Chinn Wai Wan Vivian v. Cheung Cody
Read the full judgment text of LDPE 172/2020 on BabelCite. This LDPE judgment was delivered on 6 August 2020.
1. This is an interlocutory application taken out by the respondent on 7 July 2020 seeking (i) leave to appeal against my Judgment made on 5 June 2020 (“the Judgment”) and (ii) writ of possession of premises be set aside.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 7 cases
|
LDPE 172/2020 [2020] HKLdT 29 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION APPLICATION NO. LDPE 172 OF 2020 __________________________
__________________________
________________ DECISION ________________ 1.This is an interlocutory application taken out by the respondent on 7 July 2020 seeking (i) leave to appeal against my Judgment made on 5 June 2020 (“the Judgment”) and (ii) writ of possession of premises be set aside. Background 2.By a tenancy agreement (which is both in English and Chinese) dated 8 March 2019 (“the Tenancy Agreement”), the applicant as the landlord let to the respondent as the tenant the premises at Unit 2, 16/F, Iplace, 301-305 Castle Peak Road, Kwai Chung, New Territories (“the Premises”) for a term of 2 years from 15 March 2019 to 14 March 2021 at a monthly rent of $6,800 inclusive of management fee, Government rates and Government rent. As the name of Iplace implies, this is a modern industrial building of recent built. 3.The Tenancy Agreement is however subject to a break clause as follows as stated at para 4 in Schedule II:
4.In the Notice of Application filed to the Tribunal on 17 March 2020, the applicant applied for recovery of possession of the Premises and rent as the respondent has failed to pay rent from 15 December 2019, and applied for order for mesne profits to the date of delivery of vacant possession of the Premises and costs. The Notice of Application also stated that there was balance of arrears of rent at $4,900 for the period from 15 November 2019 to 14 December 2019. The Opposition 5.Because of the general adjournment of court proceedings for public health concern since late March 2020, the respondent only filed a Notice of Opposition on 15 May 2020 the particulars of which is summarized as follows:
6.When the hearing took place on 5 June 2020, the respondent did not deny he owed the rents as claimed by the applicant. 7.The respondent emphatically repeated the incidents he was trapped twice as stated in his Notice of Opposition and requested the Tribunal to punish the applicant. 8.I explained that it is trite that a tenant’s covenant to pay rent is regarded as independent of all other covenants or obligations under a lease, including, for example, the covenant for quiet enjoyment by the landlord[1]. 9.Also, the covenant for quiet enjoyment would not be broken by impediments to access or use which cause merely temporary or limited inconvenience[2]. The respondent admitted that he could still go out to the streets and back to the Premises with the assistance of the security guard. 10.And to the extent that the respondent insisted on a counterclaim against the applicant, which is particularly criminal in nature, I explained to him that it is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This point was indeed acknowledged by the respondent on the 1st page of his affidavit attached to his Notice of Opposition. 11.On the other hand, the applicant said she had served a notice of termination dated 7 February 2020 to the respondent suggesting the Tenancy Agreement would expire on 15 March 2020. But as I pointed out to her, this notice was served premature, because it was “served before the expiration of the 11 months of the Term of Tenancy”. 12.The applicant also alleged that the respondent had breach the user clause of the Tenancy Agreement by residing at the Premises for domestic purpose instead for industrial use. However, pursuant to Section 58(1) of Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219),
13.I had also explained to the applicant that under Section 21F of the High Court Ordinance, if a lessor is proceeding by action for the first time to enforce against a lessee a right of re-entry or forfeiture in respect of any land for non-payment of rent, the lessee would be entitled to a relief period not less than 7 days from the date of the order. If the lessee can pay into court all the rent in arrears and the costs of the action (if any), the lessee shall hold the subject of the lease without any new lease. Having said that, I directed that the applicant to re-activate the 3 swipe cards so that the respondent can gain free access to the Premises. The Judgment 14.Having heard the submissions by the parties therefore I made the Judgment as follows:
Respondent’s Interlocutory Application 15.In the respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 7 July 2020, he attached an affirmation stating as follows:
16.The hearing of this interlocutory application took place on 6 August 2020. 17.As regards (1) & (3), I had explained to the respondent during the hearing on 5 June 2020 as stated in para 10 above. 18.In 黃英對譚炳新, HCMP 2049/2000 (unreported, dated 1 August 2000) and Chan Yin Kwan v Wong Kam Hoi, CACV 223/2007 (reported as [2008] 1 HKCLRT 27) and Ngai Ngok Pang & Another v Lee Syn Yuk, Michelle, LDPD 3030/2012 (unreported, dated 10 May 2013), the courts ruled that the Lands Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain any counterclaim by the respondents. 19.Even when section 8 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance was amended in 2008 to award damages solely, as well as in addition to rent and mesne profits, it was explained to the Legislative Council that the amendment did not seek to empower the Lands Tribunal to award damages that may go beyond its jurisdictional limit on the types of cases it can entertain.[3] 20.More particularly, in Ngai Ngok Pang& Another v Lee Syn Yuk, Michelle, supra, His Honour Judge Ko was of the following view:
21.During the hearing of the Interlocutory Application on 6 August 2020, the respondent also complained that I had not included my direction to the applicant to re-activate the 3 swipe cards into the body of the Judgment dated 5 June 2020. But as said, this direction was given orally in the hearing on 5 June 2020.[4] 22.As regards (2) the respondent’s intended ground for appeal, it is trite that the deposit cannot be used for the payment of rental during the term of the tenancy. More particularly, clause 7 of the Tenancy Agreement states as follows:
23.And in accordance with Rule 28 of the Lands Tribunal Rules, the reasons for any judgment, decision or order of the Tribunal may be delivered orally or in writing as the Tribunal shall think fit. Leave to Appeal 24.Under section 11(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance,
25.Section 11AA (6) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance provides that:
26.After considering what the respondent presented in his affirmation supporting his interlocutory application, and after hearing what the respondent supplemented in his oral evidence and submission, I decide that the respondent’s appeal has no reasonable prospect of success, and the respondent failed to satisfy that there is some other reason “in the interests of justice” why the appeal should be heard. 27.This is a simple application for recovery of possession and payment of outstanding rent/mesne profit and costs. Since I do not allow the respondent the leave to appeal, the consequential application by the respondent for setting aside the writ of possession dated 23 June 2020 of the premises is therefore refused. Conclusion 28.The interlocutory application by the respondent to seek leave to appeal the Judgment made on 5 June 2020 and set aside the writ of possession dated 23 June 2020 are both dismissed. Costs 29.The general rule is that costs should follow the event and the applicant seeks costs. Accordingly, I order that the respondent should pay the applicant the costs of this Application which is summarily assessed at $200.
The Applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person The Respondent, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] See Charmway Development Limited v Long China Engineering Limited, HCA 54/2001 (reported as [2001] 3 HKC 515) and more recently Worldwide Flight Services Holdings SA Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited and Neo Crown Limited v Kai Tak Cruise Plaza Limited & Another, CACV 393/2018 (reported as [2019] 4 HKLRD 56). [2] See Cheong Nin Investment Co Ltd v Tokyo Shop Ltd, HCA 309/2004 (unreported, dated 9 December 2004). [3] See for instance, the response by the Judiciary to the Bills Committee on Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2007 in September 2007: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/ajls/papers/aj1127cb2-430-2-e.pdf [4] Applicant confirmed that she had re-activate the 3 swipe cards for the respondent on 5 June 2020. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case