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HCMA 270/2020
[2022] HKCFI 3396
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
訟費申請
案件編號:裁判法院上訴案件2020年第270號
(原九龍城裁判法院刑事案件2019年第2628號)
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| 書面陳詞日期: |
2022年6月30日、7月27日、及8月3日 |
| 判案書日期: |
2022年11月10日 |
判 案 書
1.上訴人於審訊後被裁判官裁定一項「製作兒童色情物品」罪罪名成立,違反第579章《防止兒童色情物品條例》第 3(1) 條,判處入獄3個月。
2.控罪指上訴人於2014年8月26日至2018年11月22日之間的某一日,在香港九龍油麻地柯士甸道西1號漾日居1座6樓F室,製作兒童色情物品,即一段名為“Misc BBQ >Vid881101_113429”由影像攝錄儀器拍攝有關兒童色情的影片,即拍攝到一名年幼女童小便,並露出私處。
3.上訴人不服定罪及判刑,提出上訴。
4.本席於2022年3月21日頒下判案書,裁定上訴人定罪上訴得直,定罪及判刑撤銷。
5.上訴人現申請原審的訟費。
案情
6.本案的情節並不複雜。簡單來說,上訴人在他家裏的洗手間,安裝了一個隱蔽的閉路電視鏡頭進行拍攝。在不同的日子,分別拍攝到3個受僱於上訴人為校監的一所幼稚園的女士使用洗手間的情況。其中兩個是小便,另外一個因為在洗手間內洗澡,所以拍攝到她裸露的上身。
7.其中一個片段拍攝到上訴人姊姊3至4歲的幼女小便的情況,當中更暴露出這個女孩的性器官。這個片段構成本案的檢控基礎。
討論
8.上訴人及答辯人都正確地援引了Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR[1]所指出有關支付訟費的原則。這方面的法律原則其實很清晰,一個被判無罪的被告人,除非有確實理由,否則不能剝奪他應得的訟費。確實理由包括被告人是否自招嫌疑、他的行為是否誤導控方,令控方相信證據比實情更有力、及是否證據確鑿,但因技術理由而罪名不成立。
9.在HKSAR v Tong Cun Lin一案中終審法院亦作出這樣的解釋(第535頁):
“When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costs incurred in defending those charges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising the discretion must obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time. Since, however, the discretion is being exercised in the context of an acquittal - the averments constituting the charges having been found by the jury as not amounting to the crimes alleged - it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial: How he firstresponded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations, the consistency of those answers with his subsequent defence, etc. Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted: These too are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to deprive him of his costs, so long as the judge is not, indirectly, thereby punishing him by taking a view of the facts palpably different from that taken by the jury and reflected in the not-guilty verdict. The person in the best position to weigh those matters is clearly the judge himself.”
10.在香港特別行政區訴李淑妍[2]一案中,原訟庭在參考了相關的案例後,就這方面的法律原則作出了闡釋:
「一般而言,當上訴人獲判上訴得直,或當被告人獲判控罪並不成立時,他理應獲得補償(即由公帑支付他為抗辯有關控罪而付出的訟費)。除這一般原則外,視乎相關的情況,法庭亦可行使酌情權,拒絕給予成功的上訴人或被告人相關的訟費。在行使酌情權時,法庭必須審視上訴人或被告人的整體行為,包括上訴人或被告人在接受調查及審訊時的行為、他最初對調查人員所作的反應、面對指控時的應對、與及他的應對與其後的抗辯是否一致等。當然,控方案情的強弱,與及上訴人或被告人是在何等情況下獲判無罪等,這些亦是法庭考慮應否行使酌情權拒絕上訴人或被告人的訟費的有關因素(見HKSAR v Tong Cun Lin [2000] 1 HKLRD 113, HKSAR v Hui Yui Sang [2006] 2 HKLRD 738等)」
11.在本案中,本席判處上訴人上訴得直,是因為本席認為雖然片段中暴露了這個女孩的生殖器,但當中並沒有直接或間接涉及性的元素,因此不構成條例中「色情描劃」定義所指涉及性的行為。
12.代表上訴人的彭大律師指出,上訴人上訴後被判無罪,明顯地並非是因為技術的理由,而上訴人亦沒有做出自招嫌疑的行為。她認為儘管上訴人的行為應當受到譴責,但並不構成自招嫌疑的行為,因此沒有理由剝奪其訟費。她援引香港特別行政區訴陳樹雄[3]支持她的論據。
13.答辯人援引香港特別行政區訴陳鑑清[4],指上訴人的行為是令人激憤(inflammatory)及是卑鄙和值得譴責(reprehensible and deserving of condemnation)的行為,因此是自招嫌疑,不應獲得訟費。
14.本席並不同意彭大律師的說法。上訴人明顯地做出自招嫌疑的行為。在她所援引的陳樹雄案中,被告人與其他人一起將流動小販牌照交回市政署換取固定小販攤位或街市檔位後,違反與市政署達成的租約,將攤位及檔位出租與其他人經營。上訴庭認為這是違約或侵權的不道德行為,但不構成被告人等人所面對的串謀詐騙罪中的不誠實元素,因此無需承擔刑責,而他們亦沒有做出任何誤導控方,令控方誤信針對他們的證據較實際情況為強的行為。正如上訴庭在該案例中開宗明義所指出,案件明顯地是屬於民事性質。裁決因此是因着案例本身的情況而作出。
15.其實,就着一個被告人有沒有做出自招嫌疑的行為,或做出令控方誤信檢控被告人的證據更為強而有力的行為,是要視乎每一個案件的情況。因此,一個案件的裁決不一定適用於另一個案件。法庭必須考慮不同案件的不同情節去作出裁決。基於其民事的性質,陳樹雄案明顯地與本案的情況有所分別,因此並不適用。
16.相反地,香港終審法院在答辯人所援引的陳鑑清案中的評論,與本案的情況相關,值得將其節錄[5]:
“5. The principles relating to costs in criminal cases involving an acquittal at first instance or a quashing of the conviction on appeal are well-established and may be summarised as follows.
6. The courts are given a broad discretion regarding such costs. Thus, section 15(c) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance[6] provides that in any criminal proceedings “an order as to costs shall be such as a court or a judge considers just and reasonable”.
……
8. Upon an acquittal, the court normally makes a costs order in favour of the accused unless there is a positive reason for departing from that rule.[7] Most frequently, such a reason is found to exist where the accused has brought suspicion on himself or herself, leading to the prosecution. This may be due to that person’s conduct in the course of the investigation orduring the trial,[8] but the discretion is not bounded by any inflexible rule.[9] Conduct of the accused prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct providing the setting for such charges, may have invited suspicion and so be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion.[10] The courts will especially take into account conduct by the accused which is reprehensible and deserving of condemnation or such as to render an award of costs an affront to the administration of justice.[11]
9. These principles apply equally where a conviction at first instance is subsequently overturned on appeal, for instance on a point of law: the accused may be deprived of the costs of the trial because of his or her conduct as aforesaid.[12] If the conviction is quashed in the Court of Final Appeal, treatment of the costs of the intermediate appeal will depend on the circumstances and the basis on which the conviction was overturned. For instance, where arguments which ultimately succeeded in this Court were advanced in, but erroneously rejected by, the Court of Appeal, the costs of the intermediate appeal would normally be awarded to the appellant.[13]
10. It is open to the Court to deprive the accused or appellant of some portion of the costs in relation to any stage of the proceedings, for instance because much time was spent advancing unmeritorious or unarguable points.[14]
11. However, in exercising the discretion as aforesaid, the Court must not act on a basis which contradicts the verdict of acquittal or undermines the presumption of innocence. It can never refuse costs on the basis that the accused ought instead to have been convicted.[15] In jury cases, the basis for the verdict is often opaque and, while the accused mayproperly be deprived of costs based on admissions or uncontested facts, care must be taken to ensure that the exercise of discretion is consistent with the verdict of acquittal.[16]”
17.正如本席在裁定上訴人上訴得直的時候所指出,上訴人在住所的洗手間秘密安裝閉路電視鏡頭,拍攝洗手間的情況必然是出於猥褻的心態,並且拍攝了一些成年女子的裸體片段,更拍攝了一個女童的性器官。本席同意答辯人的說法,上訴人的行為正正是陳鑑清案所指的令人激憤(inflammatory)及是卑鄙和值得譴責(reprehensible and deserving of condemnation)的行為。
18.終審法庭的說法完全適用於本案。在作出這方面的考慮之後,本席認為上訴人的行為毫無疑問是自招嫌疑,及誤導控方令控方相信證據比實情更有力。
19.上訴人做出如此惡劣的行為,仍然在幸運地被裁定上訴得直的情況下申請訟費,是完全缺乏理據,及沒有經過心思熟慮的舉錯。
總結
20.駁回上訴人訟費的申請。
21.上訴人所申請的訟費細項是否合理,已經是一個學術性的問題,無須作出處理。
答辯人:由律政司副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及高級檢控官林曉敏代表香港特別行政區
上訴人:由何敦律師行延聘彭禧雯大律師代表
[1](1999) 2 HKCFAR 531。
[2]HCMA 451/2011。
[3][2001-2003] HKCLRT 409。
[4](2022) HKCFA 13。
[5] 第5至6及8至11段
[6] Cap 492.
[7] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531 at 535; HKSAR v Chan Yau Hei (FACC 3/2013, 20 May 2014) at §6; HKSAR v Pang Hung Fai (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 1 at §§3-4.
[8] Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531 at 535.
[9] Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 730 at §16.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Ibid at §17: dishonest conduct; HKSAR v Chow Nok Hang (FACC 12/2012, 18 March 2014) at §8: conduct interfering with the exercise of free speech by others “roundly condemned by each member of” the Court; HKSAR v Wong Tak Keung (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 158 at §§12-13: savage beatings administered to a 15 year old drug courier in Australia (and thus not indictable in Hong Kong).
[12]HKSAR v Chan Yau Hei (FACC 3/2013, 20 May 2014); HKSAR v Wong Tak Keung (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 158.
[13]HKSAR v Wong Tak Keung (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 158 at §15.
[14]HKSAR v Li Kwok Cheung George (No 2) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 575 at §§10-11, 20.
[15]HKSAR v Wong Tak Keung (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 158 at §6; Tsang Wai Ping v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 80 at §16; Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 730 at §§16-17; Qamar Sheraz v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 696 at §18.
[16]Tsang Wai Ping v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 80 at §28.
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