HKSAR v. Kkk
Read the full judgment text of CACC 504/2011 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 February 2013 before Stock VP, Yeung VP, Barnes J.
Criminal law – sexual offences – rape of a child – indecent assault – gross indecency – sentencing – appeal – father abusing three biological daughters over several years – guilty pleas – whether indeterminate sentence warranted – whether individual sentences and totality manifestly excessive – approach of step-by-step assessment versus global group approach – aggravating features under R v Billam – breach of parental trust – captivity of child victim – starting points and discounts for guilty plea and for sparing victims from testifying – principle of totality – appeal allowed with total reduced from 23 years 7 months to 18 years. The applicant, the natural father of three daughters X (born 1994) and twins Y and Z (born 1999), raped X on four occasions in Shenzhen and Kwai Chung between 2006 and 2009 when she was aged 12 to 14, including one rape committed in the presence of her mother and another that resulted in pregnancy and abortion; raped Y on two occasions in Shenzhen when she was aged 10 and 11; and committed an act of gross indecency with Z in Kwai Chung when she was about 9. He pleaded guilty to all seven charges. At HCCC 278/2011, McWalters J imposed a total of 23 years 7 months' imprisonment, structured as 11 years 6 months concurrent for charges 1-4, 11 years 6 months concurrent for charges 5-6, and 7 months for charge 7, with the three groups running consecutively. On application for leave to appeal sentence, the Court of Appeal first held, agreeing with the sentencing judge, that an indeterminate sentence was not warranted: although the applicant exhibited high psychopathic traits and a high risk of general reoffending, the abuse was situational in nature rather than indicative of a paedophilic disposition, and the limited sexual element in his prior record did not support an indeterminate term. The Court then rejected the argument that sexual offending by a parent against a child is less serious than rape of a stranger, holding that such offending constitutes a grave breach of the trust that a child is entitled to expect from its parent, and that the child is captive both physically and emotionally. The Court preferred a step-by-step assessment of each individual offence over the sentencing judge's 'group' approach. Applying starting points of 12 years for the first rape of X, 14 years for the second rape of X (aggravated by the mother's presence), 12 years for the third rape of X, 15 years for the fourth rape of X (aggravated by the resulting pregnancy and abortion), and 13 years for each rape of Y, with the usual one-third discount for the guilty pleas and only a modest further reduction for sparing the victims from testifying, the Court arrived at individual sentences of 7y9m, 9y6m, 7y9m, 10y, 8y6m and 8y6m, leaving the 7-month sentence for the gross indecency on charge 7 undisturbed. By specified concurrent and consecutive orders – charges 1-3 concurrent with 4 years consecutive to charge 4 (total 14 years for charges 1-4); 1y6m of charge 6 consecutive to charge 5 (total 10 years for charges 5-6); 4 years of that 10 years consecutive to the 14 years; charge 7 concurrent – the Court arrived at a total of 18 years. The Court held that the original totality of 23 years 7 months was manifestly excessive because it left insufficient room for more serious cases, citing as comparables HKSAR v Tam Kam Fai CACC 329/2001, R v Chow Kan Shing CACC 205/1995 and HKSAR v Chan Kim Kwan CACC 405/2004, and drawing on the aggravating features enumerated by Lord Lane CJ in R v Billam [1986] 1 WLR 349 and the campaign-of-rape starting point articulated by Lord Woolf LCJ in R v Millberry [2003] 2 All ER 939. Leave to appeal was granted, the hearing was treated as the appeal, and the appeal was allowed to the extent of substituting the revised sentences and reducing the total to 18 years' imprisonment.
Legal issues: Whether indeterminate sentence warranted for serial sexual abuse of own daughters · Whether total sentence of 23 years 7 months for repeated rape of three daughters was manifestly excessive
Outcome: Application for leave to appeal sentence granted; appeal allowed; sentences on charges 1 to 6 set aside and substituted; total sentence reduced from 23 years 7 months to 18 years' imprisonment; sentence on charge 7 (7 months) undisturbed.
Cited by 24 cases · Cites 3 cases
|
CACC 504/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 504 OF 2011 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 278 OF 2011) ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________
________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Stock VP (giving the judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.This is an application for leave to appeal sentences totalling 23 years 7 months’ imprisonment imposed by McWalters J on 22 November 2011. 2.The applicant has three daughters to whom we shall refer as X, Y and Z. He raped X as well as Y and committed indecent assault upon Z. X was born in 1994; and the twins, Y and Z were born in 1999. 3.The offences were committed between 2006 and 2008. At the date of sentencing, the applicant was aged 51 years; which means that at the time of the offences he was in his mid to late 40s. The charges 4.The charges to all of which he pleaded guilty at the magistracy, were as follows :
The sentences 5.The judge sentenced as follows:
The Summary of Facts 6.The summary of facts, which was the basis of the applicant’s pleas, is relatively sparse as to the circumstances of and surrounding the offences. This stands in stark contrast to the detail revealed by the victim impact statements of Y and Z and by the psychological reports in respect of all three girls. The relevance of this difference, for the purpose of the present exercise, is that extremely grave though the conduct is as revealed by the summary of facts, the panoply of degradation and abuse revealed by those statements and the psychological reports, if those revelations be true, would take the seriousness of the applicant’s conduct, within this category of offence, to a level of awfulness all of its own. In the event, the judge was constrained to sentence on the basis of the summary of facts. 7.It is convenient, and advisable, in the circumstances to relate the factual background to the charges by setting out that summary. It seems clear from the summary content (see the references to the original count numbers, in square parenthesis below) that the 7 charges to which a plea was tendered were not the only charges on the original indictment:
Other allegations 8.The allegations in the reports and victim statements we have seen went much further:
9.Mr Delaney, who appeared below as well as before us, made it clear to the sentencing judge that he proceeded on the assumption that it was the summary of facts which formed the basis of the sentencing exercise and not the additional allegations made against the applicant in various reports before the court saying that there was a great deal in those statements with which the applicant took issue. The judge accepted that he was, for sentencing purposes, limited to the information admitted by the applicant in the summary of facts, save that he correctly considered himself entitled to take into account the reports as to the impact of the applicant’s abuse upon his daughters. 10.We mention these additional allegations of the grossest possible behaviour not to judge the accuracy or otherwise of them, but in order to gauge for sentencing purposes where in the wide range of sentences available for the offence of rape the facts disclosed by the summary – as opposed to the facts disclosed by these various statements – fell. Had the full range of alleged conduct been charged and proved, that full range would have added most substantially to the sentences warranted by the present summary of facts. This is not to criticise the prosecution for the course it adopted, for we do not know what considerations dictated its ultimate approach: it may well be that it took the view that a plea of guilty to 7 charges and a limited summary was sufficient to the ends of justice, given the undesirability of requiring the girls to testify and given the likelihood of heavy sentences to be imposed on the basis of the summary of facts – if that was the reasoning, then it is hardly one which we would criticise. Impact 11.No challenge was made to the assessments by the various psychologists of the impact upon the victims of these offences. 12.X suffers a very high level of sexual distress and has recurring memories of the abuse. She engages in self-mutilation and has turned to alcohol and smoking to relieve her emotional distress. She sees only darkness in life. She is dysfunctional in respect of heterosexual relationships. 13.Y suffers flashbacks. Her relationship with her mother has been adversely affected for although she appreciates that her mother was also a victim of the applicant’s threats and violence, she remains disappointed that her mother failed to protect her. She has nightmares and fears anyone who looks like her father. She has an extreme fear of the dark. 14.Z has also, not surprisingly, been traumatically affected by the offence against her and from the sexually abusive environment which was her home. She, as in the case of the others, needs long-term psychotherapy. The question of an indeterminate sentence 15.The judge’s comprehensive sentencing remarks demonstrate a conscientious, well researched and thoroughly careful approach to this difficult sentencing exercise. 16.The judge first, and quite correctly, considered whether this was a case that warranted an indeterminate sentence. To this end, he commissioned a psychiatric report and a psychological report. 17.One thing that both reports demonstrate is the total lack of remorse by this applicant to the extent that, whilst admitting he had sexual intercourse with his daughters, he asserted he did not force them to do so and, according to the psychologist, even went so far as to blame the girls, although how they were, according to the applicant, to be blamed is not recorded. There was no evidence, said the psychiatrist, that the applicant suffered from any psychiatric illness. 18.The psychologist noted that the applicant, whilst living on the Mainland, engaged in multiple live-in relationships – in other words, he had mistresses, three of whom lived in the same house as the victims of this case and their mother. He attributed his need for intercourse with his daughters to the suggestions of a fortune teller. The applicant said that the victims were old enough to understand and capable of giving informed consent. The psychologist said that the applicant “showed a high degree of psychopathic traits, which largely contributed to his long-standing and versatile criminal history…. . His risk of general reoffending was assessed to be very high whilst his risk of sexual recidivism … was found to be moderate to high.” The psychologist recommended a long period of treatment and rehabilitation in a structured environment, though the prognosis was pessimistic. 19.The applicant’s criminal record, to which reference was then made, is indeed extensive. It goes back to 1978, when the applicant was aged about 18 years and runs through in relatively concentrated fashion to 1990; whereafter there was one offence of criminal intimidation in 2003. The offences are offences of burglary and theft and forgery; assault occasioning actual bodily harm; criminal damage; conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice; robbery; wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and agreeing to let premises be used as a gambling establishment. There are two previous occasions of sexual offences – the first in 1985, two offences of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years and the second the following year, 1986, an offence of indecent assault. The details of these offences are no longer available and we note that they are about 25 years in the past. 20.The judge did not, so it would appear, hear oral testimony from the psychiatrist or psychologist. In the light of the facts of the offences and the reports he had to decide, he said, whether the applicant represented “such a danger to the community that he should be made the subject of an indeterminate sentence.” He noted that the psychiatrist entertained doubts as to whether the applicant had a paedophilic tendency, though he could not rule it out and the judge noted the psychologist’s comment about the risk of sexual recidivism. He remarked that the applicant did not have a serious history of sexual assaults on women and that the incidents which are the subject of his criminal record did not reveal a person disposed to unlawful, violent sexual behaviour; nor was there sufficient evidence for him to conclude that the applicant was a paedophile. He went on:
21.With that conclusion it then fell for the judge to consider what determinate sentences were appropriate. The judge’s further analysis 22.The judge recognised, again correctly, the limited assistance that sentences in other rape cases provide, since the factual matrix of each case tends so much to vary but instead he identified the sentencing principles that required to be addressed, in particular: retribution, which required a proper reflection of the moral culpability of the offender; denunciation to reflect the community’s disapproval of crime; deterrence, primarily to others who may be tempted to abuse their power and authority over children as well as personal deterrence to those who might be likely to offend again; and, finally, rehabilitation of the offender though with crimes as serious as the ones committed by this applicant, the issue of rehabilitation was, he said, overshadowed by the other principles. 23.The judge took the view – one with which we agree – that there was exhibited no remorse by the applicant and that he used his daughters as “sexual toys to do with as he wished… completely indifferent to the pain and suffering both physical and psychological that he caused them.” These were, he said, “extraordinarily horrific crimes which call for a singularly severe response from the court.” 24.“Although,” he said “the offences in respect of each victim are separate I shall nevertheless treat the rape offences vis-a-vis each victim as one course of conduct and enhance the starting point to reflect the fact that the offence was repeated. As one course of conduct I shall order the sentences for the rapes in respect of each victim to be served concurrently with each other. However, because there are three different victims the final sentence must reflect the defendant’s overall culpability.” 25.The judge then noted that he would give a discount not only for the plea of guilty but an additional discount for the considerable benefit to the victims in not having to testify. 26.Against the background of this reasoning, the judge imposed the individual and total sentences to which we referred at an early part of this judgment. Analysis 27.Mr Delaney argues that the individual sentences were manifestly excessive as was the totality. He seeks to support his argument by reference to other cases and by emphasizing that the charges were not presented as sample charges. 28.In relation to his argument, there is one particular matter with which we must take issue. The suggestion was that offences of this nature are not as serious as offences of rape of strangers. We do not agree. The suggestion does not compare like with like. The rape of the stranger has its own horrors for the victim. But the fact of the matter is that girls in the position of the victims in this case are innocents, who commence their young lives instinctively trusting, and entitled to trust, the families into which they are born. They have no option but to live in the places to which they are brought after birth and to which from time to time they are taken. They are wholly at the mercy of their parents. The fundamental right of the child is to expect from its parents protection and love. In most instances, in this society, that is what the child and young person receives, for that is the normal instinct of the parent. It is painful to recognise that that instinctive protection and love is not always provided. But actual abuse of a child through physical violence or deliberate neglect is not merely at odds with that to which a child is entitled; it is a damnable breach of the trust which the child and society at large places in a parent. And since the child is not in a position to protect itself or to seek relief, society at large – ultimately through the courts – takes upon itself the duty proactively to protect the child and to visit condign punishment upon those who so abuse that trust as deliberately to harm the child. In the circumstances of a case such as the present, the child is a captive, physically and emotionally, and it is in that light that the seriousness of a sexual offence of a child by its parent, or by a person in the position of a parent, is to be viewed. 29.Previous cases are of limited value since with this category of offence there are so many variables. Amongst those cited to us as comparables, there are a few of some utility for present purposes. One is HKSAR v Tam Kam Fai CACC 329 of 2001, 14 March 2002, unreported. It was a case in which the applicant had been found guilty after trial of four counts of rape and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on each count. Those sentences were ordered to run concurrently making a total of 10 years’ imprisonment. The judge had taken a starting point of 12 years’ imprisonment for each offence. The applicant had raped a young daughter of his girlfriend on four occasions. She was aged 11 years at the time of the first offence and just turned 15 years at the time of the last two offences. During the course of the period covered by the indictment, the victim became pregnant and underwent an abortion in a hospital in Shenzhen, though the court remarked that it was only right to state that the applicant was not convicted of the allegation of rape that was said to have brought about the pregnancy. The court there said that the starting point taken by the judge, namely, 12 years’ imprisonment was “the least he should have properly considered”, a clear intimation that the court considered it to be on the low side. However it is noticeable that all sentences were ordered to run concurrently making a total, at first instance, of 10 years and upon appeal of 12 years; a total after trial for four rapes which might be thought to be on the low side. 30.In that judgment, reference was made to R v Chow Kan Shing CACC 205 of 1995, 13 September 1995, unreported, in which the applicant was the boyfriend of the mother of the two female victims, the younger of whom was aged 12 years (the age of the elder was not given). The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 7 years on the one count and 6 years on the other with a totality of 10 years which was said to be “not a day too long.” It was a case in which there was said to be no sexually humiliating conduct, meaning, no doubt, no humiliating conduct over and above that occasioned by the rapes themselves. 31.Then there is HKSAR v Chan Kim Kwan, CACC 405 of 2004, 22 June 2005, unreported, where the victim, aged 9 years was one of two sisters who were students of the applicant’s wife. He was convicted after trial on no fewer than 13 counts of rape in a nine-month period. 12 years had been imposed on each of the counts with a totality of 15 years. The judgment of Stuart-Moore VP described the total as appropriate though he added that it was, for a first time offender “at the top end of the range for offences of this kind committed by a first offender.” He cited also from the judgment of Lord Woolf LCJ in R v Millberry & Ors [2003] 2 ALL ER 939 at 946 that 15 years and upwards was recommended as a starting point for a campaign of rape. 32.Reference was also made to R v Billam [1986] 1WLR 349 where Lord Lane CJ had said that amongst the aggravating features were violence over and above the force necessary to commit rape; the use of a weapon; the rape is repeated; the rape has been carefully planned; previous convictions for rape or other serious offences of a violent or sexual kind; the subjection of the victim to further sexual indignities or perversions; that the victim is either very old or very young; and where the effect upon the victim, whether physical or mental, is of special seriousness. “Where any one or more of these aggravating features are present,” said the Chief Justice “the sentence should be substantially higher than the figures suggested as the starting point…. The extra distress which giving evidence can cause to a victim means that a plea of guilty, perhaps more so than in other cases, should normally result in some reduction from what would otherwise be the appropriate sentence. The amount of such reduction will of course depend on all the circumstances, including the likelihood of a finding of not guilty had the matter been contested.” 33.We have referred earlier to the judge’s global approach whereby he took a global approach for each set of offences against a particular victim; so that, for example, he took the view that for the first four charges the appropriate sentence after trial would have been 18 years’ imprisonment and after plea 12 years’ imprisonment. It is this approach which gives the impression that the individual sentences, on their face, were manifestly excessive. 34.We prefer to test these sentences and the totality by taking the more orthodox, perhaps more laboured approach; assessing sentence for each individual offence, not least because some of the offences, particularly that reflected in charge 4, where the rape resulted in a pregnancy and an abortion, were more grave than others. 35.The first offence was grave in itself involving as it did a gross breach of trust in respect of a girl aged only 12 years; the applicant not using any protection to prevent a pregnancy. We would take a starting point of 12 years’ imprisonment, which we would reduce to 7 years 9 months in view of the plea, and including a slight further reduction given the saving of the girl from having to give evidence. Whilst we do not discourage judges from giving some extra discount for that factor, it must nonetheless be remembered that in other jurisdictions there is no standard one-third discount regardless of circumstances as there is (save when there has been an issue as to fact decided against the defendant) in this jurisdiction and, further, in this case the proven fact of a pregnancy and an abortion resulting from one of the rapes as well as the fact of similar complaints by the sisters, rendered convictions inevitable, so the additional discount warranted must be slim. 36.For the second offence, we would take a starting point of 14 years’ imprisonment. The fact of the mother’s presence during the rape is an added aggravating feature, for we attribute that humiliating factor to the applicant: the mother lived in total fear of him. This would reduce to a sentence of 9 years 8 months’ imprisonment after plea; which we further reduce by two months for saving the girl from having to testify; therefore 9 years 6 months. 37.For the third rape, it is in the nature of the first offence, save that it is a repeat offence on the same victim which we shall take into account in judging the question of totality; so we would take a starting point of 12 years’ imprisonment and reduce it after plea to a sentence of 7 years 9 months. 38.The fourth rape on the victim X was particularly serious given the pregnancy that followed. We would take a starting point of 15 years’ imprisonment with a sentence after plea of 10 years’ imprisonment. 39.If we were to stop there, we would impose an overall sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. 40.In relation to the fifth and sixth charges we would impose on each of the fifth and sixth charges a sentence of 8 years 6 months’ imprisonment, having taken the starting point for 13 years: the girl was young indeed at the time of this offence. For the two offences, we would impose a total of 10 years’ imprisonment. 41.We would not interfere with the sentence imposed in relation to the seventh charge. 42.Whether one looks at it in the light of this stepped approach, or the “group” approach adopted by the sentencing judge, we are satisfied the totality which the judge imposed was manifestly excessive. That, primarily, is because a sentence of 23 years’ imprisonment (plus a few months for the seventh charge) leaves little room for more serious situations, which is not to detract from the gravity of the applicant’s conduct as revealed by the present charges. If 23 years’ imprisonment were appropriate for the first six offences after pleas, then insufficient realistic room is left for the sentences one would have realistically to contemplate for these offences after trial or for a greater series of like offences or for a situation which combines both, that is to say conviction after trial for a greater series of like offences. 43.We are of the view that the appropriate totality was one of 18 years’ imprisonment and we propose to allow the appeal to that extent. Result 44.Accordingly, we grant the applicant leave to appeal the sentences, treat the hearing of the application as the appeal, and allow the appeal by setting aside each sentence imposed save for that in relation to the seventh charge; and substitute the following sentences :
45.We further order:
46.This makes a total of 18 years’ imprisonment.
Ms Fanny Wong, SADPP, of Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Michael Delaney, instructed by Legal Aid Department, for the Applicant |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case