiers and owners of other units that had converted parts of the external wall to their own use with the erection of signages and a glass wall. He submitted that this amounted to arbitrary enforcement of the DMC and could lead to an unjust and unfair result, citing Incorporated Owners of Dragon View v Nalpak Ltd at 552H to I; Freder Centre (IO) v Gringo Ltd [2016] 2 HKLRD 190 at §33.

[60] It is necessary to consider the question of arbitrary enforcement in context. Here, the party seeking to enforce the DMC is not the incorporated owners and there are no incorporated owners for the Building. The applicant only acquired its interest in two units of the Building in June 2013 and raised objections to unauthorised signages in the Building about six months later. As the applicant’s representative has explained in cross-examination, the applicant has to focus its resources on the costly proceedings against the respondents, the 2nd respondent occupied the largest shop and it was thought that the pursuit against the 2nd respondent would have positive effects on other signage users.

[61] Given these circumstances, we are inclined to think there are valid reasons not to require the applicant to bring legal proceedings all at once against those other owners and occupants. It is not unreasonable for the applicant to adopt a stance of wait and see until the conclusion of the present proceedings. We do not think it would lead to an unjust and unfair result if reliefs are granted against the 1st respondent. Nor do we think it would be sufficient merely to grant the declarations and decline injunctive relief as contended by Mr Fan.」

5.8正如該判案書指出，該工程早於2017年上旬完成。本案於2022年4月才提出。本席亦作出了事實裁斷，認為A提出本案是基於雙方就污水渠事件導致雙方結怨。以上事實裁斷是基於該判案書闡述的事項，包括：

(1) 第7座的情況：關老先生和關先生是7GFA1室的註冊業主，而第7座的天台已建有頂蓋完全被圍封。在本案中，並沒有任何證據關先生或關老先生曾作出相應的投訴；

(2) 該屋苑的原外觀已經歷重大轉變。呈堂的照片顯示該屋苑每一座均已建有頂蓋， 而各座天台亦有不同程度的圍封。

(ii) 上訴理由二至五

5.9本席認為上訴理由二至五可一併處理。簡而言之，上訴理由二至五的主旨是A認為其損害難以以金錢衡量。A強調其損害包括財產權之損害、公契的保障下共同利益的損害及樓宇外觀的大程度改變的實質損害。

5.10本席必須強調，該判案書主要是依賴Morris v Redland Bricks Ltd [1970] AC 652 中闡述關於強制令的法律原則 (該判案書 §§3.8-3.10 及4.6-4.8)。A本身的開案陳詞 (§119) 亦引用了Morris 一案。A的陳詞似乎混淆了禁制令和強制令的法律原則。正如上文提及，在該判案書中，本席已頒布禁制令。

5.11Morris一案指出，就強制令而言：(1) 原告人必須證明在未來會承受重大的損害，(2) 當損害發生時，損害賠償不是一個充分或足夠的賠償及 (3) 被告人施工的費用必須納入考慮。

5.12在該判案書 §4.7 中，本席主要指出在本案中並沒有充分證據證明沒有強制令會引致A蒙受嚴重損失。損害賠償是否一個充分或足夠的賠償並不是本席主要裁決 (primary finding)。

5.13A第一份陳詞 §§23-24引述審訊時的證供，包括：

(1) 關先生及其他人不能經第八座門口的位置直接轉彎行入第七座與第八座之間的走廊及其他位置；

(2) 該工程改變建築物外觀；

(3) 該工程導致樓宇抗雨功能削弱。

5.14首先，本席的主要裁決是一項事實裁決，因此不牽涉法律問題。再者，A提出的理據明顯薄弱：

(1) 就上文 §5.13(1) 而言，很明顯，這是一個吹毛求疵的說法。從呈堂相片顯示 [15][4]，關先生只需要稍移玉步從相中顯示的梯級已經可以到達第七座第八座之間的走廊；

(2) 就上文 §§5.13(2) 及 (3) 而言，該判案書 §§4.6(2) 及4.7已經處理該些事項。

(iii) 上訴理由六及八

5.15上訴理由六是針對該判案書§4.7(5)。A認為本席考慮了無關的因素，特別是關先生沒有就第七座的外觀改變作出投訴。

5.16A忽略了該判案書§2.12(7)。在該段落中，本席指出關老先生和關先生是7GFA1室的註冊業主，而第7座的天台已建有頂蓋完全被圍封。在本案中，並沒有任何證據關先生或關老先生曾作出相應的投訴。

5.17另外，A指出其他座數業主如何改變樓宇外觀不影響第八座的樓宇建築物外觀，因第八座是單幢的建築物。

5.18本席不接納該屋苑總體上的外觀是一項無關的因素。該公契第5(c)條 (該判決書§3.3) 明顯適用於該屋苑，而不是局限於個別座數。正如該判案書 §§4.3-4.5 指出，雖然本席接受R 的證供，即該屋苑的原外觀已經歷重大轉變，但本席不認為這事實足以成立抗辯理據。亦基於這原因，本席頒下禁制令。但這並不代表如一物業的本質已經歷重大轉變，在行使強制令的酌情權時，審裁處不應該考慮一物業的本質是否已經歷重大轉變。

5.19至於A在第二份陳詞指稱第八座的改動屬在該屋苑最為嚴重，而本席單以第七座天台有被圍封的外觀改變作為考慮因素，卻沒有注意到第七座的車向瓦頂外牆仍然存在的事實因素下，而拒絕頒發強制令，實屬不合理。A明顯忽略該判案書 §§2.8 及 4.17(5)。在該部份，本席已考慮該屋苑的總體情況並不是只考慮第七座的情況。至於瓦頂外牆，這牽涉第八座的抗雨功能。正如上文 §5.14(2) 所述，該事項已在該判案書 §§4.6 及4.7(4) 處理。

(iv) 上訴理由七

5.20A認為本席沒有考量到R表示同意及願意進行清拆和還原工程反映的遵守強制令成本對R而言並非巨大，更不會造成困難。

5.21該判案書 §§1.11 及4.7(8) 已指出本席並沒有忽略R的立場是願意進行某些拆除工程。但由於雙方並沒有共識，本席必須就雙方的爭議作出裁決。從呈堂的證據顯示，§4.7(8) 作出一事實裁決，即遵守強制令的費用明顯不是一個小數目。

5.22根據 Morris，審裁處需要考慮的事項並不是遵守強制令成本對R會不會造成困難，而是 R施工的費用必須納入考慮 (the cost to the defendant to do works to prevent or lessen the likelihood of a future apprehended wrong must be an element to be taken into account)。

(v) 上訴理由九

5.23上訴理由九投訴該判案書沒有就該公契§§5(f) 及 (h) 作出裁決。

5.24該公契 §5(f) 的條文已記載於該判案書 §3.3。在考慮應否就NOA第9A(1)-(8) 段應否作出強制令，該判決書 §4.7已考慮該公契 §5(f)，即該工程有否構成滋擾、煩厭或損害。

5.25該公契 §5(h) 的條文亦已記載於該判案書 §3.3。很明顯該公契 §5(h)是牽涉 NOA 第9A(10)-(11) 段。由於A並沒有要求上訴庭就 NOA 第9A(10)-(11) 段作出任何命令，本席認為該公契 §5(h) 對本上訴許可申請沒有關連。

(vi) 上訴理由十

5.26上訴理由十針對該判案書 §4.7(7)。A認為本席沒有考慮2022投訴信，所以A自從該工程完工後， 實際上有提出跟進事項。A明顯忽略該判案書§2.12(3)。在該段落，本席明顯接受2022投訴信為A首次在文件上就該工程作出投訴。 本席接納該判案書 §4.7(7) 可以用較為清楚的措辭，但本席不認為 §4.7(7) (如合理地理解) 會引致任何誤會。

5.27再者， 2022年投訴信和本訴訟展開日期只是相隔兩個月。本席看不見任何原因上訴理由十對該判案書中的裁決有任何實質影響。

(vii) 上訴理由十一

5.28該判案書已就該工程作出圍封及佔用位於第八座地下之正面的外牆為公用部份或公用地方作出裁決。

5.29該判案書 §4.1 已裁定該工程涉及該判案書 §§1.6(1)-(5) 提及的工程。該判案書 §1.6(4) 正正提及上訴理由十一牽涉的地方。該判案書 §4.1亦提及呈堂的照片[11-20][5]。[15及17] 明顯涉及上訴理由十一關注的位置。

5.30該判決書 §4.2 繼而裁定該工程違反該公契及該條例。

(viii) 上訴理由十二

5.31上訴理由十二針對該判案書 §4.7(4)。A認為本席多次考量了無關的因素，主要是本席不應該就第八座外牆的情況與第七座的外牆情況作比較。

5.32本席必須強調，正如該判案書 §4.2(6) 指出，爭議事項為第八座外牆出現油漆脫落或污水痕是否因具有排雨功能斜向下的瓦頂被拆卸。

5.33正如該判案書 §4.7(4) 指出，在事實上，從相片中顯示第八座外牆在工程後的狀況並不是明顯遜於第七座 [65]。本席亦指出沒有任何專家證供引證A的說法。

5.34本席繼而指出維修外牆的費用 (如果成立)，損害賠償是一個充分及足夠的賠償。

5.35以上為事實裁決，並不牽涉法律問題。

(ix) 上訴理由十三

5.36上訴理由十三針對該判案書 §4.7(2)，其中主要原因為該判案書 §2.12，即本席作出的事實裁定A提出本訴訟明顯是由於污水渠事件導致雙方結怨有誤。

5.37以上為事實裁決，並不牽涉法律問題。

(x) 上訴理由十四

5.38根據A的陳詞，A接納該判案書 §4.7(6)，即在本案中並沒有任何事實或專家證據證明該工程導致第八座因該工程引致任何結構上的危險。

5.39上訴理由十四聚焦於斜身瓦頂。A認為即使沒有專家證供，審裁處應裁定拆除斜身瓦頂導致重大滋擾及永久性損害。

5.40斜身瓦頂的事宜，已在以上其他上訴理由處理。

(xi) 上訴理由十五

5.41上訴理由十五針對該判案書 §§3.8-3.10。A認為本席沒有恰當地考慮到該些案例與本案的差異。

5.42上訴理由十五並不牽涉法律問題。由於本席引用相關案例的目的是闡述相關法律原則，繼而引用該法律原則於本案的事實上，本席認為該判案書有否在法律上犯錯應聚焦於其他上訴理由。

(xii) 上訴理由十六

5.43上訴理由十六引用 Wong Kwok Chiang & Ors v Longo Construction Limited & Ors, CACV 110/1986, 31 October 1986。在該案中，上訴庭考慮Morris 一案件以下的觀察：

「 Unlike the case where a negative injunction is granted to prevent the continuance or recurrence of a wrongful act the question of the cost to the defendant to do works to prevent or lessen the likelihood of a future apprehended wrong must be an element to be taken into account:

(a) where the defendant has acted without regard to his neighbour's rights, or has tried to steal a march on him or has tried to evade the jurisdiction of the court or, to sum it up, has acted wantonly and quite unreasonably in relation to his neighbour he may be ordered to repair his wanton and unreasonable acts by doing positive work to restore the status quo even if the expense to him is out of all proportion to the advantage thereby accruing to the plaintiff…」

5.44A認為若R的作為在倫理關係而言，屬不負責任及不合理，法庭通常會要求答辯人補救及修補其不負責任及不合理的作為所導致的現況，即使遵守強制令的成本遠高於申請人承受的損失。

5.45A繼而引用The Incorporated Owners of Elite Garden v Profit More Company Ltd，CACV 3622/2001，2002年5月24日支持其論點，即結構改動或外觀改動屬其他業權人的共同利益。

5.46該判案書並沒有忽略結構改動或外觀改動。相反，該判案書裁定該工程違反該公契及該條例，亦因此頒布禁制令。但在行使強制令的酌情權時，本席亦考慮到該判案書 §4.7闡述的因素。本席並不排除上訴庭可能會持有不同的意見，但本席不認為該判案書的結論是不可理喻 (outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible)。

6.總結

6.1基於上述原因，A擬進行的上訴沒有合理機會得直，亦沒有其他有利於秉行公正的理由因而應進行聆訊。本席拒絕給予上訴許可。

6.2本席亦作出暫准訟費命令，A須支付R本上訴許可申請的訟費，如果雙方未能就數額達成協議，則由法庭以區域法院及與訟人士基準釐定。若A及R不在本判決後14天內提出有關訟費的申請，則暫准訟費命令作實。

申請人：無律師代表，由關智威先生代表應訊。

第一答辯人：無律師代表，親自應訊。

第二答辯人：無律師代表，親自應訊。