Kwong Kin Yin v. Shun Lee Copper & Decoration Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 187/2011 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 November 2014.
1. The proceedings below concerned a claim for damages for personal injuries brought by the plaintiff against the 1 st and 2 nd defendants in respect of injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a workplace accident, and a third party claim by the 2 nd defendant for indemnity or a contribution from the third party.
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CACV 187/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 187 OF 2011 (ON APPEAL FROM HCPI NO 285 of 2008) _______________________
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__________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment and Decision on Costs of the Court): 1.The proceedings below concerned a claim for damages for personal injuries brought by the plaintiff against the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a workplace accident, and a third party claim by the 2nd defendant for indemnity or a contribution from the third party. 2.The plaintiff’s case was that the 1st defendant (Shun Lee Copper & Decoration Limited) was his employer, and that the 2nd defendant (Asiaray Advertising Media Limited) was the main contractor responsible for the site at which the accident took place. The 2nd defendant, however, alleged that the plaintiff was employed, not by the 1st defendant, but by the third party (Wong Cheung Keung, trading as Shun Fat Metal Works Co), who was the 2nd defendant’s main (and only) subcontractor to whom the 2nd defendant had subcontracted the entirety of the works in question, which involved the manufacture and erection of metal advertising signage to be installed at the Kerry Cargo Centre in Kwai Chung. 3.The trial of the proceedings took place before McWalters J (as he then was) in June 2011, and lasted 5 days. The 1st defendant did not appear at the trial, which was thus contested as between the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant and the third party. Judgment was delivered on 28 July 2011. 4.So far as the main action was concerned, the judge found that the plaintiff had been employed by the 1st defendant (which he found to be a sub-subcontractor of the 2nd defendant), and that the 2nd defendant, as the main contractor for the project, was responsible for the site at which the work was being carried out and was in breach of duties owed to the plaintiff under various statutes. He awarded the plaintiff damages of HK$1,429,707 against the 1st and 2nd defendants. There is no appeal against this part of the judgment. 5.So far as the third party claim was concerned, the judge dismissed the 2nd defendant’s claim for an indemnity from the third party, holding that while the third party had been responsible for certain electrical and scaffolding works in relation to the project, it was not responsible for, or involved in, the work on which the plaintiff had been engaged, and thus could have had no liability towards the plaintiff or the 2nd defendant. The judge found that the third party was not the main or principal subcontractor of the 2nd defendant, which he found to be a company called Shun Lee Decoration Engineering Ltd (“Shun Lee Engineering”), which had in turn subcontracted the part of the work for which the plaintiff was employed to the 1st defendant. In the judge’s view, the third party was either a sub‑subcontractor, also employed by Shun Lee Engineering, but responsible for a different part of the work to that sub-subcontracted to the 1st defendant; or alternatively a direct subcontractor of the 2nd defendant (alongside Shun Lee Engineering), with responsibility only for the electrical and scaffolding works. The judge did not find it necessary to decide which of these two possibilities represented the true position of the third party, as the third party would not be liable to the 2nd defendant in either case. 6.The 2nd defendant appealed against the decision in relation to the third party proceedings. Having heard Mr Chain for the 2nd defendant, we dismissed the appeal without calling on counsel for the third party. These are our reasons for doing so. 7.Mr Chain acknowledged that in order to succeed in the appeal, he would have to overcome a substantial burden in order to persuade this court to overturn the judge’s finding of fact. It is very well established that the Court of Appeal will not lightly interfere with a finding of fact, and that it will not be enough for an appellant to complain about the weight attached by the judge to particular pieces of evidence, as the weighing of the evidence is primarily the task of the judge dealing with the matter at trial. A number of cases decided in this court make it clear that a factual finding will be reversed only when it can be shown to be palpably wrong, or one which plainly falls outside the range of findings that are open to the first instance judge on the basis of the evidence before him. It is not sufficient for an appellant to suggest only that the judge gave too much or too little weight to one piece of evidence or another – the consideration of the evidence and the allocation of the weight to be given to different pieces of evidence is quintessentially the role of the trial judge, and an appellate court will be slow to second-guess the judge, interfering only when it is clear that something (which it is for the appellant to identify) has gone wrong in that process (see eg Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336; Bank of China v Tsang Sheung Bun [2013] 5 HKLRD 62; China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd (unreported, CACV 11/2015, 27 November 2015)). 8.In this case, the onus of establishing that the third party was the main subcontractor of the 2nd defendant, with responsibility for the work on which the plaintiff was engaged when he suffered his injury, lay on the 2nd defendant. It was not the plaintiff’s case that he was employed by the third party, or that the third party had any responsibility or involvement in the work that the plaintiff was doing (on the contrary, the plaintiff alleged that he was employed, as the judge found, by the 1st defendant, who was responsible for carrying out that aspect of the work). Rather, it was the 2nd defendant who alleged that the third party was the actual employer of the plaintiff (a position which was abandoned in closing submissions), and was the main (indeed the sole) direct subcontractor of the 2nd defendant in respect of the Kerry Cargo Centre project. Accordingly, it was for the 2nd defendant to establish this, and not for the third party to disprove it. 9.In coming to the conclusion that the third party was not the main subcontractor of the 2nd defendant (or more accurately, that the 2nd defendant had not demonstrated that this was, on the balance of probabilities, the position), the judge considered the witness statements and oral evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence at trial, the limited documentary evidence that was put before him, and the surrounding facts and circumstances and the lack of certain types of documentation to his mind, surprising that he considered should have been available to the 2nd defendant, and which might be expected to throw light on this question. 10.So far as the witness evidence was concerned, on this issue the judge considered the evidence of the following witnesses:
11.The judge also had regard to the limited documentation that was put before him, consisting of:
12.The judge recorded his surprise at the paucity of the documents put forward by the 2nd defendant, observing that as the main contractor, he would have expected the 2nd defendant to have far more in the way of records relating to the project and the subcontracting arrangements it had made in respect of it. The judge was troubled by the absence of any documentation to prove the existence of a subcontracting relationship between the 2nd defendant and the third party, such as the written subcontract or any quotation leading up to it, or even documents or notes evidencing discussions between them concerning the costing of the project, which the 2nd defendant would have needed to obtain from its subcontractor in order to put forward its own quotation to its client. The judge also noted that no good explanation for the absence of any such documentation had been advanced by the 2nd defendant. 13.So far as the documents that were available were concerned, the judge, in our view reasonably, regarded these as being peripheral compared to the documentation that he had expected to see. He also correctly observed that they were contradictory, in that while some pointed to Shun Lee Engineering as being the main subcontractor of the 2nd defendant, one or two might tend to suggest that the third party was a subcontractor, and perhaps the main subcontractor. Thus, the certificate of insurance was regarded by the judge as being a document of some significance, as it is generally the obligation of the main contractor or subcontractor to provide insurance in respect of the works undertaken. The available certificate in this case had been taken out by Shun Lee Engineering, which pointed towards it being the entity (or at least, one of the entities) that had undertaken work as a subcontractor of the 2nd defendant. The judge also accepted that the first invoice issued by the third party (which included some work that would have been done by the 1st defendant and should on the third party’s case have been payable to Shun Lee Engineering) and the certificate of completion (which would normally be issued by the principal subcontractor) would tend to support the 2nd defendant’s case, but accepted the third party’s explanation of these documents, which was that the invoice was created for the purpose of obtaining payment of monies owed to him by Mr Wong Wai Fuk, and the certificate of completion was signed by him without appreciating what it was in order to obtain payment of his fees, as the 2nd defendant required him to sign it before it would pay him. 14.Before us, Mr Chain criticised the judge’s assessment of the evidence, contending that the judge should have:
15.Mr Chain submitted that in the light of these matters, the judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that Shun Lee Engineering, and not the third party, was the main subcontractor in relation to the Kerry Cargo Centre project. 16.In our view, none of these criticisms, whether viewed in isolation or cumulatively, lead to the conclusion that the judge’s finding on the key issue was plainly wrong. The judge was well aware that the third party had changed his case on the contractual relationships, and clearly had that in mind when considering whether or not to accept the third party’s version of events. So far as the suggestion that it is unusual to have two contractors side-by-side is concerned, the evidence of Andy So (as well as the third party) was that this was what had happened in this case, and Mr So’s evidence, fairly read, does support the judge’s understanding of it. As for the certificate of insurance, it clearly suggests that, even if the third party was a subcontractor of the 2nd defendant, so was Shun Lee Engineering. That being the case, the question arises as to what its role might have been – given the evidence as to the business venture between Shun Lee Engineering and the third party, and the evidence that the plaintiff was an employee of the 1st defendant, to whom under the venture Shun Lee Engineering would subcontract work obtained by it, it seems to us to have been well open to the judge to conclude that Shun Lee Engineering was the main subcontractor, with responsibility for the work on which the plaintiff was engaged. Finally, so far as the conflicting documents are concerned, the complaint is essentially one of the relative weight given to them by the judge, a matter which does not amount to a valid basis for saying that the judge was palpably wrong. 17.More fundamentally, it seems to us that the conclusion to which the judge came was one which he was entitled to reach, bearing in mind that it was for the 2nd defendant to establish that the third party was its main subcontractor, with responsibility for the work that the plaintiff was doing when he suffered his injury. Keeping that in mind, it is quite plain that the evidence proffered by the 2nd defendant fell short of what was required. The basic subcontractual documents which one would expect to see had not been produced, with no good explanation being given for the failure to do so. Simply to suggest, as Mr Lam did, that the 2nd defendant had had a high turnover of staff does not, in our view, amount to a sufficient explanation for this. That being the case, the judge was here left with a smattering of documents, which he justifiably described as being somewhat peripheral in nature, some of which pointed in one direction, and others in another. They were, at best, inconclusive, and as such would not have sufficed to discharge the burden on the 2nd defendant to make out its allegation that the third party was its main subcontractor. Moreover, we are satisfied that the judge was entitled, for the reasons that he gave, to regard the evidence of Mr So, and the certificate of insurance, as being of real weight, and in those circumstances to go on to accept the third party’s evidence, despite its imperfections. 18.For the foregoing reasons, we dismissed the appeal. Having considered the parties’ submissions as to costs, we order that the costs of the appeal be paid by the 2nd defendant to the third party, to be taxed on the party and party basis, with certificate for two counsel.
The 1st defendant was not represented and did no appear Mr Benjamin Chain & Mr PK Chan, instructed by Norman MK Yeung & Co, for the 2nd defendant (appellant) Mr Leo Remedios & Mr Jose D’ Almada Remedios, instructed by KH Yuen & David Cheung, for the third party (respondent) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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