香港特別行政區 訴 沈湧

Read the full judgment text of HCMA 1/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 June 2017.

1. 上訴人在特委裁判官喻競天席前經審訊後被裁定一項「不小心駕駛」罪罪名不成立。裁判官拒絕上訴人的訟費申請。上訴人就該訟費命令提出上訴。

Case No.HCMA 1/2017
Court
High Court CFI
Date09 Jun 2017
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMA 1/2017

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

判刑上訴

裁判法院上訴案件2017年第1號

(原東區裁判法院傳票案件2016年第32119號)

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答辯人 香港特別行政區  
第一上訴人 沈湧  

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主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官游德康
聆訊日期: 2017年4月28日
判案日期: 2017年6月9日

判 案 書


1.上訴人在特委裁判官喻競天席前經審訊後被裁定一項「不小心駕駛」罪罪名不成立。裁判官拒絕上訴人的訟費申請。上訴人就該訟費命令提出上訴。

案情

2.2016年5月10日約1654時,控方證人郭先生駕駛私家車行駛至維園道東行近興發街時,上訴人駕駛的私家車從控方證人車輛右方向左切入,導致證人需要扭軚閃避,兩車最近距離1、2呎。控方指上訴人的駕駛方式屬不小心,提出檢控。

3.上訴人車內設有前後行車紀錄儀,完全準確記錄案發前後過程。上訴人選擇不進入證人欄作供自辯。

4.裁判官在審訊後裁定記錄儀片段內容與控方證人郭先生庭上證供出現矛盾,因此「不能安穩依賴」郭先生有關上訴人切線時兩車距離的供詞。裁判官又裁定記錄儀片段內容不足以讓控方在毫無合理疑點衡量準則下證明上訴人當時的駕駛態度屬不小心,因此決定把疑點利益歸於上訴人,裁定罪名不成立。

5.上訴人提出訟費申請,裁判官在考慮有關訟費案例後,把適用法律原則引用於本案事實,作出以下裁斷:

「 13. 被告的私家車車前行車紀錄儀的錄像紀錄,即D1A,和被告的私家車車後行車紀錄儀的錄像紀錄,即D1B,有以下的錄像:

(i) D1A錄像時間0:04至0:05可見,被告駛過控方證人的私家車的車頭便向左扭;

(ii) D1B錄像時間0:05至0:06顯示當被告的私家車越過控方證人的私家車時,控方證人的私家車的右前輪和右後輪仍在被告行駛的左3線內; 及

(iii) D1A錄像時間0:04至0:07可見,被告的私家車在整個切線過程並沒有減速。

就D1A和D1B上述所顯示的影像,被告的切線行為確有自招嫌疑之處。

14. 本席依賴終審法院案例列顯倫法官在Tong Cun Lin 上述的判詞,本席考慮D1A和D1B所顯示被告切線的駕駛態度自招嫌疑,行使酌情權拒絕給予被告訟費。」

討論

6.根據終審法院案例Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR [1999] 2 HKCFAR 531,裁判官在行使是否給予訟費的酌情權時,必須整體考慮申請人所有在任何時段,不侷限於調查和審訊期間的,與控罪有關的行為[1]

7.此外,在Ting James Henry v HKSAR [2007] 10 HKCFAR 730案例中,終審法院指出以上提到的申請人行為可以包括任何導致申請人最終被檢控的背景行為,法院有權考慮這些行為是否令申請人自招嫌疑[2]

8.本席審視有關記錄儀片段後作出與裁判官相同的觀察,即上訴人在切線前明顯地突然加速,然後迅即切入左線,隨後繼續以相對其他車輛速度為高的車速行駛。上訴人當時的駕駛態度明顯地屬自招嫌疑。

決定

9.本席認為裁判官沒有錯誤行使其是否給予訟費的酌情權,本席沒有任何理由干預裁判官的決定,裁定駁回上訴人的訟費命令上訴。

訟費

10.不就本上訴作出任何訟費命令。



  ( 游德康 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

答辯人: 由律政司署理高級檢控官柏愛莉代表。

上訴人: 無律師代表,親自出席。



[1] “When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costs incurred in defending those charges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising the discretion must obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time. Since, however, the discretion is being exercised in the context of an acquittal … it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial: How he first responded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations, the consistency of those answers with his subsequent defence, etc. Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted: These too are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to deprive him of his costs, so long as the judge is not, indirectly, thereby punishing him by taking a view of the facts palpably different from that taken by the jury and reflected in the not-guilty verdict.”

[2] “By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion on himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct…so long as the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence…”