HKSAR v. Ara Kismot
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 52/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 8 July 2020.
1. There were originally two defendants in this case, both female. The appellant was the second defendant. She was charged with one charge of Taking up employment while being a person in respect of whom a removal order was in force [1] . She pleaded not guilty and was convicted after trial [2] . She appealed against her conviction.
Cites 2 cases
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HCMA 52/2020 [2020] HKCFI 1558 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 52 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM FLCC 1841 OF 2019) _______________
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___________________________________ R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T ___________________________________ 1.There were originally two defendants in this case, both female. The appellant was the second defendant. She was charged with one charge of Taking up employment while being a person in respect of whom a removal order was in force[1]. She pleaded not guilty and was convicted after trial[2]. She appealed against her conviction. 2.At the appeal hearing, after having heard submission from both parties, I dismissed the appeal. I now provide the reasons for my decision. PROSECUTION CASE 3.Evidence against the appellant came mainly from a police officer, whom the Magistrate called Constable Yeung[3]. He and some other officers were performing duty in plainclothes. He said he saw the appellant and the other defendant working inside the kitchen of a restaurant. 4.It was admitted that a removal order had been issued against the appellant on 5 September 2017 and was still in force on the date of the incident. It was also admitted that she had been released upon a Form 8 recognizance on 21 September 2017. It was further admitted that being a person in respect of whom a removal order was in force, the appellant was not permitted to take employment here, whether paid or unpaid. 5.The evidence of Constable Yeung may be summarized as follows.[4] 6.Through a display window of the barbecued meat stall of the restaurant, he was able to see the restaurant kitchen as its door was open. He said he saw the appellant and the other defendant (“the two women”) at the dish washing area of the kitchen. The appellant was washing dishes and the other defendant was tidying and conveying dishes. The observation lasted about five minutes. 7.He then went into the kitchen with another officer, Constable Lam[5], both in plain clothes. There were cooks in the kitchen. Seeing them, the two women both took off their aprons, gloves and boots. Upon request, both produced their Form 8 recognizance documents. 8.Before entering the kitchen, only Constable Yeung was able to see what the two women were doing inside. DEFENCE CASE 9.At the trial, the appellant elected to give evidence. Her testimony may be summarized as follows.[6] 10.She knew, as an asylum seeker, she was not allowed to take employment in Hong Kong. On the day of the incident, she received a phone call from a friend, Parven Jahanara (“PJ”), who asked her to come over as she needed her help. She then went to Tai Po and met PJ who took her to the restaurant and told her to wait for her as she had to go to obtain some documents from the High Court. She needed the documents for the following day as otherwise the Immigration would detain her. She asked her to wait because if the manager knew she was absent she would be in trouble. PJ left at about 5 pm. The police appeared at 8:23 pm. During this time, she called PJ three times, each time PJ told her more time was required for her to get the court paper. 11.The other defendant, Laila, came to the kitchen between 6 and 6:30 pm. They ate mangoes and played with their mobile phones. 12.During the five minutes before the arrival of the police, which was the time Constable Yeung said he was observing them, she was washing her hands after finished eating mangoes. She did not wear any apron, gloves or boots. 13.There were cooks in the kitchen. It was the first time she ever went to the restaurant. She did not know its owner and employees. FINDINGS OF THE MAGISTRATE 14.There was no dispute that the appellant was present in the restaurant. The Magistrate did not believe what the appellant said about why she was there[7]. On the other hand, noting that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was not perfect[8], he found all of the four prosecution witnesses honest and gave full weight to the evidence of Constable Yeung save for some minor areas.[9] 15.The Magistrate said he was sure that:
16.The Magistrate found that washing dishes was a crucial part in the operation of running a restaurant and kitchen was a place of employment. He found what the appellant did could never be something done for her own benefit. In his judgment, it was impossible that the management of the restaurant would allow a complete stranger to occupy the dish washing area and that the presence of the appellant must have been approved and required by the management of the restaurant. He found what the appellant did must have been under the control of the management.[11] 17.The Magistrate found that the appellant was at the material time employed as a cleaning worker by the management of the restaurant to wash dishes and she did so knowing that a removal order had been issued against her and that she was not permitted to take employment.[12] 18.The Magistrate found the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt every element of the offence and accordingly convicted the appellant.[13] GROUNDS OF APPEAL 19.The appellant appeared in person. She attached a document to her notice of appeal in which she set out some points. In gist, she repeated the main points she said at the trial, stressing that she had never worked in the restaurant and that the conviction was unfair. 20.At the hearing, she again stressed she had never worked there and said she did not understand why she was convicted. She pointed out Laila, the other defendant in this case, had been working in this restaurant for some time together with PJ. She also pointed out some areas of the evidence and made submission that these areas indicated either the prosecution witnesses were lying or in any case their testimony was not truthful and reliable. She also pointed out that there was sufficient space at where she was standing and her presence would not have affected movement of other people in the kitchen. She also identified in the photograph the refrigerator in the kitchen and said that people took food out from the refrigerator from time to time. She highlighted that as the two officers were in plain clothes and things happened so fast that they could not have reacted as alleged and there would not have been opportunities for them to take off gloves, apron and boots as alleged. DISCUSSION 21.This is a simple case. Prosecution called witnesses to tell what they saw and did. The appellant testified and gave an innocent explanation for her presence. The duty of the Magistrate was first to assess the credibility of the witnesses and then decide whether the prosecution evidence is true and reliable. Eventually if he accepted the prosecution evidence he had to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to make him sure that all elements of the offence were proved. During the course, if he found the innocent account of the appellant was true or might be true he must acquit her. 22.The Magistrate demonstrated that he had carried out the credibility assessment meticulously. 23.The Magistrate noted the following matters:
24.It was obvious that the Magistrate accepted the explanation of the witness. He had also considered the challenge by the defence against Constables Yeung and Lam which included the followings and reminded himself that “law enforcement officers might have the motive to tell lies for the purpose of finishing their tasks”[17]:
25.As regards the testimony of the appellant, the Magistrate took into account, and appropriately, matters including the followings:
26.In my judgment, the assessment of the Magistrate in respect of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the appellant was reasonable, sound and adequate. 27.In R v Kwong Wing On and Another[26], Stock J (as Stock NPJ then was) said:
28.Assuming what the appellant highlighted during the appeal hearing was evidence and had been canvassed at the trial, the Magistrate was aware of the evidence and was in the best position to judge and assess it. The appellant failed to advance sufficient reasons to persuade me that the assessment of credibility of witnesses by the Magistrate was flaw and therefore should be intervened. 29.I did not enjoy the advantage of having received the evidence at first hand[28]. I did not find the Magistrate had failed to perform his duty properly. As said, there was no reason to intervene his assessment on credibility of witnesses. There was no error in his treatment of the evidence. No material error of the Magistrate had been identified. The evidence of Constable Yeung which the Magistrate found credible was sufficient and sound basis for the Magistrate to draw the inference he did. I was satisfied that the conviction was safe and satisfactory. It was supported by an abundance of evidence. 30.I therefore dismissed the appeal.
Miss Ho May Yu, Lily, SPP of Department of Justice, for the respondent The appellant appeared in person [1] Contrary to sections 38AA(1)(b) and 38AA(2) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, Laws of Hong Kong. [2] The trial magistrate was Mr Chan Ping Chau, Kenneth. [3] PW1. [4] Paragraphs 19 ‑ 31of the Statement of Findings, pages 22 ‑ 26 of the Appeal Bundle. [5] PW2. [6] Paragraphs 44 ‑ 59 of the Statement of Findings, pages 31 ‑ 35 of the Appeal Bundle. [7] Paragraph 67 of the Statement of Findings, pages 39 and 40 of the Appeal Bundle. [8] Paragraph 80 of the Statement of Findings, page 45 of the Appeal Bundle. [9] Paragraphs 82 and 85 of the Statement of Findings, pages 46 and 47 of the Appeal Bundle. [10] Paragraph 86 of the Statement of Findings, pages 47 and 48 of the Appeal Bundle. [11] Paragraph 91 of the Statement of Findings, pages 49 and 50 of the Appeal Bundle. [12] Paragraphs 93 ‑ 98 of the Statement of Findings, pages 50 ‑ 52 of the Appeal Bundle. [13] Paragraphs 99 and 100 of the Statement of Findings, page 52 of the Appeal Bundle. [14] Paragraph 26 of the Statement of Findings, page 24 of the Appeal Bundle. [15] Paragraph 30 of the Statement of Findings, page 26 of the Appeal Bundle. [16] Paragraph 31 of the Statement of Findings, page 26 of the Appeal Bundle. [17] Paragraph 76 of the Statement of Findings, page 43 of the Appeal Bundle. [18] Paragraph 71 of the Statement of Findings, page 41 of the Appeal Bundle. [19] Paragraph 72 of the Statement of Findings, pages 41 & 42 of the Appeal Bundle. [20] Paragraphs 73 & 74 of the Statement of Findings, pages 42 & 43 in the Appeal Bundle. [21] Paragraphs 77 ‑ 82 & 85 of the Statement of Findings, pages 44 ‑ 47 in the Appeal Bundle. [22] Paragraph 61 of the Statement of Findings, page 36 in the Appeal Bundle. [23] Paragraph 62 of the Statement of Findings, page 36 in the Appeal Bundle. [24] Paragraph 62 of the Statement of Findings, pages 36 & 37 in the Appeal Bundle. [25] Paragraphs 63 ‑ 67 of the Statement of Findings, pages 37 ‑ 40 in the Appeal Bundle. [26] HCMA 574/1996. [27] Paragraph 12 in the judgment. [28] An advantage accepted by the Court of Final Appeal in Chou Shih Bin v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 70. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment