Huang Tongjie v. Silva Marc a
Read the full judgment text of LDPD 2809/2014 on BabelCite. This Lands Tribunal judgment was delivered on 16 February 2015.
1. This is an interlocutory application taken out by the respondent on 30 January 2015 seeking (i) leave to appeal against my Judgment made on 23 January 2015 and (ii) stay of execution of possession of premises pending appeal.
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LDPD 2809/2014 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION APPLICATION NO. LDPD 2809 OF 2014 __________________________ BETWEEN
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_______________________________ DECISION _______________________________ 1.This is an interlocutory application taken out by the respondent on 30 January 2015 seeking (i) leave to appeal against my Judgment made on 23 January 2015 and (ii) stay of execution of possession of premises pending appeal. Background 2.By a tenancy agreement dated 5 July 2014, the applicant as the landlord let to the respondent as the tenant the premises at Flat C (including the flat Roof adjacent thereto) on 10/F, Tower 5, Avignon, No.1 Kwun Chui Road, Tuen Mun, New Territories (“the Premises”) for a term of 2 years from 6 July 2014 to 5 July 2016 at a monthly rent of $23,500[1] (“the tenancy agreement”). Both sides agreed that the rent includes all equipment, lighting and electrical appliances. 3.In the Notice of Application filed to the Tribunal on 23 December 2014, the applicant applied for recovery of possession of the Premises and rent as the respondent has failed to pay rent from 6 August 2014, and applied for order for mesne profits to the date of delivery of vacant possession of the Premises and costs. The Opposition 4.The respondent filed a Notice of Opposition on 7 January 2015 giving the following grounds:
5.Then the respondent elaborated his repairs / safety concerns as follows:
6.The respondent alleged that the water leakage concern of the electric switches in the living room and corridor and master bedroom posed serious safety issue and put his 4 children at risk of electric shock. The respondent conceded however that this concern appears to have been resolved after mid November when the developer’s remedial works were completed. 7.As regards the main bathroom cabinet door incident as stated in the end of paragraph 4 above, the respondent submitted that in July 2014 when his 5 years old son was brushing his teeth, “the heavy metal and wood cabinet door fell off and almost crushed both of his feet. If he had not been standing on a stool, his feet would have certainly been broken. The falling cabinet door pushed his stool causing him to fall and bang his head on the metal door handle. He suffered a large contusion on the back of his head and severe periodic headaches.” The respondent then called the management office immediately to demand the removal of the broken door and requested that to be replaced or switched with a lighter wooden door. The management staff took the door away but had not yet replaced it. 8.The respondent argues that he would only make his rental payment when all the issues above are repaired and he would not be responsible for the rental during the months when the landlord breached the tenancy agreement by failing to respond to his safety concerns. 9.When the hearing took place before me on 23 January 2015, a Ms Tsang Wai Yee (“Ms Tsang”) appearing on behalf of the applicant said, apart from the rental in arrears since 6 August 2014, the respondent only paid one month’s deposit but failed to pay another month’s deposit on 15 August 2014 as required in the tenancy agreement. Ms Tsang did not comment on the allegation of facts by the respondent save that the issues complained by the respondent are all related to the interior conditions of the Premises. The respondent had viewed the Premises when he signed the tenancy agreement. To the extent that the respondent had not raised these issues when signing the tenancy agreement, the applicant should not be responsible. Relevant Clauses in Tenancy Agreement 10.The tenancy agreement appears in a standard format usually adopted by real estate agents. In the paragraph above, Ms Tsang was perhaps referring to Clause 6 of the tenancy agreement which states that:
11.In my opinion, such requirement to “keep the interior of the Premises in good and tenantable repair and condition” is wide enough to cover the respondent’s responsibility for keeping the main bathroom cabinet door in good and tenantable repair and condition. However, I considered the other water leakage problems alleged by the respondent arose out of inherent defects which are excepted by Clause 6 otherwise, as admitted by the respondent, the developer would not have taken up the responsibility to carry out the remedial repairs. Moreover there exists also Clause 9 in the tenancy agreement which states:
12.The respondent did not produce any evidence of having given such written notice during the hearing. The allegation by the respondent regarding the 15 days requirement for remedial works is also not found in the tenancy agreement. Respondent’s Liability to Pay Rent 13.Notwithstanding the above, I referred the parties to paragraphs 18-19 of Charmway Development Limited v Long China Engineering Limited, HCA 54/2001 (reported as [2001] 3 HKC 515) where Hon Chu J (as she then was) stated:
14.While the respondent said he understood the above, he submitted that what he alleged were serious breaches by the applicant that would give rise to safety concerns which would have rendered the tenancy agreement void under the law of contract. 15.I disagreed as there is no reported case where a lease has been ruled to have been rendered void for similar breaches but there are cases in which such argument has been raised unsuccessfully[2]. In any event, I considered the doctrine of frustration could not apply in the captioned case because the respondent and his family still resided at the Premises during the relevant period. Judgment Made on 23 January 2015 16.Having heard the submissions by the parties therefore I made the Judgment as follows :
Respondent’s Interlocutory Application 17.Thus, the Relief Expiration Date expired on 31st January 2015 when the respondent did not pay into the Tribunal any arrears of rent/mesne profits or costs to the applicant. 18.In the respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 30 January 2015, he attached an affirmation of 2 pages referring particularly to paragraph 17 of the Charmway Development case which states:
19.The respondent said this would be directly applicable to his case where, because of defective construction, water was allowed into the electrical system of the Premises, rendering certain areas of the Premises unsafe and unoccupiable. He complaint that he could not even get hold of the applicant for 2 months to resolve the problems which persisted until November 2014 when the developer spent a month carrying out the remedial works. The respondent suggested that my judgment on 23 January 2015 failed to review all the facts. 20.The hearing of this interlocutory application took place on 9 February 2015. Then I pointed out to the respondent that there exists in the tenancy agreement no such clause as clause 4.10 in the Charmway Development case but the respondent submitted such a clause should be implied. Unfortunately under common law, there is no implied warranty on the part of a landlord that the premises let are in a reasonably fit state for habitation, or that it may be lawfully used for the purpose for which it was let. See Edler v Auerbach [1950] 1 KB 359 and Fortune Global Development Ltd v Shung Cheong Food Trading Ltd, HCA 1786 of 1999 (unreported, dated 18 March 2002). Such clause on abatement or suspension of rental, if any, must be expressly stated in the tenancy agreement before it can be applicable. The intending tenant is presumed to have made his own inquiries as to its condition on or before he signs a tenancy agreement, and, in the absence of a special stipulation, he takes the premises as its stands. This is so even when the premises demised were, to the landlord’s knowledge, required for immediate occupation. If the premises are, in fact, uninhabitable, then after accepting the tenancy, the tenant is without remedy unless he has obtained a warranty of fitness. The mere omission of the landlord to disclose defects, if any, is not a warranty or misrepresentation. See paragraph [235.300] in Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong,Volume 36, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis 2014. 21.In any event, I consider that the water leakage problems were reasonably resolved by the developer within a reasonable time, especially when the Respondent conceded that similar water leakage problems might have occurred at other units of the building so that the developer had to erect scaffolding to carry out the remedial works. 22.Also, while the Respondent argues that during the water leakage period the Premises were dangerous and inaccessible, he conceded once again he and his family were residing there during the whole period though suffering from grave inconvenience by just being able to use only some half of the Premises. This is a far cry from the Premises being inaccessible. 23.Therefore, I do not consider the alleged breaches by the applicant, if any, amount to rendering the tenancy agreement void so that the respondent can be excused for not paying rent during the relevant period. This would not however prevent the respondent from commencing any action for damages if he still considers appropriate after taking legal advice but this would be considered as a counterclaim. 24.Nevertheless in 黃英對譚炳新, HCMP 2049/2000 (unreported, dated 1 August 2000) and Chan Yin Kwan v Wong Kam Hoi, CACV 223/2007 (reported as [2008] 1 HKCLRT 27) and Ngai Ngok Pang & Another v Lee Syn Yuk, Michelle, LDPD 3030/2012 (unreported, dated 10 May 2013), the courts ruled that the Lands Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain any counterclaim by the respondents. 25.More particularly, in Ngai Ngok Pang& Another v Lee Syn Yuk, Michelle, supra, His Honour Judge Ko was of the following view:
Leave to Appeal 26.Section 11AA (6) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance provides that:
27.After considering what the respondent presented in his affirmation supporting his interlocutory application, and after hearing what the respondent supplemented in his oral evidence and submission, I decide that the respondent’s appeal has no reasonable prospect of success, and the respondent failed to satisfy that there is some other reason “in the interests of justice” why the appeal should be heard. 28.This is a simple application for recovery of possession and payment of outstanding rent/mesne profit and costs. Since I do not allow the respondent the leave to appeal, the consequential application by the respondent for stay of execution of possession of the premises pending appeal is therefore refused. Conclusion 29.The interlocutory application by the respondent to seek leave to appeal and stay of execution of the order of possession are both dismissed. Costs 30.The general rule is that costs should follow the event and the applicant seeks costs. Accordingly, I order that the respondent should pay the applicant the costs of this Application which is summarily assessed at $200.
The Applicant, represented by Ms Tsang Wai Yee, appeared in person The Respondent appeared in person [1] The tenancy agreement is subject to a break clause exercisable by either party serving not less than 1 month’s written notice after the expiry of the 11th month of the term of tenancy. [2] As stated in footnote 5 of paragraph [235.470] in Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, Volume 36, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis 2014, there was held to be no frustration in: Yung Kee Co v Cheung So Yin Kee [1983] 1 HKC 386, [1983-85] CPR 115 (premises destroyed by fire and subject to closure order three months before the end of a four year tenancy); Li Ching Wing v Xuan Yi Xiong [2004] 1 HKLRD 754, DC (ten day isolation order due to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome infection in the building, an event that caused interruption in the expected use of premises by the lessee would not frustrate the lease unless the interruption was expected to last for the period of the unexpired term of the lease, or at least, for a long period of it, in this case, the ten days were insignificant; National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675, [1981] 1 All ER 161, HL (warehouse premises which had been let for a term of ten years was deprived of the possibility of vehicular access, and thus of any use, in excess of a year by a road closure, frustration held not even to be a triable issue for the purpose of Rules of the High Court Ord 14 (see Civil Procedure (2013 Reissue) [90.0899]) when it was raised as a defence in an action brought by the landlords for rent payable during the period of the road closure… |
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