Hui Chi Fai v. To Ka Seng and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCEC 1516/2009 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment.
1. This is the trial of the application of Mr. Hui Chi Fai for compensation under sections 9, 10 and 10A of the Employees Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282) regarding an accident that occurred on 5 th September 2008 during which he suffered injury while at work. He also appeals against the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board’s assessment issued on 3 rd December 2009. After review, the Board assessed him of having 2.5% permanent loss of earning capacity.
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DCEC 1516 / 2009 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION NO. 1516 OF 2009 ------------------------
------------------------ Coram: Deputy District Judge Clement Lee in Court Date of Hearing: 18th October 2010 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 26th October 2010 ------------------------ JUDGMENT ------------------------ A. INTRODUCTION 1.This is the trial of the application of Mr. Hui Chi Fai for compensation under sections 9, 10 and 10A of the Employees Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282) regarding an accident that occurred on 5th September 2008 during which he suffered injury while at work. He also appeals against the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board’s assessment issued on 3rd December 2009. After review, the Board assessed him of having 2.5% permanent loss of earning capacity. 2.Interlocutory judgment on liability was entered against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents on 9th April 2010 by H. H. Judge Poon. 3.The 1st Respondent was present at trial. He did not challenge the quantum. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents, same as in the pre-trial hearings, were absent during trial. Having perused the relevant affirmations of service, I am satisfied that the notices of the trial hearings were served on the updated registered office address of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. I am of the view that the trial shall commence despite without their presence. 4.The Board also endorsed 230 days being the period of absence from duty necessary as a result of the injury. 5.In short, the main issue for determination at trial is: (i) what is the amount of the Applicant’s monthly earnings; (ii) in assessing the loss of earning capacity, whether section 9(1A) should be applied. 6.The Applicant testified. He also called Mr. Yam Ka Fai to testify (“Mr. Yam”). The 1st Respondent chose not to testify. B. THE EVIDENCE B-1 The Applicant’s evidence - the accident, injuries and treatment 7.The Applicant gives evidence at trial by confirming his witness statement. In summary, the relevant part of his evidence in support of the present application is as follows. His background
The accident
Monthly earnings
B-2 Mr. Yam’s evidence 8.Mr. Yam confirmed and adopted his witness statement. In summary, the relevant part of his evidence is as follows.
C. DISCUSSION C-1 Monthly earnings-daily rate & working days 9.I do accept that the daily wage of the Applicant before the accident is $400. This rate is supported by various contemporaneous documents including his declaration to the Labour Department made on 1st December 2008. 10.Regarding the number of working days, Ms. Wan submitted that the unchallenged evidence is that there were on average 26 to 27 working days. Upon my enquiry of her understanding of “red days” as mentioned by the Applicant, she further clarified that the “red days” should not only cover rest days but should include statutory holidays (about 12 statutory holidays a year). She said that 25 working days were acceptable to her. However, a closer look at the Applicant’s own document suggests that the Applicant may not work on average of 25 days per month because of rainy days. According to the record of advance payment issued by the 1st Respondent to the Applicant dated 15th September 2008, rainy days and public holidays (statutory holidays) are not working days. In my view, there should be rainy days that were not Sunday or statutory holidays and the average working days could not be 25 days per month. Except bare assertion, the Applicant failed to adduce documentary evidence regarding the average working days per month before the accident nor the evidence of rainy days was adduced. Without such evidence, it seems to me that I can only assess the number of working days on a broad basis and I come to the view that on average, there should be 22 working days per month. 11.In essence, the Applicant’s monthly remuneration before or at the time of accident is $400 x 22 days = $8,800. 12.However, in assessing the amount of compensation under section 9 (permanent incapacity), I do not agree that at the time of the accident, he was an apprentice. In my view, section 11(4) is not applicable. If section 11(4) applies, that would increase his daily wage from $400 to $550 as if he finished his apprenticeship. Section 11(4) provides that:
13.Firstly, the Applicant’s own evidence did not suggest that he entered into a contract of apprenticeship with the 1st Respondent. Secondly, according to the Applicant, at the time of the accident, his level of skill as a scaffolding worker was between senior apprentice and the medium level. His then daily rate was $400. His daily rate was within the range as if he was a medium level worker. These ranges of daily rate were in fact part of the evidence of his witness, Mr. Yam. Thirdly, although he planned to take the examination for medium level but he failed to register himself for the examination that would be held regularly twice a month. I am of the view that so long as his skill reached a certain standard and was recognised by those sub-contractors who are willing to pay him the rate as if he is a medium level worker, examination is not a must. The relevant certificate is just a proof of his skill. In substance, the totality of the evidence suggests that he was no longer an apprentice at the time of the accident. As a result, I am of the view that section 11(4) is not applicable. 14.In assessing compensation under section 10 (temporary incapacity), Ms. Wan submitted that either section 11(1)(b) or section 11(2) should be applied. Only if section 11(1)(b) is not applicable then the Court should look to section 11(2). Her personal view is that section 11(1)(b) is more suitable in the present case though the two sections may produce the same outcome. The only difference is conceptual difference. Section 11(1) (b) provides that:-
15.Section 11(2) provides that:-
16.According to the Applicant’s evidence, he sometimes worked for Mr. Yam, sometimes worked for the 1st Respondent. At the time of the accident, he has worked for the 1st Respondent for 3 days. The bamboo demolition works were almost finished. It seems that the Applicant, had there been no accident, had to await for another job order, it might be given by the 1st Respondent, Mr. Yam or other sub-contractors. This suggests the casual nature of the employment. I am of the view that these 3 days’ employment period with the 1st Respondent were too short to be used as a yardstick to calculate the monthly earnings under section 11(1)(b). It seems that the 2nd limb of section 11(2) is more suitable in the present case because no evidence was adduced on the rate earned by the same grade of similar capacity under the 1st limb of section 11(2). In brief, I accept Mr. Yam’s evidence in relation to the 3 levels of earnings of the scaffolding workers. 17.In Lai Cheung Kwongv Lo King Sum [2008] 3 HKLRD 643, it was the first day the applicant worked for the 1st respondent as a construction site causal worker when the accident occurred. The applicant worked 20 to 21 days a month at $600 per day for another employer in the same position in the past few months before the accident. The respondent objected the number of working days per month. At issue was how the injured worker’s monthly earnings were to be determined under section 11 of the Ordinance. On appeal, it was held, inter alia, that:
18.In Tang Chau Yuet v Fu Kin Po t/a Best Kitchen and others (DCEC 28/ 2008) Deputy Judge Clement Lee dated 9th April 2010, it was the first day the applicant worked for the 1st respondent when the accident occurred. There was no verbal agreement between the respondent and applicant as to the daily wages and number of working days a week. In computing the monthly earnings of the applicant, Section 11(2) was applied. The court calculated the applicant’s monthly earning by reference to the applicant’s previous work history for the same type of work. According to the applicant, it was the usual trade practice for him to work at $400 per day and worked 6 days a week and he worked on average 26 days (hence $13000 per month) per month for the 4 to 5 years before the accident. The court accepted the applicant’s evidence as credible and reliable. 19.In Wai Lai Fong for herself and on behalf of other members of the family of Kwok Tak Chung deceased v Wong Shiu Kei t/a as Wan Mei Aluminum and Steel Engineering and Wan Mei Engineering Co. (DCEC 730/2008), the Deceased had worked for his employer for 11 days before the accident. He did not have fixed employer and fixed number of working days before the accident. On average, he worked 18 days for the 12 months before the accident with daily wage ranging from $600 to $750 (mainly earning $600). The evidence was unchallenged. The court held that the 2nd limb of section 11(2) was applicable. The mean figure of $675 was adopted as the applicant’s daily wage and the court accepted that the applicant’s monthly earning should be $675 x 18 days = $12,150. 20.In short, more authorities invoke section 11(2) in this kind of casual and temporary nature of the work and I am of the view that section 11(2) is more suitable than section 11(1)(b) in this case. The monthly earnings of the Applicant before or at the time of accident is $400 x 22 days = $8,800. C-2 Appeal against Board’s assessment 21.Next topic is the Applicant’s appeal against the Board’s assessment on loss of earning capacity issued on 25th November 2009. C-3 The Law on hearing such appeal 22.In an appeal under s.18 of the Ordinance against the assessment of the Board, the correct test is to “start afresh”: Chan Kit v Sam Wo Industrial Manufactory [1989] 1 HKC 115, cited with approval in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Tsang Kwong Tong v Tennile Decoration & Design Ltd., CACV No.42 of 2006 dated 10th October 2006. 23.InTang Shau Tsan v Wealthy Construction Co. Ltd CACV 58/2000, it was held that it is for the court to assess the percentage of loss of earning capacity. Medical opinion is useful, but it is for the court to come to its own conclusion: Butterworths Hong Kong Employees’ Compensation Handbook, paragraph 9.06, p. 100. 24.The concept of earning capacity is not limited to present, nor is it to be measured by some immediate and possibly quite fortuitous achievement. It is concerned with a continuing state, with the potential of an individual and very much with the future: Lau Ho Wah v Yau Chi Biu [1987] HKLR 1061. 25.In the present case, the Applicant’s injury is not specified in the First Schedule. Under such circumstances, the Court may invoke section 9(1)(b) and assess the percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total incapacity:
26.Alternatively, the Court may invoke section 9(1A) and assess the percentage of compensation which would have been payable in case of permanent total incapacity:
27.The formula for assessing the compensation under section 9(1A) of the Ordinance is [(b – a)/b x c] with the abbreviations as follows:-
28.Illustrations can be found in Hong Kong Paper Mills Ltd. v Chan Hin Wau [1981] HKLR 556 [at P. 562 AB]; Yip Fong Ming v Joint-Effort Engineering Co. [1989] 1 HKC 505; Lui Kwong Yan v Shui Hing Decoration Works [1993] 1 HKLR 168. This is usually referred to as the Paper Mills formula as modified in Lui Kwong Yan v Shui Hing Decoration Works & anr. [1993] 1 HKLR 168) [at 171 L15 to 20]. 29.In the present case, by a Certificate of Assessment dated 20 August 2009, the Applicant was assessed to have suffered 2% loss of earning capacity as a result of fracture of left acetabulum, left pubic rami and left radial head resulting in left hip pain. 30.By a Certificate of Review of Assessment dated 3 December 2009, the applicant was assessed to have suffered 2.5% loss of earning capacity resulting from fracture of left acetabulum, left pubic rami and left radial head resulting in left hip pain and mild weakness. 31.Pursuant to section 18 of the Ordinance, the Applicant filed an appeal in his Application dated 31 December 2009 against the Assessment as stated in the Form 9, i.e. 2.5% loss of earning capacity for “fracture of left acetabulum, left pubic rami and left radial head resulting in left hip pain and mild weakness”. 32.The Applicant was examined by his orthopaedic expert Dr. Jack Wong on 14 May 2010. His report is adduced without calling the maker. Dr. Wong in his report stated his view on “diagnosis and causation” as follows:
33.The Applicant has attained maximal medical improvement. 34.The Applicant still suffers from the following residual problems :
35.He would have mild pain and discomfort when he exerts his left elbow and hip, such as continuous and excessive standing, walking, squatting, running or jumping; and excessive lifting with left upper limb. Due to his painful left elbow and hip, his sporting enjoyment will be affected. 36.The left radial head fracture with residual pain and mild loss of extension accounts for 2% whole person impairment. The left pubic ramal fractures with acetabular involvement cause left hip pain and mild loss of rotational movements, they account for 2% whole person impairment. The combined whole person impairment is 4%. 37.Regarding loss of earning capacity, Dr. Wong opined that:-
38.His conclusion is that the Applicant suffers from 4% loss of earning capacity. However, it seems to me that on one hand, Dr. Wong opined that the Applicant should be able to resume his pre-accident occupation as a scaffolding worker, but on the other hand, he opined that the Applicant cannot climb, he cannot take up exterior wall duties. As a scaffolding worker, Dr. Wong should have known that the worker has to climb up and down, whether the work relates to delivery of bamboo to a master or the work relates to tying the bamboo together. I find it difficult to understand these inconsistent statements. Further, these statements were contrary to the observation of Pal Lui of UCH, occupational therapist, whose opinion is that after 9 sessions of work rehabilitation training, the assessment on 20th March 2009 showed improvement in his grip strength and he was able to climb scaffold in work simulated assessment. He was ready for resuming previous job. 39.More importantly, it is the Applicant’s own evidence that he was slightly scared of climbing up and worked at height, something like the lack of confidence rather than his physical inability. He needed time to adjust himself to work at height. In essence, I am of the view that the Applicant could resume working as a scaffolding worker in full capacity. Although he might not be the fittest as before, he should be as competent and skilful as before. 40.However, Ms. Wan in effect asked the Court to ignore the assessment made by the Applicant’s expert on “4% loss of earning capacity”. She asked the Court to invoke section 9(1A), that may increase the multiplier from 4% to 67.8%. Section 9(1A) provides that:-
41.Ms. Wan submitted that the Applicant earned much less after the accident ($4,596/month). She said that this case falls within “special circumstances” under section 9(1A). 42.She submitted that while the Applicant can perform works of similar type as a scaffolding worker, due to his symptoms and residual disabilities, the applicant cannot resume his pre-accident duties as a scaffolding worker in full capacity the duties of which necessarily include climbing of scaffolding and heavy manual jobs. His choice of work are greatly reduced. He cannot secure sufficient work and his employment periods tend to be periodical and short and he has suffered substantial loss of earning. Given his limitation in returning to his pre-accident job and his limited choice of suitable employment as a result of his impairment and the great disparity of income between the income of the present job he is capable of undertaking and his pre-accident job, it is submitted that the formula in Hong Kong Paper Mills Ltd. v Chan Hin Wu (1981) HKLR 556, as modified in Lui Kwong Yan v Shui Hing Decoration Works & anr. [1993] 1 HKLR 168 should be adopted for calculating the compensation payable under section 9 of the Ordinance. 43.In essence, I am of the view that the Applicant’s situation does not fall within “special circumstances” that cause me to invoke the refined Paper Mills Formula for the following reasons:-
44.Besides, having found that the Applicant could resume working as a scaffolding worker, I do not accept Ms. Wan’s submissions. His limited choice of works or lesser earnings were very much due to his lack of confidence rather than his physical limitations. I do not agree that the formula in Hong Kong Paper Mills Ltd. v Chan Hin Wu (1981) HKLR 556, as modified in Lui Kwong Yan v Shui Hing Decoration Works & anr. [1993] 1 HKLR 168 should be adopted for calculating the compensation payable under section 9 of the Ordinance. 45.While I disagree with Dr. Wong’s opinion that the Applicant cannot climb in light of the objective evidence of the occupational therapist and the Applicant’s own evidence at trial on lack of confidence of climbing up, I do agree with Dr. Wong’s assessment of loss of earning capacity in light of the residual problems of the Applicant. 46.In the premises, I should replace the Board’s assessment of 2.5% with 4%. 47.All in all, I do not accept the entirety of the Applicant’s evidence, Mr. Yam’s evidence and Dr. Wong’s opinion with my views above. D. QUANTUM OF COMPENSATION 48.I shall now come to the question of quantum. The Applicant was aged 27 at the time of the injury and his monthly remuneration was HK$8,800. D-1 Section 10 compensation 49.The Applicant has been given 230 days of sick leaves from 5th September 2008 to 21st April 2009. This is endorsed by the Board. Under section 10 (2) of the Ordinance, the medical certificates for sick leave are presumed to be conclusive evidence of temporary incapacity. In the absence of evidence of fraud, either by the certifying doctor or the employee, the presumption under S. 10(2) is irrebuttable: Siu Fu Yau v Wong Po Kee Ltd. (DCEC 654/2003) [2007] 1 HKLRD 159. 50.I find that the Board’s assessment of 230 days of absence from duty necessary as a result of the injury appropriate, reasonable and sufficient. 51.I therefore award the Applicant HK$53,973.00 (HK$8,800/30 x 230 x 4/5) as compensation under section 10 of the Ordinance. Deduction in the sum of HK12,320.00 as advance payment has to be made and that arrives at HK$41,653. 00. Section 9 compensation for permanent partial incapacity 52.As I said above, I replace the Board’s assessment with 4% as my own assessment. 53.I therefore award the Applicant HK$33,792.00 (HK$8,800 x 96 x 4%) as his compensation under section 9 of the Ordinance. Section 10A medical expenses 54.The Applicant incurred the following medical expenses:-
55.The Applicant claims a sum of HK$1,410.00 under this head. This is supported by various receipts. I therefore award the Applicant HK$1,410.00 under section 10A of the Ordinance. E. CONCLUSION 56.For the reasons set out above, the compensation for the Applicant under the Ordinance should be: (a) HK$33,792.00 under section 9, (b) HK$41,653.00 under section 10, and (c) HK$1,410.00 under section 10A. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents do jointly and severally pay the said compensation. The Applicant is further entitled to interest on these sums at half judgment rate from the date of injury to the date of judgment, and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment. 57.Costs order nisi be made in that the 1st to 3rd Respondents shall pay the Applicant’s costs of this action. Such costs shall be taxed if not agreed. The Applicant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. Unless any of the parties seek to vary the costs order nisi by way of summons within 14 days from the date hereof, the cost order nisi shall become absolute 14 days from the date hereof.
Ms. Wan Pui Shan of Messrs. Fan & Fan, Solicitors for the Applicant. The 1st Respondent appears in person. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents are absent. |
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