Lee Po Wing v. See Wah Fan

HCMP 1771/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1771 OF 2013

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D E C I S I O N

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INTRODUCTION

1.By an originating summons issued on 19 July 2013, Mr Lee applies, pursuant to Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 (“the Ordinance”), for an order that:-

(1)   no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by Madam See; and

(2)   any legal proceedings instituted by Madam See in any court before the making of the order herein shall not be continued by her without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

2.On 20 January 2017, Madam See issued a summons seeking to strike out or dismiss (i) Mr Lee’s originating summons, and (ii) a procedural summons issued by Mr Lee on 28 December 2016.

3.The main issue that I have to decide is whether Madam See has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, against different persons such that an order restricting her from instituting or continuing legal proceedings should be made under Section 27 of the Ordinance.

4.A collateral issue that I have to decide is whether Mr Lee’s originating summons should be struck out or dismissed, on the ground that he has failed to prosecute the application diligently and with expedition.

BRIEF BACKGROUND FACTS

5.Madam See is a frequent court user.  It all started, apparently, in about 1999 when she became involved in a dispute with a fellow co-owner (Madam Tam) of her building known as Block 5, Ki Tat Garden, Phase 1, Ping Tong Street West, Ping Shan, Yuen Long, New Territories (“the Building”).  Madam See was the owner or occupier of the Ground Floor, while Madam Tam was the owner or occupier of the First Floor, of the Building.  Their dispute related to an alleged illegal occupation or enclosure of the staircase/staircase landing and/or alteration of the partition wall at the First Floor of the Building by Madam Tam which Madam See complained resulted in her access to the common roof being blocked.  The dispute led to an action brought by Madam See against Madam Tam in the Lands Tribunal, LDBM 300/1999.  In those proceedings, Madam See was legally represented by Chaine, Chow & Barbara Hung, while Madam Tam was represented by Paul Kwong & Co, of which Mr Lee was formerly a partner and currently a consultant.

6.Madam See’s action against Madam Tam was struck out by Mr M Tong, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal, on 14 November 2000, on the ground that (i) her claim related to the common parts of the Building, (ii) by virtue of Section 16 of the Building Management Ordinance, any proceedings in respect of any common parts of a building could only be brought and pursued by the incorporated owners of that building, and (iii) accordingly, Madam See had no locus standi to pursue her claim against Madam Tam.

7.Thereafter, Madam See, acting in person, has commenced numerous actions and took out numerous applications in the Lands Tribunal, District Court and High Court against various parties.  Mr Lee has informed the court that Madam Lee has, over the past 18 years or so, instituted 104 legal proceedings, including 14 originating processes, 14 appeals, 3 reviews, 27 applications for leave to appeal, and 46 interlocutory applications.  The defendants or respondents named in the 14 originating processes include:-

(1)   Madam Tam;

(2)   Madam Tam’s cohabitee (Mr Yuen);

(3)   three officers of the Management Committee of the Incorporated Owners of Ki Tat Garden (Phase One);

(4)   Paul Kwong & Co; and

(5)   Mr Lee.

8.Mr Lee has also informed that court that Madam See failed or lost in 102 of the 104 legal proceedings instituted by her.  Of the remaining 2 legal proceedings, (i) one, commenced in the Small Claims Tribunal, SCTC 4601/11, which was subsequently transferred to the District Court and became DCCJ 2385/2011, was discontinued by her, and (ii) the other, an action commenced in the High Court against Kwong Wai Chuen, Paul trading as Paul Kwong & Company (HCA 2519/2016), is currently subject to a strike out application by the defendant.

9.The previous actions brought by Madam See against Mr Lee included two actions in the District Court, namely, DCCJ 1608/2012 and DCMP 2966/2012.

10.In DCCJ 1608/2012, Madam See sued Madam Tam as the 1^st defendant, Mr Yuen as the 2^nd defendant, and Mr Lee as the 3^rd defendant. Her complaints against Mr Lee included an alleged failure to comply with court order(s) and contempt of court.  The relief that she claimed against Mr Lee included an order for committal and disciplinary sanction or penalty.  Her action against Mr Lee was struck out by Master Wong on 30 August 2012. Thereafter, she sought to re-open or revive her complaints against Mr Lee, including making an ex parte application for an order of committal against Mr Lee which was rejected by H H Judge Leung on 31 October 2012.

11.In DCMP 2966/2012, Madam See sued Mr Lee as the 1^st defendant, Mr Yuen as the 2^nd defendant, and Mr Lin (Chairman of the Management Committee of the Incorporated Owners of Ki Tat Garden (Phase One)) as the 3^rd defendant.  She complained, inter alia, that Mr Lee made false representations in DCCJ 1608/2012 in the conduct of his defence and in relation to his costs or fees, and assisted Mr Yuen and Mr Lin in making false representations in previous proceedings in the District Court and Lands Tribunal.  The relief that she claimed against Mr Lee included an order for disciplinary sanction or penalty.  Madam See’s action was struck out by Master Ho on 17 April 2013.  Her appeal against Master Ho’s order was dismissed by Deputy District Judge Chan on 11 July 2013.  Her further application seeking leave to appeal against the order of Deputy District Judge Chan dated 11 July 2013 was dismissed by the same judge on 17 September 2013.

12.In the meantime, on 19 July 2013, Mr Lee issued the originating summons herein against Madam See seeking an order to restrict her from commencing or continuing any legal proceedings.

13.Notwithstanding the Section 27 application made by Mr Lee, Madam See has continued to institute numerous legal proceedings.  It is not necessary to set out in this decision all the legal actions instituted by Madam See over the years, which have been summarised in paragraphs 4 to 224 of Mr Lee’s affirmation filed on 10 February 2017.

14.As earlier mentioned, there is currently still one outstanding action commenced by Madam See on 29 September 2016 against Kwong Wai Chuen, Paul trading as Paul Kwong & Company in the High Court (HCA 2519/2016).  Mr Lee has informed the court that the defendant’s strike out application has been fixed to be heard on 28 March 2017.

MADAM SEE’S SUMMONS

15.In her summons dated 20 January 2017, Madam See applies to strike out or dismiss:-

(1)   the originating summons herein; and

(2)   Mr Lee’s summons dated 28 December 2016.

16.In so far as (1) is concerned, Madam See’s application is advanced on the basis, as I understand it, that Mr Lee has delayed in the prosecution of his application.  Mr Lee issued the originating summons on 19 July 2013, but did not apply to fix a date for the hearing of the same until 28 December 2016.  There has, plainly, been delay on Mr Lee’s part which has not been explained. However, the main consideration is whether the delay has caused any prejudice to Madam See.  None has been suggested by her.  More importantly, she has in fact continued to institute numerous legal proceedings after the date of the originating summons.  Striking out the present originating summons will not bar Mr Lee from making another application against Madam Lee under Section 27 of the Ordinance.  I am not prepared to exercise my discretion to strike out the originating summons merely on the ground that Mr Lee has delayed in the prosecution of his application.

17.In passing, I note that in her summons, Madam See also refers to the Section 30(3) of Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347.  I do not see, however, that section, which relates to the court’s power to override the time limits in respect of actions for personal injuries or under the Fatal Accident Ordinance, to be relevant to her application to strike out the originating summons.

18.In respect of (2), by his summons dated 28 December 2016, Mr Lee sought (inter alia) an order to fix a date for the hearing of the originating summons.  The basis of Madam See’s application is that Mr Lee did not file any affidavit in support of his summons.  There is, however, no requirement that I am aware of that Mr Lee’s summons must be supported by an affidavit.  Further, it is a fact that on 27 January 2017 Master Hui ordered that a date be fixed for the hearing of originating summons by a judge, and on 1 March 2017 this court heard the originating summons.  In all the circumstances, I can see no basis to strike out Mr Lee’s summons dated 28 December 2016.

MR LEE’S APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE ORDINANCE

19.Section 27(1) of the Ordinance states as follows:-

“The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that -

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.”

20.Section 27(2) of the Ordinance goes on to provide that:-

“The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless -

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.”

21.The principles governing the court’s exercise of its powers to make an order under Section 27 of the Ordinance were comprehensively reviewed by J Lam J (as he then was) in Secretary for Justice v Ma Kwai Chun [2006] 1 HKLRD 539.  For the purpose of the present application, the following statements of principle are relevant:

“29. A section 27 order is a strong measure. A person subject to such an order has to submit to a judicial screening before any intended legal action by him can be pursued. The rationale for such measure was examined by the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd [2005] 1 HKLRD 473. In essence, the Court of Final Appeal held that the right of access to the court is subject to the power of the court to adopt proportionate measure in preventing the abuses of its own process...

30. The evils of abusive proceedings were identified by the Court of Final Appeal as follows (see the Chief Justice at Paras. 3 and 4; Ribeiro PJ at Paras. 52 and 53),

(a) Unfair oppression and stress (including financial pressure) caused to the opposite party or parties;

(b) Wastage of limited judicial resources.

32. A Section 27 order is obviously more draconian than a restricted proceedings order [“RPO”] or a restricted applications order [“RAO”] under Practice Direction 11.3. Given the rationale for such measure, the court must be satisfied that it is a proportionate remedy to the abusive litigious activities of the defendant before such order is made...

33. The expression ‘habitually and persistently’ involves an element of repetition. Although it needs not be over a long period of time, it is essential to establish a course of repetitious abusive conducts in the whole history of the defendant’s litigious activities. Whilst in many cases, the activities focus on a particular adversary or a particular grievance, repetition can also manifest itself in the form of a number of unfocused vexatious claims against a wide range of persons... In this respect, the scope of Section 27 is wider than RAOs or RPOs.

34. At the same time, in some cases, even though the number of separate actions is quite small, if the whole circumstances and history of the litigious activities demonstrate an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined, coupled with such attempts being pursued in a vexatious manner (e.g. with extravagant, scandalous or wild allegations without any prospect of the same being justified), the requirement of that expression can also be satisfied...

35. For the purpose of Section 27, a distinction is drawn between the institution of legal proceedings and the continuation thereof. Although more than one view can be found in the authorities, the following are generally regarded as institution of proceedings,

(a) Filing of originating process;

(b) Making a counterclaim;

(c) Appeals from a final determination in a proceedings;

(d) Seeking to set aside a final determination....

36. As regards interlocutory applications and interlocutory appeals on such applications, the majority view is that they do not come within the meaning of ‘institution’ of proceedings. They are steps taken in the course of a pre-existing set of proceedings. A dissenting view can be found in the judgment of Blair JA in Foy v Foy (No.2) (1979) 26 OR (2d) 220. I do not need to decide this point in the present case and it may not be too significant because,

(a) The interlocutory applications and appeals can be taken into account in determining whether the main action is vexatious;

(b) In cases where vexation is only manifested in interlocutory steps as opposed to the substantive dispute in the main action, the rule of proportionality will generally dictate that the proper remedy is a RAO instead of a Section 27 application.

37. Vexatious legal proceedings are regarded as abuse of process. As the Chief Justice pointed out in Paragraph 6 of the judgment in Ng Yat Chi, the categories of abuse of process are never closed. The element of vexation in legal proceedings can likewise take as many forms as human ingenuity may devise. It should be noted that the description ‘vexatious’ in the context of Section 27 has a wider meaning [than] that given to the same word in the context of Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court. In Gallow v AG (Victorian Full Court, unreported, 4 Sept 1984, cited by Smith J in AG v Knight [2004] VSC 407 at Para. 5), the court held,

‘In the light of the mischief to which the section is directed however it seems to me that the word ‘vexatious’ is not in this context a term of art and is an omnibus expression which includes proceedings which are scandalous, which disclose no reasonable cause of action, which are oppressive, which are embarrassing, or which are an abuse of the process of the Court. All of such and similar proceedings in my opinion, fall within the meaning of the word ‘vexatious’ in the statute.’

41. In dealing with a Section 27 application, the court is not re-opening the previous proceedings which are said to be vexatious. Ordinarily, the vexatious nature should be apparent from reading the reasoned judgment and orders made in those proceedings (see AG v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 at p. 863 D to F; AG v Kay [2000] VSCA 176 at Para. 1; AG v Lawal [2004] EWHC 816 (Admin); AG v Pepin [2004] EWHC 1246 (Admin)). Section 27 application is not an occasion for a defendant to re-open holdings against him or her in the previous proceedings. Hence, unless there are special reasons for reference being made to pleadings or other documents filed in the previous proceedings, the fact that such proceedings had been struck out by the court is good evidence of the vexatious nature of those proceedings.

54. .... a RPO and RAO may generate arguments as to whether a new action is within the scope of such order with consequential proceedings and appeals relating thereto (see AG v Price [1997] EWHC Admin 296 at Para. 50)...”

22.As mentioned by J Lam J in Ma Kwai Chun, ordinarily the vexatious nature of previous proceedings should be apparent from reading the reasoned judgments and orders made in those proceedings, and it is not necessary to refer to the pleadings or other documents filed in the previous proceedings.  Further, the fact that such proceedings were struck out by the court is good evidence of the vexatious nature of those proceedings.

23.I have been referred to numerous reasoned judgments and orders given or made by the courts when striking out or dismissing previous proceedings instituted by Madam See.  The vexatious nature of those proceedings is apparent from reading those reasoned judgments and orders.  For the present purpose, I need only quote from or refer to the following reasoned judgments:-

(1)   See Wah Fan v Tam Kam Yuk and 2 Others, DCCJ 1608/2012 (31 October 2012), H H Judge Leung:-

“20. 另外，法庭剔除施女士的申索，理由是沒有合理的訴訟因由。根據法院規則第18號命令第19(2) 條規則，以此為理由要求剔除申索的申請，其實不得提交證據。雖然法庭最終的確以此理由剔除申索，但不代表聆訊中法庭沒有理會雙方各自就誓章方面的陳述。因此，施女士現在借本申請，重提法庭應如何考慮那些誓章，並不恰當。如不滿法庭該判決，只有上訴。”

21  施女士在誓章中，指李先生協助袁先生，在DCCJ 3865/2010案中作虛假陳述，以及不當處理在該案披露的證據。同樣地，DCCJ 3865/2010案中任何證據和說法，已經由主審法官考慮。如不滿該判決，只有上訴。但如上所述，該案的上訴程序也已告一段落。現在施女士借在本案針對李先生的申請，要求由本法庭再考慮該案的證據，極不恰當。

26  更重要的，是該案的主審法官，經考慮後接納了袁先生一方的證據，裁定袁先生是譚女士的單位的佔用人，並具訴訟權。該事實方面的裁斷，其後也被上訴法庭確定。如上所述，施女士現在借本申請，要求本法庭重新考慮該案的證據，極為不當。

28  無論如何，有關調解方面的命令，屬案件管理指示聆訊中作出的命令。如上所述，違反案件管理指示或命令，並不構成與訟方有理據，去提出因藐視法庭而應交付羈押的程序。與訟方於調解方面的態度和處理手法，是法庭在決定訟費命令時考慮因素之一。DCCJ 3865/2012案主審法官經考慮後作出了訟費命令，命令沒有因上訴被推翻。因此，施女士借本案及本申請，試圖重提這論點，也是不恰當的。

29  這也帶到最後一點：從本案申索陳述書針對各被告人的索償項目，可見施女士的意圖，是重申自己在DCCJ 3865/2010的反申索，以及推翻法庭於該案因裁定她敗訴而作的訟費命令。展開如此另類訴訟，意圖撓過原審和上訴判決，去推翻該案的命令，實屬濫用法律程序。”

(2)   See Wah Fan v Lee Po Wing and 2 Others, DCMP 2966/2012 (11 July 2013), Deputy District Judge Chan:-

“23.本席同意李律師的陳詞指DCCJ 1608/2012及DCCJ 3865/2010的案件相關的誓章已經經歷兩至三個法官去處理，並且經過他們考慮，因此本席認為再在這裏提出指他們的誓章、狀書、證人陳述書等包括虛假陳述，實在是濫用司法程序，此外本席亦同意李律師所指在未獲得許可之前，原告人不能根據區域法院第41A號命令第9條規則提出訴訟，本席不接納原告人方的對規例的詮釋，本席接納規例內指明即管是律政司也需要在提訴之前先獲得法庭許可。本席亦看不出有什麼理據行使酌情權矯正此程序上的不當。此外，其他針對其他被告人的申索也沒有提出訴因支持。 基於這些理據本席認為原告人的申索陳述書應該被剔除。何聆案官的命令不應被干預。”

(3)   See Wah Fan v Lee Po Wing and 2 Others, DCMP 2966/2012 (17 September 2013), Deputy District Judge Chan:-

“7. 施女士在本案要求的濟助事實上與DCCJ 1608/2012所要求的濟助相近，而根據的事實亦大概相同，都是源於DCCJ 3865/2010案及LDBM 4/2002案衍生的，她在DCCJ 1608/2012指控3名被告人就上述兩件案件作出不實的證據，特別是李律師，現時她又再在本案指他們在上述兩案及DCCJ 1608/2012中作出虛假聲明。事實上，LDBM 4/2002已經在十年前審結，施女士敗訴，她的各項上訴都被駁回(CACV 152/2003)。該案的原告人提出申請執行程序，成功獲得法庭頒發針對施女士的賣樓令。DCCJ 3865/2010經審訊後由許家灝暫委法官作出裁決，她不服提出上訴 (CACV 202/2012)，上訴被駁回。而DCCJ 1608/2012本身亦曾被法庭審理，梁法官撤銷她的交付覊押申請，黃禮榮聆案官接納李律師的申請，剔除針對他的申索，又主動剔除針對其他兩名被告人的申索，施女士沒有提出上訴，，案件已經了結。

8. 本席認為，如果有人在法律程序中作出虛假陳述，另一方必然會或應該在相關案件的審理過程中提出並處理，如果她認為法庭未有作出適當的裁決，她應提出上訴，施女士不應堅持一再入稟以新案處理。

10. ... 施女士在她的申索陳述書中指李律師教唆練國彬及練國彬作出虛假陳述(申索陳述書第45至59段)，情況正如本席在前面第7-8段的分析一樣，她已經在法庭審理相關申請時，提出了她的論點及證據(見申索陳述書第47段) ，不應再用新案申索，特別是第64段的濟助 。此外，本席決定剔除針對練國彬的申索的主要原因是施女士沒有在申索陳述書提出訴因支持她所要求的濟助，(見2013年7月11日判決書第19-22段)。”

(4)   See Wah Fan v Yuen Wai Noong, DCMP 783/2013 (2 May 2015), Deputy District Judge Yip:-

“17. 本席亦認為本案並非特殊情況，致使法庭行使酌情權去不引用「已判事情」的法律原則。是次的申請無疑是試圖將之前案件的一些問題去翻案，本席認為根據「已判事情」的法律原則，施女士不得在本案再提出有關的申請。”

(5)   See Wah Fan v Tam Kam Yuk, CACV 108/2015 (3 June 2016), Kwan JA:-

“12. 就DCCJ 3865/2010對施女士頒下的禁制令，禁止她妨礙或干擾譚女士的住客袁先生往返其處所，她雖然被上訴法庭在HCMP 202/2012駁回申請許可上訴，但仍然透過各種途徑，以間接的方式去挑戰這禁制令 (collateral challenge) 。

17. 施女士的陳詞和上訴提出的理據，是言不及義。她不能藉著訟費評定的程序，事後提出新的索償。倘若與訟人以為某一訴訟的訟費評定有錯誤，就應該在該訴訟的訟費評定程序，按照《高等法院規則》第62號命令指定的期限內，先向訟費評定官，然後向原訟法庭法官，提出覆核申請。她亦不能藉著區域法院在DCCJ 3865/2010頒布的禁制令是永久的禁制令，在申請上訴許可被拒後，就以「命令可持續性」為由，提出新的訴訟，指控譚女士與他人串謀，取得禁制令導致損害她應享有寧靜的物業權益，或是指控譚女士改變公共地方的設計，應承擔一些人身意外賠償。這無疑是間接挑戰和否定，區域法院和上訴法庭就禁制令的判決。

19. 本庭認為本案屬於例外和特定的情況。本案的申索，顯然是違反了Henderson v Henderson和訴訟終極性的原則。本訴訟亦間接挑戰區域法院和上訴法庭就禁制令的判決，明顯是濫用法律程序。本庭須顧及法庭資源，要公平分配。施女士多年來無間歇的訴訟，佔用了不少的法庭資源。單就本上訴而言，上訴法庭調動了三名法官，審閱超過700 頁的文件，所需的時間可想而知，這絕非公平善用法庭資源。”

(6)   See Wah Fan v Yuen Wai Noong, HCMP 2596/2016 (25 November 2016), Chu JA:-

“16. 原告人提出的論點似乎是針對DCCJ3865/2010案中的判決，而原告人擬提的上訴是關乎DCMP783/2013案中原審法官的訟費命令是否正確，然而兩者沒有可見的關係。更何況DCCJ3865/2010案已審結，原告人不能藉其他訴訟程序改變判決結果，或重啟已判決的爭議。”

(7)   See also:-

(a)   See Wah Fan v Lin Kwok Pun and 2 Others, HCMP 898/2013 (24 March 2014), Master Lo, at paragraphs 7 and 11.

(b)   See Wah Fan v Tam Kam Yuk, HCA 1528/2013 (24 March 2014), Master Lo, at paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

24.It is clear from the previous judgments given by various courts that:-

(1)   Madam See repeatedly sought to re-litigate issues which had already been finally determined by the courts; and

(2)   her claims and applications against various parties were so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.

25.Taking into account also the frequency with which Madam See has instituted legal proceedings against the same parties and the large number of such legal proceedings over the past 18 years or so, I consider it to be clear that Madam See has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings within the meaning of Section 27(2) of the Ordinance.

26.Madam See has raised a number of grounds in opposition to Mr Lee’s application against her.  First, she complains of Mr Lee’s delay in prosecuting the application.  I have already dealt with this complaint above.

27.Second, Madam See says that it is she who has been much “vexed” by various applications made by Mr Lee in the past.  The issue before me, however, is not whether she has been vexed by Mr Lee’s applications, but whether she has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings.

28.Third, Madam See says that the court should not “divide up” issues in legal proceedings.  As I understand it, what she is complaining about is that the court should deal with different issues in one set of legal proceedings, including disciplinary issues, contempt of court, as well as the underlying cause(s) of action.  I would merely observe that the court’s practice and procedure, including the manner in which its jurisdictions are to be exercised, are well defined.  Madam See’s complaint cannot be any justification for her habitual and persistent institution of vexatious legal proceedings without any reasonable ground.

29.In all, I consider that an order under Section 27(1) of the Ordinance is fully justified on the facts of the present case. 

DISPOSITION

30.I make an order that:-

(1)   no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by Madam See; and

(2)   any legal proceedings instituted by Madam See in any court before the making of the order herein shall not be continued by her without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

31.Having regard to the requirement of proportionality, the order above should cease to have effect at the end of 10 years from the date of the order, and the restriction is confined to legal proceedings by Madam See against the following parties only, namely:-

(1)   Tam Kam Yuk;

(2)   Yuen Wai Noong;

(3)   Lin Kwok Pun;

(4)   Leung Shi Wing;

(5)   Wat Koon Ying;

(6)   Paul Kwong & Co; and

(7)   Lee Po Wing.

32.In addition, I give the following directions:-

(1)   any application by Madam See for leave to institute or continue legal proceedings against any or all of the parties mentioned above shall be dealt with on paper and no hearing is required, unless the judge dealing with the application directs otherwise;

(2)   such application shall be supported by an affidavit accompanied by a skeleton submission of no longer than 6 pages in length;

(3)   no more than 1 application may be made by Madam See within any period of 3 months; and

(4)   a copy of the order herein shall be sent to the High Court Registry, the District Court Registry and the Lands Tribunal Registry.

33.I also dismiss Madam See’s summons dated 20 January 2017.

COSTS

34.Madam See shall pay Mr Lee his costs of the present action, as well as his costs of resisting her summons dated 20 January 2017.

35.Mr Lee seeks summary assessment of his costs and has produced a costs statement in which he claims the following items of costs:-

(1)   photocopying costs of HK$6,600; and

(2)   40 hours for preparing his affirmation filed on 10 February 2017, ½ hour for perusal of documents, 1 hour for preparation of the hearing, and 3 hours for attending the hearing on 1 March 2017, at the rate of HK$4,000 per hour.

36.Mr Lee’s affirmation, of 34 pages long, contains, essentially, a list of the unsuccessful legal proceedings previously instituted by Madam See. There is also a single exhibit to the affirmation consisting of a bundle, without any index, of 1,017 pages of previous court documents.  If it is decided to include a number of documents in one exhibit, a proper index of the documents should be prepared.  I pause to observe that the same bundle of 1,017 pages of documents was reproduced as part of the hearing bundles (in 3 volumes), also without any index.  As mentioned in the course of the hearing, I consider the preparation of the hearing bundles in this manner to be entirely unsatisfactory.

37.In view of the fact, as I understand it to be the case, that Mr Lee was involved in most if not all of the previous legal proceedings brought by Madam See, I consider the time spent by him in preparing the affirmation to be excessive.  I would allow 16 hours of work for preparation of the affirmation.  I therefore summarily assess Mr Lee’s costs at HK$88,600 (HK$6,600 + HK$4,000 per hour x 20.5 hours).

The plaintiff acting in person

The defendant acting in person