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HCMA78/2009
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
判罪上訴
案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2009年第78號
(原荃灣裁判法院案件2008年第1465號)
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官潘敏琦
聆訊日期：2009年4月30日
裁判日期：2009年4月30日
判 案 書
1.上訴人在聆訊後被裁定一項「販運危險藥物」罪罪名成立，他現不服定罪，提出上訴。
2.根據控方案情，上訴人從菲律賓抵港後，海關人員從其行李箱的暗格內搜得兩小袋總重量為1.47 克的可卡因。上訴人在警誡下表示：「我明白。」上訴人亦向關員確認箱內的物品屬他，他表示行李箱是由其菲律賓籍聯絡人交給他，他不知道箱內有什麼，更不知道當中藏有毒品。
3.上訴人供稱，行李由其菲律賓籍同事在機場交給他，他以為內有他須帶回香港的工廠貨辦，他並沒打開查看，亦不知內藏毒品。事發後，他力尋其陳姓僱主，不果。他又稱到菲律賓驗貨，祇需攜帶貨辦而無須攜帶任何文件。他承認沒有在上機之前點算核查須帶回工廠存檔之貨辦，純屬他的疏忽。
上訴理由
4.上訴理由，現歸納概述重組如下：
(1) 裁判官錯誤把舉證責任加諸上訴人身上；
(2) 裁判官在考慮《危險藥物條例》第 47 條的推定時，指辯方的舉證責任的水平是「相對可能性的衡量」，混淆了法律、責任或提出富說服力說法的責任(legal/persuasive burden)與證據責任(evidential burden)；
(3) 裁判官錯誤地祇以上訴人現場的表現作基礎，從而作出上訴人確知行李箱内藏有不法物品之推論，等同對上訴人没有即時否認指控作出不良的揣測 ，剝奪了他保持緘默的權利；及
(4) 裁判官錯誤地在裁定上訴人的證據是謊話後，没有作出相應的謊言指引。
答辯人回應
5.答辯人指，裁判官在裁斷陳述書中多處顯示，控方須在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪，他在第 4 段所指「辯方得負上全部舉證的責任」，實屬手民之誤無疑。上訴人大律師不宜無限上綱，引申指裁判官違背了必須彰顯公義的法律原則。
6.答辯人同意，裁判官要求辯方「在相對可能性的標準下證明」自己對管有的行李箱中藏有毒品一事並不知情，與終審法庭在Hung Chan Wa一案後釐清的法律準則不符。但答辯人指，上訴法庭有權根據審訊時呈遞的證據對證據作出重審，而本案可供定罪之證據充分，上訴法庭有權以此為據，裁定定罪並無不公允之處，駁回上訴。答辯人續指，上訴人大律所指出的曾英傑、岑在志及黄振强案(CACC482/1982；HCMA510/2003及HCMA243/2003)，乃基於主審法官弄錯了舉證責任，上訴得直的情況，與本案不盡相同，不宜混為一談。
7.答辯人不同意上訴人大律師所指，裁判官有利用上訴人保持緘默的權利，對他作出不良的揣測。裁判官是考慮了整體案情，包括上訴人在現埸與關員的對話、其表現及警誡下的回應，從而作出上訴人的證供不令人置信的裁決。再者，答辯人指，上訴人在現場已回答行李箱是公司提供的，在搜出毒品時又表現驚訝，這些情況根本不涉保持緘默的權利，更遑論是裁判官利用上訴人保持緘默的權利，而對他作出不良的揣測。
8.答辯人認為，上訴人大律師所援引Yuen Kwai Choi一案，已清楚表明，祇有當控方明顯引用被告的謊言來强化控方案情，或當陪審員有危機會錯誤利用其謊言作為定罪基礎時，法庭才須考慮給予謊言指引，否則一般基本舉證責任及標準指引已經足夠。
9.答辯人最後指，上訴應被駁回，維持原判。
判決
10.本席首先處理上訴理由(4)。上訴人大律師指，裁判官是基於以下的原因拒納上訴人的證供的：
「18．被告所提的事件始末，粗疏及不合情理得令人失笑；而他和陳姓僱主的關係，亦是隱閉得常理有歪。……
19. 本席於考慮是被告作供的內容，並加上本席觀察被告作證時言行之後，認為被告不是一個誠實的證人；他在法庭及調查之下所作的證供，是事後逃避刑責之下所杜撰，所以本席不接納被告的證供。……」 (本席強調）
11.大律師指，既然裁判官認為上訴人謊話連篇，他理應按「謊言指引」，考慮上訴人可能因為無辜的動機而說謊。
12.終審法庭在Jim Fai v. HKSAR [2006] 1 HKLRD 968一案是這樣説的：
“Generally speaking, a lies direction was only necessary where the prosecution intended to use a lie alleged to have been told by an accused to establish or assist its case or to strengthen an inference of guilt or where there was a danger that the jury might engage in an impermissible process of reasoning to the disadvantage of the accused. Where, as in the majority of cases and as was the case here, there was simply a conflict between the prosecution and defence evidence and an allegation that the accused had told a pack of lies in giving his evidence and it was not worthy of belief, it was not only unnecessary but inappropriate to give a lies direction. The usual direction on the burden and standard of proof would be sufficient …”
13.本案中控方既没有要求，裁判官亦没有使用上訴人的謊言以支持控方對上訴人的指控或强化有罪的推論。裁判官祇是在充分衡量證供後，作出上訴人是一名不盡不實的證人的裁斷。本席認為就本案情況而言，謊言指引，實無必要。上訴理由(4)不成立。
14.本席現處理上訴理由(3)。上訴人大律師指，裁判官以上訴人現場的表現及答覆關員查問之内容，包括他没有否認該行李屬他、沒有否認對行李内藏危險藥物是知情，而「引申出被告確知道該行李箱藏有不法物品」(裁斷陳述書第 25 段)。上訴人大律師指，裁判官的做法，明顯等同剝削了上訴人保持緘默的權利。
15.首先，本席並不認為裁判官是基於上訴人沒有否認對行李内藏危險藥物是知情，從而作出不利於上訴人的推論或惴測。裁判官有權就上訴人當時的表現和反應作出推論，這與Lee Fuk Hing案上訴庭所指，利用被告人保持緘默來削弱在審訊時才提供的解釋，以推定被告有罪的情況不能相提並論。而裁判官亦清楚在裁斷陳述書指出，上訴人在調查期間的回應，以至警誡供詞的内容，與其庭上證供是大同小異的。故此，本案根本並不存在裁判官利用上訴人保持緘默的權利，而作出對上訴人不利的推論或惴測，或此權利削弱上訴人在審訊時才提供的解釋為據的情況。
16.事實上，終審法庭在Hung Chan Wa, FACC1/2006一案中已清楚指出:
“ …It is simple common sense that possession of a container housing drugs will generally demand a full and adequate explanation, while the introduction of a statement by the defendant containing a self-serving explanation that he did not know what was in the container can be dealt with by an appropriate direction (Lambert at 573-F, Per Lord Steyn). It would be a serious mistake to think that a jury will not evaluate for itself the decision of a defendant to prefer silence, when offered an opportunity to make a statement or explanation on being questioned or charged…It is open to a trial judge to invite the jury to consider the common sense point…that it must be comparatively rare for a drug dealer to entrust a valuable parcel of drugs to an innocent …” (my emphasis)
17.上訴理由(3)不成立。
18.本席現把上訴理由(1)和(2)一併處理。
19.裁判官在裁斷陳述書説：
「這是一宗刑事起訴，辯方得負上全部舉證的責任這點，自不待言……」
20.上訴人大律師指出，雖然這很可能屬手民之誤，但與其他上訴理由，特别裁判官在衡量上訴人的證供時，錯誤地以「相對可能性的衡量」作為辯方在《危險藥物條例》第 47 條的舉證標準一併考慮時，定罪實屬不安穩。
21.上訴人大律師引用Chiu Wing Nam, Dick v. HKSAR, FACC10/2006，指出「相對可能性的衡量」的舉證標準，屬富說服力說法的責任(legal/persuasive burden)，遠較諸證據責任(evidential burden)沉重。終審法庭在該案指出：
“16. Particular reliance is placed upon the passage where the judge said ‘ …decide whether it is more likely than not that he was unaware of the nature of the drugs.’ …until the contrary is proved he is presumed to know what they are …more than once clearly placed a persuasive burden on the appellant. It must in fairness be said that the judge, when so doing, was following the view, which was then universally held by prosecutors, by defence counsel and by the courts, that s.47 imposed a persuasive burden on a defendant which he had to discharge on the balance of probabilities.” (my emphasis)
22.終審法庭在該案中重申Hung Chan Wa案中的主旨：
“It was accordingly held that the Court of Appeal had been right to apply a remedial interpretation to s.47(1) and (2) by treating the burdens of proof as creating evidential onus only.
15. In the present case the appellant did place evidence before the trial court, both from himself and from his witness, which, if believed, could be taken to support his defence …” (my emphasis)
23.上訴庭在Hung Chan Wa v. HKSAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 291是這樣說的：
“144. The practical approach to this evidential burden is the same as when that burden arises in other contexts; for example, where the issue of provocation or self-defence is raised …We suggest that in cases where either presumption under subsection 47(1) or (2) has been engaged, the following principles should be applied:
(1) It is for the judge to determine whether sufficient evidence has been adduced to constitute an issue fit to be left to the jury.
(2) The burden may be discharged regardless of the quarter from which the evidence derives. In other words, the evidence upon which the accused may rely in this regard may emanate from the prosecution or in the testimony adduced by the accused.
(3) An evidential burden is not discharged by the mere mouthing of words by an accused, whether to the police upon apprehension, or the court in testimony, that he was unaware that the container housed a dangerous drug. It is, as Lord Steyn commented in Lambert, at page 572:
‘ …important to bear in mind that it is not for the defence merely to allege the fact in question: the court decides whether there is a real issue on the matter …’,
and, whilst the exculpatory evidence may come from any quarter, we respectfully endorse the conclusion by Lord Hope in the same case, at page 588, that:
‘ …an evidential burden is not to be thought of as a burden which is illusory. What the accused must do is put evidence before the court which, if believed, could be taken by a reasonable jury to support his defence.’
(4) …By the time of a summing up, the issues will have crystallized and a judge will have determined, if necessary after hearing counsel, whether sufficient evidence as to lack of knowledge …has been adduced to raise an issue fit to be left to the jury. If the judge decides that the evidential burden has been discharged, he will then tell the jury – with such adaptation as the circumstances may require – that the accused says that he did not know that the item was in his possession, or that the item was a dangerous drugs, as the case may be, and that it is for the prosecution to prove that he did so know, and not for the accused to prove that he did not: and that if what the accused asserts is or may be true, he is entitled to be acquitted …” (my emphasis)
24.終審法庭在HKSAR v. Ng Po On, FACC6/2007一案中說：
“27. An evidential burden stands in contrast to a reverse persuasive burden. It does not require the accused to establish anything as a matter of proof. An evidential burden arises where the defendant wishes to put in issue some matter that is potentially exculpatory while the prosecution continues to bear the persuasive burden throughout. In such cases, there must be evidence supporting such exculpatory matter which is sufficiently substantial that it raises a doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Unless such reasonable doubt is removed, the prosecution fails to prove its case. If, on the other hand, the accused fails to adduce or point to any evidence on the relevant issue or if the evidence adduced is rejected or is not sufficiently substantial to raise a reasonable doubt, the potentially exculpatory matter places no obstacle in the way of the prosecution proving its case beyond reasonable doubt …” (my emphasis)
25.上訴人大律師認為，裁斷陳述書以下部份顯示，裁判官在分析辯方就《危險藥物條例》第 47 條的舉證標準犯錯:
「21. ……上述條文令辯方負上提供他不知道管有的物件中藏有毒品的證供的責任(此等證供可來自控方的證供或由辯方之證供中提供)，以供陪審團考慮(在沒有陪審團的審訊之下，由負責作出事實裁定的法官考慮)。如果後者在考慮是上述證供之後，認為辯方指稱不知情的說法是或者事實，法庭應該將控罪撤銷。辯方舉證責任的水平，並非一般刑事案件所要求的“毫無合理疑點”，而祇是“相對可能性的衡量”(此段法律論述，詳見上訴庭為孔燦華(譯音) (ACC441/2003)一案所發表的判決書內，不贅)。
22. 孔燦華(譯音)一案最後由上訴至終審庭([2006] 3 HKLRD 841)。終審庭亦確認上述條文祇會令辯方負上舉證責任(Evidential Proof)，並不違反憲法。」 （本席強調）
26.裁斷陳述書上述的段落，似乎是指出辯方就《危險藥物條例》第 47 條有舉證責任，而標準為「相對可能性的衡量」，這與Hung Chan Wa及Ng Po On，以至Chiu Wing Nam, Dick案中所指，被告的證據責任(evidential burden)並不須他證實任何事實的原則背道而馳。事實上，舉證責任由始至終均在控方，假如裁判官認為案中證據顯示，已有足夠證據致使被告的辯護理由可構成可供陪審團考慮的議題，裁判官在考慮裁決時，應表明被告的說法，是對容器中載有危險藥物毫不知情，控方是有責任證實被告是知情的，而不是由被告去證實他並不知情：假如他認為被告不知情的說法是或可能是事實，被吿應被判無罪。
27.相反而言，假如裁判官認為案中證據未能顯示有足夠證據致使被告的辯護理由可構成可供陪審團考慮的議題，那些辯白性事項對控方毫無合理疑點證實被告有罪並不構成任何障礙。雖然，本案裁判官在衡量證供後，有權全盤拒納上訴人之證供，從而作出控方已在毫無合理疑點之下證實了上訴人對其管有的行李內藏危險藥物是知情的裁斷；然而，本席實無從得知，裁判官在衡量上訴人之證供時，究竟是認為案中證據未能顯示有足夠證據致使被告的辯護理由可構成可供陪審團考慮的議題，抑或認為上訴人雖已解除了「證據責任」，但控方已在毫無合理疑點之下證實被告的辯護理由全非真實，裁判官在衡量被告以致決定是否接納被告的辯護理由時，有否把「相對可能性的衡量」的舉證準則，與本案是否有足夠證據致使被告的辯護理由可構成可供陪審團或單獨審理案件的主審法官考慮的議題的責任兩者混為一談。
28.裁判官耳聞上訴人的證供、目睹他作供的神態舉止，在衡量證供時自是處於較諸本席有優勢的位置。然而，裁判官在衡量被告的證供時，可能由於混淆了舉證準則，致有所偏差，所以本庭實無從根據審訊時的證供證據就案件進行重審。因此，即使裁判官所指辯方得負上全部舉證的責任一點，純屬手民之誤，定罪亦不穏妥。
29.下令上訴得直，定罪撤消，判刑擱置。
30.本席拒絶頒下裁判法院之訟費命令。
31.答辯人申請本席把本案發還裁判法院重審。本案控罪指上訴人把毒品從外地帶入香港境内，指控之嚴重性，不容忽視。上訴法庭在HKSAR v. Abdallah Anwar Abbsa, CACC304/2008一案中已清晰指出，把毒品從外地帶入香港境内之國際因素，屬令案情情節嚴重，必須在刑期中反映之因素。本席考慮了本案之證據、本上訴得直所基於之原因、本控罪在定罪後上訴人可被判之刑期、上訴人已服之刑期之比例及公眾利益及公義的大前提之下，下令本案須發還由另一位裁判官重審。
控方：由律政司高級檢控官金玉代表香港特別行政區。
辯方：由法律援助署轉聘蔡維邦大律師代表被告。
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