HKSAR v. Yeung May Wan and Others

Read the full judgment text of HCMA 949/2002 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 November 2004.

1. The present appeal arises from the conviction on 15 August 2002 of the 16 Appellants by Mr Symon Wong, Permanent Magistrate at Western Magistracy of the following charges : -

Cited by 5 cases · Cites 8 cases

Appeal by 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th - 10th, 13th, 16th Appellants to Court of Final Appeal. Appeal allowed. Please refer to the appeal judgment of FACC19/2004.
Case No.HCMA 949/2002[2004] 3 HKLRD 797
Court
High Court CFI
Date10 Nov 2004
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

Judgment Summary (English Version)

Judgment Summary (Chinese Version)

HCMA 949/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 949 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM WSCC NO. 548 of 2002)

_________________________

BETWEEN

 

HKSAR (香港特別行政區)

Respondent

 

and

 
 

YEUNG MAY WAN (楊美雲)

1st Appellant

 

CHEE FEI MING (徐慧敏)

2nd Appellant

 

WONG YIU HING (王耀慶)

3rd Appellant

 

LAU WAI HING (劉惠卿)

4th Appellant

 

LU JIE (盧洁)

5th Appellant

 

TSE LAI SIM (謝麗嬋)

6th Appellant

 

LAM DUY QUOC (林維國)

7th Appellant

 

TSO CHI SIN (曹志仙)

8th Appellant

 

TSANG HAU SIM (曾巧嬋)

9th Appellant

 

LAU YUK LING (劉玉玲)

10th Appellant

 

BACHMANN ERICH

11th Appellant

 

ISENSCHMIDT ROLAND

12th Appellant

 

CHAU SING (周勝)

13th Appellant

 

SCHLEGEL-GRUNENFELDER SIMONE CLAUDIA

14th Appellant

 

LAM CHI FOR (林志科)

15th Appellant

 

LEE JENNY (李珍妮)

16th Appellant

_________________________

Before : Hon Ma CJHC, Woo V-P & Stock JA in Court

Dates of Hearing : 3, 4 & 5 September 2003

Date of Handing Down Judgment : 10 November 2004

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Ma CJHC :

1.The present appeal arises from the conviction on 15 August 2002 of the 16 Appellants by Mr Symon Wong, Permanent Magistrate at Western Magistracy of the following charges : -

(1)    Obstruction of a public place contrary to section 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap.228 (“SOO”) : Charge 1 (all Appellants).  The Appellants were each fined $1,000.

(2)    Doing an act whereby obstruction may accrue to a public place contrary to section 4(28) of SOO : Charge 2 (all Appellants).  The Appellants were fined $300 in respect of this offence.

(3)    Wilfully obstructing a police officer contrary to section 36(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap.212 : Charge 3 (1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th and 16th Appellants).  These Appellants were each fined $500.

(4)    Assaulting a police officer contrary to section 63 of the Police Force Ordinance, Cap.232 : Charges 4 to 7 (3rd, 5th and 10th Appellants).  These Appellants were fined $1,000 each.

2.Each of the Appellants has appealed against conviction.  On 16 June 2003, Pang J transferred the hearing of the appeals to this Court.  At the hearing of the appeals, Mr John Haynes represented the 1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th and 14th Appellants, Mr Paul Harris represented the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 12th and 13th Appellants and Mr Andrew Bruce SC represented the 8th, 11th, 15th and 16th Appellants.  Mr Gerard McCoy SC and Mr Kevin Zervos SC represented the Respondent.  The 3rd Appellant was at one stage represented by the same solicitors as the other Appellants but as no instructions could be obtained from her, the solicitors ceased to act.  She was not present at the appeal but we have treated the submissions made on behalf of the other Appellants as also being applicable to her.

3.It has taken over a year for the present judgment to be handed down.  While this is to be regretted, I wanted this Court to have in mind such principles as were likely to emerge from the important issues concerning freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and the limits to their exercise after this Court (differently constituted) had heard arguments in another Magistracy Appeal (HCMA 16/2003), which touched upon these issues.  The judgment of that case is being handed down at the same time as the present.

Facts

4.The Appellants belong to an entity known as the Falun Gong.  It is not necessary to determine just what type of entity or organization the Falun Gong is nor its legal personality.  By using the terms ‘Falun Gong’ or ‘Falun Gong activists’, I use these terms neutrally and for convenience only.  The Central People’s Government and the Falun Gong hold directly contrary views to one another.

5.The members or practitioners of the Falun Gong enjoy the same freedoms as other persons in Hong Kong.  Its supporters regularly demonstrate in Hong Kong and are permitted to do so.  The present case involves the Falun Gong demonstration that took place on 14 March 2002 outside a building located at 160, Connaught Road West, in the Western District.  This building, a 42-storey commercial building (“the Building”) contains the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government (“the Liaison Office”).

6.I now describe the area outside of the Building on the day in question (the position may now be different).  The main entrance of the Building faces Connaught Road West and is separated from this road by a pedestrian pavement.  Immediately outside the entrance was a vehicle driveway with entrance and exit points to the side of the Building leading to and from Connaught Road West.  In front of the Building on the other side of the driveway, on the pavement abutting Connaught Road West, was a flag podium flanked by two stone pillars.  The base of the flag podium measured 1.7 metres by 2.4 metres, the base of the stone pillars 1.75 metres by 2.55 metres.  On the flag podium was hoisted the Chinese National flag.  The gaps between the flagstand and the stone pillars on either side measured 3.1 metres and was thus sufficiently wide to enable pedestrians to enter the Building from the pavement using this route.  People wishing to enter the Building could also do so using the vehicle driveway entrance and exit, which were, as noted above, towards the front sides of the Building.  The distance from the entrance of the Building to the outer extremities of the flag podium and stone pillars was 9.5 metres.  From these points to the road, the pavement measured 9.5 metres.  The length of the pavement outside the Building measured some 13.7 metres.  It can therefore be seen that the area of pavement outside the Building on the day in question can fairly be described as being a large one by Hong Kong standards.

7.I have described the area outside the Building in some detail because the Falun Gong demonstration that took place on 14 March 2002 was located in that area of the pavement immediately in front of the flag podium.

8.Prior to that day, Falun Gong activists had been demonstrating in the area of the pavement outside 162, Connaught Road West.  On 14 March 2002, the activists decided to move their demonstration to the Building where, as I have stated above, the Liaison Office was located.  There is little doubt that any demonstration on the part of Falun Gong activists would have a greater impact there.

9.The Statement of Findings by the Magistrate states that at 8:50 am on the day, a number of Falun Gong members, including 4 Swiss nationals (the 7th, 11th, 12th and 14th Appellants), conducted a demonstration at the area of the pavement in front of the flag podium.  The 7th, 11th, 12th and 14th Appellants sat on the pavement, at first facing the Building and then later facing the road.  They wore sashes bearing the words “Hunger Strike”.  About 3 other members of the group stood behind them.  The group carried a 5 x 10 foot banner with words of protest written on it.

10.Shortly after the start of this demonstration, security guards of the Building contacted the police who arrived at the scene.  At about 9:20 am, barriers were erected by the police behind the demonstrators in front of the flag podium and stone pillars so that this effectively blocked the route into the Building from the pavement past the flag podium.

11.According to the prosecution, the size of the demonstration grew.  Eventually, all 16 of the Appellants were present at the said area demonstrating.  As the number of demonstrators increased, a crowd developed to watch them.  Included in the crowd, apart from passers-by were journalists and other members of the media.  There was a police presence as well.

12.A number of warnings were given by the police to the demonstrators between 10:00 am and 1:00 pm.  Specifically, 5 warnings were given at 10:07 am, 10:50 am, 11:35 am, 12:07 pm and 1:01 pm.  Eventually, at about 1:15 pm, arrests of the Appellants were effected.  The Appellants strongly resisted the attempts by the police to remove them.  It took about 28 minutes for the arrests to be completed.  The Appellants were then taken in 2 police vehicles to Western Police Station.  Further resistance was met there the female Appellants were asked to leave the vehicle in which they had traveled.  The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th and 16th Appellants all strongly resisted leaving the vehicle and, as they were being forcibly evicted from the vehicle, some violence occurred which continued in the briefing room of the police station.  Injuries were caused to various police officers.

13.The above facts provide a brief (and I hope, uncontentious) description of the events that occurred on 14 March 2002.  It is now necessary to deal in more detail with each of the charges and the facts surrounding them.

Obstruction of a public place : section 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Charge 1)

14.Section 4A states : -

4A.     Obstruction of public places

Any person who without lawful authority or excuse sets out or leaves, or causes to be set out or left, any matter or thing which obstructs, inconveniences or endangers, or may obstruct, inconvenience or endanger, any person or vehicle in a public place shall be liable to a fine of $5,000 or to imprisonment for 3 months.”

15.This charge related only to the banner that was displayed by the Appellants.  I have already described the banner in paragraph 9 above.  In his Statement of Findings, however, the Magistrate did not deal separately with this charge, instead dealing with it alongside the section 4(28) charge as if both charges involved the same facts.  In my view, he fell into error in treating the charge in this way.  Perhaps it was assumed that in dealing with the particulars of this charge, not only did the banner in question have to be considered but also the demonstrators themselves as well.  This, as Mr McCoy acknowledged, was wrong : only the banner ought to have been considered.

16.That apart and for the reasons that appear in Stock JA’s judgment as well, I would allow the appeal on the charge and accordingly quash the conviction of the Appellants thereunder.

The section 4(28) charge (Charge 2)

17.The argument on this charge constituted the main focus of the present appeal.  Section 4 of SOO contains a number of quite diverse and disparate offences under the heading “Nuisances committed in public places etc”.

18.Section 4(28) states : -

“Any person who without lawful authority or excuse  -

….

(28)    does any act whereby injury or obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, may accrue to a public place or to the shore of the sea, or to navigation, mooring or anchorage, transit or traffic;

shall be liable to a fine of $500 or to imprisonment for 3 months.”

19.We are on the facts of this appeal concerned with that subsection in the particular context of the freedom of assembly, demonstration and expression : the Appellants were staging a demonstration outside the Building to protest their beliefs.  These fundamental freedoms are contained in Article 27 of the Basic Law, and Articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (which apply in Hong Kong through Article 39 of the Basic Law).  They are also contained in Articles 16 and 17 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383.  These provisions can conveniently be set out : -

Basic Law

Article 27

“Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.”

Article 39

“The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law.  Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.”

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 19

“1.    Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2.    Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3.    The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary :

(a)    For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b)    For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”

Article 21

“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance

“Article 16
Freedom of opinion and expression

(1)    Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

(2)    Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

(3)    The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph (2) of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary –

(a)    for respect of the rights or reputations of others; or

(b)    for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Article 17
Right of peaceful assembly

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

20.In analyzing the law that has to be applied to the facts, I believe it useful first to identify other relevant statutory provisions which touch upon these fundamental freedoms in the particular context with which we are involved.  Though I have identified 3 freedoms, for present purposes, they are to be treated in the same way.  Mr Bruce was similarly content to adopt this approach.

21.The Public Order Ordinance, Cap.245 (“POO”) contains detailed provisions specifically dealing with the right to demonstrate by means of public gatherings or meetings.  In brief, the scheme under that Ordinance is as follows : -

(1)    The term “meeting” is defined in section 2(1) of POO as including a gathering or assembly of persons for the purpose of expressing their views – such as the Appellants in the present case.  Such a meeting which is held in public is known as a “public meeting”.

(2)    A “public gathering” is defined in section 2(1) as a “public meeting, a public procession and any other meeting, gathering or assembly of 10 or more persons in any public place”.  As noted above, the Appellants numbered 16 eventually.

(3)    The Ordinance contains separate provisions for public meetings, gatherings or processions involving different numbers of people : -

(a)    Where a public meeting involves more than 50 persons, there is required a prior notice (providing details of the meeting) to be given to the Commissioner of Police who is then able to assess the position with a view possibly to prohibit the meeting or impose conditions : - see sections 7 to 11.

(b)    Where a public procession involving more than 30 persons is concerned, there is again a notification scheme whereby the Commissioner of Police must be given prior notice containing details of that procession.  The Commissioner may again prohibit the procession or impose conditions in relation thereto.  See here : sections 13 to 15.

(c)    Where public gatherings are involved (as defined above) – therefore involving more than 10 persons), there is, unless such gatherings fall within the ambit of the provisions regarding public meetings or public processions just referred to, no notification procedure.

(4)    One common (but important) feature shared by all 3 types of gathering identified above is the power of the Commissioner of Police either to prohibit their taking place or to impose conditions regulating their conduct.  These powers are, however, restricted only to the situation where the Commissioner of Police reasonably considers it necessary “in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” : - see sections 6, 9, 11, 14 and 15.  It is not entirely clear whether section 6 enables the Commissioner of Police actually to prohibit in the way that sections 9 and 14 expressly enable him to do, but I think he must have this power.  Of importance here is the limited discretion that the Commissioner of Police has.  I am of course here referring to the considerations of “national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.  I shall, for convenience, refer to these factors as “the Permitted Restrictions”.  Put another way, unless there is a necessity to prohibit or impose conditions by reason of one or more of the Permitted Restrictions, the police simply do not have the power either to prohibit or impose conditions on a public meeting, gathering or procession.  In my view, the Permitted Restrictions reflect almost exactly those restrictions expressly permitted under the ICCPR and the Bill of Rights (see paragraph 19 above).  In the decision of this Court in HCMA 16/2003, the constitutionality of a number of the provisions in the POO set out above were considered.  In the present case, however, none of the Appellants has argued that section 4(28) is in any way unconstitutional.

22.How then does this affect the consideration of section 4(28) of SOO in the context of a public demonstration?  As a general rule, in construing legislation, it is necessary to take into account applicable provisions of the Basic Law, the ICCPR and Bill of Rights.  This follows from Articles 8, 18, 39, 84 and 160 of the Basic Law and the spirit behind the Bill of Rights.  Wherever possible, all legislation ought to be read consistently with the Basic Law, the ICCPR and the Bill of Rights.  Where they cannot, the legislation in question may be declared invalid or unconstitutional.  See here : - Lau Cheong & Another v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415, at 448A-B (paragraph 101).  Accordingly, in construing section 4(28) in the context of demonstrations, one must by necessity take into account those provisions in the Basic Law, the ICCPR and Bill of Rights set out above.  In my judgment, it is extremely helpful therefore in the consideration of the offence under that provision when seen against the various freedoms (of assembly, demonstration and expression) to bear in mind the said provisions (and their limits) in POO.  The following represents what I believe to be the applicable principles when considering section 4(28) of SOO in the context of public demonstrations : -

(1)    There are 2 points of focus or inquiry, both important, as far as section 4 (28) is concerned.  First, it is necessary to inquire whether the accused person has done any act whereby “injury or obstruction” is caused to the various places or things identified in that subsection.  In the present case, we are of course only involved with the aspect of obstruction to a public place, actual or potential.  Where there is no evidence of injury or obstruction, that is the end of the matter : no offence under section 4(28) can be committed.  Where, however, one or both these elements exist, it then becomes necessary to consider the second aspect of whether the accused has any lawful authority or excuse to have done the relevant act causing the injury or obstruction.

(2)    The first aspect is a question of fact.  In the present case, the inquiry is simple : have the Appellants done any act whereby obstruction, directly or consequentially may accrue to a public place (the area outside the Building)?

(3)    The second aspect is more difficult where fundamental freedoms are involved.  Generally, the burden of showing that lawful authority or excuse exists is on the accused : - see section 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap.221.  Where a person reasonably believes that he is exercising a fundamental right such as the freedom of assembly, demonstration or expression in doing what he did, this, if proved, provides the basis for saying that he had the necessary lawful authority or excuse.  The reasonable and honest belief on the part of the accused is essential : - see The Queen v Li Wing-tat and Others [1991] 1 HKLR 731, at 734 referring to Cambridgeshire and Isle of Ely County Council v Rust [1972] 2 QB 426.

(4)    As to what constitutes a reasonable or honest belief requires of course an examination of the relevant circumstances, but in evaluating this, it is important to bear in mind the limits of the fundamental right in question.  Here, as I have already observed, the freedom or assembly, demonstration and expression contained in Articles 19 and 21 of the ICCPR (reproduced in Articles 16 and 17 of the Bill of Rights) are restricted where the interests of national security, public safety, public order (ordre public), and the rights and freedoms of others are involved (the Permitted Restrictions).  It is also clear that although Article 27 of the Basic Law does not set out any of the said restrictions, the freedoms therein stated are so restricted.  This is perhaps made clear by Article 39.

(5)    In HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu & Another (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442, the Court of Final Appeal examined the limits to the freedom of speech and expression in the context of a person who had been accused of desecrating the national and regional flags, contrary to section 7 of the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance and the Regional Flag and Emblem Ordinance.  There, the Chief Justice described the freedom of expression in an oft-quoted passage at 455H-I : -

“Freedom or expression is a fundamental freedom in a democratic society.  It lies at the heart of civil society and of Hong Kong’s system and way of life.  The courts must give a generous interpretation to its constitutional guarantee.  This freedom includes the freedom to express ideas which the majority may find disagreeable or offensive and the freedom to criticise governmental institutions and the conduct of public officials.”

(6)    However, it was recognized by the Court that the freedom of expression had limits.  Reference was made to the permitted restrictions on this right in the following passage at 456I-457C : -

“Freedom of expression is not an absolute.  The Preamble to the ICCPR recognises that the individual has duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs.  Article 19(3) itself recognises that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities and it may therefore be subject to certain restrictions.  But these restrictions shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a)    For respect of the rights or reputation of others;

(b)    For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

The requirement that the restriction be provided by law is satisfied by the two statutory provisions which are in question in this case.  In considering the extent of a restriction, it is well settled that any restriction on the right to freedom of expression must be narrowly interpreted.  See Ming Pao Newspapers Ltd v A-G [1996] AC 907 at p.917B-C.  It is common ground that the burden rests on the Government to justify any restriction.”

(7)    The restrictions identified above being permissible, how are they to be applied in practice in the context of the lawful authority or excuse aspect in section 4(28) of SOO where demonstrations are involved?  Here, in my view, where the evidence demonstrates that the accused person knew or can be taken to know by his actions alone that in demonstrating, he was acting against the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) or contrary to the rights and freedoms of others, he will be unable to dislodge the burden on him under section 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance.  For example, a demonstrator or a group of demonstrators who block off a busy pavement thus forcing pedestrians to use a road full of vehicular traffic may probably be taken to know that in exercising their right of demonstration, they are in turn causing a public danger.

(8)    However, in other cases, the situation may not be so clearcut or obvious to the demonstrator.  A person, while demonstrating, may cause an obstruction, but may not be aware from his acts alone that he was exceeding his rights; in other words, that he has acted in such a way so as to offend against the Permitted Restrictions.  In such a situation, he may only be made aware by reason of his being informed by someone else or, in a case such as the present, by the police.  This is where, in my view, the provisions of POO referred to in paragraph 21 above provide helpful guidance.  These provisions (in particular section 6) permit restrictions to be placed by the police on the freedom of assembly, demonstration or expression where it is reasonably considered necessary to restrict the rights (whether by prohibiting the demonstration or imposing conditions in relation thereto) by reason of the Permitted Restrictions.  The word “necessary” is of course important because fundamental rights are to be given a generous meaning :  see the Chief Justice’s judgment in Ng Kung Siu at 135D.  The full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms which are constitutionally guaranteed must be respected : - see Ng Ka Ling & Others v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, at 29A-B.  Such rights are not to be easily diluted and any restrictions must be construed narrowly : - see Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press Group Ltd & Others [1998] 2 HKLRD 123, at 164 H-I per Chan CJHC and Keith J.  See also the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ming Pao Newspapers Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1996] AC 907, at 917A-E per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle.

(9)    Accordingly, in this situation, where the police are involved and have decided to curtail a demonstration or to advise demonstrators to curtail a demonstration, the demonstrators will be held to have committed an offence under section 4(28) (providing of course that an obstruction or potential obstruction exists) where the police reasonably considers it necessary to do so by reason of one or more of the Permitted Restrictions and have so warned the demonstrators of this.  A warning may not be necessary where it is obvious to the demonstrator that by his actions, he has exceeded his rights (see sub-paragraph (7) above), but where the demonstrator does not know or cannot be taken to know this, a warning will be required.  Where a warning is given, provided of course that the police had reasonable grounds to consider it necessary in the first place to curtail the demonstration or impose conditions by reason of the Permitted Restrictions, the demonstrator will not be able then to entertain a reasonable belief that he has the necessary lawful authority or excuse.  Where, however, the police have no reasonable grounds to consider it necessary to curtail the demonstration (whether by stopping it altogether or imposing conditions), then a demonstration will not be unlawful irrespective of whether any warning has been given.

23.It will be seen from this analysis of the legal principles that in many cases, what will confront the police in the first instance (and later the Court when charges are laid) is a balancing exercise.  The balance is of course basically between the fundamental rights of persons to exercise the freedoms of assembly, demonstration and expression on the one hand, and those of the rest of the community on the other.  This approach is recognized by numerous authorities.

24.In Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and another [2003] 1 AC 681, at 704F-G, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in referring to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, said this : -

“The court has also recognized the need for a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, the search for which balance has been described as inherent in the whole of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights]”.

25.We were also referred to the decision of the House of Lords in D.P.P. v Jones [1998] 2 AC 240.  This case raised the important issue of the limits of the right of peaceful assembly on a public highway.  There, the defendants had gathered on a road to demonstrate (in that case about Stonehenge).  There was in force in respect of the highway an order under section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986 prohibiting the holding of trespassory assemblies.  On the broad issue of the limits to the right of peaceful assembly, the House of Lords adopted a reasonableness test, namely, that as long as an activity (such as a demonstration) did not amount to a public or private nuisance and did not obstruct the highway by “unreasonably” impeding the public’s primary right to pass and re-pass, there was a right of peaceful assembly that could be enjoyed :  see the speech of Lord Irvine of Lairg LC at 254H and 257D-E.  Quite clearly, this test involves the carrying out of a balancing exercise.  As Lord Slynn of Hadley put it in his dissenting speech at 263G : -

“The right of assembly, of demonstration, is of great importance but in English law it is not an absolute right which requires all limitations on other rights to be set aside or ignored”.

The need to strike a balance between the right to free speech and to demonstration on the one hand and the need for “peace and good order” on the other was also emphasized in the speech of Lord Hope of Craighead at 274D-E and at 276H-277A (referring to the Otton LJ’s judgment in Hirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1987) 85 Cr.App.R. 143).

26.In relation to the right of assembly, the Lord Chancellor continued at 257F-G : -

“Provided an assembly is reasonable and non-obstructive, taking into account its size, duration and the nature of the highway on which it takes place, it is irrelevant whether it is premeditated or spontaneous: what matters is its objective nature”.

The test adopted by the House of Lords was made in the absence of any legislation governing the freedom of assembly such as those contained in the Basic Law, the ICCPR and the Bill of Rights.  Although reference was made to Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (dealing with the freedom of peaceful assembly), it would appear that none of their Lordships regarded it as either necessary or desirable to modify the test earlier stated : - see 259B-G, 265D-F.

27.In my judgment, while it is helpful to refer to cases like Jones for the proposition that a balancing exercise is involved, care must be taken not to ignore the constitutional and statutory framework that exists in Hong Kong.  By this I mean of course those provisions in the Basic Law, the ICCPR and Bill of Rights earlier discussed.  It is also important to bear firmly in mind the particular statutory provisions with which we are concerned.  In the analysis undertaken at paragraph 22 above, I have endeavoured to show that the causing of an obstruction is but one ingredient (albeit an essential one) of the offence under that provision.  In Jones, the House of Lords were not dealing with such a provision, although it is clear that a mere obstruction of the highway would not be sufficient to render impermissible an activity such as a demonstration.  An obstruction was impermissible where there was an unreasonable impeding of the public’s right to pass and re-pass : - see 254H and 257D-E.  In a jurisdiction like the United Kingdom where there does not exist the same constitutional and statutory provisions as we have in Hong Kong, I have no doubt that the test of reasonableness is appropriate.  In Hong Kong, however, I find it more helpful to state the balancing exercise that has to be carried out by reference to the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable here.  This provides in my view a more precise and focused test than just reasonableness.

28.The Magistrate recorded in the Statement of Findings the Appellants’ position that section 4(28) had to be construed so as not to be inconsistent with the Basic Law.  In my view, this was for the reasons already gone into, a correct analysis.  In his own conclusions on the law, the Magistrate recognized the need to view any obstruction against the fact that the Appellants were exercising their constitutional rights.

29.Where, however, I think the Magistrate erred was in his treatment of the facts.  I have read in draft the judgment of Stock JA and find myself in complete agreement with his analysis of the facts and the way the Magistrate treated the evidence before him.  Based on Stock JA’s analysis, I wish, though, to emphasize the following facts and matters : -

(1)    There was admittedly some evidence to justify a finding that obstruction (actual or potential) was caused by the Appellants.  For example, Mr Fung Kin Luen (PW4), one of the security staff on duty on the day in question, observed a number of people (about 30) who, upon seeing the demonstration at the front of the Building , avoided them and used instead the vehicle driveway to gain access to the Building.  He also said that normally, most workers in the Building would use the flag podium area to gain access rather than the driveway.  He was supported in this by another security officer on duty that day, Mr Wong Yeung (PW5).

(2)    For the reasons already discussed, obstruction formed only one aspect of the offence under section 4(28) that the Magistrate had to consider.  It was necessary to go further and analyze the aspect of lawful authority or excuse, particularly in the context of the fundamental rights of assembly, demonstration and expression.  Here, it was important for the Magistrate to have looked closely at all the facts before him to decide whether or not the Appellants had a lawful authority or excuse.

(3)    There can be little doubt that the Appellants were exercising and believed they were exercising their constitutional rights.  This therefore prima facie provided them with a lawful authority or excuse to demonstrate at the area outside the Building.  Were they however aware or made aware that in doing what they did, they had somehow overstepped the mark so that the Permitted Restrictions became relevant?  Certainly, none of the evidence we have seen leads me to believe that, independently of the police warnings, the Appellants knew or ought to have known that what they were doing was such that any one or more of the Permitted Restrictions came into play.  As far as the demonstrators were concerned, they were staging a peaceful demonstration.  As much was accepted by Senior Inspector Wong Tak Hung (PW10) who said, “as a whole, the protest held on that day was quite peaceful”.

(4)    Did the police warnings then make any difference?  There is no doubt that warnings were given to the Appellants by the police.  Senior Inspector Wong gave evidence that he had issued the 5 warnings to the Appellants, all to the same effect, namely that the demonstrators were causing an actual obstruction.  However, it was incumbent on the Magistrate to have considered the question whether the police had sufficient justification to curtail the demonstration.  It will be recalled that at 1:15 pm that day, the police started to make arrests.  Here, it became crucial to carry out the balancing exercise that I have earlier discussed, between the constitutional rights of the Appellants and other legitimate interests.  Were the police reasonable in their view that it was necessary by reason of one or more of the Permitted Restrictions to curtail the Appellants’ demonstration?  Evidence was led by the prosecution to the dangers that were caused by the presence of the demonstrators.  Mr Fung and Mr Wong (the security guards) referred to vehicles having to slow down or stop.  Senior Inspector Wong also gave evidence to the potential dangers, referring not just to vehicles stopping but also to people using the vehicle driveway of the Building.  So did his superior, Superintendent Chiu Kai Ting (PW11).  The Magistrate referred to the aspect of danger in the Statement of Findings in that vehicles had to stop.

(5)    While, if one were to be selective, evidence did exist that could support the view that it was necessary to curtail the demonstration by reason of one or more of the Permitted Restrictions, I am not satisfied that the Magistrate fully and fairly considered the whole of the evidence before him.  Stock JA has undergone a comprehensive analysis in this regard.  I highlight just one aspect.  In his Statement of Findings, the Magistrate said this about the exhibits produced by the Appellants, “The defence exhibits were of no significance to the present proceedings”.  With respect, I would beg to differ.  Certain of the defence exhibits (such as the photographs and the video tapes of the events on the day in question), while not conclusive in themselves, nevertheless showed that any disruption or danger caused by the presence of Appellants demonstrating, was perhaps not as serious as had been suggested by the prosecution witnesses.  For example, a video tape produced by the defence (PD22) showed that at about 9:15 am on the day (before the barriers were erected by the police behind the demonstrators), the setting was somewhat tranquil and that there was little going on in the vehicle driveway.  The defence exhibits were certainly not without significance and had in my view to be considered by the Magistrate in carrying out the balancing exercise that had to be undertaken.

(6)    Instead, the Magistrate dealt with the aspect of the Appellants’ fundamental rights by referring to their attitude being “nothing short of disrespecting the rights of the staff of the Liaison Office and members of the public” and, somewhat puzzling, to their rights having to be viewed “against the background, history and culture of Hong Kong” and the principle of One Country Two Systems and Hong Kong being an inalienable part of China.  With respect to the Magistrate, these were not considerations that, at their highest, could be said to be relevant.  At worst, they displayed a tendency not to view the evidence, both for and against the prosecution, in an even light.

30.For the above reasons, the convictions under this charge were unsafe and unsatisfactory.  I would therefore allow the appeal on the section 4(28) charge as well.

The obstruction and assault charges (Charges 3 to 7)

31.These charges can conveniently be dealt with together.

32.Section 36(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance states : -

36.    Assault with intent to commit offence, or on police officer, etc.

Any person who –

(a)    …

(b)    assaults, resists, or wilfully obstructs any police officer in the due execution of his duty or any person acting in aid of such officer; or

(c)    …

shall be guilty of an offence triable either summarily or upon indictment, and shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 years.”

33.Section 63 of the Police Force Ordinance states : -

63.    Penalty on person assaulting, etc. police officer in execution of duty, or misleading officer by false information

Any person who assaults or resists any police officer acting in the execution of his duty, or aids or incites any person so to assault or resists, or refuses to assist any such officer in the execution of his duty when called upon to do so, or who, by the giving of false information with intent to defeat or delay the ends of justice, wilfully misleads or attempts to mislead any such officer, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of $5,000 and to imprisonment for 6 months.”

34.The facts surrounding these charges were not really in dispute in the appeal.  While in a police vehicle at Western Police Station after their arrest, the relevant Appellants steadfastly refused to leave the vehicle when asked to, instead remaining in the vehicle, chanting and shouting abuse.  They were told twice by an Inspector Ho to leave the vehicle and go into the police station.  As the police then tried forcibly to remove them, assaults took place in and out of the police van and then later in the briefing room of the police station.  The Magistrate has described the details of this in the Statement of Findings and as I have said, there is really no dispute on these factual findings.  The video and photographic evidence before us strongly support the findings.

35.The crucial point in this part of the appeal was over the question whether the obstruction or assaults to the police took place in the due execution of their duty.

36.It was submitted on behalf of the Appellants who were convicted under these charges that if the 1st and 2nd charges could not be sustained (which I have held to be the case), it must then follow that charges 3 to 7 had similarly to be dismissed.  The argument essentially runs along these lines : since the offences for which these Appellants were arrested cannot be sustained, their arrests were unlawful and it must therefore follow that the police could not have been in the due execution of their duty when the obstruction and assaults took place.  Since a reasonable doubt exists (as I have found) as to whether the police had reasonable grounds to curtail the demonstration on 14 March 2002, there were therefore insufficient grounds to arrest the Appellants for the purposes of sections 10(d) and 50 of the Police Force Ordinance.

37.I cannot agree with these submissions.  Sections 50(1) and (1A) of the Police Force Ordinance state in part as follows : -

50.    Arrest, detention and bail of suspected persons and seizure of suspected property

(1)  It shall be lawful for any police officer to apprehend any person who he reasonably believes will be charged with or whom he reasonably suspects of being guilty of –

(a)    any offence for which the sentence is fixed by law or for which a person may (on a first conviction for that offence) be sentenced to imprisonment; or

(b)    …

(1A)  A police officer may exercise the power to apprehend a person under subsection (1) without any warrant for that purpose and whether or not he has seen any offence committed.”

38.Insofar as the focus should be on the validity of the arrests, while doubt exists as to whether the police had reasonable grounds to stop the demonstration when they did, there was never any doubt that the police had reason to believe that an offence had been committed.  Both Senior Inspector Wong and Superintendent Chiu gave evidence not only as to the obstruction, but also to the potential dangers caused by the demonstration.  These dangers may have been given a prominence that, on a careful balancing exercise, might not have been merited, but to say that the police did not have any reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed, is simply not supported by the facts.  The test of reasonable suspicion is both a subjective and objective one : subjective in that the police officer must have genuinely formed a suspicion; objective in that he must have reasonable grounds for the suspicion he formed.  See : - O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286.

39.Sight should not be lost either of the other limb of section 50(1), namely, a reasonable belief that the relevant Appellants would be charged (the Appellants were of course eventually charged).

40.In any event, I doubt whether the focus ought to be on the validity of the arrests in the first place.  Section 36(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance does not just concentrate on the aspect of arrest.  It refers more generally to the position of police officers in the due execution of their duty.  Some of the relevant officers who were obstructed and assaulted were not even the arresting officers.  In any event, all those present at the police station were trying to persuade the Appellants to leave the police vehicle and be questioned or undergo some other formality in the police station.  In the circumstances, I am of the view that the relevant police officers were without doubt in the due execution of their duty at the time of the obstruction and assaults.

41.For the above reasons, I would dismiss the appeals under these charges and would make the following orders.

42.The appeals of all the Appellants on charges 1 and 2 are allowed and their convictions thereunder are quashed.

43.The appeals of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th and 16th Appellants under the 3rd charge are dismissed.

44.The appeals of the 3rd, 5th and 10th Appellants under charges 4 to 7 are likewise dismissed.

Hon Woo V-P :

45.I have had the advantage of reading the detailed judgments of the CJHC and Stock JA in draft.  I will briefly state my views.

46.I agree that the convictions on the obstruction charges based on the banner and the demonstration on the pavement outside 160 Connaught Road West should be quashed for the reasons that the magistrate when evaluating the evidence wrongly failed to undertake a balancing exercise between the enshrined freedoms of expression, assembly and demonstration on the one hand and “the Permitted Restrictions” referred to in the CJHC’s judgment on the other and that the magistrate also erred in disregarding the photographic evidence adduced by the appellants.  I am of the view that the convictions on the obstruction charges are therefore unsafe and unsatisfactory.

47.On the convictions on the obstruction and assault charges affecting the person of the police officers, I entirely agree with the CJHC and Stock JA that they should be upheld.

48.Factually and logically, there can be no nexus between the arrests of the appellants by the police on the pavement outside 160 Connaught Road West and the conduct of the appellants after the vehicle carrying them had arrived at the Western Police Station. 

49.Even though three officers (PW13, PW15 and PW17), the complainants of the obstruction and assault charges 3, 4, 5 and 6, took part in the arrest of the appellants, their asking the appellants to alight from the vehicle at the police station had nothing to do with the arrest.  The obstruction under charge 3 did not occur on the pavement outside 160 Connaught Road West when the appellants were arrested; it occurred after the appellants had arrived at the Western Police Station when the three complainants and their colleagues requested the appellants to leave the vehicle.  Whether the appellants had been lawfully arrested, the requesting police officers must be executing their lawful duties when requesting the appellants to alight (see section 51 of the Police Force Ordinance).  Even if the appellants had been unlawfully arrested, they had no right to remain on the vehicle.  PW15 and PW17, who were assaulted as charged in charges 4, 5 and 6, were lawfully executing their duties in using reasonable force to carry the appellants concerned out of the vehicle, but they were bitten, scratched and grabbed on the neck by these appellants.

50.Charge 7 is even stronger.  Woman Inspector Chan (PW14) was the victim of the assault in charge 7.  She was not one of the arresting officers.  To her, the appellants had been arrested and they were waiting in the briefing room of the police station for going through with the formalities normally and usually required after any arrest.  There cannot be any requirement that Inspector Chan should know under what circumstances these persons had been arrested, let alone whether they had been lawfully arrested.  Her duty was to maintain order while these persons were to go through with the formalities.  There can be no doubt that she was executing her lawful duties.  She was suddenly grabbed on the neck from behind and fell.

51.In both of the situations described above, the appellants’ acts, including refusing to alight from the vehicle, biting, grabbing and scratching the officers, were obstructing and assaulting the officers in the due execution of their police duties and were utterly unjustified even if the appellants believed that they had been unlawfully arrested.

52.I agree with the orders proposed in the conclusions of the judgments of both of my brethren.

Hon Stock JA :

Introduction

53.Whilst I agree with the conclusions of the Chief Judge and Woo V-P as to the disposal of these appeals, there are certain aspects of their approach to that result with which I am, respectfully, not able to agree.  In particular, I take the view that the suggested application of the Public Order Ordinance to this case is inappropriate; and I take that view quite independently of the issue of the constitutionality of key provisions of the Public Order Ordinance, which issue is the subject of my judgment in HKSAR v Leung Kwok Hung and others, HCMA 16 of 2003.  It is, I think, desirable for me briefly to describe the broad scope of that disagreement at the outset, for in so doing I may better set the somewhat different framework in which my judgment is presented and the route by which my conclusions are reached.

54.The two public place obstruction charges in this case (I use ‘public place obstruction’ to distinguish the first two charges from the obstruction of police charge, charge 3) were laid under sections 4A and 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap 228.  They were worded as follows:

“1st Charge:    Obstruction of a public place (against all defendants)

Statement of Offence:    Contrary to Section 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap. 228.

Particulars of Offence: YEUNG May-wan, CHEE Fei-ming, WONG Yiu-hing, LAU Wai-hing, LU Jie, TSE Lai-sim, LAM Duy-quoc, TSO Chi-sin, TSANG Hau-sim, LAU Yuk-ling, BACHMANN Erich, ISENSCHMID Roland, CHAU Sing, Schlegel-Grunenfelder Simone Claudia, LAM Chi-for and LEE Jenny, on the 14th day of March, 2002, outside the entrance of No. 160 Connaught Road West, Western, in Hong Kong, without lawful authority or excuse, set out a banner of about 5 feet x 10 feet which might obstruct, inconvenience or endanger persons in the said public place.

2nd Charge:    Doing an act whereby obstruction may accrue to a public place (against all defendants)

Statement of Offence:    Contrary to Section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap. 228.

Particulars of Offence: YEUNG May-wan, CHEE Fei-ming, WONG Yiu-hing, LAU Wai-hing, LU Jie, TSE Lai-sim, LAM Duy-quoc, TSO Chi-sin, TSANG Hau-sim, LAU Yuk-ling, BACHMANN Erich, ISENSCHMID Roland, CHAU Sing, Schlegel-Grunenfelder Simone Claudia, LAM Chi-for and LEE Jenny, on the 14th day of March, 2002, outside the entrance of No. 160 Connaught Road West, Western, in Hong Kong, without lawful authority or excuse did an act, namely assembling together and displaying a banner of about 5 feet x 10 feet outside the said entrance, whereby obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, might accrue to a public place.” (Emphasis added).

55.Those charges alleged obstruction.  They did not assert the holding of a meeting for which notice had not been given, or the holding of a meeting which had been prohibited, or the holding of a meeting in breach of any police-imposed conditions or indeed any other offence under the Public Order Ordinance.  Nor did the police, either at the time they gave warnings to those demonstrating outside the Liaison Office, or at the time they stopped the demonstration and arrested the appellants, or when they gave evidence, suggest that in taking any of those steps they were exercising a power under the Public Order Ordinance.  Nor were powers under that Ordinance prayed in aid by the prosecutor in the court below.  The police acted as they did because the appellants were, so it was suggested, causing an actual or potential unlawful obstruction contrary to the Summary Offences Ordinance.

56.The restrictions which are referred to by my Lords as ‘Permitted Restrictions’ – to prohibit or control or impose conditions on meetings, processions and gatherings ‘in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) or the protection of the freedom or rights of others’ – are those available under the Public Order Ordinance, sections 6, 9, 11, 14, and 15 (see para [21(4)] above). Sections 9 and 11 do not apply to the present case because the meeting of these appellants was smaller than contemplated by those sections; and sections 14 and 15 do not apply because this was not a procession contemplated by the terms of those sections.  As for section 6, it is suggested at paragraph [21(4)] above that section 6 empowers the Commissioner to prohibit a meeting. I do not, with respect, agree.  Section 6 is by its terms restricted to the control and direction of gatherings and processions, not to their prohibition.  In any event, the police in this case did not purport to be acting pursuant to that section.

57.It follows that I must depart from my colleagues in their suggestion that in considering the offence created by section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, it is helpful to bear in mind the provisions of the Public Order Ordinance or the restrictions in them.  The questions of ‘necessity to curtail the demonstration by reason of one or more of the Permitted Restrictions’ (para [29(5) above], or of awareness of ‘ overstepp[ing] the mark so that the Permitted Restrictions became relevant’ (para [29(3)] above) do not, in my respectful judgment, arise.

58.I accept that the Basic Law permits restrictions upon the freedom of expression and on the right of peaceful assembly where such restriction is necessary for the protection of national security, or of public order (ordre public), of public health or morals and, in relation to the freedom of expression, the rights and reputations of others.  Those restrictions are permitted by the terms of articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) to which effect is given by article 39 of the Basic Law.  Yet the sole restriction which is relevant in this case is the restriction constituted by the terms of sections 4(28) and 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance themselves.  The effect of those sections is this: that they impose a restriction on the citizen who expresses himself in Hong Kong by holding up a banner in that he may not do so if his act unreasonably obstructs, inconveniences or endangers another, or may do so (section 4A); and they impose a restriction upon individuals who gather in a public place to express themselves by saying that they may do so but only in so far as in all the circumstances an unreasonable obstruction is not occasioned.  It is no longer suggested in argument in this appeal that those restrictions, constituted by the very sections themselves, are other than restrictions permitted by the relevant articles of the ICCPR and, therefore, by the Basic Law.  So the limits of the permissible restriction in a case under either of the two sections with which we are concerned are provided by the sections themselves, and cannot be widened by the police where they act pursuant to those sections, or by the terms of the Public Order Ordinance or indeed by any other statutory provision not expressly applicable to those two sections.  Since the police stopped this demonstration because, so they said, they suspected obstruction offences and since there is no other ordinance applicable to the sections of the Summary Offences Ordinance under which the charges are laid and pursuant to which the police acted, it is the law of obstruction as that has developed, and to which I shall later return in some detail, that applies.  Where the Basic Law is relevant in the present context is that, first, it permits some restriction upon freedom of assembly by the enactment of reasonably necessary, proportionate and clear laws that prohibit actual or threatened unreasonable obstructions – these we find in sections 4(28) and 4A; and secondly, and importantly in this context, it enshrines the right of assembly and freedom of expression, so that those rights must be given their proper weight when the defence of lawful excuse which expressly applies under both sections 4(28) and 4A are considered.  

59.As for the suggested impact of our constitutional provisions upon the approach or test of reasonableness emphasized in Jones and in the obstruction decisions which the majority in that case endorse, I deal with this at paragraphs [90] to [92] below.  It will be seen that in my opinion the provisions of the Basic Law should be taken to reaffirm the approach in Jones and in the obstruction decisions there endorsed.

The first charge

60.The obstruction charges against these appellants fell under sections 4A and 4(28) of the Summary offences Ordinance, Cap. 228.  The first charge was that the appellants set out a banner which might obstruct, inconvenience or endanger persons in the public place.  That charge was otiose because it could not on any reasonable view survive an acquittal on the second charge which was directed at the congregation of the demonstrators.  In any event, it could not on any view of the facts succeed, for the suggestion that the banner itself caused an unreasonable obstruction or might do so was nonsensical.  Counsel for the respondent pointed out that both sections 4(28) and 4A include the word ‘may’ as in ‘whereby.. obstruction… may accrue…’ (section 4(28)) and ‘ …any matter or thing which obstructs or may obstruct…’ (section 4A), and it is said that this enables the commission of an offence to be demonstrated without the need to prove actual obstruction.  That is true.  But the reason for the inclusion of the word ‘may’ in both subsections is obvious, so it seems to me, in a city such as Hong Kong, riddled as it is with narrow streets and passages.  If, for example, a barrier is placed across a narrow access path, there is then no need to wait until obstruction is in fact caused or someone is in fact endangered or injured.  Its removal can be demanded at once, and the offender prosecuted.  Yet the appearance of the word ‘may’ in the sections is not an invitation to abandon common sense.  The facts which attend assertions of obstruction in a public place will differ widely from case to case, and in a case such as the present where a banner of the size and type used on 14 March 2002 is exhibited on its own, as is postulated by the first charge, in a space as large and open as that outside the Liaison Office, and in the position in which it was placed, far from the entrance, the notion that of itself it might, had one waited long enough, have unreasonably obstructed a person or a vehicle is fanciful.  I would allow the appeal of each appellant on the first charge and quash that conviction.

The second charge

61.Section 4(28) provides that:

“Any person who without lawful authority or excuse –

(28)    … does any act whereby injury or obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, may accrue to a public place or to the shore of the sea, or to navigation, mooring or anchorage, transit or traffic;

….

shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for three months.”

62.The testimony of the prosecution witnesses was firm in its assertion of repeated actual, as opposed to potential, obstruction; and actual rather than potential obstruction was the gravamen of the prosecution case.  The wording of the charge, however, asserts that the appellants so assembled themselves and so displayed their banner that obstruction ‘might accrue’ to a public place.  That wording is no doubt no more than a reflection of the act proscribed by the section.  Be that as it may, the fact that proof of the offence was complete once a potential obstruction was shown was a matter which formed part of the respondent’s submissions in this appeal. In the event, neither approach matters to my conclusion, for I am satisfied that, on either approach, the conviction in relation to the obstruction charge, which is charge 2, should not stand.  The reasons, to which I now turn, are somewhat more complex than in the case of the first charge. 

The Defence

63.The prosecution evidence of obstruction was not accepted by the defence.  The defence case was that evidence of actual and potential obstruction was unreliable and materially exaggerated.

64.The defence in this case was that no actual or potential obstruction occurred but that if it did, there was a lawful excuse for it.  The lawful excuse was reasonable use of the space outside the Liaison Office.  It was reasonable, it was said, having regard to the purpose of the occupation (the exercise of a fundamental right), the smallness of the area occupied in relation to the area available for pedestrians and for office workers, and the fact that few if any were or were likely to be inconvenienced by the demonstration.

The Key Questions

65.The first question in this case, as it was presented, was whether the presence of the group obstructed anyone (or, though not thus presented, might have obstructed anyone) in the sense that persons who might otherwise have crossed the very space occupied by the group could not by reason of its presence, cross that very space (or might not be able to do so).  I am prepared to assume that that was proved. 

66.But that was not what this case was about.  The case was about whether the use of that space by the group was an unreasonable use of the pavement outside the Liaison Offices; for if the use was lawful and reasonable, lawful excuse is made out :

“For my part I think that excuse and reasonableness are really the same ground…. It is undoubtedly true that there must be proof that the use in question was an unreasonable use.  Whether or not the user amounting to an obstruction is or is not an unreasonable use of the highway is a question of fact.  It depends upon all the circumstances, including the length of the time the obstruction continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and of course whether it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential obstruction.”

per Lord Parker CJ in Nagy v Weston [1965] 1WLR 280, 284.

Given our statutory provision, one needs to substitute for the last phrase the test: whether either an actual or potential obstruction is occasioned.

67.How was the question of reasonableness to be answered in this case?  It could only properly be answered if, first, due recognition was accorded to the fact that the activity in which these appellants were engaged was inherently lawful, and was an exercise of a fundamental right to which the Basic Law gives specific protection.  If the use to which the area has been put is inherently lawful, as in the present case it was, then the answer to the question is provided, or should have been provided, by reference to the importance of the right which was exercised in occupying the space and to the impact or likely impact upon the use of the same facility by others.

Context

68.Any tribunal of fact faced with a material dispute of fact will need to test conflicting contentions with regard to the context in which the central events take place.  That was of particular importance in this case.

69.In one sense this case was not at all about the identity or nature of the protesting group, or about the political environment in which the protest was conducted; but in another sense it very much was. 

70.The rights to demonstrate, to assemble and freely to express one’s views are rights belonging to all regardless of political or religious or philosophical allegiance.  Popularity of the views which are sought to be expressed is not a condition precedent to the exercise of those rights.  Were it so, the test of reasonableness underpinning the concept of lawful excuse, with which we are in this case concerned, would vary according to the political or social or religious colour of the accused, a notion at once recognizable as inimical to the essence of the rule of law.

71.This is not to say that an assembly is lawful no matter the manner of its conduct and regardless of such threat to public order as may be inherent in the circumstances of a particular demonstration.  But a peaceful non–obstructive user of a public place for the exercise of the fundamental right of expression is a lawful act, and is not transformed into an unlawful act by reason only of the identity of the demonstrator.

72.It was said in HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu [2000] 1 HKC 117, 135 that:

“Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom in a democratic society.  It lies at the heart of civil society and Hong Kong’s way of life.  The courts must give a generous interpretation to its constitutional guarantee.  This freedom includes the freedom to express ideas which the majority may find disagreeable or offensive and the freedom to criticize governmental institutions and the conduct of public officials.”

73.It is in that sense that this case is not, and never was, about the Falun Gong.  If their views or practices are unpalatable to some, or indeed to many, whether to officials or sections of the public, their rights in law are not thereby diminished.  That group, the Falun Gong, is no more or less immune from such restrictions as are reasonably imposed by law on the exercise of fundamental freedoms as is any other group.  By the same token, members of that group are no less free lawfully to assemble or to demonstrate.

74.But in this case there is a sense in which the identity of the demonstrators was relevant, and it is a sense, as the testimony showed, that had to be addressed.  Those who were demonstrating were members of a sect which had fallen foul of the Central authorities; and it did not need the oral testimony to which I shall shortly refer to bring home the fact that a demonstration by followers of this sect was likely to be distasteful to those whose entrance to the Liaison Office was said to be obstructed.  Yet that evidence was vivid in underscoring not only that fact, but also the likelihood that those walking in and about that area viewed the group with disapproval or disdain.  Not one office employee was called to testify.  No member of the public gave evidence.  Nor did the official who saw the demonstration from its outset and who made repeated complaints to the police alleging obstruction, testify about the obstructions that were said to have motivated such apparent anxiety on his part.  It should be obvious that a real question arose in this case as to the cause of such detours as were said to have been made: whether, on the one hand, the location and space occupied by the appellants, or whether, on the other, the choice of the employees and other pedestrians, not forced upon them other than by their disapproval of the identity of the group, or of such cause as the group espoused or were perceived to espouse.  That question arises purely on the facts of this case; and it arises because there was significant oral testimony suggestive of self-imposed detours, and it arises further because the photographic evidence of the space left by the applicants to office workers and to other pedestrians to pass and re-pass and to gain access to the Liaison Office building through the front entrance, was not on its face suggestive of any appreciable obstruction.  There is nothing in the Statement of Findings that recognizes this dimension to the case.

75.The identity of the group and the enmity between it and the Central authorities was relevant also to the issue of credibility of certain prosecution witnesses.  It is clear beyond question that cross-examination by those acting for the appellants was almost wholly designed to illustrate an incongruity between, on the one hand, the geography and scope of the entire area available to pedestrians and the place within it of the space occupied by the demonstration as shown by plans and photographs and video-film and, on the other, the oral testimony asserting actual obstruction; a theme which invited the court to view that oral evidence with considerable skepticism.  The contention was that behind the action taken by the security guards in calling the police, and the action taken by the police themselves, was an anxious desire to accommodate the urgent and frequent requests, if not demands, of Liaison Office officials to clear the square of the actual and political eyesore to them that was constituted by the demonstration and to relegate the demonstrators to a place which was less directly offensive; that the assertions of obstruction were at least grossly exaggerated; and that the warnings and arrests for obstruction were the only perceived tool by which to resolve the impasse occasioned by the hostility of the Liaison Office on the one hand, and the determination of the demonstrating group to demonstrate at the place of their choosing, on the other.  It was a contention said by the appellants at trial to be supported by the photographs and videos taken from the outset of the demonstration, and by other objective indicia; and I am not satisfied that the magistrate paid sufficient regard to those indicia which gave credence to that contention.

The evidence asserting obstruction

76.Senior Inspector Wong seems to have been the first officer of senior rank to have arrived at the scene.  He arrived at 8.55am.  There were then four demonstrators sitting outside the building: ‘Quite far away,’ as he described it (page 1790 appeal bundle).  He took the view, he said in evidence, that if the group attracted the attention of drivers who passed by, a danger to traffic might well be caused; and he also saw one or two persons pushing handcarts who ‘had to move’ in the sense that ‘they did not push the hand carts in a straight line’ (page 1791).  Those intending to enter the building had to do so ‘at an angle’ (page 1793).  He spoke to the group and told them that they were causing an obstruction and asked them to go to the adjacent area, outside No. 162 Connaught Road, where there was space allotted for the Falun Gong; but they did not reply (pages 1793K and 1083)(Emphasis added).

77.I pause to comment that it is not without significance that the view that an obstruction had been occasioned was formed already then, when there were but four demonstrators. 

78.What then transpired was that the officer gave instructions for metal barriers to be erected behind the group of four; and barriers were erected at 9.20am.  He said that he did so to prevent the demonstrators from dashing into the building and also because there were a great number of reporters and in order to maintain order (page 1794).  There was no suggestion that the demonstrators were other than peaceful or that they made any threat or move to dash into the building.  But, said the officer, ‘if the people wanted to enter the building from their front, then this group of people had already caused obstruction’ (page 1808) (Emphasis added).

79.We have seen photographs of the barriers and of the places at which they were installed.  There can be no question but that once they were in place, pedestrian access to the building through the front podium was blocked.  The demonstrators were, from that moment on, cordoned off.

80.Superintendent Chiu arrived at about 9am.  At that stage there were ten demonstrators in two rows: four in front and six at the back.  By 9.15am he had determined that the demonstrators were causing an obstruction (page 1292), so he gave instructions to other officers that they be told to move.  A complaint had already been received by the police from Mr Deng of the Liaison Office.  This was the complaint that first prompted the police visit to the scene.  The Superintendent’s evidence was that there were people blocked from entering or exiting the building; and that local residents had to make detours to avoid the group.  With his own eyes, so he said, he saw members of the staff who could not enter via the main entrance (page 1256) (My emphasis).  The group, the demonstrating appellants, were ‘…. depriving the right of those people who want to enter the Liaison Office by the front entrance.’ (page 1258).  There were people who simply could not get in (page 1290).  There were those who could not walk in straight lines because of the group (page 1291).  And in the meantime Mr Deng made further complaints at 9.15; 9.30; and 9.45am.

81.Let it be noted that the time by which the office workers had in general entered the building was 9am.  The first warning given to the group was at 10.07am.  That is also the time at which the police commenced taking their videos.  The only photographs taken of the demonstration before then was a video taken by those acting on behalf of the demonstrators.  It is not suggested that those photographs do not show the scene of the alleged offence as it was before 10.07am; though there was some suggestion of distorted angles.  The first warning – the very first one – told them that they had already caused an obstruction.  That was the sole subject matter, or the sole alleged offence, to which the warning was directed.

82.Mr Fung the security guard spoke of the events as they occurred at 8.50am when people were coming to work.  ‘When some people saw that there was a demonstration being carried out, they were not able to get through the main entrance’ (page 1689)(Emphasis added).  About thirty people were thus affected.  Later, reporters came.  People were not able to gain any access to the main entrance, he said; and that at about 10am there were about 40 to 50 people consisting of Falun Gong members and reporters gathered at the pavement outside the main entrance (page 1692).  Mr Wong, a senior security officer, said that the demonstration and attendant gatherers blocked the vehicular passage (page 1737).

83.The phrases that I have emphasized are intended to highlight two matters: first, the apparent occupation of the witnesses with the assumed importance of office workers and pedestrians being able to walk or to gain access in a straight line and, secondly, the assertions that the obstruction was such that people were entirely precluded from access to the building through its front entrance.

84.Subject only to the suggestion made that the diversions taken caused those diverted a degree of danger because they had therefore to cross vehicular traffic, a point in respect of which I make later comment, that was the essence of the case.  Whether that testimony was credible and even if so it demonstrated appreciable inconvenience to others, is a matter to be discussed. But first, the law.

A balance of rights, and the law of give and take

85.If one is to reduce to its essence the law relating to the user of highways, one is unlikely to manage a more succinct encapsulation than that of Romer LJ in Harper v G N Haden and Sons Limited [1933] 1 Ch. 298, 320, that:

“The law relating to the user of highways is in truth the law of give and take”.

86.In this context, it was and is fundamental to a proper approach to this case to appreciate that the law of the highway does not assume that reasonable use of the highway is restricted to its use for passing and re-passing or to uses incidental to that function.  Whilst the paramount use of the highway is for the public as a place for passage:

“The right of the public to pass and re-pass on a highway is subject to all those reasonable extensions which may from time to time be recognized as necessary to its exercise in accordance with enlarged notions of people in a country becoming more populous and highly civilized… .”

per Collins LJ in Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752, 757-758.

87.Similarly in DPP v Jones [1999] 2 AC 240, a decision of particular interest to our deliberations in that it addresses the relationship between rights of passage and rights of public assembly, Lord Irvine said, at page 256A, that:

“The law should not make unlawful what is commonplace and well accepted.”

88.Thus it is that modern democratic society accepts as normal the use of pedestrian areas, such as pavements and squares and plazas, for the handing out of leaflets, for collections, for passing time, for electioneering, for sitting to enjoy lunch or the company of friends and, amongst a host of other acceptable activities, for carrying placards and for protesting and exercising the right of assembly.  Though recognizing that the right of passage is the prime object of a highway and should not unreasonably be impeded, so that these other activities accommodate the right of passage, nonetheless the right of passage must reasonably accommodate the exercise of other rights.  That accommodation is part of the give and take of any modern city that purports to be tolerant and cognizant of the plurality of rights to be enjoyed by, and indeed protected for the benefit of, the variety of its residents and the manifold interests and views that they espouse at any given time.  This same variety of interest and views necessarily means that what is important to one man may be unimportant or perhaps even irksome to the next; but if there is to be true respect for the rights of all, then some must occasionally put up with a degree of inconvenience.  It is always a question of what is reasonable, of the effect of the one upon the other, a question to be addressed with maturity and objectivity but realizing all the while that fundamental rights are rights, not to be begrudged as some necessary nuisance, but to be promoted, let alone protected.  These notions are not merely recognitions of intrinsic values and the product of developed human rights law, but are pronounced and enshrined by the Basic Law, and it therefore behoves the courts of this jurisdiction all the more to ensure that the right is not mouthed as a platitude, but is accorded full effect in the application of our laws to everyday situations.  I do not, with respect, think that the court below sufficiently appreciated the accommodation required as between these rights or that it struck the balance between them that the particular facts allowed and demanded.

89.It is clear from Jones to which no reference is made in the Statement of Findings (because, I assume, it was not drawn to the court’s attention), and from those dicta in obstruction case decisions endorsed by the majority:

(1)    that reasonable use of the highway contemplates more than passing and re-passing; and

(2)    that the essential issue is whether the use of the highway by others was, not just impeded, but unreasonably impeded.

Referring to Lord Esher’s approach in Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 QB 142, the Lord Chancellor said, at page 255C:

in modern times a reasonable extension has been given to the use of the highway as such … The right of the public to pass and repass on a highway is subject to all those reasonable extensions which may from time to time be recognised as necessary to its exercise in accordance with the enlarged notions of people in a country becoming more populous and highlycivilised, but they must be such as are not inconsistent with the maintenance of the paramount idea that the right of the pubic is that of passage.’

I do not, therefore, accept that, to be lawful, activities on the highway must fall within a rubric incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the right of passage.  The meaning of Lord Esher M.R.’s judgment in Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, at pp. 146-147, is clear: it is not that a person may use the highway only for passage and repassage and acts incidental or ancillary thereto; it is that any ‘reasonable and usual’ mode of using the highway is lawful, provided it is not inconsistent with the general public’s right of passage.  I understand Collins L.J.’s acceptance in Hickman v. Maisey, at pp. 757-758, of Lord Esher M.R.’s judgment in Harrison v. Duke of Rutland in that sense.

To commence from a premise, that the right of passage is the only right which members of the public are entitled to exercise on a highway, is circular: the very question in this appeal is whether the public’s right is confined to the right of passage.  I conclude that the judgments of Lord Esher M.R. and Collins L.J. are authority for the proposition that the public have the right to use the public highway for such reasonable and usual activities as are consistent with the general public’s primary right to use the highway for purposes of passage and repassage.”

Then this at page 254H-255A:

“I conclude therefore the law to be that the public highway is a public place which the public may enjoy for any reasonable purpose, provided the activity in question does not amount to a public or private nuisance and does not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass: within these qualifications there is a public right of peaceful assembly on the highway.

“The question to which this appeal gives rise is whether the law today should recognise that the public highway is a public place, on which all manner of reasonable activities may go on.  For the reasons I set out below in my judgment it should.  Provided these activities are reasonable, do not involve the commission of a public or private nuisance, and do not amount to an obstruction of the highway unreasonably impeding the primary right of the general public to pass and repass, they should not constitute a trespass.  Subject to these qualifications, therefore, there would be a public right of peaceful assembly on the public highway.” (Emphasis added).

90.I do not share such sentiments as have been expressed by my Lords about the need to qualify or adapt the approach suggested by Jones with its emphasis on, or test of, reasonableness.  I acknowledge that the statutory provision with which their Lordships in Jones were directly concerned was different from the obstruction provisions which we are here addressing.  But the ratio of that decision is properly applicable in our case:

(1)    We are, in the context of sections 4(28) and 4A, concerned with lawful excuse, and it seems to me obvious that one of the key considerations relevant to that issue is whether the use to which the highway (by which I include plaza, square and pavement) is lawfully put is or is not restricted to the right of passage and use incidental thereto and, if not thus restricted, what are the considerations to be applied in answering the question whether a use other than that for passage does or does not constitute a lawful excuse.  These are issues addressed by the House of Lords in Jones.  That that was the issue there addressed is evident from the last two paragraphs cited at paragraph [89] above.

(2)    Nagy v Weston to which I refer at paragraph [66] above, cited in Jones (at page 258H) with approval by the Lord Chancellor, who was in the majority, was an obstruction case prosecuted pursuant to a provision not dissimilar to our section 4(28) and at page 258C Lord Irvine said this:

“By section 137 of the Act of 1980: ‘(1) If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence …”  The relevant case law was extensively considered by the Divisional Court in Hurst v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr.App.R. 143.

The appeal was by animal rights supporters, who had been demonstrating against the use of animal fur both outside and in the doorway of a furrier’s shop.  They handed out leaflets, held banners and attracted groups of passers-by who blocked the street.  The issue whether they were guilty of the statutory offence was held (per Glidewell L.J., at pp. 150-151) to turn on three questions: (i) was there an obstruction (with ‘any stopping on the highway,’ unless de minimis, counting as an obstruction)? (ii) was the obstruction deliberate? and (iii) was the obstruction without lawful excuse?

The latter question, if the obstruction was not unlawful in itself (as in the case of unlawful picketing), was ‘to be answered by deciding whether the activity in which the defendant was engaged was or was not a reasonable user of the highway.’  Glidewell L.J. instanced, at p. 150:

‘what is now relatively commonplace, at least in London and large cities, distributing advertising material or free periodicals outside stations, when people are arriving in the morning.  Clearly, that is an obstruction; clearly, it is not incidental to passage up and down the street because the distributors are virtually stationary.  The question must be: is it a reasonable use of the highway or not? … It may be decided that if the activity grows to an extent that it is unreasonable by reason of the space occupied or the duration of time for which it goes on that an offence would be committed, but it s a matter on the facts for the magistrates …’

In so holding Glidewell L.J. applied the reasoning of the Divisional Court in Nagy v. Weston [1965] 1 W.L.R. 280, where the activity in question, the sale of hot dogs in the street, ‘could not … be said to be incidental to the right to pass and repass along the street.’  The question was one of fact: ‘whether the activity was or was not reasonable.’”

(3)    That the principles espoused in Jones were intended to apply as much to obstruction cases as to trespassory assemblies (the offence there alleged) is in any event clear enough from the following:

(a)    “I find it satisfactory that there is a symmetry in the law between activities on the public highway which may be trespassory and those which may amount to unlawful obstruction of the highway.”

per Lord Irvine at page 258H to 259A

(b)    “In my opinion, the law would be left in an unsatisfactory state if your Lordships’ House held that in this case the peaceful assembly on the highway, which caused no actual obstruction to persons passing along the highway, constituted a criminal trespass under section 14B of the Act of 1986, because the assembly was not incidental to passage along the highway, whilst the law recognised, as held in Hirst v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, that such an assembly may be a reasonable use of the highway and in consequence there is a lawful excuse under section 137 of the Act of 1980 in respect of a charge of wilfully obstructing the free passage along a highway.”

per Lord Hutton at page 290A.

91.Neither do I see (save in two aspects to which I shall presently refer), in the context of obstruction offences, that the test of reasonableness suggested by Nagy, and Hirst, and Jones requires modification by reason of our constitutional provisions or because at the time those cases were decided similar constitutional or human rights provisions were not in place in England.  It seems to me (and these are the ‘two aspects’ to which I refer) that the effect of the constitutional provisions make only these changes, that they put beyond doubt that use of a public place for assembly or for expression of opinion is prima facie lawful notwithstanding that that use is not in the exercise of the right of passage and, further, that they require, in the assessment of reasonableness, significant weight to be attributed to the exercise of the rights entrenched by the constitutional provisions.  In other words, the constitutional provisions enhance the defence of reasonableness, a view for which there is support in Freedman ‘Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales’ 2002, pages 1057-1058:

“The majority [in Jones] reached their conclusion without directly applying the Convention rights, since the decision predated coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998.  Nevertheless, had it been necessary to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights.  Lord Irvine and perhaps Lord Clyde would have held that undue restrictions on rights of the public on highways would have threatened the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under ECHR Article 11, and there is no doubt that the 1998 Act reinforces the grounds for the decision by the majority.”

A failure to appreciate the true issue.

92.There can be no question but that the appellants had a right to use the pavement for a reasonable purpose.  There is no question but that the use of a pavement for the purpose of a peaceful assembly is prima facie lawful.  And, further, there is no question but that the assembly in this case was peaceful.  So the true question in this case is and was whether this lawful use of the highway unreasonably (see Jones above) impeded the primary right of the public, including those wishing to gain access to the Liaison Offices, to pass and re-pass and to gain access; and as I suggested at [67] above the prime considerations to be ‘keyed in’ when answering that question were the fact that the appellants were exercising a fundamental and protected right and, as against that – but bearing in mind all the time the concept of give and take – the impact at the material time of the demonstration on the use of the square or area as a whole and, as to impact, whether the obstruction was appreciable (see R v Bartholomew [1908] 1 KB 554); or unduly obstructive (see Hubbard v Pitt [1976] 1 QB 142, 150). 

93.One of the several matters that has troubled me in this case is whether the facets to which I have referred at the outset of paragraph [92] above – matters about which there could have been no question – were recognized, and whether the fact and the centrality of the requirement of showing an unreasonable impediment to the primary right of passage, was appreciated by the police officers who on 14 March 2002 asserted that an offence had been committed, or by the prosecutor in the presentation of the case; and whether the true issues were addressed by the magistrate. There is much in the transcript of the proceedings which suggests to me that these dimensions of the case were not appreciated either at all or sufficiently.  There is much that suggests to me that when coming to the view that an offence of obstruction had been committed, the police - particularly the police superintendent who ordered the erection and deployment of barriers, who ordered warnings to be given, and who ordered the arrests - never addressed the requirement of give and take that is inherent in the law of the highway; and that they failed sufficiently or at all to appreciate that the right to use a highway to demonstrate or protest was part, a significant part at that, of the dimension of reasonableness.  There is much in the evidence, as well as in the comments that were made in the course of the hearing below both by the prosecutor and by the court, which suggests that an unduly narrow view was taken of what constituted an unlawful obstruction, that the question of overall reasonableness was ignored, as was the fact that within the equation true substance had to be given to the right to demonstrate and to the distinction between causing undue inconvenience, on the one hand, and some inconvenience on the other.  Thus we see for example:

(1)    In the cross-examination of Superintendent Chiu, at pp1258-1259 of the appeal bundle:

“Q.   And when you saw them, you were aware, of course – whether they were visitors or not – they did have a right to demonstrate in Hong Kong.

A.    Yes, but in a peaceful and lawful manner.

Q.    Well, when you first saw them they were peaceful.

A.    They were peaceful but they were not lawful.  They were causing obstruction to other members of public.

Q.    I’ll deal with that in a minute.  And did you recognise that the right of peaceful demonstration means that they’re entitled to try and achieve a certain high profile for their demonstration, as long as they do it lawfully?

A.    They have to do it lawfully and legally.

Q.    And the place they were was dramatically below the China flag flying on a mast on its podium.

A.    I believe they can achieve the same objective by using to the designate public activity area.

Q.    But do you accept that the other area would not be so demonstrative or dramatic?

A.    I believe the overriding principle is to be legal.”

These answers begged the question whether, given the right to demonstrate and given the area occupied in comparison to the space available to others, the obstruction (assuming there was any at all) was unreasonable (Jones), or appreciable (Bartholomew); or unduly obstructive (Hubbard v Pitt).  The attitude thus demonstrated was in my judgment also flawed in its assumption that the right to demonstrate was equally satisfied if exercised elsewhere than at the place of greatest impact, a point which I develop briefly at [93] and [94] below.

(2)    “And I asked you why,” counsel continued, at page 1264, ‘if the problem was obstruction to the podium, you didn’t just suggest that they move 2 or 3 yards away from the podium and have their little demonstration there?

….

[A]  We tried to accommodate the demonstration by advising them to move to the DPAA on the day, but they refused.

PUNTI INTERPRETER: I’m sorry, DP?

A.    Designated Public Activity Area.  Because in my view the mere presence of the group at that location will cause actual obstruction.

Q.    Well, you see, once they were moved 2 or 3 metres out, away from the podium, they would no longer affect the workers.

PUNTI INTERPRETER: 2 to 3 metres?

Q.    Away from the flag podium.

A.    In our view, the best location is the DPAA.

Q.    And if they were 2 or 3 metres out from the podium, the ordinary pedestrian traffic, such as it is in Connaught road, could, in fact, pass either behind or in front of them.

A.    I would say the best position is the DPAA on that day.

Q.    It sounds as though you never gave this possibility a thought.

MR ZERVOS [for the prosecution]:    Well, my objection is that my learned friend is putting hypothetical situations, a hypothetical set of circumstances.  He gets his answer and he’s stuck with it.  We’re not dealing with actual facts of what actually happened on the day.  We’re dealing with the hypothetical that my learned friend has been exploring and he’s answered the question and that’s it.  It’s a lateral issue.

COURT:    I think you are right.  This is the second time today that the prosecution has quite correctly pointed out, you are stuck with the answers.

MR HAYNES:    Your Worship, I haven’t, in fact, reacted to the objection.

COURT:    And besides, I really question whether this line of cross-examination really takes us anywhere.” (Emphasis added).

I have two comments:

(i)    the suggestion by this officer - the very one who decided to order the arrest of these appellants - that their mere presence would cause actual obstruction is highly significant, for it illustrates a failure to address the issue of reasonableness and fails to accord sufficient, if any, weight to their right to demonstrate; and

(ii)     the objection taken by prosecuting counsel, seemingly upheld by the court, was an ill-founded objection, and illustrates a significant failure, I believe, to appreciate the point which counsel for the appellants was, quite rightly, seeking to demonstrate, which was that the attitude of the police was, incorrectly, that it mattered not where on the plaza outside the Liaison Office the demonstration took place, or how much room was accorded to the workers at that office, since, so they were suggesting, any actual obstruction of a pedestrian was unlawful (this went to charges one and two); alternatively that the police were not exercising their powers in a bona fide manner (this went to the question whether the police, when arresting the appellants, were acting in the exercise of their duty).

(3)    The following morning, Mr Harris sought to press home the point that choice of place at which to demonstrate was integral to the right to demonstrate:

“And as to the issue of reasonable limits, another aspect of our case is that there is, in Hong Kong, a constitutionally guaranteed right to demonstrate.

COURT:    But bearing in mind that is not an absolute right.

MR HARRIS:    Indeed not, but the question …

COURT:    It is a matter of degree again.  We are talking about the degree of reasonableness.

MR HARRIS:    Well, it is partly a matter of degree.  It is also a matter of what factors are reasonably to be taken into account and in my submission it’s highly relevant if demonstrators are not being permitted to demonstrate in front of this office and in my submission Mr Haynes’s questions are very relevant on that issue.

COURT:    Well, I think you have overlooked and perhaps you had completely missed what I had just said.  I said most of the questions put to various prosecution witnesses are totally irrelevant and in fact not sensible at all.

MR HARRIS:    I’ve made my points.

COURT:    I make my point too.

MR ZERVOS:    Can I just say something in response to Mr Harris’s comments?  If Mr Harris wants to get on a soapbox, he can go outside the courtroom and get on a soapbox and make the sort of comments that he’s made because it’s not relevant in relation to the charges that these people are facing and for which your Worship is here to decide on.  We’re here to deal with a case against these defendants in relation to obstruction on that day, 14 March, and that’s what we’ve got to be focused on.”

(Appeal bundle p. 1281) (Emphasis added).

This was a strange objection to take and, I am bound to say, an unattractive way to take it.  The point Mr Harris was making was a good one and highly relevant not least because the police superintendent was insisting that the appellants should have taken their demonstration elsewhere, and that the failure to do so was to be held against the appellants; an error, in the factual context, which was endorsed, as we shall see, by the magistrate in his findings.

(4)“Q.  Do you remember writing down in your witness statement that you had ‘explicitly’ seen obstruction offences?

A.    That is what I meant.  I could see people who could not walk in straight lines.”

(Appeal bundle p. 1291).

My comment here is that in the context of this case, the fact – if it was a fact – that some were prevented by the demonstration from walking in straight lines could not of itself render the demonstrators guilty of obstruction offences.  The same question – whether the unlawful obstruction was constituted by the mere presence of the appellants causing some to make a detour of no moment or on the other hand was constituted by an appreciable inconvenience occasioned to others - was frequently pursued elsewhere in the hearing, for example:

(a) “Q.  Are you able to tell us from your knowledge of this locality and the building to what extent, if any, was the level of pedestrian traffic in the area or in and out of the building affected by the demonstration?  Was it greater or smaller than usual?

A.    My knowledge of the area in Connaught Road West was in the … morning a lot of residents do use that part of the road and there were people pushing trolleys, transporting goods between shops in the nearby area as well.

Q.    Are you able to tell us whether people were keeping away or keeping out of distance from what was going on in front of 160?

A.    From my own observation at the scene, there were people who tried to avoid using that part of the road and some who had to use that part of the road could not walk in straight lines.  They have to make detours to get past the group.

(Appeal bundle p. 1300). (Emphasis added).

(b) “Q.     And I want you to consider this.  At all times, there was room for a brave person to walk behind the backs of the – sorry, at that time they were facing.  There was room for a brave person to walk between the step of the podium and the sitting demonstrators.

A.    Please tell him that although there was enough space but what they did had caused unnecessary fear.  However, this area was very narrow.  After they had held a sit-in and set out a banner, this area was narrow.

….

Q.    No, but the obstruction you’ve told us left a 2-metre gap.

A.    Although the space here was 2 metres, but however, there’s no reason for that person to go here from here at an angle.”

(Appeal bundle pp. 1754-1756; testimony of the security guard who asserted obstruction, Mr Wong (PW5)) (Emphasis added).

(c) “Q.    Now, this demonstration that was taking place and where you’ve indicated or where you observed the demonstrators assembling or congregating, what impact did you observe that it had on the pedestrian traffic or on pedestrians?

A.    Since this group of people was there and it was undoubtedly that they were not able to go to their desired destination in a straight line.

Q.    Who were ‘they’?

A.    ‘They’ refers to the passers-by who walked past the Connaught Road West or who went to work or the workers who were pushing the hand carts, and for the people who intended to enter the building for work, they had to enter the building at an angle.”

(Appeal bundle p. 1793; evidence of Senior Inspector Wong) (Emphasis added).

(d) “Q.    Yes, but you see, the police action in accepting that the pavement was wide enough to accommodate a demonstration outside 162, right?  That means since the pavement was the same width outside 160, it was wide enough to accommodate a demonstration outside 160.

A.    If there was a demonstration held at No. 160 Connaught Road and the pedestrians walked directly in a straight line, then the demonstration would cause obstruction to the pedestrians.  If they choose a route in order to avoid the demonstrators, then the demonstration would not cause obstruction to them.

(Appeal bundle p. 1812).  (Emphasis added).

(5)    The security officer Wong agreed that compared to the rest of Hong Kong the pedestrians were very few and the pavement uncrowded (page 1764), but when it was suggested that:  ‘the pavement was such a big space that it could easily accommodate a small demonstration’, his reply (page 1765) was that ‘As I worked at that place, I was informed by the police they themselves did have a protest area’; testimony, so it seems, symptomatic of the factors upon which the security guards and police concentrated.

94.In the light of the factual matrix which presented itself to the learned magistrate, the precept of give and take was fundamental to a properly informed conclusion in this case.  But I believe that a full study of the transcript in this case reveals an assumption on the part of the prosecution witnesses who alleged obstruction, and also on the part of prosecuting counsel, that all that had to be shown was that pedestrians were diverted from the path which but for the presence of the demonstrators they would have taken; and that since there was a space available down the road for the Falun Gong to demonstrate, an obstruction contrary to section 28(4) of the Summary offences Ordinance was proved.  I see little in the evidence of those who apparently decided that there was unlawful obstruction occasioned by the appellants, and little in the approach of prosecuting counsel in the frequent objections he took to what appears to me to have been perfectly acceptable cross-examination, that was imbued with a recognition of the give and take to be accorded to use of the highway; and little that recognized the important right to meaningful demonstration as part of the equation that had to be addressed.  With respect to the magistrate, whose task was not made easier by some unhappy exchanges between counsel, I find scant assurance from the Statement of Findings that give and take as between two rights was accorded adequate consideration: indeed, there is a strong assertion in that Statement that the demonstrators were disrespectful of the rights of those seeking access to the offices – a conclusion against which the testimony tended - with no concomitant recognition of the tolerance and respect demanded by the right to assemble and protest guaranteed in terms by the Basic Law.  Conversely, if the magistrate did seek to balance the two rights, then I take the view, based upon the testimony that I have studied, that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could on the facts of this case have convicted of charge(s 1 and) 2.

Pointers

95.That there was testimony which called into question the accuracy of the evidence of actual obstruction, and the magistrate’s approach to that testimony, is a later and important question.  For the moment, however, I wish to turn to the evidence which gave rise to the question whether the space occupied by the demonstrators was such as truly impeded convenient access to the main entrance of the office block; whether such detours as were taken to avoid the group were necessary and, even if so, were significant; whether there was a peculiar sensitivity by those who would access the building to the identity of the demonstrators such that the wide berth which they may have accorded to those demonstrators did not in the event mean that the demonstrators were using the space unreasonably but, rather, that give and take was viewed by those who decided that there was an obstruction in too narrow or one-sided a fashion.  These were questions which the magistrate had in the circumstances of this case to address, and the Statement of Findings gives me scant assurance that they were addressed. 

96.The evidence to which I allude came from prosecution witnesses themselves, and it tended to undermine the case of actual obstruction; and was evidence which hints that such detours as took place may well have been self imposed in the sense to which I have earlier referred:

(i)    Cross-examination of the Superintendent concentrated for quite a time upon an attempt, successful in the event, to move him from an initial estimate that the gap between the group and the flag podium was only about two or three feet to a gap that was considerably wider.  He was asked then why, if indeed an obstruction was caused by reason of the group’s proximity to the podium, he had not proposed that the group move forward to create a wider gap for access. His answer is telling:

“Because,” he said, “in my view the mere presence of the group at that location will cause actual obstruction”. (page 1264) “... I saw people actually had to make a detour to avoid the group.  What went through their mind I don’t know, maybe they were intimidated by the group, because there had been incidents that Falun Gong followers interfered with members of staff of the Liaison Office.”

(ii)    He was asked then by reference to a photograph how it could be that a person coming from a westerly direction, a person going to work, could not walk through the space left by the demonstrators and across the podium, and he said:

“In my view it would be intimidating for a normal person to walk near the group.” (page 1260). 

(iii)    The metal barriers which had been erected stayed in place for several days.  There was no suggestion that they caused danger to those thereby diverted by having to cross the path of vehicular access; a contrast to the suggestion made that the demonstrators by occupying the very same space caused just such a danger.  Mr Haynes, for some of the appellants, cross-examined Mr Fung to this end, and Mr Fung said:

“ ... they [the staff of the Liaison Office] did say to me that they find it that it would be better to have the presence of the metal barriers rather than the presence of the Falun Gong members.” (page 1719);

and then went on to concede that, despite the presence of the barriers, the pavement was very wide and that there remained still plenty of room for pedestrians to use the pavement without being obstructed ... because even though this area was fenced by the metal barriers, I personally witnessed that there was enough space for the taxi to mount the pavement’(page 1720) ( Emphasis added).

(iv)    Mr Wong, the senior security officer, was accused in cross-examination of exaggerating the limitations upon space and access which was created by the demonstrators.  His prime fear, it would seem from his testimony, was that the demonstrators might rush into the building.  When it was put to him that there was room for a person to walk between the steps of the podium and the sitting demonstrators – as quite obviously from the evidence I have seen there was – Mr Wong replied:

Please tell himthat although there was enough space but what they did had caused unnecessary fear.”. (page 1755). (Emphasis added).

(v)    I note too that one of the points underlying Mr Wong’s assertion of obstruction was that although there was ample space to pass next to the demonstrators in order to gain direct frontal access to the main doors of the building, the presence of the demonstrators meant that the pedestrians would have to approach from an angle rather than directly in a straight line from the front (page 1756).  The same concern seems to have been in the mind of the Superintendent (page 1291), and of the Senior Inspector (page 1793).  Senior Inspector Wong accepted that the area behind the backs of the demonstrators allowed ample room for access to the building; it was only that direct frontal access, he suggested, was blocked (pages 1808, 1811 and 1812).

(vi)    The attention of witnesses was drawn, understandably enough, to the fact that the Falun Gong followers, in numbers larger than those who demonstrated outside the Liaison Office on 14 March 2002, were permitted daily to sit in a group farther down the road outside number 162 Connaught Road West.  It was shown that an accommodation had there been reached between the rival rights – the right to demonstrate and the right to pass and re-pass – at an area significantly narrower than the space outside No. 160; the suggestion being that that fact undermined the case of unreasonable user outside No. 160.  When the point was put to Senior Inspector Wong, he accepted that the demonstration outside No. 162 never caused an obstruction.  However, he had learnt that:

“Although they did not cause obstruction but the company [occupier] found them disgusting.” (page 1806). 

Issues of credibility; and relevance of issues

97.One notes from the evidence that the conclusion that there was an obstruction was a conclusion formed at an early stage of the demonstration (see, for example, appeal bundle page 1292L), and that the suggestion was that there were those who simply could not enter through the front doors of the building.  The Superintendent said, for example, that:

“I saw with my own eyes on 14 March members of staff who tried to get into the Liaison Office from the main entrance of Connaught Road West and they couldn’t do it’ (page 1256)

and that:

“ … it would be difficult for any normal person to get through the gap [between the demonstrators and the actual entrance to the main building] and enter the Liaison Office via the front entrance.” (page 1259). (Emphasis added).

He first described the gap between the demonstrators and the flag podium as one of about two to three feet, changing that, after he was shown defence photographs, to about six feet.  One would have thought in the context of this case – and it seems to me clear that the demonstrators chose the size and place of their demonstration with care (perhaps because of the legal advice they had apparently sought) – that the actual size of that gap was relevant, relevant to issues of credibility as well as to the central issue of reasonableness.  It is a little surprising therefore to see the court’s comments in the following exchange between Bench and Bar:

“COURT:    We have different kinds of evidence so far describing about the width and the length of the pavement and, in fact, I had personally raised the question when I was visiting the site about the measurements.  I was assured that measurements of a particular area will be given to court in due course.

MR HAYNES:    Yes.

MR ZERVOS:    Yes, we will be providing it, your Worship.

COURT:    So I wonder if that is really sensible to pursue this line of questioning.  Do you think it will get us anywhere?

MR HAYNES:    Well, the last photo got us somewhere and sometimes it does jog people’s memory and make them more accurate.

COURT:    Well, if that is your view.

MR HAYNES:    Well, I mean, the last photographs took us from 2 to 3 feet to 6 feet.

COURT:    And even 8, do you think that would make a vast difference?

MR HAYNES:    In terms of highway obstruction it makes every difference.  Certainly in obstruction of public place.”

(Appeal bundle p. 1263) (Emphasis added).

And then this:

“COURT:     Now, I am not criticizing you in respect of many areas of cross-examination, but I do question, for example – and I would like to stress ‘for example’ – the gap between the demonstrators and the stone pillars.  Frankly, if you want to be very specific, you can even ask this witness or other prosecution witnesses to the effect that what happened if the gap was 9 feet and 2 inches in width.  You can be so specific to that extent, but whether, if you do conduct that line of cross-examination, I really have doubt if that would assist any of us in this courtroom.

MR HAYNES:    Your Worship, I am a bit concerned about that, because obstruction of a public place frequently is a matter of feet and inches, and give and take, and what is – nobody has the right to walk along the pavement in a straight line totally unobstructed, and as we know, Hong Kong is a very – public areas are heavily obstructed with all kinds of problems, in other words, various temporary obstructions are accommodated and within the right to demonstrate it may be that pedestrians from time to time may have to alter their course, although not regularly, to accommodate …”

(Appeal bundle p. 1266)

98.When the police officer was shown the photograph marked PD11, a photograph taken before the erection of the barriers, of ten demonstrators holding the banner and occupying the position they occupied throughout the morning (and showing, in my judgment, the ample room for those who wished to pass to do so, and for those who wished to gain access to the main building to gain access, easily, to the main building), it was put to the Superintendent by counsel:

“ …isn’t the simple truth that having looked at PD11 you realise that the idea that the demonstration physically obstructed access to the flag podium simply cannot be maintained in the [light] of that photograph?”

and the officer replied:

“I disagree’. (page 1261).

In my opinion, however, these statements, and statements like them from this and other witnesses, did not sit well with the objective or non-contentious indicia.

99.The probable truth of the matter, so it seems to me, was revealed by other testimony; and it suffices for this purpose to concentrate on the testimony of the Superintendent who accepted that in the first hour of this demonstration he received repeated complaints from Mr Deng of the Liaison Office (page 1238).  He gave evidence that the demonstrators were advised to go, as early as 9.15am, to the space designated for the Falun Gong outside No. 162 Connaught Road.  The pavement outside No. 162 was certainly no wider than that outside No.160 and it was not as unencumbered in that there were trees planted intermittently within that stretch of pavement, and it was, of course, not outside the Liaison Office itself.  Yet the Superintendent did not accept, when it was put to him, that to require the demonstrators to move from in front of that which he had described as a de facto embassy (page 1254) was a requirement that, if successful, would deprive the demonstrators of ‘their most visible demonstration position’.  That was a strange denial, for it seems to me as obvious as can be that such a move would clearly deprive them of just that.  Indeed, there was evidence from the officer himself, the Superintendent, that as far as he was concerned no demonstration in that location (that is outside the Liaison Office) was acceptable, and in context I take him to have meant no demonstration by that group.  He was asked about counter proposals to the suggestion that they were to move to outside No. 162 and he said it was not ‘appropriate for any demonstration to take place at that particular location’ since obstruction would be caused and he feared a breach of the peace (page 1293)(Emphasis added).  The object of the exercise he said (page 1296) was not to stop them from demonstrating but just to ‘move them to a location where inconvenience is minimal.’

100.These comments are remarkable.  The place to which they were to be removed was, so it seems to me, no less convenient to the pedestrian, and there was much to suggest little or no substantial physical inconvenience to the workers at the Liaison Office building, unless one interprets inconvenience to be that occasioned by the presence of those with whose ideas or habits one disapproves.  Conversely, there was no question but that the disadvantage to the efficacy of the demonstration would, by such a move, have been material, evidencing inadequate consideration to the countervailing rights at play.  The right to demonstrate and the right to protest are rights to be exercised:

“… without impediment so long as no wrongful act is done. It is often the only means by which grievances can be brought to the knowledge of those in authority – at any rate with such impact as to gain a remedy”

per Lord Denning MR in Hubbard v Pitt [1976] 1 QB 142, 178.

As one so often sees in newscasts from around the world, pavements or plazas outside government buildings or embassies are regularly used for protests, and the reason for the choice of site is clear, namely, that they are the natural or most obvious sites for demonstrations, precisely because demonstrating ‘down the road’ is less likely to bring home the intended message either to government or embassy officials or to passers-by.  It is no answer to say, as was said in terms by the Superintendent:

“I believe they can achieve the same objective by using the public activity area.’ (page 1259). 

101.In the court below, counsel for the appellants pursued the suggestion that the police were according to the Liaison Office special treatment, in the sense of being overly sensitive to the complaints emanating from that Office without proper regard to the facts or to the importance of the right to demonstrate.  This line of questioning was the subject of objection by prosecuting counsel on the basis of irrelevance.  But since the facts were in dispute and the credibility and motives of the police were at the heart of the case, the questioning was entirely relevant, and I am surprised that the court below thought that ‘most of the questions put to various prosecution witnesses are totally irrelevant and in fact not sensible at all’, an assessment with which I cannot agree.  The following exchange in the context of the same line of cross-examination is noteworthy:

“MR HARRIS:    Sir, may I address you on this?  Mr Haynes is cross-examining on my behalf as well on these issues and I am very anxious that these questions are put because it seems to me that this is a prosecution brought because of the involvement of the Liaison Office, that one could walk around the streets around this court and in a short walk and find hundreds of obstructions greater than anything that’s put forward in evidence.

COURT:    Right, correct me …

MR HARRIS:    Therefore, I say that it is very relevant …

COURT:    Right. Correct me if I’m wrong then …

MR HARRIS:     … that this issue is gone into.

COURT: … Mr Harris.

MR ZERVOS:    Not here to decide.

COURT:    The way I understand the defence case, let me try to summarisethat so far.  The defence is saying that the Falun Gong were suffering from persecution and that because of the persecution it may raise the possible defence of reasonable excuse – lawful excuse.  And it is also the defence case, if I understand the defence position correctly, that the Liaison Office has been receiving special treatment.

Now, that’s the gist of the defence case in relation to the obstruction charges.” (Appeal bundle p.1280).

102.Persecution was not the lawful excuse upon which the defence rested.  The lawful excuse advanced was the reasonable exercise of the right of protest.  Counsel for the appellants was evidently concerned that the point was being missed, a concern which in the course of the transcript we see repeated in other contexts.  Shortly after the passage just recited, Mr Haynes appeared concerned that neither the prosecution nor, more importantly, the court seemed to appreciate valid reasons for pursuing various lines of questioning.  One such line was to illustrate that no action had been taken when the pavement had been littered with vehicles. The objection to this line was that failure to charge previous obstructions was irrelevant, whereas the defence point was that neither the vehicles nor the demonstrators had caused any unreasonable obstruction.  The same point was made about the police barriers left in place for several days.  There followed this exchange:

“MR HAYNES:    I’ve said that now because from what you’ve told me, it seems that the Bench and the prosecution are together in misunderstanding the line of the defence.

COURT:    No.

MR ZERVOS:    No, not misunderstanding …

COURT:    If I understand you correctly, you are only putting it in a different way.  I said earlier on it is part of the defence case that the Falun Gong members were being persecuted.  Now, the element of persecution suggested by the defence is implicit in the sense that the Liaison Office was given, may I use the word priority or, using the defence terms, special treatment.

Now, it goes hand in hand, the defence, on which words or terms you use, but insofar as the final meaning, they all mean the same; persecution, lawful excuse, special treatment, whatever you name it, as long as it carry the same meaning.  This is one of the gist, one of the basis of the defence.  I fully appreciate that and I remind you I kept making myself clear.  I fully appreciate what the defendants are facing, what kind of charges the nature of them, the elements of the charges I appreciate.  I am aware of it.” (Appeal bundle p. 1285).

It must, surely, be a matter of concern that the tribunal thought at that relatively advanced stage of the case that the defence were construing persecution as the lawful excuse which provided their defence.

The defence photographs and films

103.Between the time the handful of demonstrators first took up their position outside the Liaison Offices and the time the demonstrators were first ordered to move, a period less than one hour, a series of complaints was made to the police by an official of the Liaison Office about the demonstrators.  After the first complaint, the complaint was repeated at 9.15am; then again at 9.30am; and then yet again at 9.45am, well after the bulk of workers arrived at that building.  Barriers started to go up at about 9.20am around the demonstrators sealing them off from the building; and at 10.07am the first warning was issued to the demonstrators.  The reason given was that they were causing an obstruction (and not, let it be noted, that their demonstration might have that effect).  As we have seen, testimony of the security guards and of police officers was directed at the period between the formation of the demonstration and the putting up of the barriers, though not exclusively so.  A reading of the extensive cross-examination, which cross-examination was, I regret to have to say, not facilitated by some unnecessarily strident interruptions by prosecuting counsel, shows a constant theme, namely, that the testimony of these witnesses was not to be believed.  In support of that contention, counsel for the appellants sought to highlight certain indicia which, they asserted, undermined the credibility of the testimony.  Those suggested indicia included:

(1)    a comparison of sketches drawn by witnesses which, on their face, exaggerated the width of the demonstration and the proximity of the demonstrators to the flag podium;

(2)    the fact that the police permitted Falun Gong demonstrators in larger numbers than those gathered in front of the Liaison Office on 14 March, to gather regularly and for prolonged hours each day in front of a narrower piece of pavement along the same road but out of view of the Office;

(3)    the fact of numerous complaints (five within one hour) to the police by the Liaison Office, whose view of the demonstrators was unlikely to be neutral;

(4)    the absence of any testimony from anyone who was said to have been obstructed in his or her path to the Office entrance, as well as an absence of testimony from the members of staff at the Liaison Office who made the five complaints; and

(5)    the fact that railings stayed up for several days after the demonstration which kept pedestrians out from an area significantly larger than that occupied by the demonstrators

104.For reasons I have advanced, the suggestions that the complaints to the police were not motivated by true concern about obstruction, and that the police approach to the whole affair was coloured by the identity of the complainants, were not suggestions to be avoided.  They constituted an issue that was a recurrent theme of the cross-examination and emerged from the facts themselves and, as we have seen, there was a stage when counsel for the appellants suggested in terms that the Liaison Office had been accorded ‘special treatment’ by the police; and there was a suggestion too that the area of pavement outside the Liaison Office had in effect been declared a ‘sort of unofficial “no demonstration” area’ (page 1296).  Counsel for the appellants sought regularly to refer to other instances where the pavement in question was occupied either by vehicles or by the barriers themselves.  None of this was irrelevant, for it went to suggest that whereas other obstacles were not viewed as unlawful or unreasonable obstructions, the demonstration, occupying a smaller space, was; so that that could only be accounted for (so ran the argument) by the identity of the sect to which the appellants adhered and the identity of the place outside which they were ensconced.  There were thus raised two contentions – that there was in fact no unreasonable obstruction, and that the allegation to the contrary was disingenuous. 

105.This issue of the bona fides of the allegations was an issue that had to be faced squarely and there was in my opinion much which ought to have caused the magistrate to pause and to look for uncontroversial indicia as to the truth.  In a case imbued as was this case with political overtones, with strong opposing sensitivities, and with hotly contested issues of fact, it is the evidence which is not in dispute, or that cannot be gainsaid, that is likely to resolve the contested testimony.  Such evidence was available in this case, and we have seen it.  It took the form of photographs and of videos which showed the scene between the time the demonstration was formed to beyond the stage of the erection of the barriers.  That was the vital period in this case.  In so far as those photographs show the area occupied by the demonstrators, and by the banner they held, the position of the demonstrators in relation to the flag podium, the spaces left available for pedestrian traffic, the tightness of the group, the attitude assumed by the demonstrators: such matters were not suggested to be falsified by those photographs or by the video.

106.This is evidence which was shown to this Court in the appeal and in my judgment it substantially undermined the case for the prosecution.  It is instructive therefore to see how the magistrate approached this evidence.

107.But the magistrate took the view that the defence exhibits were of no value.  That assessment cannot, with respect, withstand an examination of the exhibits themselves.  These photographs were persistently, and understandably, used in the course of the case by counsel for the appellants in order to illustrate the exaggeration of some witnesses – and exaggeration there clearly was – and to support assertions that there was ample space for a demonstration of the size of this demonstration; that there was less space outside No. 162 Connaught Road; and that occupation of the same space on other occasions suggested a motive behind the objections in this case that had little to do, in reality, with obstruction:

(1)    The photographs were used to show that the assessment of the witness Wong (PW5) as to the breadth of the demonstration on a sketch plan which he had drawn was materially inaccurate.

(2)    Exhibit PD5 was used to show the witness Wong the clear space of pavement between the demonstrators and the podium (pages 1762-3).

(3)    A photograph was used to show an occasion when official vehicles covering almost the entire width of the pavement in front of the Liaison Office parked there with apparent impunity (page 1766); suggesting either disparate standards or that in fact the pavement was such as to allow relatively easy passage for pedestrians and office workers despite extensive alternative use of the area.

(4)    One of the advantages of the defence photographs was that the police took no photographs or videos until 10.05am; that is at almost the same time as the first warning was delivered to the protesters, and after the police barriers were erected, whereas the defence photographs showed the protesters, the size of their demonstration, and the position they occupied before the barriers were erected, when it was said that the offending obstructions had already been effected; and showed, more effectively in my view than the prosecution photographs, exactly how much space there was for pedestrians and office workers to negotiate their way along the pavement and to the main entrance of the building.  Photographs PD13 and PD14 were particularly useful to this end.

(5)    Photograph PD3 showed Mr Wong the security guard using the route suggested in evidence to be the least used route to the main entrance, and illustrated exactly the route one would expect an office worker to take to the main entrance; a path, incidentally, across vehicular access to the building.

(6)    Photograph PD7 showed the area occupied by the demonstrators outside No. 162 by juxtaposition with the area outside No. 160 after the barriers had been erected.

(7)    The video PD22 was used in cross-examination (pages 1844-45) to illustrate the position and space occupied by the group when first they gathered outside the building, and showed the ease with which a passer-by made his way past the group.

(8)    I have earlier referred to the passage at page 1261 where the Superintendent disagreed with the suggestion, obviously a sound suggestion, that photograph PD11 illustrated that the demonstrators did not physically obstruct access to the flag podium.  Whether the assessment of this officer, who was after all in charge of the arrest action, was fair and objective could also, I would have thought, be tested by reference to his reaction to the photograph shown to him, numbered PD14, to which one has only to look to see the oddity of the response at page 1296:

“Q.    And I suggest that the pavement depicted in PD14 could easily accommodate a small peaceful demonstration without intolerably obstructing pedestrians.

A.    I disagree.”

108.Against this background, there are two comments in the Statement of Findings which deserve particular attention:

(1)    ‘The entire incident, starting at about 10:05 hours, was captured by police videos.’ (page 241 appeal bundle).

The entire incident did not start at 10.05am nor was the entire incident filmed by the police. By 10.15am the obstruction, according to the police and prosecution, had been going on for an hour or so; and by 10.05am the situation had materially changed by reason of the police barriers which seem to me to have had little to do with availing office workers in their passage to the entrance of the main building, and upon which barriers the police officers did not rely in their testimony as forming or contributing to the obstruction; and

(2)    ‘The defence exhibits were of no significance to the present proceedings.’ (page 261 appeal bundle).

I view this latter finding as one that is impossible to support.  These defence exhibits were of considerable significance to the issues which the magistrate had to decide.  They were relevant to the issue of credibility; to the issue of the manner in which the appellants were conducting themselves; to the space occupied; to the space available for others; to whether there could have been an obstruction in fact and, if so, whether an appreciable or unreasonable one by or at the time the police concluded that the law had been breached; to whether the complaints made before and after the police arrived could conceivably have been related to any appreciable obstruction to those wanting access to the Office whether by the frontal route or at an angle; to whether it mattered two hoots that one or more persons could not approach the main entrance at a 90° angle from the road; to whether the space available and the space occupied outside the Office was greater or smaller than outside No. 162 Connaught Road; and to whether the demonstrators were so grouped as to show a deliberate attempt to keep to a small and specific area, thus demonstrating the probability, as they contended, that they had received legal advice by which they were seeking to abide.  The dismissal of these photographs in this manner was an echo, I regret to conclude, of the failure, evident elsewhere in the proceedings, of the court below to appreciate the essential issues which it was incumbent upon the court to determine.

109.In the course of this appeal, it was suggested that the defence photographs hardly showed an accurate or complete picture, taken as they were at a particular time or from a particular angle and that once this Court was shown the prosecution videos, a reality would be revealed that would readily demonstrate the obstruction caused.  The reality did not in the event match the promise.  I saw little, certainly insufficient, in the prosecution videos that supported a conclusion that this demonstration occasioned an unreasonable obstruction.  Looking at the photographs and films as a whole, I have considerable difficulty in accepting that this small and tightly knit group caused obstruction of the kind to which the prosecution witnesses attested.  It may be said there were onlookers swelling the ranks of those occupying the square; but that suggestion does not accord with the visual evidence we have seen, save in respect of those kept to the very sides, behind barriers and well away from the demonstrators.

Contradictions

110.This was a peaceful demonstration – see the concessions to this effect at pages 1258; 1295; and 1820 – and, by any standard, a small one, and the films we have seen illustrate that a concerted attempt seems to have been made by the demonstrators to remain a tightly knit group in two perfectly straight lines with a significant space between themselves and the flag podium.  The view that an obstruction was occasioned was taken when there were only four demonstrators (page 1793), a view that sits oddly with that number and the size of the pavement.  The view was taken that the demonstration outside No. 162 caused no obstruction (pages 1805; 1812), a view that sat oddly with the conclusion that a smaller number, less spread out, outside No. 160 did cause an obstruction.  It was conceded (page 1811) that the demonstration would have allowed for an eight-foot ladder to be carried behind the backs of the demonstrators (page 1811), yet the view was allegedly held that there was no room for people to pass (page 1259).  An attempt was made to bolster the assertion of obstruction by reference to the suggested detours that the group allegedly caused pedestrians to make across the path of vehicular traffic, yet it was accepted (page 1809) that even those who gained access through the flag area had still to cross a vehicular area; and in any event the objective evidence undermines the suggestion that it was this group that caused office workers to take a diagonal route to the main door, and furthermore, the type of path across a vehicular access as was occasioned by the construction of this building and its curtilege is the type that one sees being negotiated with relative ease every day throughout this city.  It was said that there arose a security risk, yet the protesters sat or stood in one spot for several hours advertising the fact that they were on a hunger strike with no hint of any other objective.  Evidence was given of numbers who were said to have been diverted from their paths (as if a mere diversion sufficed), yet not one such incident was filmed nor one person thus allegedly diverted called to give evidence.  The attitude of the demonstrators was said by the magistrate to be ‘nothing short of disrespecting the rights of the staff of the [Liaison Office] and members of the public’ (see page 271 appeal bundle), yet that very criticism directed at these demonstrators, who (or some of whom) had taken the trouble of seeking legal advice, carries no concomitant recognition of the respect or tolerance to be accorded to the right to protest.

The findings

111.There are certain, though disparate, aspects of the Findings that merit specific comment.

112.The magistrate relied, in part at least, for his decision on Cooper v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1986) 82 Cr. App. R. 74 and on Hirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 143.  It is instructive to see to what end he relied on those authorities, and how he applied those decisions to the facts as he found them.  He said, at page 267 of the appeal bundle, that:

“In Cooper v Metropolitan Police Commissioner(1986) 82 Cr. App. R. Tudor Evans J. said at P242: ‘… a member of the public has a right to pass and repass along a highway and to do everything which is reasonable thereto.  For example, a member of the public exercising that right undoubtedly has a right to look in a shop window or to talk to a passing friend without committing an offence.  However, if as a matter of fact and degree a member of the public’s use of the highway is so unreasonable so as to amount to an obstruction, then an offence under the Highways Act 1980 may be committed.  If that is right, then it follows that it is a question of fact and degree in every case …’  The cases cited were decided before the enactment of the Basic Law and the BORO.  The underlying principle to determine the issue of obstruction, in my judgment, was the same.  In the present case the defendants were setting out/displaying a banner, congregating as a group and practicing meditation, the conduct clearly was not incidental to pass and repass the pavement because they were virtually stationary.  The occupation of the public pavement outside the L.O. by the defendants were clearly wilfully done.  The question which followed must be: was it reasonable use of the public pavement?  Taking into account of the size of the occupation, which varied in different intervals, and the duration of the activity, which lasted over four hours during busy office hours; it was not a reasonable use of the pavement.  In R v Yau Bun (1964) HKLR 364, the Court in construing Sec. 3(4) (i.e. the precursor to Sec. 4A) of the Summary Offences Ordinance held that ‘… the section expressly distinguishes between a matter or thing which “obstructs” and a matter or thing which “may obstruct” … The section itself creates the distinction between the case where obstruction is to be proved and the case where it need not be proved’.  In the present case, the video recordings such as Exh. P1, 3, 5, 9, 11 and 13 were cogent evidence proving the manner in which the demonstration took place.  Though proof of potential obstruction sufficed; the evidence of PW4, PW5, PW10 and PW11 went beyond that.  Their evidence proved that the defendants had caused actual obstruction.”

Cooper was a strange case upon which to rely in the context of the issues in the instant case.  It was a 1986 decision where the facts were very far from the facts and issues in the present case.  In that case the court was concerned with a club tout who was approaching pedestrians on a four foot wide busy footway and causing them to step into the road; and in that case the court placed emphasis on the right of passage and actions incidental thereto, an emphasis that is echoed in the magistrate’s comment that the conduct of the appellants ‘was not incidental to pass and repass’.  Quite apart from the fact that the law has for long moved away from regarding the permissible use of the highway as one restricted to passage and use incidental thereto, stopping pedestrians to press them to come into a club, and occasioning some obstruction when doing so, is clearly not in itself a reasonable activity.  In such a situation, lawful excuse was unlikely to have a successful run as a defence.  Exercising a right of protest outside an office housing governmental officials is hardly analogous, and to say in such a context that a four hour use of the pavement for such a purpose by the relatively small numbers we have in this case is ‘not a reasonable use of the pavement’ is a comment that begs the question: Why not?  Of itself, it was lawful.  Of itself, it was in the exercise of a fundamental right.  Four hours is not an unusual time for a political protest.  The numbers were smaller than those required by the Public Order Ordinance, Cap 245 to seek the permission of the Commissioner of Police to gather.  The use to which the space occupied was put was self evidently, of itself, reasonable.  The reference to busy office hours is, with respect, relatively meaningless without some indication of the numbers during those four hours seeking to gain access in a building at that part of town.  The magistrate found that actual obstruction was caused.  Be that as it may, it will seldom be difficult for the prosecution to prove a degree of obstruction; but that will hardly ever be the true issue in such a case.  The true issue will be the lawfulness of the activity that causes that obstruction, whether in the exercise of a fundamental right, and whether the activity is, in context of space occupied, time taken, and most particularly the nature and degree of inconvenience caused to others, unreasonable.  In the analysis found in the passage to which I have just referred, important elements of the mixture are omitted.

113.The key issue as we have seen from Jones is whether the activities of the appellants unreasonably obstructed others.  The magistrate instead concentrated on whether the use of the area was ‘so unreasonable as to amount to an obstruction’, concluding that because of the size of the demonstration and the fact that it lasted over four hours it was not a reasonable use.  The size and duration of the activity was of no consequence if no inconvenience to others was occasioned, or if such inconvenience as was caused was slight and of the type that has to be tolerated in a society that gives due weight to the right to demonstrate.

114.At page 271 of the appeal bundle the magistrate said:

“The defendants, in the present case, were obsessed with the idea of persecution of FLG.  Despite numerous reminders that they were causing obstruction to others, they made a conscious decision to remain there.  The attitude was nothing short of disrespecting the rights of the staff of the L.O. and member of the public.” (Appeal bundle p. 271).

I fail to see the relevance of the reference to their obsession with the idea of persecution.  The subjective views and intentions of the demonstrators are irrelevant to the issue which the court had to determine: see Jones at page 257F.  So too is it irrelevant that the demonstrators continued to demonstrate in that spot despite warnings to move elsewhere.  If their use of the pavement was not an unreasonable use, it did not become unreasonable because of warnings:

“… in the latter stages of the argument before us it was suggested that the user on the day in question was eminently unreasonable.  I do not for a moment deny that there may have been evidence in the case that the user was unreasonable, but in the careful formulation of their reasons the magistrates have made it manifest that this was not a ground of their judgment.  The ground of their judgment, as I have already said, was that the band continued to play after being warned not to do so, and that caused an obstruction.  These were the grounds of the judgment, and these alone.  They did not, nor do they, at all indicate that they considered the question whether the use of the street by a moving body in the way it was used was an unreasonable one.  There may be considerable obstruction and yet the use of the street may be quite reasonable.  As to playing a party tune, this is not unlawful; and as to the warning of the police, no doubt prudent and well-disposed citizens will promptly accede to the suggestions of the police, and will be slow indeed to incur the reproach which would naturally arise from disregarding the advice of those who are charged with the preservation of public order; but, having regard to the charge in this case, the warning of the police could not merely of itself render the user of the highway unreasonable.”

See Lowdens v Keaveney [1903] 2 IR 82 at 87-88.

Furthermore, the reference to disrespecting the rights of others begs the very question which the court had to tackle, which was whether there was a proper balance between the rights at issue.

115.At page 272, the magistrate said that ‘the police never sought to stop the demonstration’ and that the same purpose could have been achieved elsewhere.  This is to fail to recognize the nature of the right in question: see my comments at [100] above.

116.At page 271 of the appeal bundle, we find the following from the magistrate:

“The extent or degree of tolerating the demonstration will invariably differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  When deciding the rights of the defendants, as demonstrators; it must be viewed against the background, history and culture of Hong Kong.  The principle of ‘one country, two systems’ must be protected and preserved given Hong Kong is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.  It followed that the legitimate interests of the public to enjoy the free passage of pavement, which was protected by relevant provisions before 1st July, 97, should continue to be protected.  These legitimate interests formed part of the general welfare and the interests of the collectivity as a whole.  Clearly these interests were within the concept of public order (ordre public).”

I fail to understand what it is the court below was driving at, and I agree with the Chief Judge (paragraph 27(6) above) that it is puzzling why the issue of one country, two systems was, as a matter of law, relevant to this case.  True it is that the legitimate interests of the public require protection of their right to pass along pavements and to gain access to buildings.  No-one in this case ever suggested otherwise.  In so far as 1997 is relevant in this case as a matter of law, it is relevant because the Basic Law then came into effect and that very Law provided constitutional protection to another right which the facts of this case put in the balance. It is significant that that right received no mention in the passage I have here reproduced.

Charge 2: Conclusion

117.I am satisfied:

(1)    that the objective indicia and the facts which are common ground show clearly enough that there was ample room for pedestrians as well as office workers safely to pass and to gain access to the building;

(2)    that that situation was not likely materially to change;

(3)    that the court below failed to take into account relevant evidence;

(4)    that the court below accorded too little regard to the right of assembly and protest;

(5)    that the court below applied too restrictive a test to the issue of reasonableness as it arises when two fundamental rights compete for space on a highway;

(6)    that the court below failed to recognize, or to accord sufficient weight to, the significance of the sensitive setting in which the demonstration took place;

(7)    that the court below failed, in assessing credibility, to pay adequate regard to the force of non-contentious indicia and testimony;

(8)    that the court below failed to appreciate the relevance of a number of legitimate lines of inquiry pursued on the appellant’s behalf in cross-examination; and

(9)    that the findings of fact reached by the court on the issue of obstruction to a public place were findings which no reasonable tribunal accurately directing itself could properly reach.

118.For the reasons I have provided, I would allow the appeal of those appellants convicted on the second charge, that is, the charge of obstruction under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, and quash those convictions.

Charges 3-7: Obstruction of police and assault in the execution of an officer’s duty

Introduction

119.I agree that the appeals against the convictions for obstruction of a police officer in the execution of his duty (charges 3) and for assaulting police officers in the execution of their duties (charges 4 to 7 inclusive) should be dismissed, but since, as should be clear from much of my judgment thus far, I do not share my colleagues’ view that it was established, at least as to the objective component, that Superintendent Chiu himself had reasonable grounds for suspecting a public place obstruction offence, I must provide the reasons for saying that nonetheless this aspect of the appeal must fail.

The charges

120.Charges 3-7 each alleged an offence against a police officer in the execution of his or her duty.

121.Charge 3 was an allegation that the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th and 16th appellants obstructed a police officer, Inspector Ho, “in the due execution of his duty”, contrary to section 36(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap. 212.  This obstruction was said to have taken place on board a vehicle at the Western Police Station, and to have been constituted by the refusal of those appellants to disembark a police van into which they had been placed after their arrest and which they were required to disembark by an Inspector Ho when the van had arrived at the Western Police Station.  Section 36(b) of that Ordinance provides that a person whowilfully obstructs “any police officer in the due execution of his duty … commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years”.

122.Charge 4 was levelledagainst the 5th appellant and alleged an assault by her on board the same vehicle of a WPC Wong (No. 1453) whilst that officer was acting in the execution of her duty.  The allegation here was that whilst being removed from the van she bit the officer’s arm.

123.Charge 5 asserted that the 10th appellant assaulted that same police officer on board the same vehicle by grabbing her neck and collar whilst that officer was acting in the execution of her duty, namely, seeking to remove this appellant from the van.

124.Charge 6 alleged an assault, again by the 10thappellant, but against another police officer, WPC Chan, No. 56952, in the execution of her duty, whilst in the car park of the police station.  The contention here was that whilst being carried away from the van, this appellant grabbed hold of the officer’s waist and neck.

125.Charge 7, against the 3rd appellant, was an assertion that this appellant was approached by Woman Inspector Chan in the briefing room of the police station when those arrested had been asked to show proof of identity whereupon the appellant grabbed that officer’s neck from behind causing her to fall.

126.The fourth to seventh offences were said to be contrary to section 63 of the Police Force Ordinance, Cap. 232.  Section 63 provides that any person who assaults a police officer acting in the execution of his duty is liable on summary conviction to a fine of $5,000 or to imprisonment for six months.

The defences

127.The defences put forward at trial are summarized in the Statement of Findings.  The 5th appellant denied assaulting the officer WPC Wong (Charge 4); and as for Charges 5 and 6, the 10th appellant said that she was only struggling to maintain balance when she thought she might be dropped to the ground.  The 3rd appellant (Charge 7) said she was trying to prevent the 2nd appellant from being removed from the briefing room but in any event assaulted no-one.

The grounds of appeal

128.In relation to these charges, Mr Haynes appeared for the 1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th appellants.  Their grounds of appeal, pertaining to charges 3-7 inclusive, are broadly put.  They are that “the magistrate erred in finding that the 1st, 6th, 9th and 10th appellants had been lawfully arrested”; and, further – although the point is in essence the same – that the police officers in question were not acting in the lawful execution of their duty.  Of those appellants for whom Mr Harris appeared, only the 13th appellant is for present purposes relevant in that she was charged with wilful obstruction of Inspector Ho.  Her ground of appeal in this connection is that “in the event that it is held that the 13th appellant was wrongly convicted of offences against sections 4(28) and 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance, the police officers in question were not acting in the lawful execution of their duty.”

129.The issue is not that simple, and it is an issue which I confess has caused me difficulty.  That is because:

(1)    whereas it will be clear from the earlier part of my judgment that I do not accept that such suspicion as the Superintendent may have nursed that a public place obstruction offence had been committed was reasonably based, it does not necessarily follow that those who effected the arrests themselves also fell foul of the objective part of the two part test to which I shall shortly refer, or that at the time the obstruction and assaults were committed they were not otherwise acting in the execution of their duty; and

(2)    the analysis before us of the testimony and of the issues of law relevant to these four charges was particularly sparse, for the argument on appeal concentrated almost wholly on the public place obstruction offences and gave, I respectfully suggest, insufficient attention to the particular issue that, as I see it, arises in this case, namely, the circumstances in which junior officers can be said to be acting in the execution of their duty in relation to a suspect when it is not adequately shown that the test is satisfied in relation to the officer supervising the same operation.  There was no analysis of, or indeed reference to, O’Hara, below, or to any other cases or texts save one, Yeung Ho Kwong, which, for reasons I shall explain, is of no direct assistance.

The law

130.It cannot in my judgment reasonably be argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate’s conclusions that the appellants who are the subject of these charges obstructed Inspector Ho, and that the other officers named were assaulted.  That such obstruction occurred, and that the assaults took place, is obvious enough from the evidence we have seen.  But, however unattractive such conduct undoubtedly is, that is not wholly determinative of these charges, for each charge required proof, the burden of which lay upon the prosecution, that the officers who were obstructed and assaulted were at the material times acting in the execution of their duties.  The taking hold of another, the application of force upon another, and the detention of another, are acts which are prima facie unlawful and, if it is sought to justify such acts, the burden of so doing is upon the person who applies force and who detains.  Police are in no different position.  A police officer is not merely by virtue of his office entitled to assault or to detain a citizen, and a citizen who is unlawfully assaulted or unlawfully detained is entitled to resist.  This is a statement of law, even though any assault on an officer must be deprecated.  These principles have for long been established by the common law and are enshrined in article 28 of the Basic Law as well as by article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied by article 39 of the Basic Law.  (See also article 5 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance; and the history of the underlying principles cogently summarized by Lord Denning in his 1949 Hamlyn Lecture entitled ‘Freedom under the Law’).  There can be no question in this case but that the officers named in these five charges applied force upon, and detained, the appellants.  Prima facie, their acts were unlawful and the burden lay upon the prosecution to demonstrate in the case of each officer that his or her act was lawful, thereby rendering resistance unlawful.  Expression is given to this approach by the terms of section 36(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance and section 63 of the Police Force Ordinance, making it an offence to assault or obstruct an officer in the execution of his duty.

131.An arrest does not become unlawful merely because it subsequently transpires that the offence was not in fact committed or not committed by the suspect arrested. So much is obvious from the terms of section 50 of the Police Force Ordinance, Cap 232 which provides, in so far as is here relevant that:

“(1) It shall be lawful for any police officer to apprehend any person who he reasonably believes will be charged with or whom he reasonably suspects of being guilty of-

(a)   any offence for which the sentence is fixed by law or for which a person may (on a first conviction for that offence) be sentenced to imprisonment; or

….

(1A) A police officer may exercise the power to apprehend a person under subsection (1) without any warrant for that purpose and whether or not he has seen any offence committed.

(2) If any person who may lawfully be apprehended under subsection (1) or (1B) forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him or attempts to evade the arrest, a police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.”

It must follow that if a police officer reasonably believes an offence to have been committed and, in pursuit of that reasonable belief, effects an arrest, the arrest is lawful no matter that it subsequently turns out that the offence was not committed, or was not committed by the arrested person.  I note in passing that the section is different from sections to which authorities in some other jurisdictions refer, in its additional and alternative basis for arrest which is a reasonable belief that a person is to be charged, a basis that may well have been of significance in this case had that been the basis put forward.

132.I find further comfort for the point I have just made from the judgment of the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Wheatley, in Dryburgh v Galt 1981 J.C. 69, 72, where he said :

“Suffice it to say that the fact that the information on which the police officer formed his suspicion turns out to be ill-founded does not in itself necessarily establish that the police officer’s suspicion was ill-founded.  The circumstances known to the police officer at the time he formed his suspicion constitute the criterion, not the facts as subsequently ascertained.  The circumstances may be either what the police officer has himself observed, or the information which he has received.”

133.Whether in effecting arrests, the officers who actually arrested appellants were or were not acting in the execution of their duty depends in each instance whether:

(1)    he or she, as the case may be, reasonably believed the public place obstruction offence to have been committed and the arrested person to have been party to that offence; and there is here both a subjective and an objective element – the subjective element is whether the officer in fact believed that offence to have been committed, the objective element whether that belief was reasonable; failing which

(2)    the arresting officer reasonably believed that the person arrested would be charged.

134.The magistrate evidently came to the conclusion that the Superintendent who gave the original warnings and gave instructions that arrest action be taken both believed the offences to have taken place and reasonably so.  It will be apparent from the text and tenor of the earlier part of this judgment that I cannot accept that finding, certainly in so far as the objective aspect goes.  But that is not the end of the matter, for it is to the arresting officer’s conduct to which we must look; and there may be circumstances, so it seems to me, where such an officer’s conduct is lawful, although that of the instructing officer, had he effected the arrests himself, would not have been.

135.Section 24(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (England and Wales) provides that :

“(6) Where a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence.”

In relation to this provision, it has been said that:

"Where reasonable grounds for suspicion are required in order to justify the arrest of someone who turns out to be innocent, section 24 of PACE requires that the constable personally has reasonable grounds for the suspicion, and it would seem to follow that he is not protected if, knowing nothing of the case, he acts on orders from another officer, who, perhaps, does have such grounds.  On the other hand, under statutes which require only the objective existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion, it is possible that the officer needs neither have the reasonable grounds nor himself suspect, anything; he can simply follow orders.”

See: Feldman ‘Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales’ 2002, page 337; a passage approved in O’Hara v Chief Constable of R.U.C [1997] AC 286, 292.

136.In my opinion, the same principle applies to section 50 of the Police Force Ordinance, a section which is of the former category, that is to say, that it requires the arresting officer personally to suspect the commission of the offence and reasonably so. A mere instruction, without more, will not suffice. This is explained by Lord Steyn in O’Hara, at pages 293-294:

“Certain general propositions about the powers of constables under a section such as section 12(1) can now be summarized.  (1) In order to have a reasonable suspicion the constable need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case.  Ex hypothesi one is considering a preliminary stage of the investigation and information from an informer or a tip-off from a member of the public may be enough: Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam [1970] A.C. 942, 949.  (2) Hearsay information may therefore afford a constable reasonable grounds to arrest.  Such information may come from other officers: Hussien’s case, ibid.  (3) The information which causes the constable to be suspicious of the individual must be in existence to the knowledge of the police officer at the time he makes the arrest.  (4) The executive “discretion” to arrest or not, as Lord Diplock described it in Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke [1984] A.C. 437, 446, vests in the constable, who is engaged on the decision to arrest or not, and not in his superior officers.

Given the independent responsibility and accountability of a constable under a provision such as section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 it seems to follow that the mere fact that an arresting officer has been instructed by a superior officer to effect the arrest is not capable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion within the meaning of section 12(1).  It is accepted, and rightly accepted, that a mere request to arrest without any further information by an equal ranking officer, or a junior officer, is incapable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion.  How can the badge of the superior officer, and the fact that he gave an order, make a difference?  In respect of a statute vesting an independent discretion in the particular constable, and requiring him personally to have reasonable grounds for suspicion, it would be surprising if seniority made a difference.  It would be contrary to the principle underlying section 12(1) which makes a constable individually responsible for the arrest and accountable in law.  In Reg. v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, Ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 458, 474 Lawton L.J. touched on this point.  He observed:

‘[chief constables] cannot give an officer under command an order to do acts which can only lawfully be done if the officer himself with reasonable cause suspects that a breach of the peace has occurred or is imminently likely to occur or an arrestable offence has been committed.’

Such an order to arrest cannot without some further information being given to the constable be sufficient to afford the constable reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion.”

137.As Freedman points out, at page 338, ‘Lords Steyn and Hope (with whose speeches Lords Goff, Mustill and Hoffman agreed) stressed that the statute made the lawfulness of the arrest depend on the arresting officer having a suspicion on grounds which are present in that officer’s mind and which are objectively sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for that the suspicion.’

138.Thus far, we see that the person who has to house the reasonable suspicion is the arresting officer himself, and that a mere request or instruction without more may well not be sufficient for the arresting officer properly to assert that he reasonably suspects the commission of the offence by the person arrested.  That said, the circumstances in which an officer who is part of a team may properly so assert will vary infinitely, and there is no warrant for a suggestion that he may not rely on the information provided by others.  The point was made by Lord Hope in O’Hara, at pages 301-302:

Copeland v. McPherson, 1970 S.L.T. 87 shows how the question whether the constable had reasonable cause to suspect may arise in a case where the exercise of the power is the result of co-operation between several police officers.  The respondent in that case was driving along a road when he was stopped by two plain clothes police officers.  They noticed a smell of alcohol on his breath, so they sent for uniformed police officers and breath sampling equipment for the carrying out of a roadside breath test.  The respondent refused to provide a sample of his breath when he was required to do so by the uniformed officers.  He was removed to a police station where he again refused to provide a breath sample.  He was charged with offences under section 2(3) of the Road Safety Act 1967.  He was acquitted by the sheriff on the ground that the uniformed police officers had not seen the respondent driving or attempting to drive before they required him to submit to the breath test.  On appeal by the prosecutor it was held that the uniformed police officers had reasonable cause to suspect the respondent of having alcohol in his body and that, as it was conceded that the respondent at the time was a person who came within the category of “a person driving … a motor vehicle,” they were acting within their powers when they required the respondent to provide a sample of his breath.  Lord Cameron, at p. 90, rejected the respondent’s contention that reasonable cause could not exist in any case in which the uniformed police officers did not themselves see the person suspected himself driving or attempting to drive the motor car.  He pointed out that to hold otherwise would involve that a uniformed constable could never act in such a case on information received, however compelling and reliable in quality and source.  He went on to say:

‘The issue then becomes purely one of fact: the findings in the case, in my opinion, clearly support the conclusion that the uniformed police officers who were called to the scene at the request of their plain clothes colleagues had such reasonable cause.  No doubt the “reasonable cause” must have arisen in the mind of the officer before he makes the statutory request of a person in the necessary category but when, as here, uniformed officers are called on by plain clothes colleagues to attend on a driver whose conduct has led to such a call and for so obvious reason as is found in this case, I think that in such circumstances the uniformed officers have in fact very reasonable cause for suspicion that the driver has alcohol in his body.’

Many other examples may be cited of cases where the action of the constable who exercises a statutory power of arrest or of search is a member of a team of police officers, or where his action is the culmination of various steps taken by other police officers, perhaps over a long period and perhaps also involving officers from other police forces.  For obvious practical reasons police officers must be able to rely upon each other in taking decisions as to whom to arrest or where to search and in what circumstances.  The statutory power does not require that the constable who exercises the power must be in possession of all the information which has led to a decision, perhaps taken by others, that the time has come for it to be exercised.  What it does require is that the constable who exercises the power must first have equipped himself with sufficient information so that he has reasonable cause to suspect before the power is exercised.”

139.Mr Haynes relied on the decision in R v Yeung Ho Kwong [1991] 1 HKC 83, but that decision seems to me to be off the point.  In that case, the appellant had been arrested by a police constable on the instruction of his sergeant, and the magistrate had held that the order for arrest given by the sergeant was in excess of the sergeant's power and not in the due execution of his duty with respect to the appellant.  However, the appellant was convicted of an assault upon the constable on the basis that at the time of the assault, the constable was not in the course of effecting an arrest.  The Court of Appeal held that on the facts it seemed relatively obvious that at the time of the assault, the appellant had indeed been arrested and that, therefore, in the light of the finding that the arrest was in excess of the sergeant's power, the assault could not be said to have taken place in the due execution of duty.  The case is only authority for the proposition that however unnecessary or distasteful an assailant’s conduct upon a police officer might in a particular case be, an assailant cannot be found guilty of a charge alleging assault upon an officer in the due execution of that officer’s duty, if at the time of the assault the officer was not acting in the lawful execution of such a duty.

This case

140.So much then for the principles.  Their application in a particular case may be altogether more difficult, and this case is one such example.

141.There can be no doubt but that the magistrate in this case was fully aware that the persons upon whom his attention had to focus for the purpose of the second set of charges were the officers who actually arrested the appellants and took them to the vans which were to transport them to the police station, and who then later sought to take them from those vans; and that it was contended that all that those officers had done was to obey an instruction and had not themselves harboured any grounds to suspect the commission of an offence.  So much is clear from argument advanced on 3 and 4 July 2002 (see, for example, the submissions made at page 1895 of the appeal bundle), and we see from those exchanges that the prosecution was to call officers to deal with the very issue.  The same point was made by Mr Haynes in his closing submissions (see pages 96 and 97 of the appeal bundle).  Though lacking in particularity in this regard, the Findings themselves (at page 276) illustrate that the magistrate addressed the issue of personal assessments:

“The arrests were carried out by PW15, PW17, PW18 and WPC 57215.  Prior to the arrest they were briefed to stand by for possible arrest action.  PW15, for instance, had section 50 of the Police Force Ordinance on mind when arrest actions were carried out.  PW18 also had made personal assessment of the conduct of the defendants before carrying out the arrest.”

142.We have not been taken to the evidence of the officers named in charges 3 to 6 (charge 7 did not involve an arresting officer) as part of any attempt to demonstrate that they could not have harboured the requisite state of mind.  Indeed, we do not have the transcript of the testimony of Inspector Ho (charge 3) or of WPC Wong (charges 4 and 5), but only of WPC Chan (charge 6) and Inspector Chan (charge 7).  In so far as it seems clear that the magistrate did address the question of the states of mind of the arresting officers, it seems to me to be difficult for the appellants to demonstrate, without reference to the effect of their testimony that his conclusion was erroneous.

143.This is not a case in which arresting officers were told without more to go to some household, for example, to arrest a suspect for a named offence.  There was evidence that there was a briefing of the various officers and, significantly, they went to a place where the appellants were still self-evidently holding a demonstration in a public place.  The evidence was (appeal bundle page 1241) that a Superintendent Hodson was in charge of arrest action and whose unit was summoned to the scene ‘to take arrest action if necessary’.  The evidence of Superintendent Chiu was that ‘I was there with him [Hodson] all the time.’

“Q.    And can you tell us as best you can what the instruction was in relation to this arrest action, what it was for, how it was to be done?

A.    The main reason I gave to the arresting officers was that the group of demonstrators were causing obstruction under the Summary Offences Ordinance and they had to be taken back to the police station for further action.” (Appeal bundle p. 1241).

144.There is reference too in the Statement of Findings to the fact that Inspector Ho was ‘briefed at about 11:25am by PW11 about the demonstration’ (see page 274 appeal bundle); and there is also in the appeal bundle the testimony of WPC Chan (PW17) to whom the magistrate makes reference as one of the arresting officers.  According to her evidence, she and WPC Wong (PW15) were part of a group who were given instructions by a woman sergeant to arrest and remove female members of the demonstrating group.  The question was asked (p. 1859):

“Q.    After the briefing at Western Police Station, is it correct that you and other colleagues left the Western Police Station at about 1247 hours?

A.    Yes;

….

Q.    And it’s correct that at the time this Woman Sergeant 55315 briefed you, gave you instructions on further duties.

A.    Yes.

Q.    You were instructed at that time that you would be part of a team of woman officers who may be called upon to take some removal action at the scene.

A.    Yes.

Q.    Is it correct that the scene you were told was the pavement outside No. 160 Connaught Road West, that that would be the scene you would be going to?

A.    Yes.

Q.    And removal action refers to removing some people there and arresting them.  After arresting them, removing them away from that area.” (Appeal bundle p. 1860).

Similarly in cross-examination:

“Q.    And at about 12.47, some time shortly after 12.47, you received a briefing.

A.    Yes.

Q.    And that at briefing, were you told that it would be your duty to remove female members of Falun Gong who caused obstruction?

A.    Yes.

Q.    And that such removal would take place when necessary.

A.    Yes.

Q.    So as you arrived outside 160 Connaught Road, you expected that your duty would involve removing female members of Falun Gong.

A.    Yes.

Q.    And in fact, you yourself became involved in seizing some female Falun Gong members.

A.    Yes.

Q.    And you had arrived at the scene at 1309.

A.    Yes.” (Appeal bundle p. 1874).

145.On the evidence placed before us, I am satisfied that, despite such flaw as their may have been in the Superintendent’s approach to the issue of public place obstruction, there is enough upon which the magistrate could properly conclude that the arresting officers themselves had reasonable cause to suspect the commission of an offence under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance.  They had been briefed and they went to the very scene where the demonstration was still afoot.  Mr Haynes points to the fact that at the time the arresting officers went to the scene, the situation had changed, in that barriers had been erected, and that therefore the facts upon which the original view had allegedly been formed that an obstruction had been caused were no longer the same facts.  This he says is highly material.  The answer is that for the purpose of section 50 of the Police Force Ordinance it might not be material at all.  The question for the arresting officers was not necessarily whether they reasonably suspected that an offence was in the course of commission at the very time of arrest, but rather whether they reasonably suspected that one had been committed.  I think that it can reasonably be said that an officer who is given a briefing that an obstruction has taken place, and is told that those who were obstructing are still in situ, and then himself or herself sees persons fitting the description of the described group actually occupying the described place has reasonable, even if mistaken, grounds for suspecting the earlier commission of the offence.  It must follow from this that the conduct of Inspector Ho who was party to the arrests and of WPC Wong in effecting arrests was lawful; and it is therefore difficult to conclude other than that their conduct in taking the appellants to the police station, and in removing them from the van, was other than conduct in the lawful execution of their duty.  Indeed, section 51 of the Police Force Ordinance provides that: “Every person taken into custody by a police officer with or without a warrant, except a person detained for the mere purpose of taking his name and residence or detained under section 54, shall be forthwith delivered into the custody of the officer in charge of a police station or a police officer authorized in that behalf by the Commissioner.”  And it seems to me also that the conduct of the Inspector at the briefing room must have been conduct in the lawful execution of her duty.

146.It follows that I would dismiss the appeals against conviction in relation to charges 3 to 7 inclusive.

Conclusion

147.For the reasons I have provided, I would:

(1)    allow the appeals of all appellants against their convictions for obstruction of a public place (charges 1 and 2) and quash those convictions; and

(2)    dismiss the appeals against the convictions for obstruction of a public officer (charge 3) and for assaults on police officers (charges 4 to 7 inclusive).

Hon Ma CJHC :

148.It follows from the above judgments that : -

(1)    The appeals of all the Appellants on charges 1 and 2 are allowed and their convictions thereunder are quashed.

(2)    The appeals of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th and 16th Appellants under the 3rd charge are dismissed.

(3)    The appeals of the 3rd, 5th and 10th Appellants under charges 4 to 7 are likewise dismissed.

(Geoffrey Ma)

(K H Woo)

(Frank Stock)

Chief Judge, High Court

Vice-President

Justice of Appeal

Mr Gerard McCoy SC on fiat and Mr Kevin Zervos SC, SADPP of the Department of Justice for HKSAR/Respondent

Mr John Haynes instructed by Messrs Ho, Tse & Wai for the1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th and 14th Appellants

Mr Paul Harris instructed by Messrs Ho, Tse & Wai for the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 12th and 13th Appellants

Mr Andrew Bruce SC instructed by Messrs Ho, Tse & Wai assigned by the Director of Legal Aid for the 8th, 11th, 15th and 16th Appellants

3rd Appellant in person (Absent)

Appeal by 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th - 10th, 13th, 16th Appellants to Court of Final Appeal. Appeal allowed. Please refer to the appeal judgment of FACC19/2004.
Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCMA 949/2002