HKSAR v. Luk Chi Kan
Read the full judgment text of CACC 273/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 August 2024.
1. With leave of the Single Judge granted on 23 November 2023 [1] , the appellant appeals against his sentence of 9 years and 9 months’ imprisonment passed on 9 November 2021, having confirmed, before Andrew Chan J (“the judge”), his plea of guilty to a single charge of throwing corrosive fluid with intent, contrary to section 29(c) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 13 cases
|
CACC 273 /2021, [2024] HKCA 802 On Appeal From [2022] HKCFI 83 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 273 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 366 OF 2020) ________________________
________________________
____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Hon Macrae VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.With leave of the Single Judge granted on 23 November 2023[1], the appellant appeals against his sentence of 9 years and 9 months’ imprisonment passed on 9 November 2021, having confirmed, before Andrew Chan J (“the judge”), his plea of guilty to a single charge of throwing corrosive fluid with intent, contrary to section 29(c) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. 2.Given that it is the common position of the parties that the appellant’s sentence should be reduced on the basis that his assistance to the authorities has been of practical use, the remaining question, should we agree with that position, is what discount is appropriate. The facts 3.Ms Ho Mei-yan (“Ho”) was married to the victim (“PW1”) but had an extramarital relationship with the appellant. She in turn suspected that PW1 was also having an extramarital affair and sought to take revenge on him[2]. At 4 pm on 27 November 2019, she made a telephone call to the appellant, and sent him a photograph of PW1, instructing him to buy some drainage cleaner to throw at PW1[3]. At 9:20 pm on the same day, Ho informed the appellant that PW1 was driving home and asked him to “do the job”[4]. Accordingly, the appellant lay in wait for PW1 downstairs of his home in Tseung Kwan O and, upon seeing him, did as instructed and threw a paper cup of sulphuric acid at PW1. This action caused PW1, as he later described, “excruciating pain on his head, face and body”. 4.The appellant then left the scene, whilst PW1 was admitted to the Accident and Emergency Department of Tseung Kwan O Hospital[5]. He was found to have suffered 3% full thickness and 3% partial thickness chemical burns to 6% of his total body surface, which required multiple surgical interventions in respect of burns to his face, neck, upper body and the corneas of both eyes. PW1 underwent amniotic membrane grafting to his left eye in December 2019 and August 2020. The vision in his right eye has normalised following surgery, but his right eye is still affected. He has a contracture of his left nostril, which has affected his breathing, while scars on his neck have limited its extension and rotation. He was hospitalised for 30 days[6], since when he has suffered severe depression and post-traumatic syndrome[7], which will require long-term and persistent psychological and psychiatric treatment. The sentence 5.The appellant was 31 years of age at the time of sentence and had a clear criminal record. By reference to this Court’s decision in HKSAR v Lau Ching Him[8], the judge adopted a starting point of 15 years’ imprisonment, which he reduced by one-third for the appellant’s plea of guilty to 10 years’ imprisonment. He then accorded the appellant a further reduction of 3 months for his voluntary surrender to the police. The ultimate sentence thereby became 9 years and 9 months’ imprisonment. It is against that sentence the appellant now appeals. The appellant’s assistance 6.It is not disputed by the parties that:
The parties’ position 7.For present purpose, no argument is made of the starting point of 15 years’ imprisonment. Mr Beel submits that, in view of his cooperation with the authorities, the appellant is entitled to a sentencing discount above the customary one-third for plea[17]. For his part, Mr Leung, on behalf of the respondent, accepts that the appropriate range of discount should be between 40% and 50%. Both counsel have referred to Z v HKSAR[18] and HKSAR v Lo Sze Tung Stephanie[19]in support of their respective positions. Mr Leung accepts that at the time the appellant surrendered to the police, the police did not know of his identity. Discussion 8.Z v HKSAR is an important authority on discounts for assistance to the authorities, approving the various maximum discounts of 40%, 50% and 66.6%, depending on the level of assistance provided in a particular case. In Lo Sze Tung Stephanie, the specific categories of assistance, which were said to attract discount ranges of 33.3% to 40% and 40% to 50%, were further explained. In respect of the discount range of 40% to 50%, into which the present case falls, the Court stated at [64] that:
9.Whilst the facts of Lo Sze Tung Stephanie were more concerned with the applicant’s assistance in a controlled delivery dangerous drugs operation (successfully resulting in another defendant being caught red-handed), the five authorities to which the Court referred in Lo Sze Tung Stephanie at [56]-[63] involved applicants (as with the present appellant) giving non-prejudicial statements against other persons and pleading guilty to the charges against themselves, although their promise to testify for the prosecution was rendered unnecessary because of events beyond their control. The approved discounts in those authorities (from lowest to the highest) were as follows:
10.The Court in Lo Sze Tung Stephanie also noted, at [63], that, in the case of Herrera Jhorman, “[t]he lower discount appears to have flowed from the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the value of the applicant’s assistance”. 11.On the other hand, in Tso Kin Hong,the two appellant spleaded guilty to robbery charges and rendered assistance to the authorities in relation to another member of the gang. After they had each given non-prejudicial statements implicating him in the robberies, the defendant pleaded guilty, as a result of which the prosecution was not required to call the appellants to testify in court. It may be noted that the Court described the discount of 46% in those circumstances as “generous”. 12.We have also had drawn to our attention the case of HKSAR v Ng Chi Ming[25]. There, the applicant received a sentence of 13 years and 4 months for his conviction of trafficking, the starting point of which was 26 years’ imprisonment, reduced by one-third to reflect his guilty plea, and by a further 4 years to reflect his offer to testify against his co-accused who eventually pleaded guilty. The reduction in sentence thereby became 49% from the starting point. In upholding such sentence, the Court said (at [14]) that:
13.The cases of Tso Kin Hong and Ng Chi Ming were subsequently considered by the Chinese division of this Court (Kwan JA and Chu JA, as the two Vice-Presidents then were) in HKSAR v Luk Chi Yan Adison[26]. There, the applicant pleaded guilty to the trafficking charges laid against her and gave a non-prejudicial statement implicating the second defendant who, as a result, also pleaded guilty to the trafficking charges laid against him. The Court allowed the appeal and awarded her a discount of 45%. 14.In the present case, we are satisfied that the appellant has provided useful assistance to the police by implicating the very person who orchestrated his throwing of the sulphuric acid at Ho’s husband, and is entitled to a further discount on his sentence. We have no doubt that the assistance provided by the appellant has led to Ho’s decision to plead guilty (albeit at a rather late stage), and her eventual conviction. In our judgment, the appellant should be given a discount of 45%. 15.There has been no complaint about the starting point of 15 years’ imprisonment, which we are prepared to adopt. Giving the appellant a 45% discount from the sentence after trial would produce a sentence of 8 years and 3 months’ imprisonment. 16.We have invited submissions as to whether the further 3 months’ discount ordered by the judge in the exercise of his discretion to reflect the appellant’s voluntary surrender to the police should be subsumed in the 45% discount for assisting the authorities, or whether it should be regarded as a separate matter warranting a specific additional discount. We consider that the extra discount addresses the issue of a defendant owning up to his own misdeeds and turning himself into the police, which is something to be encouraged; while the 45% discount addresses identifying, and being prepared to give evidence against, the person who instigated the offence, which was of significant assistance to the authorities. In this case, the appellant’s recording of Ho’s ‘confession’ in a telephone call when he was about to hand himself into the police was plainly instrumental in making her change her mind and plead guilty to the offence. 17.The actual discount for someone who surrenders himself to police is, as was made clear in HKSAR v Chow Tak Fuk[27], “always a contextual question”. The Court went on to explain[28]:
18.In the present case, the police did not know the identity of the person who had attacked PW1 and we accept that the appellant was driven by remorse to hand himself in to the police. We shall honour the further 3 months’ reduction given by the judge, which we think is a correct quantification of the appropriate discount in the circumstances. Disposition 19.Accordingly, we allow the appeal and reduce the sentence from 9 years and 9 months’ imprisonment to one of 8 years’ imprisonment.
Mr Gary Leung SADPP (Ag), of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Trevor Beel, instructed by Tai, Tang & Chong, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the Appellant [1] HKSAR v Luk Chi Kan [2023] HKCA 1300, per Anthea Pang JA. [2] Summary of Facts, [9(b)]: Appeal Bundle (“AB”), p 48. [3] Summary of Facts, [9(c)]: AB, p 48. [4] Summary of Facts, [9(e)]: AB, p 48. [5] Summary of Facts, [3]: AB, p 47. [6] Summary of Facts, [12]: AB, p 49. [7] AB, p 7C-D. [8] HKSAR v Lau Ching Him (Unrep., CACC 271/2016, 30 March 2017). [9] Summary of Facts, [8]-[9]. [10] Respondent’s written submissions, [2]. [11] The appellant’s NPS dated 1 February 2021, at [13]. [12] Respondent’s written submissions, [14i]. [13] Respondent’s written submissions, [4]. [14] Respondent’s written submissions, [14ii]. [15] Respondent’s written submissions, [5]. [16] Respondent’s written submissions, [5]. [17] Appellant’s written argument, [20]. [18] Z v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 183. [19] HKSAR v Lo Sze Tung Stephanie [2018] HKCA 421. [20] HKSAR v Herrera Jhorman [2013] 1 HKC 119. [21] R v Yan Im Kun [1997] 4 HKC 339. [22] HKSAR v Ng Shek Yu (Unrep, CACC 178/2000, 1 March 2001). [23] HKSAR v Yau Kwok Yin (Unrep., CACC 69/2016, 30 August 2016). [24] HKSAR v Tso Kin Hong & Anor (Unrep., CACC 503/2006, 22 November 2007). [25] HKSAR v Ng Chi Ming (Unrep., CACC 570/2001, 21 March 2002). [26] HKSAR v Luk Chi Yan Adison (Unrep., CACC 26/2011, 9 August 2011). [27] HKSAR v Chow Tak Fuk (Unrep., CACC 428/2004, 15 February 2005). [28] Ibid., at [7]. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 273/2021