Wong Tze Yam v. Tang King Shing, Commissioner of Police and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 199/2009 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 23 July 2010.
1. In December 2006, the appellant Mr. Wong Tze Yam (“Mr. Wong”) commenced a civil action at the High Court (HCA 2689/2006) claiming damages against the Commissioner of Police (“the Commissioner”) on the cause of action that he had allegedly been illegally detained by police officers at a certain place of public entertainment in Tsim Sha Tsui.
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CACV199/2009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 199 OF 2009 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA539 OF 2007) __________________
__________________ Coram: Hon Cheung JA, Hon Yeung JA and Hon Kwan JA Date of Hearing: 8 July 2010 Date of Judgment: 23 July 2010 JUDGMENT Hon Yeung JA (giving the judgment of the Court): Background 1.In December 2006, the appellant Mr. Wong Tze Yam (“Mr. Wong”) commenced a civil action at the High Court (HCA 2689/2006) claiming damages against the Commissioner of Police (“the Commissioner”) on the cause of action that he had allegedly been illegally detained by police officers at a certain place of public entertainment in Tsim Sha Tsui. 2.Mr. Wong alleged that the Commissioner took revenge on him and his younger brother Wong Tze Yuk (“younger brother”) because of the incident mentioned above. Between 12 November 2006 and 4 March 2007 a number of police officers, on 5 occasions, stopped and searched him or his younger brother and him in the streets. The police officers searched their persons, demanded them to produce their identity cards and recorded in the police notebooks their personal particulars as set out in their identity cards. 3.Mr. Wong complained that the police officers should not have any reasonable suspicion against him or his younger brother, but they demanded them to produce their identity cards and searched their persons, and by doing so they violated section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance. Mr. Wong also asserted that whether or not any reasonable suspicion existed, a police officer was not allowed to record or collect the personal particulars of a person stopped and searched. Mr. Wong alleged that what the police officers had done contravened Article 39 of the Basic Law and Article 14 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“Bill of Rights”), both of which provided for the protection of the privacy of citizens, as well as paragraph 2(a) of the Data Protection Principle 1 (purpose and manner of collection of personal data) under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (“Personal Privacy Ordinance”). 4.In 2007, Mr. Wong filed another claim with the Court of First Instance of the High Court (HCA539/2007) for damages against the Commissioner and his representative the Secretary for Justice (“the Secretary”). The amount of damages which Mr. Wong claimed against the Commissioner and the Secretary was HK$1,888,888. 5.On 11 August 2009, Mr. Justice Jeremy Poon of the Court of First Instance dismissed Mr. Wong’s claim and ordered him to pay costs fixed in the sum of $500,000. 6.Mr. Wong now appeals to this Court against Poon J’s decision. 7.The undisputed facts were that Mr. Wong or Mr. Wong and his younger brother were stopped and searched by police officers at the following times and locations:
8.The position of the Commissioner and the Secretary was that the stopping and searching of Mr. Wong or Mr. Wong and his younger brother were done solely in lawful execution of the police officers’ duties and did not constitute any illegal acts of tort, and that the recording of the personal particulars of a citizen by a police officer in his notebook following a lawful stop and search of the citizen was lawful, constitutional and did not contravene the Personal Privacy Ordinance. Evidence given by the parties 9.Both Mr. Wong and his younger brother gave evidence about what happened when they were stopped and searched by the police officers. Different police officers were involved in these 5 occasions of stop and search. They were respectively: 1st occasion: PC 54107 Wong Shing Chung; 2nd occasion: PC 58904 Tam Kwai Yong; 3rd occasion: PC 51635 Mak Chi Man and Station Sergeant 23770 Ho Chun Chiu; 4th occasion: PC 34474 Tang Hin Fung and Station Sergeant 22731 Sum Yik Man; 5th occasion: PC 1697 Lee Gong Tai, Sergeant 48112 Ho Wai Ming and Senior Inspector 90056 Luk Hoi Ho. All these police officers gave evidence about how they stopped and searched Mr. Wong and his younger brother. 10.The evidence given by the parties in respect of these 5 occasions was as follows:
Findings made by the trial judge 11.As far as factual issues are concerned, Poon J found that all the police officers were honest and reliable, but Mr. Wong and his younger brother were not. Therefore, where the evidence of Mr. Wong and his younger brother differed from that of the police officers, Poon J rejected their evidence and accepted the evidence of the latter. 12.Poon J found that on all the 5 occasions of stopping and searching Mr. Wong or Mr. Wong and his younger brother, the police officers were lawfully exercising their powers under section 54(1) or 54(2) of the Police Force Ordinance. Poon J found that the police officers had the power to stop and search Mr. Wong and his younger brother, to demand them to produce their identity cards for inspection, and to record in the police notebooks their names, dates of birth and identity card numbers as shown on their identity cards. 13.Poon J carefully set out the relevant legal principles and made his findings according to these principles. 14.Poon J found that the personal particulars set out on the identity card of a citizen, including his name, gender, date of birth and the identity card number were unique and were the most useful information that could be relied on to ascertain or verify the “personal identity” of an individual and that therefore the personal particulars set out on an identity card formed part of the “privacy” of a citizen and were protected by Article 39 of the Basic Law, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and Article 14 of the Bill of Rights. 15.However, Poon J found that when a police officer, by exercising his powers under the Police Force Ordinance, stopped and searched a citizen and recorded in his notebook the personal particulars on the identity card of the person so stopped and searched, what he did was prescribed by law and did not constitute unreasonable, arbitrary or unlawful interference, so that there was no contravention of Article 39 of the Basic Law, Article 17 of the ICCPR or Article 14 of the Bill of Rights, and the requirements laid down in the Personal Privacy Ordinance were satisfied. 16.Poon J also found that after a police officer lawfully stopped and searched a citizen by exercising his powers under section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance, he could, by virtue of section 10(b), record in his notebook the personal particulars as shown on the identity card of the person stopped and searched by him. This was because the purpose of his doing so was to detect and prevent crime, and the act was therefore lawful and constitutional. 17.Poon J carefully considered the circumstances surrounding the 5 occasions on which the police officers stopped and searched Mr Wong or Mr. Wong and his younger brother, and came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the police officers to invoke section 54(1) or 54(2) of the Police Force Ordinance, so that what they did, including the recording in their notebooks the names, dates of birth and identity card numbers of Mr Wong and his younger brother after searching them, was done for the reasonable execution of their duties and did not contravene the Basic Law, the ICCPR, the Bill of Rights or the Personal Privacy Ordinance, and that therefore they did not constitute any illegal tortious act. Poon J gave judgment against Mr. Wong, dismissed all his claims and ordered him to pay costs fixed in the sum of $500,000. Grounds of appeal 18.In his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Wong complained that Poon J did not sufficiently assessed the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, and as a result he made erroneous findings as to the facts. Mr. Wong emphasized that Poon J did not explain why he concluded that he and his younger brother were not honest and reliable witnesses, but ruled that all the police officers were honest and reliable. Mr. Wong said that the conclusion reached by Poon J showed that he was biased. 19.Mr. Wong asserted that Poon J misinterpreted the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Police Force Ordinance, and therefore he wrongly found that the police officers’ stopping and searching him and his younger brother, the recording in the notebooks their names, dates of birth, identity card numbers and other information did not contravene Article 39 of the Basic Law, Article 17 of the ICCPR or Article 14 of the Bill of Rights. 20.Mr. Wong submitted that Poon J failed to consider sufficiently or failed to consider at all the principles concerning the rule of law and that he, just based on a simple bill of costs, ordered him to pay $500,000 costs, without analyzing the legal issues and factual disputes involved in the case. Mr. Wong said that he did not have sufficient time to object to the bill of costs prepared by the Commissioner and the Secretary. 21.Mr. Wong insisted that the police officers wrongly recorded in their notebooks his personal particulars and those of his younger brother in contravention of the Basic Law, the ICCPR, the Bill of Rights and also in violation of the Personal Privacy Ordinance, and that therefore he was entitled to claim for damages against the Commissioner and the Secretary. 22.When Mr. Wong made submissions to this Court in accordance with his “Skeleton Arguments (Open)”, he made some changes in his position. He did not complain about Poon J’s findings of fact any more, and he no longer insisted that the police officers’ stopping and searching him and his younger brother was unlawful and unconstitutional. Mr. Wong just maintained that the recording of his personal particulars and those of his younger brother by the police officers during or after stopping and searching them was against the Basic Law, the Bill of the Rights and the ICCPR, and was at variance with the Personal Privacy Ordinance. Mr. Wong stressed that one of the purposes of the police officers’ stopping and searching them, including detaining him and his younger brother, was to obtain the information contained in their identity cards and to record the information in their notebooks. Mr. Wong submitted that such acts were devoid of any legal basis. 23.Mr. Wong protested that he and his younger brother were Hong Kong permanent residents and should be entitled to the protection afforded by the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights, and should not be lightly deprived of such protection. Mr. Wong was of the view that even though section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance authorized a police officer to stop and search any suspicious character and to demand that he produce proof of his identity for inspection, it did not give power to the police officer to record the particulars on the identity card of the person so stopped and searched. 24.Mr. Wong was adamant on the point that after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, the Legislative Council did not make any law which gave power to a police officer to collect the personal particulars of a citizen stopped and searched by him. Section 10(b) of the Police Force Ordinance, which Poon J invoked, was not clear enough on this point to satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement to restrict the rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents, including the right to protection of the privacy of their personal data . 25.Mr. Wong prayed in aid a number of Court of Final Appeal judgments, including Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 381, HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu and Lee Kin Yun (1999) 2 HKCFAR 469, Ng Ka Ling and Anor v Director of Immigration (1999) HKCFAR 49, Leung Kwok Hung & Others v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229 and Gurung Kesh Bahadur v Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 480 to support his position. Mr Wong asserted that the protection afforded to a citizen for his basic human rights should be all encompassing, and that these rights should be interpreted generously so as to give effect to the rights of an individual to the full; that on the other hand, restrictions imposed on the rights should be narrowly interpreted; and that it was incumbent on the Government to provide sufficient reasons to justify any measure which restricted human rights. 26.Mr. Wong pointed out that neither the Commissioner nor the Secretary provided any reason and/or evidence to show that the recording of the personal particulars of a person stopped and searched was in any way reasonably connected with any lawful purpose. Mr. Wong also expressed his views on the present level of human rights, the present condition of the rule of law and the present relationship between the Judiciary and the Government in Hong Kong, which served as the conclusion of his Skeleton Arguments. Respondent’s position 27.Mr. Edward Shum, for the Commissioner and the Secretary, submitted that the learned judge had found that the police officers’ stopping and searching Mr. Wong and his younger brother was lawful, and that therefore the only issue to be resolved was whether it was unconstitutional or an encroachment on the two persons’ privacy for the police officers to record in the notebooks the personal particulars contained in their identity cards. 28.Mr. Shum stressed that the relevant provisions in the Police Force Ordinance complied with the “prescribed by law” requirement in Article 39 of the Basic Law, and that the recording of the particulars of a person stopped and searched was not unreasonable or arbitrary, but was only minimal interference with the “privacy” of the person stopped and searched, and so there was no contravention of the Basic Law, the ICCPR or the Bill of Rights. 29.Mr. Shum argued that the purpose of recording in the police notebook the personal particulars of a person stopped and searched was to detect and prevent crimes, therefore it was within the exemption under section 58 of the Personal Privacy Ordinance. 30.Mr. Shum put forward an alternative argument, namely that the personal particulars contained in the identity card of a citizen did not form part of the “privacy” of the citizen, and so Poon J’s finding made in respect of this issue was wrong. Even if such information was information concerning “privacy”, in order to strike a proper balance between the interests of the society and the privacy of the individual, it was reasonable to allow a police officer to record in his notebook the particulars contained in the identity card of a citizen after he stopped and searched that citizen. Discussion 31.Article 39 of the Basic Law provides that the ICCPR is applicable in Hong Kong. Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the Bill of Rights stipulate that [Translator’s note: the English versions of these two provisions are identical]:
32.The learned judge found that the personal particulars set out on the identity card of a citizen formed part of the “privacy” of the citizen and should be protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Shum disagreed and he stressed that the European Commission of Human Rights had never made any decision that “privacy” included the name of a person, and that in Reyntjens v Belgium (Application No. 16810/90) 73 D.R. 136, it was clearly held that the complainant’s identity document bore only his name, date of birth and other personal particulars but did not bear any information about the “private life”[1] of any individual. 33.If the respondent in an appeal is aggrieved by a decision made at the trial and desires the Court of Appeal to vary the decision, he must give a respondent’s notice and lodge a cross-appeal in accordance with Order 59 rule 6(1) of the Rules of the High Court. Otherwise, it is not necessary for the Court of Appeal to grant any remedy or relief. 34.Neither the Commissioner nor the Secretary has given any respondent’s notice in respect of Poon J’s decision. In the circumstances of this case, we do not think that we should exercise our discretion to deal with the respondent’s allegation that Poon J had made a wrong decision. 35.The right to protection of “privacy”-related information which a citizen enjoys is not a right which is absolutely free from any interference. When it is reasonable and lawful to do so, law enforcement agencies, including the police force, are empowered to take certain actions, notwithstanding such actions violate the principle of protection of “privacy”. It is for this reason that Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the Bill of Rights stipulate only that no one shall be subjected to “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy”, and that Article 39 of the Basic Law provides that “The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law.” 36.Poon J in his judgment correctly pointed out that sections 54(1) and (2) of the Police Force Ordinance expressly provide that under certain specifically defined circumstances a police officer has the power to stop any person who has aroused his suspicion and demand that he produce proof of his identity for inspection. The wording of sections 54(1) and (2) of the Police Force Ordinance is clear. Even if they are interpreted in the narrowest sense, they still confer power on a police officer, in circumstances specified in the provisions, to stop a person who has aroused his suspicion and to demand that the person produce proof of his identity for inspection. 37.As a matter of fact, section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance was amended and became as it is now after the Bill of Rights came into force in 1991. The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that a police officer’s stopping and searching a suspicions character and demanding that he produce proof of his identity for inspection did not contravene any provision which protects human rights. 38.Taking into account the importance of preventing and detecting crimes, and the disturbance caused to a person by stopping and searching him and demanding that he produce proof of his identity for inspection, the restrictions imposed by section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance on the protection for privacy-related personal data are clearly reasonably connected with and proportional to the end sought, so that they meet the requirements laid down in R v Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 HKCLR 127. Mr. Wong actually raised no more objection in this respect. 39.Mr. Wong’s position was that even if it was lawful and constitutional for a police officer to stop and search a person who aroused his suspicion and to demand that the person produce proof of his identity for inspection, it did not follow that the police officer had the power to record in his notebook the personal data of the person whom he stopped and searched. Mr. Wong argued that inspection of proof of identity after stopping and searching someone and the recording of information were two different procedures. Mr. Wong even insisted that one of the purposes of a police officer’s stopping and searching a suspicions character was to collect the personal data of that person. 40.We do not agree with Mr Wong’s argument. A police officer is a member of a disciplinary force and is required to strictly observe disciplinary rules and regulations. In order to ensure that the police officers will carry out their duties properly and that how they behave when carrying out their duties can be examined where it is necessary to do so, all police officers must make detailed record of events which happened when they were carrying out their duties. There are multiple purposes for doing this. It can protect the police officers and can help them, when necessary to do so, to refresh their memory of what happened in the execution of their duties. It is also for the protection of the interests of the citizens, for it can ensure that the police officers will not abuse their powers when they were performing their duties. The notebooks which the police officers use to record the details of how they discharge their duties are one of the specified articles of equipment that, under the Police Force Ordinance, should be provided to police officers. 41.As pointed out by Mr Shum, the Law Reform Commission had scrutinized the amended section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance. The Commission not only considered that the provision did not contravene the Bill of Rights, they even made the following recommendation:
42.We agree that to record in the notebook the information contained in the proof of identity of the person stopped and searched is just the exercise of part of the powers conferred on a police officer by section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance. It is a reasonable extension of such powers and is a necessary and reasonable step. This step, just like stopping and searching a suspicious character and demanding that he produce proof of his identity for inspection, is constitutional and lawful. 43.Had there been any information which shows that the police officers’ recording the information contained in the identity cards of the persons stopped and searched by them was a result of any ulterior motive or purpose in addition to the purpose of making a record of what had happened, then the outcome may have been different. However, there is no information which shows that this did happen. Mr. Wong did not make such allegation, nor did he produce any evidence to substantiate such allegation. We do not need to consider what the outcome would have been if such thing did happen. 44.We must emphasize that the workload of a police officer is heavy and the duties he needs to carry out are many. A police officer, when required to act as such, shall be deemed to be on duty, regardless of where he is and what time it is. A police officer is a member of a disciplinary force and his conduct is governed by disciplinary rules and regulations. If a police officer cannot make written record of details about how he carries out his duties, he will be seriously hampered in his work and his efficiency will surely decrease. This is certainly not a desirable phenomenon in a civilized society. 45.Poon J found that the information, namely the names, dates of birth and identity card numbers of the persons which the police officers recorded after they stopped and searched those persons in accordance with the Police Force Ordinance was the most basic information needed for ascertaining or verifying the identity of a person, and that recording such information was proportional to the purpose of preventing and detecting crimes. Poon J stressed that the evidence showed that the police officers’ recording such basic information of the persons stopped and searched, like stopping and searching the persons who aroused their suspicions, was solely for preventing and detecting crimes. The information was not put to any other use. The interference that was caused to the “privacy” of the persons stopped and searched was minimal. These findings made by Poon J are reasonable and correct. We agree with them. 46.Poon J correctly stated in paragraph 34 of his judgment that “Paragraph 2(a) of Data Protection Principle 1 under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance provides that personal data must be collected in a lawful manner. … the lawful interception of a person by the police pursuant to section 54 of the Police Force Ordinance and the subsequent recording in the police notebook of the particulars of that person as shown on the identity card pursuant to section 10(b) are aimed at investigating and preventing crimes. It is of course lawful to collect personal data in this way.” 47.The stopping and searching of the two Mr. Wong and the recording of the information on their identity cards by the police officers had a sound legal basis and were done as “prescribed by law”. Judging the legal provisions in the perspective of reasonableness and proportionality, they do not infringe upon the “privacy” protected by the Basic Law, the ICCPR and the Bill of Rights. 48.We have carefully considered the judgment given by Poon J and we approve his judgment. When a police officer stops and searches a citizen and records in his notebook the name, date of birth and other information contained in the citizen’s identity card, there is no contravention of Article 39 of the Basic Law, Article 17 of the ICCPR or Article 14 of the Bill of Rights, and such acts satisfy the requirements in the Personal Privacy Ordinance. 49.Poon J found that each of the 5 occasions of stopping and searching Mr. Wong or Mr. Wong and his younger brother was lawful action taken by the police officers in accordance with section 54(1) or 54(2) of the Police Force Ordinance when the officers felt suspicious of them. 50.Mr. Wong complained that Poon J accepted the police officers’ evidence but rejected the evidence given by him and his younger brother. He accused Poon J of being biased. 51.General speaking, the Court of Appeal will not disturb findings of fact made in the lower court, because the trial judge had the opportunity to hear and observe the demeanor of the witnesses when they were giving evidence. The Court of Appeal will not reverse the findings of fact made by the trial judge and replace them by its own, unless it considers that the findings of fact in question are not supported by the evidence or are inconsistent with the documentary evidence produced at the trial. (See Ting Kwok Keung v. Tam Dick Yuen and Ors (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336). 52.Poon J had the opportunity to observe how the witnesses of the two sides gave evidence. The police officers concerned had no motive for framing Mr. Wong. Mr. Wong’s allegations against the police officers have no objective basis. Poon J was entitled to accept the police officers’ evidence and reject the evidence given by Mr. Wong and his younger brother. 53.We uphold Poon J’s decision to dismiss Mr Wong’s claim against the Commissioner and the Secretary. 54.As a general rule, the losing party in a civil case has to pay the opposite party’s costs. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case. Poon J is entitled to order Mr. Wong to pay the costs of the Commissioner and the Secretary. However, we have reservations about the decision made by Poon J summarily that the costs should be $500,000. This case is not too complicated and the hearing finished within 4 days. We have considered and analyzed the Statement of Costs submitted by the Commissioner and the Secretary. We can determine the reasonable amount of the Commissioner and the Secretary’s costs on the same footing as Poon J. We think that the reasonable amount should be $300,000, instead of $500,000. 55.We dismiss Mr. Wong’s appeal, but reduce the costs payable by him to the Commissioner and the Secretary from $500,000 to $300,000. 56.We also order that Mr. Wong shall pay the costs of this appeal. Having considered the Statement of Costs of the Commissioner and the Secretary and relevant factors, including our decision that the costs of the first instance hearing shall be reduced, we fix the costs of the appeal at $50,000.
The Appellant/Plaintiff, acting in person, present. Mr. Edward Shum, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the 1st and the 2nd Respondents/Defendants Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and approved by Mr. P. Y. Lo, Barrister-at-law. [1] “Private life” in this sentence is a reference in the context of the “right to respect for his private…life” under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 199/2009