HKSAR v. Ecin-kuraesin

DCCC 1525/2025 & 867/2026 (Consolidated)

[2026] HKDC 1457

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NOS 1525 OF 2025 AND 867 OF 2026

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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CHARGES

1.The Defendant pleads guilty and is convicted of a total of 3 charges of ‘Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence’, contrary to section 25(1)  and (3)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455 (OSCO).

2.Those charges averred that, during the period between 6 October 2024 and 12 December 2024, together with another person known as Tati, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that three sums of monies in three separate bank accounts, namely, HK$1,531,692.27, HK$5,321,587.59 and HK$459,626 respectively, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of indictable offences, the Defendant dealt with them.

THE AMENDED CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF FACTS

3.At all material times, the Defendant held the following 3 bank accounts under her sole name and her being the sole signatory:

(1)  Hang Seng Bank account 775715634888 (HASE Account);

(2)  MOX Bank Limited account 38974935573068 (MOX Account); and

(3)  Bank of China (Hong Kong)  Limited account 01266520468561 (BOC Account).

4.During the period from October to December 2024, these three accounts received monies from victims (PW1-PW3)  of various scams, who were lured into making the deposits or transfers:

HASE Account – HK$135,200 (PW1: HK$36,200; PW2: HK$99,000)

MOX Account – HK$4,000 (PW3: HK$2,000 x 2)

BOC Account – HK$20,000 (PW1: HK$20,000)

HASE Account

5.Stating in her account opening form as domestic helper for Kiew Ellvy earning monthly salary of HK$4,870, the Defendant opened the HASE Account on 28 October 2024.

6.From 28 October 2024 to 26 November 2024, the HASE Account had the following transactions:

(a)  78 deposits in the sum of HK$1,531,692.27; and

(b)  86 withdrawals in the sum of HK$1,531,644.

7.Apart from clear ‘mirroring transactions’, there were also features of quick-speed withdrawals, sudden upsurge in deposit and low day-end balances. The balance of the HASE Account as at 26 November 2024 was HK$48.27.

MOX Account

8.The MOX Account was opened by the Defendant on 6 October 2024, 3 weeks before she opened the HASE Account. She stated in the bank document that she was working as domestic helper.

9.In the following two months, there were huge numbers of deposits and withdrawals:

(a)  3,261 deposits in the sum of HK$5,321,587.59; and

(b)  1,112 withdrawals in the sum of HK$5,321,599.00.

10.Apart from clear ‘mirroring transactions’, there were also features of quick-speed withdrawals, sudden upsurge in deposit and low day-end balances in this MOX Account. It carried zero balance as at 12 December 2024.

BOC Account

11.The Defendant opened the BOC Account on 28 October 2024, the same day as she opened the HASE Account. She stated in the bank document that she worked as domestic helper for Kiew Ellvy, earning a monthly salary of HK$10,000 or below.

12.During the period from 28 October 2024 to 27 November 2024, there were:

(a)  47 deposits in the sum of HK$459,626; and

(b)  38 withdrawals in the sum of HK$459,600.

13.Similarly, apart from clear ‘mirroring transactions’, there were also features of quick-speed withdrawals, sudden upsurge in deposit and low day-end balances in the BOC Account. It had a balance of HK$26 as at 27 November 2024.

Arrest

14.On 26 March 2025, the Defendant was arrested in relation to the HASE Account and the MOX Account.  Under caution, the Defendant stated, amongst others, that:

(a)  she opened the HASE Account, but she had no access to internet banking;

(b)  she lost the ATM card on an unknown day in 2024, but she remained silent when being asked whether she had reported the loss of ATM card;

(c)  she had a debt of HK$4,000;

(d)  she had no knowledge of the MOX Account;

(e)  her picture on the account opening mandate was taken by her friend Dadi, also an Indonesian, who told her that it was for opening Telegram account;

(f)  Dadi gave her HK$200 for taking picture of her HKID card; and

(g)  (changing her version)  she borrowed HK$200 from Dadi, who took the Defendant’s picture as a form of security.

15.On 2 March 2026, the Defendant was arrested in relation to the BOC Account.  Under caution, she stated, amongst others, that:

(a)  she opened the BOC Account, lent it to her friend Tati for receipt of Tati’s salary and was rewarded with HK$200;

(b)  she gave Tati the bank passbook, bank card and PIN; and

(c)  she had no knowledge of those funds or transactions in the BOC Account.

16.The Defendant now admits that all the above 3 accounts were opened under the instructions of Tati.  After opening of these accounts, the Defendant surrendered the complete access and control to Tati. 

17.The Defendant now also admits that at all material times, together with Tati, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the total sums involved in these 3 accounts (HK$7,312,905.86)  in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented proceeds of indictable offence, she dealt with these sums of money.

APPLICATION FOR ENHANCEMENT OF SENTENCE

18.Pursuant to s 27(2)  of the OSCO, the prosecution furnished a statement of 20 July 2026 prepared by CIP Li Yiu Nam of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment of the Financial Intelligence and Investigation Bureau. They applied for the court to enhance the Defendant’s sentence pursuant to s 27(11).

19.The following information, amongst others, is provided in CIP Li’s statement (paras 16-20):

(a)  the number of deception cases and money laundering cases rose from 16,643 in 2020 to 47,701 in 2025, with a significant figure of 23,131 in the first 6 months of 2026;

(b)  the number of stooges arrested similarly rose from 760 in 2020 to its highest of 7,883 in 2024, then dropped to 5,355 in 2025;

(c)  in the first 6 months of 2026, the number of stooges arrested has already reached 3,156, more than half of the 2025 total;

(d)  throughout the years of 2022 to 2026 (January-June), the total numbers of stooges arrested have remained high – consistently representing over 70% of the total arrestees for deception and money laundering cases;

(e)  in light of these figures, CIP Li takes the view that the use of stooge remains prominent; and

(f)  the amount of reported monetary losses and proceeds laundered remains very significant, with a high percentage of such cases involving the use of stooge accounts.

20.In paragraph 18 of his statement, CIP Li sets out the harm occasioned by the prevalence of stooges for money laundering activities, which include: interference with banking system, negative impact on Hong Kong's reputation as international financial hub; rendering it difficult if not impossible for police to identify the masterminds behind the scheme; the chain reaction being that it would be easier for the culprits to make use of their ill-gotten gains to extend their illegal activities.

MITIGATION

21.The Defendant is 55 years of age, mother of 2 adult children who are in Indonesia. She has secondary school education. She has a clear criminal record in Hong Kong.  She started working as domestic helper in Hong Kong in 2014. She was earning HK$6,000 per month at the time of these offences. 

22.As regards those 3 bank accounts, it was an Indonesian woman Tati who paid HK$200 to the Defendant for opening of each account. The Defendant then surrendered the complete control of those accounts to Tati.  Her friend, Tati, was obviously working for the criminal syndicate. (In her cautioned interview, the Defendant mentioned Dadi, who was indeed Tati. It was due to translation problem.)

23.It was said that the Defendant had no knowledge of those transactions in the three accounts, but defence counsel Mr Wright confirmed that the Defendant did have belief that what she was doing must be to facilitate criminal offences.  

24.I was referred to HKSAR v Li Chi Ho, DCCC 1/2025 [2026] HKDC 1016, in which 4 bank accounts were used to launder about HK$8.9 million of crime proceeds, where the sentencing judge adopted an overall starting point of 4.5 years and enhanced the sentence for 25%.  Given that the instant case involved a lower total sums, i.e. around HK$7.3 million, Mr Wright urged the Court to adopt a starting point of 4 years, with 25% of enhancement.

SENTENCE

25.Money laundering is a serious offence, with a maximum sentence of 14 years of imprisonment. Whilst the Court of Appeal did not lay down sentencing guidelines, the Court had in a number of leading appellate judgments enunciated the relevant sentencing principles and set out the crucial factors germane to a proper sentence:

- sum of monies laundered;

- number of transactions;

- length of time the offence was committed;

- nature of the predicate offence;

- degree of a defendant’s participation in the predicate offence;

- sophistication of the offence, including the degree of planning;

- whether the offence was committed by an organized syndicate;

- any international dimension, including money laundered from, or for those operating in, the Mainland;

- a defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the predicate offence and knowledge that the funds represented proceeds of indictable offence;

- whether a defendant continued to launder the monies after having known that those funds represented proceeds of indictable offence; and

- a defendant’s role and the acts performed by him.

(HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33; HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545; SJ v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201; HKSAR v Liao Liting, CACC 334/2015 unreported, SJ v Xie Zhijian CAAR 4/2024, [2025] HKCA 911)

26.In this case, the Defendant opened three accounts at three different banks in October 2024. On the same day when the HASE Account and the BOC Account were opened, crime proceeds immediately landed at those accounts. That followed by a large number of mirroring transactions in the next 4 weeks (78 deposits and 86 withdrawals in HASE Account involving over HK$1.53 million; 47 deposits and 38 withdrawals in BOC Account involving about HK$460,000).

27.As regards the MOX Account, several days after the Defendant opened it on 6 October 2024, a huge number of transactions were effected in the following 2 months (3,261 deposits and 1,112 withdrawals involving over HK$5.3 million).

28.Although there is no evidence capable of establishing that the Defendant did have the knowledge of the predicate offence, this Court cannot ignore the fact that there is positive evidence that those three accounts, opened by the Defendant and held under her sole name with her being the sole signatory, had been used in laundering monies of scam victims (PW1-PW3). These victims were lured to deposit monies into these three accounts: HK$135,200 to HASE Account; HK$4,000 to MOX Account; and HK$20,000 to BOC Account.

29.The Defendant claimed that she had no knowledge of the bank transactions. However, as acknowledged in mitigation, the Defendant must have belief that what she was doing must be to facilitate criminal offences. I am satisfied, in the particular circumstances of this case, that must be right. The Defendant opened the MOX Account on 6 October 2024. Three weeks later on 28 October 2024, she opened two more accounts on the same day: the HASE Account and the BOC Account. Once those accounts were opened, crime proceeds immediately rushed in and out.

30.In SJ v Wan Kwok Keung (supra), the Court of Appeal observed that, by reference to those cases cited in HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi (supra), the starting point for money laundering: HK$1-2 million would be around 3 years; HK$3-6 million would be around 4 years; and above HK$10 million would be over 5 years.  Whilst those figures do not represent sentencing guidelines, they are always considered as important factor in sentencing money laundering offenders.

31.Having carefully considered the above sentencing principles, the nature of these offences, the Defendant’s role, and the mitigation (Mr Wright’s written and oral submissions), I adopt starting points of 3 years, 4 years and 1.5 years for the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Charges respectively. Giving the conventional one third discount for the Defendant’s plea, the sentences are 24 months; 32 months and 12 months of imprisonment respectively.

32.I am satisfied from CIP Li's information, use of stooges to facilitate laundering of crime proceeds remains prevalent, which has caused significant harm to the community. I would enhance the sentences by 25%, resulting in the final terms of 30 months; 40 months and 15 months of imprisonment respectively for the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Charges. 

33.Totality consideration: The total sum of monies involved in the 1^st-3^rd Charges is around HK$7.3 million. Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that an overall sentence of 42 months would sufficiently reflect the Defendant’s culpability in this case.  I would order that the sentences of 1^st Charge and 2^nd Charges are to run concurrently; and 2 months of the sentence for the 3^rd Charge to run consecutively to the 2^nd Charge, and all the remaining term of the 3^rd Charge is to run concurrently with the 1^st and 2^nd Charge, making a total sentence of 42 months of imprisonment. (This ultimate sentence of 42 months of imprisonment would mean a notional global starting point of slightly over 50 months of imprisonment.)

34.The Defendant's sentences are:

1^st Charge - 30 months of imprisonment, concurrent with 2^nd Charge

2^nd Charge - 40 months of imprisonment

3^rd Charge - 15 months of imprisonment, 2 months of which consecutive to 2^nd Charge, remaining term concurrent with 1^st and 2^nd Charges.

Total term: 42 months of imprisonment.