香港特別行政區 訴 劉子安
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 644/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 1 June 2016.
1. 上訴人被控一項「故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員」罪，違反香港法例第212 章《侵害人身罪條例》第36(b) 條。上訴人否認控罪，經審訊後被東區裁判法院暫委裁判官許肇強(下稱裁判官)裁定罪名不成立。辯方申請訟費，控方反對，最終裁判官祇批准上訴人可獲一半訟費。上訴人不服，提出上訴。
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 4 cases
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HCMA 644/2015 香港特別行政區 高等法院原訟法庭 刑事上訴司法管轄權 判令上訴 案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2015年第644號 (原東區裁判法院刑事案件2015年第1191號) ______________________
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判 案 書 1.上訴人被控一項「故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員」罪，違反香港法例第212 章《侵害人身罪條例》第36(b) 條。上訴人否認控罪，經審訊後被東區裁判法院暫委裁判官許肇強(下稱裁判官)裁定罪名不成立。辯方申請訟費，控方反對，最終裁判官祇批准上訴人可獲一半訟費。上訴人不服，提出上訴。 案情及上訴人被判無罪的理由 2.裁判官在「判決理由書」列出案情及上訴人獲判無罪的理由：
訟費申請及裁判官的裁決理由 3.裁判官亦在其「判決理由書」列出有關申請及其裁決理由：
上訴理由 4.上訴人代表石書銘大律師共提出三項上訴理由：
控方立場 5.代表答辯一方的署理高級助理刑事檢控專員關百安認同錄影片段不能清晰顯示上訴人當時作出可疑行為，即使上訴人被補後保持緘默及其後沒有出庭作供，答辯一方認為以本案案情而言，裁判官是沒有充分基礎指上訴人自招嫌疑。故此，在本上訴本席不須處理上訴理由 (1) 及 (2)。 6.但答辯人認為上訴人沒有披露關鍵的開脫性資料，裁判官是有權拒絕給予上訴人訟費。 本席須處理的議題 7.本席完全認同石大律師及關專員就上訴人有否自招嫌疑的陳詞及論據。以本案案情而言，上訴人當時的行為及在被捕後保持緘默不屬自招嫌疑行為。上訴人在審訊時不作證亦非自招嫌疑行為。裁判官實不應以上訴人自招嫌疑為理由而行使酌情權、祇給予上訴人一半訟費。 8.基於上訴是重審，既然裁判官在處理訟費申請時犯了錯誤，本席便須重新考慮訟費問題：即應否以上訴人未有事先披露該具開脫性的現場錄影片段而不獲全部訟費？ 有關法律原則 9.有關訟費的法律原則很清晰。 10.香港法例第492 章《刑事案件訟費條例》第3(1)(c) 條列明，裁判官在以簡易程序處理罪行後判被告人無罪，裁判官可命令將訟費判給被告人。法例指裁判官可作出上述命令，裁判官有酌情權是否作出上述命令，但法例並無列出裁判官行使酌情權的原則為何。 11.在第492 章立法之前，刑事案件的訟費是依據現已被廢除了的《刑事訴訟程序條例》第73A 條(香港法例第221 章)。法庭在下列案件已就相關的原則作出討論：R v Ng Yui Kin & Others [1]，R v Kwok Moon Yan & Another [2]。 12.終審法院在 Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR [3] 一案確立並詳盡描述有關原則。終審法院亦在另一宗案例 Hui Yui Sang v HKSAR [4] 再次確立有關原則。 13.一般基本原則是一名獲判無罪的被告人應可獲訟費——除非有確實理由(positive reasons)剝奪他應得的訟費。確實理由包括被告人是否自招嫌疑，他的行為是否誤導了控方，令控方相信證據比實情更確鑿，是否證據確鑿但因技術理由而罪名不成立，等等。 14.在 Tong Cun Lin一案，終審法院非常任法官烈顯倫如此說 [5](本席沿用《刑事案例摘錄》一書內編者的中文翻譯版本如下)：
15.再者，一般而言，除非原審法官考慮了不應考慮的事項，上訴法庭不會輕易干預法官行使的酌情權(Tong Cun Lin 案例537 頁C 行)。 16.在 Ting James Henry [6] 一案，終審法院指出「通常一名被告人有自招嫌疑的行為而被剝奪其訟費是指該被告人在案件調查期間及審訊時的作為。該等行為曾被指為最與行使酌情權有關的作為。但若指祇有被告人在調查期間或審訊時的行為，才可有自招嫌疑情況，此言是不正確的。法庭行使酌情權時並不被如此不能改變的定律規範。一名被告人可就他在調查期間及審訊前的行為，包括有關他在指控他的罪行的周遭環境的行為，被告人可能已經明顯有自招嫌疑之舉，祇要法官並無在行使酌情權時損毀了『假定被告人無罪』此法律原則，及沒有採納了一個與被告人被判無罪的情況互相違背的立場，則法官無理由在被告人被裁定無罪後、在行使酌情權時，不考慮有關行為。」(非官方翻譯) 17.就一名被告人行使緘默權，在調查階段拒絕或未有披露其辯護理由或作出解釋，又或在審訊前沒有披露其辯護理由，最終被判無罪，申請訟費時法庭須考慮的原則，本席完全認同當時官階為高等法院原訟法庭法官的張舉能法官在 Cheng Kam Kuen v HKSAR [7] 一案的裁定(判辭第27-33 段)：
18.簡而言之，張法官考慮分析香港及澳洲的案例後，達致的總結是一名被告人行使緘默權，在調查期間不作回應或在審訊前不披露其辯護理由，這不代表法庭在考慮訟費申請時，不能將被告人上述情況考慮在內。法庭須就每宗案件不同的案情——在顧及被告人的緘默權不被剝奪的同時——作出評估判斷，決定應否判被告人可從公帑取得訟費。 19.本席須考慮及決定的是以本案的案情及所有有關情況而言，將上述法律原則應用於本案，本席應否行使酌情權，不給予上訴人全部訟費？ 事實背景 20.在考慮有關議題及雙方就此議題的陳詞論據前，本席先將有關事實背景道出。 21.案件發生在2014 年10 月15 日。 22.辯方在2015 年6 月已知悉有關影片存在，但因未知控方第一證人的容貌身材，因此不知控方第一證人是否影片中所見的警員之一。 23.在2015 年6 月23 日，辯方去函案件主管，要求控方提供文件及控方第一證人的照片。辯方並無在信函中提及索取照片的原因。警方未有提供有關照片。 24.在2015 年7 月7 日，第三次案前預審時，因當時辯方仍未知影片內是否有控方第一證人出現，辯方祇向法庭提及有可能在審訊時有影片。 25.在7 月31 日，辯方再次致函案件主管，要求提供控方第一證人的照片，辯方既無提及索取照片原因，亦無提及影片。警方仍沒有提供照片。 26.其後在8 月19 日，另一名曾在影片中出現的人(藍衣者)就另一宗案件受審。本案的控方第一證人亦在該案作證。代表上訴人的石大律師當時亦代表該藍衣者。辯方因應控方第一證人的容貌、身材及他在該宗案件所作的證供，得到結論是在本案呈堂影片所見的警員並非控方第一證人。 27.在案件審訊前數星期，辯方向法庭申請證人傳票，傳召拍攝有關影片的人出庭作證，以便將有關影片呈堂。 28.在審訊時，因控方第一證人在被盤問時承認影片所見是當時他身處案發現場的情況，因此辯方最終不須傳召該名拍攝者作證。 29.控方第一證人確認在影片所見、與上訴人有身體接觸的兩名警員均不是他。他指他在現場，因有移動才沒有在影片出現。換言之，即使影片所見與他所描述的情況不同，他仍堅持他在場及案情如他所言。 30.在控方舉證完畢後，辯方作中段陳詞，指上訴人無須答辯。代表控方的外聘大律師提出反對，陳詞指鏡頭所見並非全部角度、控方表證成立。 31.裁判官裁定表證成立。被告選擇不作證。最終裁判官裁定上訴人罪名不成立。 32.辯方要求訟費，控方指上訴人自招嫌疑及未有在審訊前向控方提供有關影片，指若辯方事先提交影片，控方有可能不繼續檢控上訴人。 33.最終裁判官祇判令上訴人可得一半訟費。 控辯雙方的陳詞 34.控方陳詞指上訴人沒有於審訊前披露該具關鍵性的影片，因而令控方在沒有看到該具有削弱控方證據效果的影片下，被誤導以為控方的案情較實際為強，因此祇應得一半訟費。 35.關專員強調若他是主控，在審訊前看到影片，他必定會終止對上訴人的指控，因影片內容實無可置疑地顯示控方第一證人指證上訴人的證供不能成立。若辯方於審訊前將影片給控方觀看，則不會有審訊，故此上訴人不應得全部訟費。 36.上訴一方的論據是控方第一證人的證言與影片所見明顯不同，但既然控方第一證人能虛構證供誣衊上訴人，若辯方在審訊前將影片交給控方，有可能令控方第一證人有機會在作證前觀看影片，繼而修改其證供，以符合或解釋影片所示。基於上述顧慮，在避免「打草驚蛇」的情況下，辯方選擇不將影片先給控方觀看，以免控方第一證人能「修補錯漏」。 37.上訴一方指若上訴人因此而得不到全部訟費，便等同剝削上訴人的權利，逼使上訴人要在審訊前披露其答辯理由。 本席作出的考慮 38.關專員陳詞指若他在審訊前已觀看有關影片，他必定會終止檢控。當然關專員此說法是有「事後孔明」之嫌，而事實上，當時代表控方的外聘大律師在看到有關影片後、在辯方作中途陳詞後，亦堅持表面證據成立，在反對訟費申請時，外聘律師亦祇是說他有可能不繼續檢控，而非必定不作檢控。 39.本案的控方第一證人是一名警員，他指上訴人故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警員(即他本人)。上訴人行使緘默權，不單不是自招嫌疑，亦無令控方誤以為案情比實際為強。控方的案情是依賴控方第一證人。 40.本案並非涉及普通市民之間的瓜葛。若一名市民(投訴人)指被告人作出詐騙或其他不當行為，而被告人有他本人才知悉的答辯理由(例如有文件證明他與投訴人之間有合約關係)，法庭可在考慮訟費申請時，以被告人不披露其辯護理由而令他自招嫌疑或令控方誤以為案情較實際為強而不給予被告人訟費。 41.但本案的情況並非如此，辯方的關注是有理據的。辯方在審訊前不久(8 月19 日)才正式確定控方第一證人並非在影片中所見、與上訴人有身體接觸的警員之一。若辯方及早將影片交給控方，難免有可能控方第一證人會在審訊前被問及為何他所言的情況並不在影片出現，屆時控方第一證人可能再給予另一份書面供詞以作解釋。 42.須知法庭是以證人在宣誓下所言為證據，控方第一證人的書面供詞並非證據。辯方雖可以就控方第一證人證言與其「先前不相符」的供詞向他作出盤問，但仍可能有一風險：即法庭接納控方第一證人就前後不符說法作出的解釋。 43.再者，在本案，控方代表外聘大律師在控方舉證完畢後(即在看過有關影片後)，並無接納影片內容清楚顯示控方第一證人的證言不成立，反而是在辯方作中段陳詞時指表面證供成立。 44.裁判官在聽取雙方陳詞後，裁定表面證供成立。本席認為就裁判官一方面裁定表面證供成立，而另一方面在不給予上訴人全部訟費時指辯方根據手頭的影片實可預見上訴人必然會脫罪，兩者看來有矛盾之處。 45.若有關影片的效用是強而有力、以致會令上訴人能預見他必然會脫罪，那麼裁判官是否應在中段陳詞時，以 R v Galbraith [8] 一案的第二原則(即若將控方案情推至最高點，經正確指引的陪審團不能恰當地裁定被告有罪，法官便應在辯方作出中途申請時終止案件)裁定上訴人無須答辯呢？ 46.本席認為以本案的所有情況而言，上訴人未有在審訊前披露其辯護理由、未有預先將有關影片給予控方，並不構成確實理由，令本席行使酌情權剝奪他應得的訟費。 結論 47.基於上述理由，本席裁定上訴得直。上訴人可得審訊的全部訟費。若雙方未能就訟費達成協議，則由法庭作出評估。
答辯人：由律政司署理高級助理刑事檢控專員關百安代表香港特別行政區 上訴人：由韋智達律師行轉聘石書銘大律師代表上訴人 [1] R v Ng Yui Kin & Others [1983] HKLR 356 [2] R v Kwok Moon Yan & Another [1989] 2 HKLR 396 [3] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531 [4] Hui Yui Sang v HKSAR(2006) 9 HKCFAR 308 [5] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR(1999) 2 HKCFAR 531, “…What then are the governing principles? When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costsincurredindefendingthosecharges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising thediscretionmust obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time. Since, however, thediscretionis being exercised in the context of anacquittal – theavermentsconstituting the charges having been found by thejuryas not amounting to the crimesalleged – it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant's conduct during theinvestigationand at the trial: How he first responded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations, the consistency of those answers with his subsequentdefence, etc. Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted: These too are relevant to the exercise of thediscretionto deprive him of his costs, so long as the judge is not, indirectly, thereby punishing him by taking a view of the facts palpably different from that taken by thejuryand reflected in the not-guiltyverdict. The person in the best position toweighthose matters is clearly the judge himself.” [6] Ting James Henry v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 735, “16. It may often be the case that a defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial is such that it brings suspicion on himself, providing a ground for refusing him costs. Such conduct has been described as ‘most relevant’ to the discretionary exercise. However, it is incorrect to suggest (and the authorities give no warrant for suggesting) that a defendant can only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise. The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, provided always that the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence, and in particular, provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.” [7] Cheng Kam Kuen v HKSAR, HCAL 92/2004,“27. Both on first principles and authorities, I totally agree that the right of silence is a fundamental part of the common law and the criminal law (I include here the absence of any affirmative duty of disclosure of the defence prior to trial – indeed an accused may choose to keep silent even at trial and simply put the prosecution to proof of its case). The right must be jealously guarded. It cannot be taken away or watered down, whether in form or in content, and whether directly or indirectly. This has been recently reaffirmed by the Court of Final Appeal in Lee Fuk Hing v. HKSAR [2005] 1 HKLRD 349. 28. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances can the refusal or failure to disclose one’s defence or proffer an explanation at the investigation stage, done in the exercise of the right of silence, be taken into account by the court in considering costs following an acquittal. The Court of Appeal in Kwok Moon-yan, supra, has said so in terms. The Australian cases have both explained why and demonstrated in what circumstances this may be done. Quite apart from the fact that Kwok Moon-yan as a decision of the Court of Appeal is binding on this Court, I agree with the conclusion that has been reached in these authorities. 29. Some may interpret this conclusion as putting a premium on an accused’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence, not in terms of guilt or innocence, but in terms of his ‘reasonable expectation’ (as opposed to ‘right’) to costs. 30. Ultimately this is a question of where to draw the line. The constitutional right of silence, enshrined in article 11(2)(g) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights contained in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383), which is itself entrenched by article 39 of the Basic Law, is essentially concerned with an accused’s innocence or guilt. One could certainly argue that the possibility of an accused being deprived of costs by reason of his silence or non-disclosure may have the effect of putting undue pressure on him not to exercise his right to silence, thereby indirectly diluting that right and adversely affecting his position on innocence or guilt – the very object of protection of the right of silence in the first place. I can see the force of the argument. 31. Countering this are several considerations: the suggested connection is an indirect one; the direct point in question is costs, not guilt or innocence, and when legal aid is widely available, concern during the investigation/pre-trial stage about recovery of costs in future is in all likelihood more imaginary than real; what is in issue is payment of costs out of the public revenue to the accused, not payment of costs by him to anybody; there is no right or entitlement to costs, which is a discretionary benefit created by statute which does not see fit to exclude – at least not expressly – non-disclosure in the exercise of the right of silence from the discretionary considerations that may be taken into account; and that in an appropriate case the exercise of the right may be taken into account is not tantamount to an automatic refusal of costs – rather the fact that the non-disclosure was the result of the exercise of the accused’s constitutional right of silence must be firmly borne in mind and given due weight in the weighing exercise itself (Ling at pp. 387-388). 32. As I said, authorities apart, ultimately this is a question of value judgment and drawing the boundary of the right of silence. The authorities reviewed in this judgment have shown where that boundary, in the wisdom of the judges concerned, should be drawn. For my part, I agree with the conclusion reached. 33. How much weight, if any, should be attached to the refusal or failure to explain or non-disclosure in a particular case is an entirely different matter. Furthermore, as mentioned above, in the weighing process, the fact that the refusal or failure to explain was done in the exercise of the accused’s constitutional right of silence must be fully borne in mind and given due weight.” [8] R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124, CA, “Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the case.” |
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