香港特別行政區 訴 黃義輝

DCCC 697/2025

[2026] HKDC 1137

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2025年第697號

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判刑理由書

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1.被告人在本席席前承認控罪1 - 3，分別是兩項交通類別的案件及一項盜竊罪。

2.案情指，控方第一證人 (PW1)  發現他所租用的中型貨車不見了，他於是向警方報失，並聯絡車主，即他向對方租賃車輛的公司求助。

3.幸好，該中型貨車裝設的GPS定位器顯示了其位置。因此他在2022年12月19日1200時左右把該中型貨車找回。但經檢查，發現車匙不見了，又發現該中型貨車右邊車身中間位置及車尾頂部有損毀。

4.經翻看附近的閉路電視片段警方發現，拍攝到被告人的行徑如下：

閉路電視時間標記	描述
09:40:34	被告人駕駛該中型貨車並將車停泊在田灣街22號外。
09:41:01	被告人從該中型貨車司機位下車。
09:41:22	被告人徒步離開該中型貨車。
10:20:50	被告人返回該中型貨車停泊地點，但沒有走近該中型貨車。

5.警方於是在2022年12月19日1900時把被告人拘捕。

6.在警誡錄影會面中，被告人亦承認：

(a)  由於被告人在案發時身無分文，但又急需去見女友，而他又看見該中型貨車車匙插在匙膽，且車門沒有鎖上，於是取用該車開往田灣與女友見面；

(b)  被告人確認自己是閉路電視拍攝到案發時從該中型貨車下車的人；

(c)  被告人是在未獲授權的情況下取用該中型貨車；及

(d)  被告人自2021年起（包括案發當日）被停牌兩年。

7.事實上，被告人於2021年7月7日至2023年7月6日期間（包括首尾兩日）被取消持有或領取駕駛執照的資格。

8.基於以上，被告人在案發期間：

(a)  身為被取消持有或領取駕駛執照資格的人，於取消駕駛資格期間，在道路上駕駛該中型貨車（控罪1）；

(b)  在道路上使用該中型貨車時，並無就其對該中型貨車的使用備有一份有效的和符合香港法例第272章《汽車保險（第三者風險）條例》的規定的第三者風險保險單或保證單（控罪2）；及

(c)  偷竊該中型貨車，而該貨車為屬於海迅供應鏈有限公司的財產（控罪3）。

9.求情方面，辯方把被告人的個人背景詳細交代。事發原故與他在警誡所說的一樣，急著見女友所致。

10.辯方強調被告人一直與警方合作。對於是次犯案有深刻反省。辯方亦表示被告人在還押期間，深切反省，努力完成了不同課程，希望釋放之後，可以找到正當工作，改過自新，和繼續孝順母親。被告在懲教署修讀不同課程獲得的證書和資歷包括：

(a)  香港中文大學專業進修學院「生活英語一結業證書」；

(b)  香港管理專業協會「食物衛生經理證書」；

(c)  建造業議會「地盤安全卡」；及

(d)  建造業議會「中級工藝測試證明書」。

11.就三項控罪的罰則，辯方有以下主張：

控罪一：3個月起刑點及停牌3年（見HKSAR v Kwan Chung Wa HCMA 471/2005）；

控罪二：4.5 – 6個月起刑點（見HKSAR v Lam Shun Choi CACC 402/2012及HKSAR v Muhammad Waqas [2019] 4 HKLRD 323）；及

控罪三：3年起刑點（見香港特別行政區 訴 余志釗 [2017] 1 HKLRD 392）。

12.綜合而言，辯方認為就着本案而言，失竊車輛很快被找回，並沒有對控方證人造成重大損失；被告人明顯是機會主義，看見控方證人的輕型貨車並沒有關門，車匙亦插在匙孔，而干犯本案；被告是單獨行事，並沒有使用工具和涉及任何複雜手法。三項控罪均由同一事件引起，所有判刑可以以同期執行。

13.經小心考慮後，本席認為恰當的量刑起點如下：

控罪一：4.5個月，因認罪減至3個月；

控罪二：6個月，因認罪減至4個月；

控罪三：3年，因認罪減至24個月。

14.值得一提的是，被告人有很多與毒品有關的定罪紀錄[1]，亦包括一次事件涉及兩項與交通行為有關的定罪，分別判監4個月及2個月不等。至於一般盜竊罪也有三次。

15.毫無疑問，判被告人有足夠阻礙性的刑罰才足以反映他的刑責及對他起著阻嚇作用。

16.至於同期執行方面，本席則接受可以以同期執行處理。畢竟，事件是一連串的犯罪行為所致。另外，就所謂停牌令等事宜，辯方正確地指出被告人是首次犯上控罪一，因此根據條例，法庭須命令取消他駕駛資格至少12個月而且是訂明為「之外所加判者」（見香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第44條）。

17.至於控罪二，則有類似條文，但要注意特別有「由定罪之日起計」的細節（見香港法例第272章《汽車保險（第三者風險）條例》第4條）。

18.由此可見，一旦案件出現兩項控罪，又啟動了下達停牌令的責任時，兩項停牌令是否可同期執行（尤其是從何時起計）是容易被忽略的。

19.辯方大律師提供近期的HKSAR v Fung Ka Wai Roger CACC 81/2024及HKSAR v Chow Kuen Fung CACC 136/2024一合併處理案件以作解釋。該案涉及多項和本案控罪一及控罪二一樣的控罪。兩位法官最終下令兩位被告人停牌5年及7年。

20.辯方大律師指：

“ 上訴庭在「討論/Discussion (disqualification order)」的重要分析包括：

(1)  法庭發出停牌令的權力可來自三個源頭：

(i)  條文本身

(ii)  《道路交通條例》第69條提及的罪行被定罪

(iii)  根據《道路交通條例》第69A「有關罪行」再次被定罪

(2)  與一般法律原則一樣，停牌令在發出命令當天生效，例外的例子是《道路交通條例》第69A(2)  條，是在服刑完畢才生效。”

21.上訴庭更指：

“19. There has, however, been a competing line of local appellate authorities as to whether two disqualification periods should be made wholly concurrent, or wholly consecutive. Although the focus of that debate has been on the interplay between the respective disqualification periods ordered for the offences of driving whilst disqualified and driving without third party insurance only, the argument seems to have attempted to lay down an approach to disqualification orders generally. In R v Lau Hon Tung [12] , for example, in reliance on the general sentencing principle that “[i]t is a practice of the court to pass concurrent sentences for two offences arising out of the same facts”, Ryan J concluded that “the magistrate was wrong to impose consecutive disqualifications”. Lau Hon Tung was subsequently followed in R v Tang Sik Hung [13] , in which Leong J (as he then was)  commented that “[w]ithout the statutory power existing in s.44(3), all disqualifications were concurrent.” [14] However, Lau Hon Tung and Tang Sik Hung were not followed in HKSAR v Tsui Wai Nin [15] , where McMahon J upheld the wholly consecutive disqualification periods given for the same charges and said that:

“Any views expressed in those judgments as to the operation of s 44(3)  being restricted to making periods of disqualification imposed under s 44 be in addition only to pre-existing orders for disqualification are plainly obiter .”

20. Although both are part of the sentencing process, there is perhaps a distinction between passing a term of imprisonment and ordering a period of disqualification on a defendant. However, a disqualification order should not be seen as double punishment but as part of the overall penalty considered appropriate by the legislature for persons who break the road traffic laws: see HKSAR v Lee Wai Ping [16] . As a matter of principle, a disqualification order was said in R v Cooksley [17] to be forward-looking and preventative rather than backward-looking and punitive. As distinct from a term of imprisonment, in which case a sentencing court should always stand back and look at the total sentence to ensure that it is not out of proportion to the defendant’s overall criminality, a disqualification order should be sufficiently preventative in order to safeguard and protect other road users. A disqualification period may, therefore, be ineffective or serve no useful purpose if it is shorter than the actual prison sentence passed (assuming that the defendant is entitled to a one-third remission for good behaviour: see HKSAR v Wong Kwok Leung [18] )

21. The calculation of a total disqualification period, however, becomes complicated where multiple disqualification periods are ordered at the same time, and where their effective dates may vary in accordance with different governing provisions. That said, as noted above, the actual effect of a disqualification period will begin when a person is discharged from prison. It follows that when considering the length of a disqualification period, or of an overall disqualification period, instead of focusing on the mechanics by which it is reached, the Court of Appeal will always ask itself whether the length of the disqualification to which a defendant is subject after he is discharged from prison is a reasonable one, in particular with regard to the considerations set out in Cooksley at [40] to [44]. The individual disqualification period should conform with the statutory minimum requirement and commence from the date as prescribed.

22. It may well be that the legislative intention underlying section 44(3)  of the RTO was to put a defendant off the road for a longer period in addition to the disqualification period ordered for the other offence(s). However, the problem presented by section 44(3)  is that, if it is a mandatory requirement that the stipulated minimum disqualification period made under section 44(2)  must be consecutive to any other disqualification period ordered, it would result in a rigid minimum addition of 3 years’ disqualification (for a second or subsequent conviction)  on top of what the court might otherwise consider a reasonable overall disqualification period. Moreover, there will be no certainty as to the expiry of the disqualification period based on the driving whilst disqualified offence itself, because it will be deferred to run from a date based on the effective date (and expiry date)  of the anchor disqualification, which may begin to run from the date it is made, or the date after the existing term of imprisonment is fully served (in a section 69A situation). The issue is further complicated if there are two, rather than one, “other period(s)  of disqualification ordered under any other provision of this Ordinance”, with one to run from the date of the order, and the other to run from the date of discharge (which would presumably result in a longer period). The question arises as to which of these two periods is the one which the disqualification order made under section 44(2)  “shall be in addition to”?

23. Even if a rigid interpretation should apply to section 44(3), it may not serve its effect, which can be neutralised by way of a judge or magistrate invoking his discretionary power under section 44(2)  to impose a shorter disqualification period before ordering it to run in addition to the other disqualification period.

24. We noted the respondent’s reliance on the Court of Final Appeal decision in HKSAR v Choy Yuk Ling [19] in support of its contention that even if the word “shall” is used in a statutory provision, it may not be absolute. Given the analysis above, we consider that no rigid interpretation should be given to the word “shall” in section 44(3).”

22.基於以上，辯方主張：

“「於取消駕駛資格期間駕駛」及「沒有第三者保險而使用汽車」的停牌令不一定要分期執行。”

23.首先，本席認為依足法例停牌12個月是足夠的，少則沒有依據。兩項控罪性質不同，但源於一次事故，也與一貫可以同期處理的情況無異，所以本席屬意把兩項控罪的停牌令同期執行，生效日期為今天起。

24.最後是本案的判刑，應否與被告人正在服刑的判罰加以綜合考慮及作出相應的判刑調節。

25.就此，辯方大律師強調：

“ 3. 懇請法庭考慮被告案件的情況給予適當扣減，根據控方2026年6月18日提供的案件時序表顯示：

(1)  被告由被拘捕 (2022-12-19)  到在區域法院法官席前 承認控罪差不多3年半 (2026-06-12)。

(2)  本案是一個簡單案件，2022年12月19日失車被尋 回，同日控方證人錄取證人供，第二天12月20日 被告亦在會面記錄承認控罪。案件沒有複雜的跟進 調查。

(3)  案件發生後11個月多才交給律政署索取法律意見 (2023-11-23)。

(4)  收到法律意見 (2024-02-20)  後1年1個多月，亦即案 件發生後2年3個多月才起訴被告 (2025-04-08)。

(5)  期間被告大部份時間都被拘留在懲教署，即是需要 被告的跟進行動或調查並不困難。

(6)  之後的法律程序，辯方明白需要時間，只是希望法 庭考慮被告在被拘捕後差不多3年6個月才在法官 席前承認控罪。

(7)  延誤並不是由被告引起。

(8)  延誤並不合理。

(9)  延誤對被告造成面對控罪和法庭程序的精神壓力。

(10)  在懲教署期間改過自新，完成了不同課程，並獲得 證書和資歷。”

26.經小心考慮，本席同意可適量減刑。畢竟，本席現在要處罰的是當年的被告人；無論以等候期間展開了更生的角度來看，或以判決本案是否有「不合理延誤」來看[2]，本席認為把控罪三減刑3個月是合理的。基於以上，控罪三的刑期減為21個月。即使無實際影響，控罪一及控罪二也略按比例減刑至2個月及3個月，全部同期執行。

27.至於被告仍在服刑的案件其實無需判以同期執行。本席認為即使所有控罪及時放在同一位法官席前，基於控罪性質及總刑期考慮，都不合適處以同期執行。

28.本席認為較合理的做法是，本案的刑期與任何其他刑期作以下判令：

控罪一：完全與其他案作分期，但與本案的各控罪同期；

控罪二：同上；及

控罪三：與控罪一及控罪二同期，本案的總刑期為21個月。本席亦下令，當中12個月與其他案件分期執。