Securities and Futures Commission v. Liu Su Ke

Read the full judgment text of HCMA 518/2009 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 November 2009.

1. The appellant appealed against his conviction on 2 June 2009 by Mr Douglas T.H. Yau at Eastern Magistrates’ Court of two summonses, in respect of his failure to make the requisite disclosure, to the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited and Warderly International Holdings Limited (“Warderly”) respectively, within three days of becoming aware on 31 August 2007 of his interest in of 231.8 million Warderly shares on 28 December 2006, contrary to sections 310(1)(a), 313(1)(a), 324, 325(1)(b) and 32

Cited by 3 cases · Cites 8 cases

Case No.HCMA 518/2009[2010] 2 HKLRD 673
Court
High Court CFI
Date25 Nov 2009
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMA518/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 518 OF 2009

(ON APPEAL FROM ESS 45475 AND 45476 OF 2008)

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BETWEEN

  SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION Respondent
  and  
  LIU SU KE (廖澍基) Appellant

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Before : Hon Lunn J in Court

Date of Hearing : 17 November 2009

Date of Judgment : 25 November 2009

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J U D G M E N T

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1.The appellant appealed against his conviction on 2 June 2009 by Mr Douglas T.H. Yau at Eastern Magistrates’ Court of two summonses, in respect of his failure to make the requisite disclosure, to the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited and Warderly International Holdings Limited (“Warderly”) respectively, within three days of becoming aware on 31 August 2007 of his interest in of 231.8 million Warderly shares on 28 December 2006, contrary to sections 310(1)(a), 313(1)(a), 324, 325(1)(b) and 328(a)(ii) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap. 571 9 (the “Ordinance”). There is no appeal against the fines of $5,000 imposed by the magistrate on each summons.

SUMMONSES

2.The two summonses, amended in the course of the trial, were similar in nature and alleged that without reasonable excuse the appellant had failed as required to notify firstly, Warderly and secondly, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited:

“…of your interest in 231,800,000 shares comprised in the relevant share capital of Warderly International Holdings Limited, a listed corporation, within the period specified in sections 325(1)(b) of the SFO i.e. within three business days after 31 August 2007 on which date you became aware that on 28 December 2006 those shares were pledged to you, alternatively were subject to an equitable mortgage in your favour, and you acquired an interest in those shares, which acquisition caused you to come under a duty of disclosure because you had a notifiable interest immediately after but did not have a notifiable interest immediately before the acquisition.”[amended text of the summons in italics]

THE PROSECUTION CASE

3.The prosecution case at trial was that on 28 December 2006 a company controlled by the appellant, Vision Eagle Limited (“Vision Eagle”), had entered into a ‘Term Loan Facility’ agreement with Housely Industries Limited (“Housely”) a subsidiary of Warderly to lend a maximum of $6 million. At that time Mr Yeung Kui Wong was the Chairman and an executive director of Warderly, of whose issued shares he held 54.99%. By a document of the same date, headed ‘Authorisation Letter under Seal’, Mr Yeung and two companies that he controlled, Imperial Profit Enterprises Limited (“Imperial”) and Primer Capital Investments Limited (“Primer”), undertook to deposit with the appellant 231,800,000 Warderly shares. By reference to the Term Loan Facility, the Authorisation Letter stated that Mr Yeung and the two companies:

“… irrevocably authorise you to sell sufficient number of Shares so deposited with you as aforesaid to repay the Lender in the event that there is default of repayment by the Borrower on the Repayment Date..”

A “Notice of Drawing”, dated 28 December 2006, signed by Mr Yeung on behalf of Housley gave notice that the borrower wished to draw the entire sum of $6 million.  It was an admitted fact that the loan was made.

4.The prosecution called two partners and a former assistant solicitor of Messrs Stevenson Wong, who described their role in the drafting and execution of the Term Loan Agreement, the Authorisation Letter and the related documentation. Furthermore, they described the circumstances in which Stevenson Wong had come to be in possession of those Warderly share certificates prior to the execution of the Letter of Authorization. It was an admitted fact that, on behalf of Imperial and Primer, Mr Yeung had deposited those share certificates: on 17 November 2006, 144,800,000 and 30 million Warderly shares on behalf of Imperial and Primer respectively; and on22 December 2008, 30 million shares on behalf of Imperial.

5.The share certificates were delivered by Mr Yeung to Ms Cordelia Chu, a partner of Stevenson Wong, accompanied by related “Standard Form of Transfer” and “Bought and Sold” notes, signed by Mr Yeung on behalf of the respective transferors, but blank as to the transferee.

6.Mr Lo Hang Fong, a partner of Stevenson Wong and the company secretary of Warderly at the material time, testified that he was aware Housley had defaulted on repayment of the term loan, the date for repayment being one month after the grant of the loan. Ms Cordelia Chu signed as a witness on the Standard Transfer Form in which 30 million Wardley shares, out of the 231,800,000 shares, were transferred to the appellant on 20 April 2007. She did so on instructions either of Mr Yeung or Mr Johnny Tang.

7.It was an admitted fact that by a letter dated 31 August 2007, from Stevenson Wong to the appellant, copies of the Term Loan Facility agreement, the Authorisation Letter and the Notice of Drawing, all dated 28 December 2006, together with undated Standard Forms of Transfer and Bought and Sold notes signed by Mr Yeung in the names of Imperial and Primer respectively were delivered to the appellant, receipt of which was acknowledged by the appellant.

DEFENCE CASE

8.The appellant did not give or call evidence at trial. On his behalf various issues of law were canvassed, it being submitted that:

(i)  the defendant did not acquire an interest in the 231,800,000 Wardley shares upon execution of the Authorisation Letter, those shares being the subject of neither a pledge nor of an equitable mortgage in his favour;

(ii)  the provision in the legislation applicable to the impugned conduct, namely that it occur “without reasonable excuse”, did not impose either a legal or evidential burden upon the appellant, the burden of proof of all matters being upon the prosecution;

(iii)  the prosecution was required to prove not only that the event giving rise to the duty to disclose had occurred, but that the appellant “was aware that it gave rise to a duty to disclose” in law.

9.Of evidential matters, it was submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant knew of the existence of the Authorisation Letter until receipt of a copy of that document by the letter of Stevenson Wong to him dated 31 August 2007. Further, that in any event the Authorisation Letter only authorised the sale of shares to the extent of a failure to repay monies due under the Term Loan Facility. It followed that the number of shares that the appellant was authorised to sell was not determined until that event occurred. The transfer of 30 million shares to the appellant on 20 April 2007, apparently related to the failure to make repayment of loans and interest due, had been accompanied by appropriate disclosure to both Warderly and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong on 24 April 2007.

REASONS FOR VERDICT

The intention of the parties

10.The magistrate determined that there was no pledge of the shares to the appellant. In support of that determination, he cited statements in the judgment of Ma J (as he was then) in the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd and Kanishi (Far East) Ltd & Another [2002] 2 HKLRD 52. In the context of the grant of a charging order absolute the judge considered the validity of a loan agreement under which shares were described as “pledged” as security for the loan. Under the agreement the borrower had delivered to the lender share certificates and signed blank instruments of transfer. On failure to repay the loan, the claimant enforced the security of the shares by completing the blanks on the Instrument of Transfer, previously signed by the Judgment Debtor, signing it as transferee. The magistrate relied upon the statement of Ma J that (page 25A–D, paragraph 25) that:

“Shares are choses in action and not choses in possession.  It is therefore not possible to create a pledge of shares as one would pledge other choses in possession (ie physical objects) or certain types of choses in action which by custom are equivalent to the objects they represent (such as bills of lading). …  The depositing of share certificates or instruments of transfer cannot therefore constitute a pledge of the underlying shares.  All that is pledged here are pieces of paper.”

11.However, having considered the circumstances of the deposit of the share certificates with Stevenson and Wong by Mr Yeung and having addressed the issue of the intention of the parties as related to the making of the Authorisation Letter, the magistrate determined (paragraph 19):

“It is clear from a simple reading of the documents that the Warderly shares are to be security for the repayment of the loan. The authorisation letter is one of the “Conditions Precedent” to the Loan Agreement.”

He went on to note(paragraph 21)::

“The deposit of the share certificates with SWC for the collection by the defendant, the contractual clause in the loan facility agreement that the authorisation letter is a condition precedent to the advancing of the loan and the provision of a power for the defendant to sell the shares in the event of default of repayment all point to the intention of the parties of the [sic] using the shares as security for the loan facility”

12.Of the nature of that agreement, the magistrate found (paragraph 20):

“It is clear from the wording of the letter of authorisation that the defendant had the power to acquire the shares upon non-repayment of the loan.  While it is true that at the time of the creation of the mortgage no one knew whether there was going to be non-repayment or how many shares will have to be acquired by the defendant in order to cover such non-repayment, I find that the equitable interest in the 231.8M shares had risen at as at the time of the execution of the authorisation letter.”

13.In the result, the magistrate concluded (paragraph 21):

“… I find that the true nature of the interest in the shares was an equitable mortgage in favour of the defendant in the 231.8 M shares of Wardley.”

‘Without reasonable excuse’: the burden of proof

14.Of the issue of upon whom lay the burden of proving or disproving that the failure to disclose was “without reasonable excuse”, the magistrate rejected the submission of the prosecution that the burden lay on the appellant on the balance of probabilities. The magistrate determined that (paragraph 25):

“… there is still an evidential burden on the defendant to show that he had reasonable excuse in not disclosing his interest.  Once that is done, it would then be for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have such reasonable excuse.”

15.In so finding, the magistrate stated that he relied upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lam Yuk Fai v HKSAR [2006] 9 HKCFAR 281 and the judgment of McMahon J in the Court of First Instance in HKSAR v Ng Po On [2007] 2 HKLRD 255. It appears that the magistrate was not informed that the Court of Final Appeal had delivered judgment in the latter case more than 12 months prior to the hearing before him and reported in [2008] 11 HKCFAR 91.

16.Of the resolution of the factual issue, of whether or not the appellant had conducted himself as he did “without reasonable excuse” the magistrate stated:

“There is no evidence whatsoever as to why the defendant did not comply with the legal requirement to disclose.  There is however ample evidence to show that the defendant must have known about the creation of the equitable interest in the 231.8 M shares: he signed a loan facility agreement, he was delivered the Authorisation letter the latest by the 31st August 2007, he was informed by the SWC lawyers to seek independent legal advice on all things relating to the loan, 30 M shares were later on transferred from Imperial Profit to the defendant on the 20th April 2007.”

‘Ignorance of the law’

17.The magistrate stated that it was trite law that “ignorance of the law is no defence”. He pointed out that there was no evidence at all that the defendant had made a mistake of law or that he was ignorant of the law.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION

GROUND 1

18.By Ground 1, Mr Cheng Huan SC submitted that the magistrate had erred law in determining that the letter of authorisation created an equitable mortgage in favour of the appellant in respect of the 231.8 million Warderly shares.

19.It was contended that the magistrate had failed “to make a proper finding” in respect of the issue of whether or not, following the deposit of the Warderly shares with them, Stevenson Wong held them on behalf of the appellant. The court was reminded of Mr Lo Hang Fong’s evidence that initially the shares had been deposited with Stevenson Wong, apparently to allay concerns of a re-structuring management committee within Warderly that Mr Yeung would dispose of his shares. Further, that the share certificates had never been deposited with the appellant and that Stevenson Wong for their part merely “sat on the documents”.

20.The court was asked to note the evidence of Mr Lo Hang Fong and Ms Cordelia Chu in respect of the transfer, on 21 March 2007, of 30 million of the 231.8 million Warderly shares held by Stevenson Wong, 10 million shares to Grand Access Finance Limited and 20 million shares to Liu Ping. In particular, the court’s attention was drawn to the evidence of Ms Cordelia Chu that those transfers, which she witnessed on the Standard Form of Transfer, occurred on the instructions of either Mr Yeung or Mr Johnny Tang (the latter being a consultant of one of the potential investors), not on the instructions of the appellant. Similarly, she said that she had acted on instructions of either Mr Yeung or Mr Johnny Tang and witnessed similar documentation concerned in the transfer to the appellant of 30 million shares on 20 April 2004.

21.Further, it was contended that the evidence of Mr Lo Hang Fong that following his advice at the initial stage to the representative of both parties that, if a mortgage of shares was put in place as security for the loan, duties of disclosure by both lender and borrower might arise, together with his testimony that the representatives of Warderly did not wish disclosure of the fact of a mortgage of Mr Yeung’s Warderly shares to be made, suggested that:

“… no equitable mortgage was intended or could have arisen by virtue of the authorisation letter or the deposit of the shares with SWC together with the blank transfer forms.”

22.Finally, it was submitted that the magistrate erred in finding that although physical possession of the 231.8 million shares of Warderly remained throughout with Stevenson Wong, nevertheless the appellant was in “constructive possession” of those shares. In particular, it was submitted that the magistrate had erred in reaching that finding in relying upon the evidence in re-examination of Mr Lo Hang Fong that, in light of the terms of the Authorisation Letter, the appellant was entitled to call for the shares and that, if called upon to do so, he would have delivered them to the appellant.

GROUND 2

23.By Ground 2 it was submitted that the magistrate erred in convicting the appellant of the offences alleged in the two summonses given that at the time averred, namely within three business days after 31 August 2007, the appellant’s interest in the 231.8 million Warderly shares had been extinguished, following the transfer of 30 million shares to him on 20 April 2007 in settlement of the monies due under the term loan facility. In support of Ground 2, the rhetorical question was posed:

“If the appellant had to file a disclosure of his interest after 31 August 2007, what is the number of shares that he should report showing that he had interest in?”

GROUND 3: without reasonable excuse

24.By Ground 3 it was submitted that the magistrate erred in the determining that the provision in section 328 operated to impose an “evidential burden” on the appellant, namely that:

“A person—

(a)  who, without reasonable excuse, fails to perform within the period specified in section 325(1)(a)…, a duty of disclosure arising under Division 2 in accordance with the provisions of this Part applicable to that duty…

commits an offence”.

25.It was contended that the prosecution had to prove not only that the appellant had failed to perform the duty imposed upon him but also that the appellant had done so “without reasonable excuse”, which matter was an ingredient of the offence.

26.Mr Cheng submitted that the magistrate made contradictory determinations when he stated (paragraph 25):

“I find that Ng Po On and Lam Yuk Fai are both applicable to our present case and since the element of without reasonable excuse is part of the law creating the offence, there is no reversal of the burden of proof.  I find however that there is still an evidential burden on the defendant to show that he had reasonable excuse in not disclosing his interest.”

27.Mr Cheng suggested that if what the magistrate meant in saying, “the element of without reasonable excuse is part of the law creating the offence” was that was an element or ingredient of the offence, then it followed that it was for the prosecution to disprove that issue and to do so beyond reasonable doubt. No question of an evidential burden on the appellant arose.

28.Finally, Mr Cheng drew the attention of the court to the judgment of Barnes J in Securities and Futures Commission v Yu Ka Tak (HCMA 62/2007, 9 November 2007—unreported), in which she addressed the ingredients of the offence provided for in section 114(3)(b) and (9) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Those provisions make it an offence for a person without reasonable excuse to hold himself out as performing any regulated function in relation to a regulated activity carried on as a business. Barnes J held that proof that the conduct was without reasonable excuse was an ingredient of the offence.

GROUND 4

29.By Ground 4 it was submitted that the magistrate had erred in concluding, “… that because the Appellant elected not to give evidence, there was no evidential basis for a claim of reasonable excuse for non-disclosure.”

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

GROUND 1

30.Mr Bell submitted that the magistrate was entitled to pay particular attention to the documentation created between borrower and lender in determining that it established an equitable mortgage of the Warderly shares deposited by Mr Yeung with Stevenson Wong. In particular, he pointed out that the Term Loan Facility letter provided by clause 3(c) that it was a condition precedent, of an obligation in the Lender to advance monies under the loan agreement, that it had received first of all an irrevocable Authorisation Letter addressed to the appellant and executed by Mr Yeung, Imperial and Primer. The Authorisation letter, also executed on 28 December 2006, undertook to deposit Warderly share certificates to a total of 231.8 million shares with the appellant together with signed share transfer forms. Signed, but the otherwise blank, share transfer forms together with signed, but otherwise blank, ‘Bought and Sold’ notes were deposited with Stevenson Wong. Finally, a notice dated 28 December 2006 was given of the ‘drawdown’ of whole facility of $6 million.

31.Of the contention made on behalf of the appellant, that nevertheless the evidence as a whole did not establish that it was the intention of the appellant to become the beneficiary of an equitable mortgage of the Warderly shares, Mr Bell invited the court to note that neither Mr Yeung nor the appellant gave evidence and therefore did not address their respective intentions in reaching and carrying out the agreement. He accepted that it was clear that Mr Yeung did not wish to make a disclosure of the fact of a change in his interest in his holding of Warderly shares. On the other hand, he submitted that it was clear that the appellant wished to have security for the loan advanced and that there was put in place an irrevocable right in the appellant to sell the Warderly shares in the event of a default in repayment, which event occurred and which resulted in the transfer of 30 million Warderly shares into the name of the appellant on 20 April 2007.

32.Of the evidence that, on 21 March 2007, 30 million of the 231.8 million shares deposited with Stevenson Wong had been transferred into the names of other parties on the instructions of either Mr Yeung or Mr Tang, Mr Bell submitted that the evidence of the circumstances of transfer was unclear but, if the transfer had been done without the appellant’s consent, clearly that was in breach of the arrangements between the parties of 28 December 2006.

33.Finally, Mr Bell submitted that although the documentation described an “undertaking” to deposit the 231.8 million Warderly shares, in fact that had been done in advance of that date by deposit with Stevenson Wong, who then held them on behalf of the appellant. As a result, he submitted the magistrate was correct to determine that an equitable mortgage of the 231.8 million shares in favour of the appellant had been created on 28 December 2006.

GROUND 2

34.Mr Bell invited the court to reject the submission that because, by the time that the appellant came to know that he had a notifiable interest in Warderly shares, namely 31 August 2007, his interest had been extinguished with the result that he was under no duty to make any disclosure. He pointed out that:

(i)  section 322, which addresses the circumstances in which a person has or ceases to have an interest in shares that is notifiable, provides by subsection (2) that, “a reference to an interest in shares shall be construed as including a reference to an interest of any kind whatsoever in the shares”;

(ii)  section 310(1)(a) provides that a person acquiring or ceasing to have an interest in shares comes under a duty of disclosure in the circumstances specified in section 313(1) of the Ordinance; and

(iii)  section 313(1)(a) provides that the circumstances specified in section 310(1)(a) are those where the person “has a notifiable interest immediately after the relevant time, but did not have a notifiable interest immediately before the relevant time;”

35.Of the effect of those provisions, Mr Bell submitted that there was nothing in the Ordinance that dispensed with the requirement of disclosure in the appellant if his interest in the Warderly shares was subsequently extinguished. Of the appellant’s duty, he contended:

“If he acquired a notifiable interest on 28th of December 2006, he remained obliged to disclose that interest within three working days of becoming aware of it.”

GROUND 3: without reasonable excuse

36.Mr Bell opposed the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of sections 328, relating to the issue of conduct “without reasonable excuse”, were ingredients of the offence for the prosecution to prove. He drew the attention of the court to a passage in the judgment of Lord Steyn in R v Lambert and others [2002] 2 AC 545 at 571, cited with approval in the judgment of Ribeiro PJ in Ng Po On (page 107, paragraph 41):

“The distinction between constituent elements of the crime and defensive issues will sometimes be unprincipled and arbitrary. After all, it is sometimes simply a matter of which drafting technique is adopted: a true constituent element can be removed from the definition of the crime and cast as a defensive issue whereas any definition of an offence can be reformulated so as to include all possible defences within it.  It is necessary to concentrate not on technicalities and niceties of language but rather on matters of substance.”

37.Mr Bell submitted that approach to the construction of a statutory provision was to be found in the judgment of Chan PJ in Tong Yiu Wah, in which he described the task as being (page 569J, paragraph 10):

“... one examines not only the form of the provision but also the substance in reality of its language.”

Having adverted to the need to construe the statute in its context, Chan PJ went on to say (page 570 C, paragraph 11):

“Amongst the relevant context are the objects and purposes of the Ordinance”.

38.Of the relevance of the underlying policy, that lay behind the objects and purposes of a statute or an Ordinance, Mr Bell referred to the judgment of Lord Woolf NPJ in Lam Yuk Fai, in which he had contrasted the context of the legislation there being considered, namely provisions in the Immigration Ordinance relating to the transfer of travel documents, with the statutory provision in the United Kingdom relating to the carrying of a bladed instrument in a public place without good reason or lawful authority, considered in R v Mathews [2003] EWCA Crim 813 (page 294F, paragraph 35):

“In that type of case the policy of the legislation is to make the carrying of the bladed article the offence.  Here it is not the transfer of the travel document alone that is the offence.”

The purpose and objects of the legislation

39.Mr Bell submitted that it was clear from the Long Title of the Ordinance, together with the fact that the whole of Part XV of the Ordinance was given over to the issue of disclosure of interests, that a significant purpose was the “protection of investors” through transparency by making available to the market as a whole information about the acquisition and cessation of interests in listed shares at certain levels of holdings.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBMISSIONS

The nature of these proceedings

40.As was pointed out in the judgment of Bokhary PJ in the Court of Final Appeal in Chou Shih Bin v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 70 at 78 (paragraph 19):

“An appeal under s. 113 of the Magistrates Ordinance is by way of rehearing on the evidence before the trial court supplemented by such further evidence as the intermediate appellate court may admit under its statutory power to do so.”

The judge went on to note:

“Where the facts are concerned, the appellate tribunal will recognize that it does not enjoy the advantage of having received the evidence at first hand which the magistrate enjoyed.”

The material available to the court

41.There is available to the court not only all the documentary evidence placed before the magistrate but also a transcript of all the oral evidence at trial.

The statutory scheme

(i)  Acquisition of an interest in shares: the duty of disclosure

42.Section 310 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap. 571 provides that:

“(1)  Where—

(a)  a person acquires an interest in shares comprised in the relevant share capital of a listed corporation…

then in the circumstances specified in section 313(1), he comes under the duty of disclosure.”

Section 313(1) provides that:

“The circumstances referred to in section 310(1) are those where—

(a)  the person has a notifiable interest immediately after the relevant time, but did not have a notifiable interest immediately before the relevant time;”

(ii)  A notifiable interest

43.Section 322(1), inter-alia, determines the circumstances in which a person has or ceases to have an interest in shares. Section 322(2) provides that:

“A reference to an interest in shares shall be construed as including a reference to an interest of any kind whatsoever in the shares.”

By operation of sections 308(1) and 311(3) of the Ordinance, a person has a notifiable interest:

“… at any time when he is interested in shares comprised in the relevant share capital of the listed corporation concerned of an aggregate nominal value equal to or more than the nominal value of the percentage of the issued equity share capital which is the notifiable percentage level for the time being.”

Section 315(1)(a) provides that the “notifiable percentage level” in Part XV of the Ordinance is 5%.

(iii)  Requirements for giving notification

44.Section 324 requires that a person under a duty of disclosure under section 310:

“… shall give notification to the listed corporation concerned and to the relevant exchange company of—

(a)  the interests which he has, or ceases to have, in shares comprised in the relevant share capital of the listed corporation..”.

45.Section 325 makes provision for the time at which notification is to be given, where the duty arises under section 310(1) or (4):

“(a)  in the case that at the time at which the relevant event occurs in the person concerned knows of its occurrence, within three business days after the day on which the relevant event occurs; or

(b)  otherwise, within three business days after the day on which the occurrence of the relevant event comes to his knowledge.”

(iv)  The offence: the requisite circumstances

46.Section 328 provides that:

“A person—

(a)  who, without reasonable excuse fails to perform, within the period specified in section 325(1)(a)…, a duty of disclosure arising under Division 2 in accordance with the provisions of this Part applicable to that duty;

commits an offence and is liable—

(i)  on conviction on indictment to a fine at level 6 and to imprisonment for 2 years; or

(ii)  on summary conviction to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for six months.”

“relevant event”

Section 308 provides that:

“relevant event”

“(a)  for the purposes of… Division 2... means—

(i)  in a case under section 310(1)(a)…, the event or change referred to in such section.”

The nature of the appellant’s interests in the parcel of 231.8 million Warderly shares

47.In his analysis of the nature of the appellant’s interest in the 231.8 million Warderly shares deposited with Stevenson and Wong by Mr Yeung, the magistrate examined both the relevant law and the evidence adduced at trial. Of the evidence, the magistrate addressed specifically: (i) the relevant documentation, in particular the Term Loan Facility letter and the Authorisation Letter and the circumstances in which they had come into being; and (ii) the circumstances of the deposit and subsequent dealings in the share certificates at Stevenson Wong.

48.Clearly, the intention of the parties is of importance in determining the nature of the arrangement reached between the parties. In determining the intention of the parties, it is important to bear in mind the purpose of the arrangement.

THE LAW

A. Pledge

49.In my opinion, with respect, the magistrate was correct to rely upon the judgment of Ma J in Bank of China v Kanishi and others in determining that the arrangement between the parties was not a pledge of the 231.8 million Warderly shares, in particular that:

“Shares are choses in action and not choses in possession.  It is therefore not possible to create a pledge of shares as one would pledge other choses in possession….”

50.The authors of Crossley Vaines ‘Personal Property’ (5th Edition–1973) make the same point (page 459):

“It is essential to the creation of a pledge that there should be a delivery of the chattels comprise therein…  But in the case of delivery of documents of title other than bills of lading, a pledge of the documents is merely a pledge of the ipsa corpora of them… because delivery is a necessary ingredient, only those species of personal property which admit of delivery may be pledged; thus a pledge may be affected by the delivery of bearer bonds but not a deposit of share certificates.”

B.  An equitable mortgage

51.There is no dispute that in quoting from passages in Fisher and Lightwood’s ‘Law of Mortgages’ (12th edition–2006) the magistrate reminded himself correctly of the kind of documentation that passes between the parties that is the indicia that the parties intend an equitable mortgage of shares offered as security for a loan:

“a mortgage of shares is most commonly effected by a deposit of the share certificates with the mortgagee, usually accompanied by memorandum of deposit”.

52.Of the memorandum of deposit, the authors note that it usually contains:

“a statement that the deposit is by way of security, a covenant for payment of principal and interest, a proviso for redemption, a power for  the mortgagee to sell the shares…”

Of other documentation, the authors note:

“Sometimes the deposit is accompanied by a form of transfer executed by the mortgagor, but leaving the name of the transferee and the date blank.”

(i)  Deposit of the 231.8 million Warderly shares with Stevenson Wong

53.The magistrate noted that the appellant had never had personal physical possession of the share certificates, rather throughout the share certificates were in the possession of Stevenson Wong. Nevertheless, in finding that the appellant had “constructive possession” of the share certificates, he noted the evidence of Mr Lo to the effect that if the appellant had called for physical possession of the share certificates to be given to him he would have complied with that request.

54.Criticism is made on behalf of the appellant of the magistrate’s acceptance of that evidence. However, the evidence was entirely understandable and consistent with the documentation that Stevenson Wong had drafted for the parties to sign to bring into effect the loan of $6 million. As the magistrate noted elsewhere in his Reasons for Verdict, it was a ‘Condition Precedent’ of the making of an advance under the Term Loan Facility agreement, dated 28 December 2006, that the lender:

“… shall first have received each of the following in form and substance satisfactory to the lender:

(a)  ...

(b)  ...

(c)  the irrevocable authorisation letter duly executed by Yeung Kui Wong, Imperial Profit Enterprises Limited and Primer Capital Investments Limited and addressed to Liu Su Kee;”

55.The ‘Authorisation Letter Under Seal’, dated 28 December 2006, signed by Mr Yeung personally and in his capacity as a director of Imperial and Primer respectively, was addressed to the appellant and provided an undertaking:

“1.  … to deposit with you the certificates of 231,800,000 ordinary shares.. in the issued share capital (sic) Warderly… together with share transfer thereof duly signed by us.”

It went on to refer to the Term Loan Facility Letter, which it stated was annexed thereto, and provided:

“We hereby irrevocably authorise you to sell sufficient numbers of shares so deposited with you as aforesaid to repay the Lender in the event there is a default of repayment by the Borrower on the Repayment Date (as defined in the Facility Letter).”

56.Of the fact that Stevenson Wong did not transfer physical possession of the share certificates to the appellant, Mr Lo Hang Fong explained in his evidence that came about because, “… neither of the parties… ask us to do anything, we just sat on the documents.” It is to be remembered in that context, that the Warderly share certificates were deposited with Stevenson Wong on two separate occasions, receipt being acknowledged on 17 November and 22 December 2006. Originally, the purpose was to assuage concerns of the management committee and potential investors that Mr Yeung might sell his shares. The Term Loan Facility agreement, Authorisation Letter and advance of $6 million on 28 December 2006 overtook the original purpose of the deposit of the shares with Stevenson Wong. In cross-examination, Mr Lo Hang Fong was unable to proffer any explanation for the fact that the value of the 231.8 million Warderly shares deposited with Stevenson Wong was entirely out of proportion to the $6 million loan. On 20 April 2007, the day on which 30 million of the Warderly shares deposited with Stevenson Wong were transferred to the appellant, the low price of Warderly shares quoted at the Hong Kong stock exchange was $0.52. There was no evidence of the value of Warderly shares on other dates.

57.Of the fact that Stevenson Wong acted on Mr Yeung’s instructions in dealing with parcels of the 231.8 million Warderly shares deposited with them, on 21 March and 20 April 2007, the magistrate determined that:

“would not detract from the fact that the defendant has an equitable interest in the shares.”

For his part, Mr Lo Hang Fong could not remember if he advised Mr Yeung that in light of the letter of authorisation he should not transfer Warderly shares from the parcel deposited with Stevenson Wong to other parties.  He thought that either he or one of his colleagues had informed the management committee of the fact of the transfer in March 2007.

(ii)  The effect of the Term Loan Facility agreement and the Authorisation Letter

58.The magistrate stated that, having had regard to all the evidence:

“It is clear that the lender and borrower had intended to use the Warderly shares as security to [sic] the $6 M loan.”

Of that finding, it is to be noted that the word “security”, in respect of the 231.8 million Warderly shares, is conspicuous by its absence in either the ‘Conditions Precedent’ clause of the Term Loan Facility agreement or the Authorization Letter.  Significantly, in his evidence Mr Lo Hang Fong pointed out the absence of that description in the Authorisation Letter but, said that it was “accepted” that effecting security for the loan was the purpose of the arrangement.  Clearly, in my judgment that was the nature and purpose of the deposit of the shares and, the magistrate was entitled to find, as he did, that was intended by the parties.  Similarly, in my judgment he was correct in determining that:

“… the equitable interest in the 231.8 M shares had arisen as at the time of the execution of the authorisation letter.”

GROUND 2

59.By Ground 2 it is contended that by 31 August 2007, the time stipulated as the time at which the appellant came to know that he had an interest in 231.8 Warderly shares, he no longer had any such interest. There is no dispute that such an interest had been extinguished upon transfer of 30 million shares Warderly shares to him on 20 April 2007, the shares being worth far in excess of the $6 million capital loan and any interest or other payments due in consequence. In essence, it is contended that at the time the appellant came to know of the fact of his earlier interest in the Warderly shares such an interest did not exist any more, with the result that he had no duty to make disclosure.

60.There is no merit in that submission. Section 325 makes that clear, providing as it does that:

“A notification required by section 324 shall be given, where the duty of disclosure arises under section 310(1)…—

(a)  in the case that at the time at which the relevant event occurs the person concerned knows of its occurrence, within three business days after the date on which the relevant event occurs; or

(b)  otherwise, within three business days after the day on which the occurrence of the relevant event comes to his knowledge.”

Section 308 provides that:

“relevant event”

“(a)  for the purposes of… Division 2… means—

(i)  in a case under section 310(1)(a)…, the event or change referred to in such section.”

61.It follows, that although the “relevant event”, namely an acquisition of a notifiable interest in Warderly shares by the creation of the equitable mortgage over the 231.8 million Warderly shares, occurred on 28 December 2006, pursuant to section 325(b) the appellant remained under a duty to make disclosure within three business days of that relevant event coming to his knowledge. The magistrate determined that to be:

“… the latest date he became aware of such a position was 31 August 2007”.

The fact that at and after 31 August 2007 the appellant no longer enjoyed an interest in any Warderly shares is irrelevant to the duty imposed upon him by that sub-section.

GROUND 3—“without reasonable excuse”

62.By Ground 3 it was contended that the magistrate erred in determining that the offence creating provision in section 328 of the Ordinance imposed an evidential burden upon the appellant in respect of the caveat applied to the impugned conduct, namely that it be “without reasonable excuse”. On the contrary, it was submitted that was an ingredient of the offence which the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

63.By contrast, it was the primary contention of the respondent that the burden of proving the existence of reasonable excuse was on the appellant on the balance of probabilities. In the alternative, it was submitted that the magistrate was correct to construe the legislation as imposing an evidential burden upon the appellant to raise the issue of reasonable excuse, and in finding that the burden was not discharged.

64.In my judgment there is force Mr Cheng’s submission that in his analysis of the effect of the provision relating to “without reasonable excuse”, the magistrate made contradictory determinations. Having said that the decisions of McMahon J in Ng Po On and the Court of Final Appeal in Lam Yuk Fai were applicable to the circumstances obtaining in this case, the magistrate determined:

“… since the element of without reasonable excuse is part of the law creating the offence, there is no reversal of the burden of proof.  I find however that there is still an evidential burden on the defendant to show that he had reasonable excuse in not disclosing his interest.”

65.The magistrate had adverted to the phrase “part of the law creating the offence” in the immediately preceding paragraph, in which he had said:

“In Ng Po On, McMahon J found that “without reasonable excuse” in s.  14(4) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 was part of the law creating the offence and thus s. 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221 does not apply and the onus of prove (sic) is not reversed.  McMahon J however found that there is an evidential burden on the defendant regarding the defence of “without reasonable excuse”.”

66.At paragraph 24 of his judgment, McMahon J had determined that “a failure to comply be (sic) ‘without reasonable excuse’ is a separate element of the offence”. In paragraphs 25 and 26, he considered the consequences of that finding:

“25.  It follows then that s.94A does not apply so as to legitimise the reversal of the onus of proof.  That is because, again for the reasons expressed in Lam Yuk Fai….  the section only applies to an ‘exception or exemption from or qualification to the operation of the law creating the offence(emphasis added).  If the phrase ‘without reasonable excuse’ in s.14(4) itself as part of the law creating the offence, then it is not an ‘exceptional exemption from or qualification to…’ that provision.

26.  Accordingly, s.94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance does not provide a basis for the magistrate reversal of the onus of proof.”

67.It was in the context of his construction of section 24 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, that McMahon J determined that merely an evidential burden, not the legal burden, was imposed upon the appellant. That provision states:

“... the burden of proving a defence of lawful authority or reasonable excuse shall lie upon the accused”.

McMahon J determined that (paragraph page 260, paragraph 42):

“... s.24 can be treated as imposing a merely evidential burden so far as s.14(4) of the Ordinance is concerned.  By doing so, the fundamental structure of the legislation is addressed the purpose and intent of s.24 is given sufficient effect.  A merely evidential onus would not breach the appellant right to be presumed innocent: see HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574 at pp. 611-612.”

In his judgment in the Court of Final Appeal, Ribeiro PJ agreed in terms with that approach (see page 115, paragraph 77).

68.By contrast, the relevant provisions of the Securities and Futures Ordinance do not provide for an express allocation of the burden of proof, as provided by section 24 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. In my judgment, the magistrate conflated the two separate issues addressed by McMahon J in ruling as he did at paragraph 25 of his Reasons for Verdict. If the issue of whether or not the impugned conduct occurred “without reasonable excuse “is part of the “law creating the offence”, then proof lies on the prosecution to the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. That was the decision reached by the Court of Final Appeal in Lam Yuk Fai. Accordingly, with respect, the magistrate’s analysis in paragraph 25 of his Reasons for Verdict was flawed and incorrect.

69.In his judgment in the Court of Final Appeal, with which the other judges agreed, in Tong Yiu wah v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKLRD 565 Chan PJ addressed the construction of section 20(1) of the Airport Authority Bylaw made under the Airport Authority Ordinance, Cap. 483, which provides:

“No person shall loiter in any part of the Bylaw Area without reasonable cause.”

70.Noting that the provision was to be construed in context, Chan PJ identified the objects and purposes of the Ordinance as being (page 570C–D, paragraph 11):

“…to facilitate the safe, secure and efficient operation and management of the airport”.

He went on to identify the purpose of designating the “Bylaw Area” as including the:

“… securing the safety of persons using the Airport, preventing danger to the public arising from the use and operation of the Airport, and preventing obstruction and preserving order.”

Furthermore, he found that the purpose of designating the Bylaw Area, was for use by members of the public for (page 571A–C, paragraph 14):

“… ordinary and legitimate purposes connected with the use of the Airport, such as waiting for planes to arrive or depart, meeting or picking up people arriving at the Airport, or seeing friends and relatives off. It is contemplated that people may have to idle, linger and hang about in the Bylaw Area for such purposes…  Clearly, the legislature does not intend to penalize people for this type of conduct and activity.  It would be absurd to say that the subsection is aimed at prohibiting people from doing precisely what the Bylaw Area is intended to allow them to do.”

71.Of that analysis, he said (page 571E, paragraph 15):

“… it’s strongly points to the construction that loitering in the Bylaw Area and the lack of reasonable cause for doing so are necessarily interrelated and form the integral parts of the offence under s. 20(1).”

In the result he concluded (page 572C–D, paragraph 18):

“… that it is the loitering without apparent reasonable cause in the Bylaw Area that constitutes the offence which is punishable by the law.”

72.In Ng Po On, the Court of Final Appeal addressed the issue of the ingredients constituting the offence under section 14(4) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201: on receipt of a notice to furnish information, was it “failure to comply” or “failure to comply without reasonable excuse?” In determining that it was the latter, Ribeiro PJ, with whose judgment the other judges agreed, cited with approval examples given by McMahon J in his judgment in the Court of First Instance in the appeal in the instant case of many circumstances in which innocent non-compliance might occur: the loss or unavailability of documents, illness or an inability to comply with time limits. Ribeiro PJ said that he agreed with the judge’s conclusion that “the legislature no doubt wished the offence contained in s.14(4) to apply only to culpable non-compliance.”

73.In Lam Yuk Fai v HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 281, the Court of Final Appeal addressed the issue of the ingredients constituting the offence under section 42(2)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Ordinance, which provides: “Any person who… transfers to another without reasonable excuse, any travel document… shall be guilty of an offence.” In his judgment, with which all the other judges agreed, Lord Woolf NPJ addressed the issue of the ingredients of the offence (page 293D–E, paragraph 32):

“It is necessary to start by going back to the two limbs of the offence and ask whether the second limb constitutes an ‘exception or exemption from or qualification to the operation of the law creating the offence’ referred to in section 94A(1).  The answer to this question is no.  It is both limbs that are the ‘the law creating the offence”.

74.In my opinion, Mr Bell has identified succinctly the correct approach to the construction of the relevant provisions of this Ordinance:

“Specific conduct or omission prohibited by a statutory provision may or may not be sufficient to constitute an offence.  The essential criterion is whether the prohibited conduct or omission is inherently culpable.”

75.It is apparent from the Long Title of the Ordinance that one of the purposes and objectives in regulating activities in the securities market is, and is stated, to be the “protection of investors”. Clearly, the requirement of a disclosure of interests in shares, on acquisition or cessation of that interest, is the better to inform the market and is for the protection of investors. Importantly, the ingredients of the offence alleged against the appellant require proof by the prosecution of knowledge in the appellant of the occurrence of the relevant event. It is only with that knowledge, that culpability is imposed in consequence of a failure to make disclosure of a notifiable interest. The prosecution was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant:

(i)  acquired an interest in the issued share capital of Wardley; and

(ii)  failed to give the requisite notice, if the interest is a notifiable one, within three business days of knowing of the occurrence of that event or otherwise, of coming to know of its occurrence.  [Italics added]

76.In my judgment, in the context of the objects and purposes of the Ordinance, in particular the regime of disclosure to better inform and protect investors that is an inherently culpable act and those are the ingredients of the offence.

Strict Liability

77.In his written submissions, Mr Bell advanced a submission not made to the magistrate, namely that by application of the criteria identified by the Privy Council in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] 1 AC 1 the offences created by section 328(a),(c) and (d) are “evidently offences of strict liability.” In the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Scarman the propositions of law relevant to a determination of the issue were described as being (page 14B–D):

“(1)  there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a criminal offence;

(2)  the presumption is particularly strong were the offence is ‘truly criminal’ in character;

(3)  the presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statue;

(4)  the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where the statue is concerned with an issue of social concern, and public safety is such an issue;

(5)  even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of mens rea stands unless it can be shown that the creation of strict liability will be effective to promote the object of the statue by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the prohibited act.”

78.In my judgment, the issue can be disposed of simply by reference to the language of the Ordinance in creating the offence. The element of mens rea is provided for specifically by operation of section 325(1)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance, which requires that notification required by section 324, where the duty of disclosure arises under section 310(1), notification shall be given:

“(a)  in the case that at the time at which the relevant event occurs the person concerned knows of its occurrence, within three business days after the day on which the relevant event occurs; or

(b)  otherwise, within three business days after the day on which the occurrence of the relevant event comes to his knowledge.”

79.It follows, as noted earlier, that knowledge in the appellant of the occurrence of the relevant event, namely his acquisition of an interest in Warderly shares, is an ingredient of the offence stipulated by section 328 of the Ordinance. Accordingly, the offence is not one of strict liability.

Section 94A the Criminal Procedure Ordinance

80.Section 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221 provides that:

“(1)  It shall not be necessary in an indictment, charge, complaint or information alleging an offence to negative any exception or exemption from or qualification to the operation of the law creating the offence.

(2)  For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that in criminal proceedings—

(a)  it is not necessary for the prosecution to negative by evidence any matter to which the subsection applies; and

(b)  the burden of proving the same lies on the person seeking to avail himself thereof.

(3)  This section applies to criminal proceedings in the District Court or a magistrate’s court.

(4)  The matters to which subsection (2) applies are any licence, permit certificate, authorization, permission, lawful or reasonable authority, purpose, cause or excuse, exception, exemption, qualification or other similar matter.”

81.In his judgment in Tong Yiu Wah, Chan PJ said of that provision (page 573E–H, paragraph 23):

“… s. 94A is invoked only after it has been ascertained that the statutory provision has created not only an offence but also an exception, exemption or qualification to her the offence. The mere presence in a statutory provision of a phrase similar to those set out in 94A(4) (such as “without reasonable cause” in the present case) does not necessarily make it a true exception falling within s. 94A the CPO of the CPO or the type of exception anticipated in R v Edwards [1975] QB 27.  The reverse onus is provided for in s. 94A(2) does not apply unless it is a s. 94A(1) situation.  See Lam Yuk Fai v HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 281.”

82.In his judgment in Ng Po On, Ribeiro PJ considered the approach to be taken to the operation of section 94A (page 105D–E, paragraph 35):

“Where an enactment imposes criminal liability subject to an exception or qualification of the type listed in s.94A(4), that enactment is construed as imposing a persuasive burden on the accused to bring himself within such exception or qualification, thereby engaging the presumption of innocence.”

The presumption of innocence

83.Of the engagement of the presumption of innocence, Ribeiro PJ went on to say: (pages 106I–107B, paragraph 39):

“… the Court looks at the substance and reality of the enactment rather than its form.  Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate fact which the defendant is required to prove involves an element which may be characterized as an essential ingredient of the offence or a matter of defence.  Its substantive effect is what counts: does the enactment expose the defendant to a conviction even though there may be reasonable doubt regarding some matter determinative of his criminal liability?”

84.Clearly, the presumption of innocence is engaged in that if the appellant fails to prove the facts constituting reasonable excuse on the balance of probabilities, albeit that a reasonable doubt is raised as to whether the excuse is made out, the appellant is at risk of being convicted. Accordingly, the appellant is at risk of being convicted even though there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Justification for abrogation of the presumption of innocence

85.Next, it falls to be considered whether the abrogation of the presumption of innocence is justified. The test to be applied is that described in the judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in the Court of Final Appeal, with which judgment all the other judges agreed, in HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai & Another (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574 (see: page 592B–C, paragraph 17):

“… was the derogation from the presumption justifiable as a measure which:

(a)  had a rational connection with the pursuit of a legitimate societal objective (the rationality test); and

(b)  was no more than was necessary to achieve the societal objective (the proportionality test).”

The rationality test

86.The aim of the legislation is the protection of investors in the securities markets. The legitimate societal objective is obvious. The requirement of disclosure of changes in holdings of shares in publicly listed companies at a threshold level provides the whole market with relevant information and assists in transparency in the activities of the market. The creation of an offence for failing in a duty to make disclosure of a notifiable interest in circumstances where the person knows of the occurrence of the relevant event is a rational means of enforcing the protection of investors.

The proportionality test

87.Is the imposition of a persuasive burden upon the appellant to prove reasonable excuse for non-compliance with his duty of disclosure of a notifiable interest no more than is necessary to enforce the protection of investors, or would the imposition of an evidential burden on the appellant to raise the issue of reasonable excuse be sufficient?

88.The burden of proving the justification of the imposition of a persuasive burden upon the appellant lies upon the respondent, as Ribeiro NPJ noted in his judgment in Ng Po On and requires (page 110E–F, paragraph 52):

“… compelling reasons why a persuasive burden is no more than necessary and why an evidential burden does not suffice.”

89.In seeking to justify the imposition of a persuasive burden upon the appellant, Mr Bell prayed-in-aid some of the categories relevant to that consideration identified in the judgment in Ng Po On. Of the gravamen of the offence, he suggested that it lay in the failure to make disclosure of a notifiable interest in circumstances where the particular defendant knew of the occurrence of the event, namely his acquisition of an interest in the shares. He should bear the burden of excusing his failure. Of the maximum penalties for the commission of the offence, Mr Bell pointed out that on summary conviction it was imprisonment for six months and a fine, although he did accept that on conviction on indictment it was imprisonment for two years and a fine. Finally, he suggested that the existence of a reasonable excuse is something peculiarly within the knowledge of the particular defendant.

90.In my judgment, a maximum sentence on conviction on indictment of imprisonment of two years together with a fine of $100,000 is not to be regarded as a low penalty. Although it might often be the case that the reasonable excuse lay within the peculiar knowledge of a particular defendant, obviously it would lie within the powers of the prosecuting authorities to investigate that excuse. For example, if the reasonable excuse lay in contended reliance on others, such as solicitors or brokers, to make the requisite disclosure by making enquiries of them.

Conclusion

91.In the result, in my judgment the imposition of the persuasive burden on the appellant is not proportionate, there being no compelling reasons to justify the abrogation of the presumption of innocence in that way. The obvious remedy, which I adopt, is that described in the judgment of Ribeiro PJ in Ng Po On, namely to read down section 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance so that an evidential burden is imposed upon the appellant to point to evidence that raises the issue of reasonable excuse. The judge described the operation of an evidential burden earlier in his judgment (page 102E–G, paragraph 27):

“In such cases, there must be evidence supporting such exculpatory matter which is sufficiently substantial that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.  Unless such reasonable doubt is removed the prosecution fails to prove its case.  If, on the other hand, the accused fails to adduce or point to any evidence on the relevant issue or if the evidence adduced is rejected or is not sufficiently substantial to raise a reasonable doubt, the potentially exculpatory matter places no obstacle in the way of the prosecution proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.”

GROUND 4

92.The contention made by Ground 4, that the magistrate had erred in concluding, “that because the appellant elected not to give evidence, there was no evidential basis for a claim of reasonable excuse for non-disclosure” is simply not borne out by what the magistrate stated in his reasons for verdict. As noted earlier, in addressing the evidential burden that he found to be placed on the appellant in respect of the issue of whether or not there was a reasonable excuse for the appellant’s non-compliance with his duty he said:

“In the present case, the defendant elected not to give evidence.  There is no evidence whatsoever as to why the defendant did not comply with the legal requirement to disclose.  There is however ample evidence to show that the defendant must have known about the creation of the equitable interest in the 231.8 M Warderly shares.”

Clearly, all the magistrate was doing was stating the obvious.  There is no merit whatsoever in this ground of appeal.

CONCLUSION

93.I am satisfied that the magistrate was correct in determining that on 28 December 2006 the appellant acquired a notifiable equitable interest in the 231.8 million Warderly shares deposited with Stevenson Wong and that the latest date on which he became aware of his interest was on 31 August 2007, when he acknowledge receipt of the related documentation from Stevenson Wong. There is no dispute that the appellant did not make the requisite disclosure of the acquisition of that interest. There was an evidential burden imposed upon the appellant to point to evidence that raised the issue of a reasonable excuse for his failure to make the requisite disclosure. The magistrate was correct in determining that there was no evidence whatsoever as to why the appellant failed in that duty, that there was no reasonable excuse for him not making the requisite disclosure and finding him guilty of the two summonses. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeals against conviction.

COSTS

94.I make an order nisi that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed. Any submissions the parties wish to make in that respect to be made within 14 days, failing which the order is to be made absolute.

  (Michael Lunn)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Cheng Huan SC, Mr Paul Leung, Mr Anthony Wu and Mr David Lai, instructed by Messrs Sit, Fung, Kwong and Shum, for the Appellant

Mr Adrian Bell, instructed by the Securities and Futures Commission, for the Respondent