香港特別行政區 訴 呂嘉俊
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HCMA 437/2014 香港特別行政區 高等法院原訟法庭 刑事上訴司法管轄權 不服命令上訴 案件編號:裁判法院上訴案件2014年第437號 (原觀塘裁判法院案件2014年第2183號) ______________________
______________________ 主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官張慧玲 聆訊及判案日期:2014年10月29日 判案理由書日期:2014年11月7日 判 案 理 由 書 1.本案上訴人 (下稱被告人) 經審訊後被觀塘裁判法院暫委裁判官梁耀煒裁定一項「刑事恐嚇」罪罪名不成立。 2.被告人申請訟費,但被裁判官拒絕。被告人現就此判令提出上訴。本席在聆訊後駁回上訴。以下是本席的理由。 控罪詳情 3.被告人被控於2014 年1 月23 日,在將軍澳「元朗正記」茶餐廳外,威脅彭嘉華會使其人身遭受損害,意圖使該彭嘉華受驚,違反香港法例第200 章《刑事罪行條例》第24(a)(i) 及27 條。 案情 4.裁判官在訟費裁斷陳述書將案情道出:
裁判官就事實的裁斷
不批准訟費理由
上訴理由 5.被告人代表大律師吳建五共提出三項上訴理由:
6.吳大律師指被告人的行為頂多是行為不檢,不涉及刑事恐嚇。況且控方第一證人報案時亦並非指被告人刑事恐嚇,而是指有交通事故,因此被告人的行為並不是與刑事恐嚇此控罪有關,被告人並無自招嫌疑。 7.吳大律師亦指裁判官根本無給予辯方反駁控方的機會便作出裁定,對被告人不公。 答辯人回應 8.答辯人代表高級檢控官關百安支持裁判官的裁定。他在聆訊時告知本席控方第一證人報案時是指有交通事故及被告人作出刑事毀壞。在一星期後控方第一證人才前往警署,指被告人刑事恐嚇。上訴一方接納答辯人所言。 有關法律原則 9.有關訟費的法律原則很清晰。 10.香港法例第492 章《刑事案件訟費條例》第3(1)(c) 條,裁判官在以簡易程序處理罪行後判被告人無罪,裁判官可命令將訟費判給被告人。法例指裁判官可作出上述命令,裁判官有酌情權是否作出上述命令,但法例並無列出裁判官行使酌情權的原則為何。 11.在第492 章立法之前,刑事案件的訟費是依據現已被廢除了的《刑事訴訟程序條例》第73A 條 (香港法例第221 章)。法庭在下列案件已就相關的原則作出討論:R v Ng Yui Kin & Others[2],R v Kwok Moon Yan & Another[3]。 12.終審法院在 Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR[4] 一案確立並詳盡描述有關原則。終審法院亦在另一宗案例 Hui Yiu Sang v HKSAR[5] 再次確立有關原則。 13.一般基本原則是一名獲判無罪的被告人應可獲訟費除非有確實理由 (positive reasons) 剝奪他應得的訟費。確實理由包括被告人是否自招嫌疑,他的行為是否誤導了控方,令控方相信證據比實情更確鑿,是否證據確鑿但因技術理由而罪名不成立,等等。 14.在 Tong Cun Lin一案,終審法院非常任法官烈顯倫如此說[6] (本席沿用《刑事案例摘錄》一書內編者的中文翻譯版本如下):
15.再者,一般而言,除非原審法官考慮了不應考慮的事項,上訴法庭不會輕易干預法官行使的酌情權 ( Tong Cun Lin 案例537 頁C 行)。 16.在 Ting James Henry 一案,終審法院指出「通常一名被告人有自招嫌疑的行為而被剝奪其訟費是指該被告人在案件調查期間及審訊時的作為。該等行為曾被指為最與行使酌情權有關的作為。但若指祇有被告人在調查期間或審訊時的行為,才可有自招嫌疑情況,此言是不正確的。法庭行使酌情權時並不被如此不能改變的定律規範。一名被告人可就他在調查期間及審訊前的行為,包括有關他在指控他的罪行的周遭環境的行為,被告人可能已經明顯有自招嫌疑之舉,祇要法官並無在行使酌情權時損毀了『假定被告人無罪』此法律原則,及沒有採納了一個與被告人被判無罪的情況互相違背的立場,則法官無理由在被告人被裁定無罪後、在行使酌情權時,不考慮有關行為。」[7] (非官方翻譯) 有關訟費申請的程序 17.就有關訟費申請的程序,在法庭判被告人罪名不成立後,有以下四個步驟 ( Hui Yui Sang案例第318 頁F 行),簡略而言:
本席所作的考慮 18.本席首先處理上訴理由 (3)。 19.誠言,根據謄本,裁判官並無給予辯方任何機會作出陳詞便拒絕訟費申請 (上訴文件第22 頁G-J 行):
20.吳大律師亦是審訊當時代表被告人的大律師。他告知本席,他在聽到裁判官在未讓他作出陳詞情況下,便立即作出裁定,感到錯愕,他來不及反應。往後他認為既然裁判官已作出裁定,要求裁判官覆核亦是徒勞無功的。 21.本席不知曉是否裁判官錯誤以為辯方亦認同控方指被告人的作為自招嫌疑,因此無讓辯方陳詞。 22.本席希望裁判官在處理有關訟費申請時,能謹記 Hui Yui Sang一案列出的程序,確保辯方有機會就控方提出的反對理由作出回應。 23.不過,以本案而言,上訴一方及答辯人均同意基於上訴是「重審」,本席可重新考慮被告人應否被剝奪訟費。 24.本席認為考慮了本案的案情事實,被告人在被控方第一證人要求他道歉時,大力拍打控方第一證人的車窗及不斷向該證人說粗言穢語。當時控方第一證人在車內。本席認為被告人當時的行為是會令人感到驚恐。本席認同裁判官指被告人當時的行為是有自招嫌疑的情況。本席不認同吳大律師指控方第一證人在案發當日並無就刑事恐嚇報警,因此無自招嫌疑。以控方第一證人所言,事源於他在被告人泊車時,他聽到有一聲巨響,明顯控方第一證人認定被告人的車撞及其車,才要求被告人道歉。控方第一證人就「交通事故」報警,是可理解的。況且控方第一證人亦向警員提及「刑事毀壞」,明顯是有關被告人對其車輛作出的行為。控方第一證人無即時指控被告人刑事恐嚇,在本案並不重要。重要的是被告人當時的行為是會令人感到驚恐,被告人是自招嫌疑。在此情況下,本席亦會如裁判官一般,在行使酌情權時不給予被告人訟費。 25.基於上述理由,本席駁回就不服訟費命令的上訴。
答辯人:由律政司高級檢控官關百安代表香港特別行政區 上訴人:由曾憲文律師事務所轉聘吳建五大律師代表 [1] X 代表粗言 [2] R v Ng Yui Kin & Others [1983] HKLR 356 [3] R v Kwok Moon Yan & Another [1989] 2 HKLR 396 [4] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531 [5] Hui Yiu Sang v HKSAR(2006) 9 HKCFAR 308 [6] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR(1999) 2 HKCFAR 531, “…What then are the governing principles? When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costsincurredindefendingthosecharges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising thediscretionmust obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time. Since, however, thediscretionis being exercised in the context of anacquittal – theavermentsconstituting the charges having been found by thejuryas not amounting to the crimesalleged - it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant's conduct during theinvestigationand at the trial: How he first responded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations, the consistency of those answers with his subsequentdefence, etc. Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted: These too are relevant to the exercise of thediscretionto deprive him of his costs, so long as the judge is not, indirectly, thereby punishing him by taking a view of the facts palpably different from that taken by thejuryand reflected in the not-guiltyverdict. The person in the best position toweighthose matters is clearly the judge himself.” [7] Ting James Henry v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 735, “16. It may often be the case that a defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial is such that it brings suspicion on himself, providing a ground for refusing him costs. Such conduct has been described as ‘most relevant’ to the discretionary exercise. However, it is incorrect to suggest (and the authorities give no warrant for suggesting) that a defendant can only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise. The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, provided always that the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence, and in particular, provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.” |
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Further hearings and rulings under HCMA 437/2014