香港特別行政區 訴 陳樂怡及另二人

DCCC 221/2020

[2021] HKDC 1607

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2020年第221號

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裁決理由書

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1.本案涉及三名被告人及三項控罪，即：—

(1)  三名被告共同被控一項暴動罪，違反香港法例第245章《公安條例》第19(1)及(2)條（控罪一）；

(2)  第二被告被控一項在公眾地方管有攻擊性武器，違反香港法例第245章《公安條例》第33(1)及(2)條（控罪二）；

(3)  第二被告被控一項故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員，違反香港法例第212章《侵害人身罪條例》第36(b)條（控罪三）。

論點

2.控方指三名被告人於2019年9月22日在香港新界沙田源禾路好運中心外，連同其他身分不詳的人士，參與暴動。另控方指第二被告當時攜有攻擊性武器，即一個鐵錘，一把鉗子及一把螺絲批。控方亦指當第一被告正被制服時，第二被告突然從路旁花圃內的草叢跳出，試圖拉走第一被告，故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。

3.控方的案情是三名被告事發前於新城市廣場外的空地與其他示威者聚集，之後陸續步往源禾路作堵路、縱火及暴動。在第一及第二被告的審前覆核問卷，他們承認事發時，於源禾路近担杆莆街被截停及拘捕，但對傳媒於新城市廣場外所攝片段內的一對男女（控方指為首兩名被告）的身分有爭議。另外亦提出下述論點：—

(1)  當時於源禾道發生的事情是否構成暴動；

(2)  如有暴動，第一及第二被告有否參與暴動；

(3)  於第二被告身上檢取的鐵錘、鉗子及螺絲批是否攻擊性武器；

(4)  如該些物品是攻擊性武器，第二被告有否合理辯解藏有該些武器；

(5)  第二被告有否阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。

4.證供完結後，第一及第二被告同意案發當日於源禾路發生暴動。根據大律師的結案陳詞，就控罪二，唯一的爭議是涉案錘子、鉗子和螺絲批是否法例訂明的攻擊性武器。換句話說，就第一及第二被告，論點為：—

(1)  新聞片段所攝，於新城市廣場外的一對男女是否第一及第二被告；

(2)  第一及第二被告有否參與暴動；

(3)  第二被告管有的錘子、鉗子及螺絲批是否攻擊性武器；

(4)  第二被告有否阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員。

5.第三被告亦不爭議當日在源禾路發生暴動。他亦同意他當日的部份行為被新聞片段攝錄（包括與示威者一同將小巴站頭的站牌移往源禾路中心）。唯一的爭議是他的行為是否構成參與暴動。

各方承認的事實

6.控方及各被告人根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第65C條的規定，承認以下事實：—

A. 截停各被告人

於2019年9月22日約下午5時45分，警方在沙田源禾路近担杆莆街交界處截停第一、第二及第三被告。

B. 警方從互聯網上取得的片段

(2)  警方透過互聯網取得下述的新聞片段：—

(i)  一段香港電台（RTHK）的新聞片段

{片名：錄制RTHK - [各區最新情況] 現場直播_2019_10_31_2335}

[控方證物P2A]；

(ii)  一段NOW TV的新聞片段

{片名：錄製NOW TV - 各區示威現場_2019_10_31_2351}

[控方證物P2B]；

(iii)  一段蘋果日報（Apple Daily）的新聞片段

{片名：錄製Apple Daily - 沙田新城市廣場及連城廣場「和你shop」_2019_11_01_0039}

[控方證物P2C]；

(iv)  一段有線寛頻（i-CABLE）的新聞片段

{片名：錄製有線寛頻i-CABLE - 沙田有人堵路縱火防暴警驅散（現埸）}

[控方證物P2D]；

(v)  一段立埸新聞（Stand News）的新聞片段

{片名：錄製Stand News立場新聞 - [沙田現場.直播1]_2019_11_01_0004}；

[控方證物P2E]；及

(vi)  一段南華早報（SCMP）的新聞片段

{片名：SCMP - live riot police}。

[控方證物P2F]；

(3)  警方其後把該些片段下載，完整地燒錄入並儲存在一個外置電腦硬盤。該硬盤呈為 [控方證物P2]。該些片段呈為 [控方證物P2A，P2B，P2C，P2D，P2E及P2F]。

C. 各被告人的個人物品

(4)  第一被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證物：—

一個藍、白色口罩 [控方證物P3]；

一副藍、黑色泳鏡 [控方證物P4]；

一個黑色腰包 [控方證物P5]；

一個藍色背囊（印有MINIgo）[控方證物P6]；

一個白色頭盔（印有DELTAPLUS）[控方證物P7]；

一頂啡色鴨舌帽 [控方證物P8]；

一件白色短袖T-恤 [控方證物P9]；

一對灰、粉紅色濾罐 [控方證物P10]；

一個灰色面具（印有3M）[控方證物P11]；

一副黑、藍色護目鏡（印有3M）[控方證物P12]；

一對灰、紅色手套 [控方證物P13]及

一對黑、藍色手袖 [控方證物P14]。

(5)  第二被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證物：—

一把藍色手柄錘仔連一個黃色標籤 [控方證物P15]；

一把紅色鉗子 [控方證物P16]；

一把綠色螺絲批 [控方證物P17]；

一個白色頭盔（印有DELTAPLUS）連頭帶 [控方證物P18]；

一個灰色面具（印有3M）連兩個灰、粉紅色濾罐 [控方證物P19]；

一個藍色樽，內有白色固體（印有POCARI SWEAT）[控方證物P20]；

一頂啡色鴨舌帽（印有Carhartt）[控方證物P21]；

兩支“Pattex”牌膠水 [控方證物P22]；

一個藍色口罩連膠袋（印有Prozone）[控方證物P23]；

一個藍、紅色的肩背袋（印有DOUGHNUT）[控方證物P24]；

一副藍色泳鏡（印有GOMA）連一個盒 [控方證物P25]；

一對黑、灰色手袖 [控方證物P26]；

一對灰色手套 [控方證物P27]；

一條藍色頸巾 [控方證物P28]；

一條灰色毛巾（印有AVENGERS） [控方證物P29]；

一件藍色T-恤 [控方證物P30]；

一個黑色腰包 [控方證物P31]；

一個灰色背囊 [控方證物P32]；

一個黑色電筒 [控方證物P33]及

一隻灰、粉紅色防火手套（連一個“IKEA”膠袋 [控方證物P34]。

(6)  第三被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品列為下述證物：—

一條黑、白色頸巾 [控方證物P35]；

一件黑、紅、白色T-恤（印有“Just do it”）[控方證物P36]；

一件綠色背心 [控方證物P37]；

一條灰色運動褲（印有“Nike”）[控方證物P38]及

一個“Adidas”牌子黑色背囊 [控方證物P39]。

除該些物品外，第三被告同時亦攜帶著包括下述物品：—

一部金色“蘋果”流動電話連手機殼；

一張SIM咭S/N B78985200012770571054;

一個保溫水杯；

一罐健身奶粉；

一條綠、白色毛巾；

兩條拉背帶；

一對無線耳機；

一支洗面液；

一支止汗劑；

一支沐浴露；

一包紙巾；

兩個印有「蜘蛛俠」的玩具；

一張單據；

一張信用咭單據；

一條皮帶；

一張第三被告的身份証及

一張第三被告的職員証。

D. 照片

(7)  警方於2019年9月22日晚上在沙田源禾路與橫壆街交界處一帶拍攝了合共5幅的晚間照片，呈為 [控方證物P40(1)-(5)]（即相簿1/8）。

(8)  警方再於近沙田中心的源禾路一帶拍攝了合共5 幅的日間照片，呈為 [控方證物P41(1)-(5)]（即相簿2/8）。

(9)  警方就第一被告人被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物拍攝了合共2幅照片，呈為 [控方證物P42(1)-(2)]（即相簿3/8）。

(10)  警方就第一被告人被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝了合共15幅照片，呈為 [控方證物P43(1)-(15)]（即相簿4/8）。

(11)  警方就第二被告被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物拍攝了合共3幅照片，呈堂為 [控方證物P44(1)-(3)]（即相簿5/8）。

(12)  警方就第二被告被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝了合共28幅照片，呈為 [控方證物P45(1)-(28)]（即相簿6/8）。

(13)  警方就第三被告被警方截停時身穿的部份衣物拍攝了合共2幅照片，呈為 [控方證物P46(1)-(2)]（即相簿7/8）。

(14)  警方就第三被告被警方截停時攜帶的物品拍攝了合共10幅照片，呈為 [控方證物P47(1)-(10)]（即相簿8/8）。

E. 地圖

(15)  控方呈遞一張地圖 [控方證物P48]，顯示沙田源禾路與橫壆街交界處一帶的情況（非比例地圖）。該證物以及當中以文字標註的街道和建築物均大致上準確地反映2019年9月22日該地區一帶的情況。

F. 其他

(16)  本案所有由警方封存或檢取的證物自被封存或檢取後直至法庭呈堂前，一直被妥善保存，沒有受到任何不當或非法干擾。

(17)  所有呈堂的照片，都如實反映相關的底片或數碼檔案。本案所有照片在法庭呈堂前均獲妥善保存和處理，沒有受到任何不當或非法干擾。照片冊的目錄準確地描述了相關照片所顯示的事物。

(18)  所有呈堂的片段，當中的影像和音頻都如實反映了相關時間所拍攝和收錄得到的情況。

(19)  本案所有用以拍攝照片和拍攝片段的儀器，在所有關鍵時間都運作正常。

(20)  本案所有用以從互聯網上取得的電腦和儀器，在所有關鍵時間都運作正常。

(21)  本案所有用以把片段和照片燒錄為光碟的電腦和儀器，在所有關鍵時間都運作正常。

G. 刑事定罪紀錄

(22)  三名被告人在香港均沒有刑事定罪紀錄。

控方的證供

7.控方共傳召3名證人；其餘兩名證人的證供不受爭議，其證人供詞亦根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第65B條的規定納為證供。

8.總督察58483是控方第一證人（PW1）。當日他於下午1時開始，穿著防暴級別的軍裝當值，於沙田體育館對開候命。該體育館位於沙田源禾路及鄉事會道交界。同日下午約5時40分，PW1經對講機接獲消息，有人在源禾路近好運中心堵路及縱火。他與隊員遵從命令，上前到源禾路進行驅散、掃蕩及拘捕。PW1目睹源禾路好運中心外的馬路上有用大量不同物品堆切而成的路障，完全堵塞該道路的三條行車綫；部分的物品更正在燃燒。該些路障引致源禾路上的交通完全癱瘓。

9.一群超過100人的示威者正站在近担杆莆街的路障後面。該群示威者大部份均穿著黑衣黑褲，以粗言穢語及「死黑警」等字詞辱罵警方。PW1留意到站在最前的一排示威者中有一男一女。上述男子穿著黑色T-恤、黑色褲，雙臂穿著防曬手袖，面上戴著泳鏡，背上孭著灰色背囊。該男子身旁的女子穿著黑色T-恤、黑色長褲，面上戴著護目鏡或泳鏡，雙臂穿著手袖，背上孭著藍色背囊。

10.基於以上情景，PW1認為該群示威者已干犯非法集結，決定作出驅散和拘捕。因此他大叫：「警察，唔好走！」PW1隨即衝向示威者。這時，示威者立即轉身逃跑，而PW1則尾隨追截。後來，PW1於源禾路及担杆莆街交界的花圃旁成功追上上述女子。各方沒有爭議該名女子是第一被告。PW1用手搭著第一被告的肩膊；第一被告失了平衡，伏在花圃上，不停大叫大喊。於是PW1便按著她，將她制服。接著，警員11723及女警23439上前協助。PW1向兩名同僚交代拘捕原因後，便打算將第一被告交由該兩名同僚處理。突然，之前站在該女子身旁的男子從花圃的草叢跳出來。沒有爭議，該名男子是第二被告。第二被告伸手拖著女子，嘗試將她帶走。於是PW1立即上前。第二被告轉身逃走，PW1追截，從後捉著第二被告的肩膊。第二被告失了平衡，跌在地上，被一同跌倒的PW1壓在地上。第二被告不停掙扎及大叫。警方最終將第二被告制服，期間曾使用胡椒噴霧。後來警員11723及警員17113前來協助。期後PW1的同僚向第一及第二被告宣布拘捕。

11.之後，控方於PW1作供期間播放各方同意的新聞片段，顯示警方行動前的情況。從P2A可見，案發當日下午約5時30分，有大批人士聚集於沙田新城市廣場外的行人專用區。該批人士大部份穿著黑色上衣，黑色褲，用面罩或圍巾遮蓋口鼻。其中一些人士戴上泳鏡或護目鏡、手袖、手套及推著可伸縮的黑色鐵閘。該批人士在行人專用區聚集後，一同朝著担杆莆街的方向步行往源禾路。沿途，其中一些人士推著大型黑色伸縮鐵閘，亦有人推著大型垃圾筒及拿著屏風。到達源禾路後，該批人士於馬路上架設路障，以作堵路。他們打開伸縮鐵閘，用膠索帶將鐵閘連結，造成長長的鐵閘，分別放於三段的馬路上，形成三排路障。該些路障橫跨源禾路的三條行車線，令交通完全癱瘓。該批人士續而將不同的雜物放置於鐵閘上，包括不同的大型垃圾筒、屏風、沙包、小巴站頭的站牌及大型的枯葉等。有人在馬路上淋上擬似食油的液體，亦有人在中間的一排路障上淋上不明液體。隨即，有人將中間的一排路障上的雜物燃點，引起大火，冒出濃煙。不久後，警方便到場展開行動。片段亦顯示第一及第二被告被截獲及制服的過程。

12.PW1指從P2A可見，在新城市廣場外聚集的人士包括一男一女；該對男女的特徵與第一及第二被告完全脗合。控方指該對男女便是首兩名被告。辯方否認該指控。除此之外，第一及第二被告對PW1的大部份證供沒有爭議。辯方大律師只向PW1指出，第二被告從草叢跳出後從沒嘗試拉走第一被告，第二被告亦從沒掙扎或嘗試逃走。PW1否認該説法。

13.控方第二證人，警員11723（PW2）的證供不受爭議。控辯各方根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第65B條同意將PW2的書面供詞呈為控方第49號證物。除了PW2的個人資料，他的證供如下：—

「於2019年9月22日，當值…特別更份…負責對新界南總區內特發事故作出即時快速應變。

於同日1740時，本隊於沙田源禾路體育館外在車上候命，其後從通訊機得知源禾路好運中心外有示威者堵路及縱火，於是本隊奉新界南衝鋒隊警司命立即落車上前作出驅散或拘捕，當時距離事發位置約100 米，本人已見到前方有人群、雜物、火勢及黑煙，相信前方人群正在參與非法集結，本人緊隨高級督察林佩武向好運中心方向跑，而本隊其他人員在本人後方尾隨，跑至好運中心外，現場環境非常嘈吵混亂，聽到大量「屌你老母、死黑警、死全家」 等等辱罵的言語，好運中心橫跨源禾路之行人天橋上，亦有示威者向我方掟雜物，而前方有大量雜物堆成之路障，並已起火焚燒，冒起大量黑煙、橫跨源和路三條行車線，路障後方約10米距離有約超過一百名穿黑衣，戴頭盔，口罩的示威者，當見到我方衝前後，大量示威者立即掉頭跑，本人越過兩重路障後，在源和路轉入担杆莆街近花槽位置，見到高級督察林佩武正制服一名不斷反抗的女子（後知為女子/陳樂怡，24歲，約1.6米高，長髮，當時身穿黑色短tee，黑色長褲，黑色鞋，戴口罩，護目鏡、後稱AP1），於是立即上前協助，其間本人感到前方有其他不是警方的人正干擾我方，林佩武高級督察上前處理，而女警員23439亦緊接到場接管AP1，本人再次跟上前協助林佩武高級督察，亦見到他正在制服一名不斷反抗的男子（後知為男子/周錦威，約1.7米高，23歲，短髮，當時身穿黑色短tee，黑色長褲，戴泳鏡，灰手套，後稱AP2），於是亦立即上前協助制服AP2，其間仍有示威者想向我方上前，於是林佩武高級督察再向示威者作出驅散，而AP2 則由緊隨到達之警員17113 接管，本隊其他人員亦相繼到達，本人繼續隨大隊往前作出驅散行動」。

14.2019年9月22日下午約5時40分，控方第三證人，女警23439（PW3）正與其他隊員於沙田體育館外候命。同日約5時46分，她與同僚接獲命令到源禾路進行掃蕩。沿途，PW3目睹源禾路，好運中心外的馬路上有路障，而且有物品正在燃燒。現場亦有超過100名，穿黑衣的示威者。大部分的示威者集結於路障後面。當PW3跑經路障時聽見有人以粗言穢語辱罵警方。跑至源禾路與担杆莆街交界的花圃時，PW3看見PW1正在制服一名黑衣女子；更有人大叫：「女警」。於是PW3便立即上前。她看見PW2正在協助PW1制服一名黑衣女子（即第一被告）。當時，第一被告不斷大叫，掙扎及反抗。於是PW3亦上前增援。PW3接手後，PW2便離開。後來，PW3向第一被告宣布拘捕。

15.雖然辯方大律師要求控方傳召PW3上庭作供，但對PW3的證供全無盤問。明顯地，她的證供不受爭議。

16.控辯各方亦根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第65B條的規定同意控方第四證人，警員17113的證供，呈為控方第50號證物。除了他及兩名被告的個人資料、無關痛癢的事實及已於承認事實列出的事項之外，他的供詞如下：—

「我係警員17113…

於2019年9月22日，我值勤於新界南衝鋒隊…於同日1345時由小隊指揮官SIP LAM K.P.作更前訓示，而…隊員有SGT53779，PCs 2087，22838，20169，19573，7957，於新界南警區區份執勤。

於同日1740時，本小隊於沙田源禾路沙田體育館外等候指示。

於同日1746時，本小隊由新界南衝鋒隊之大隊長SP CHAN K.F.指示前往源禾路往沙田市中心方向進行一個掃蕩行動，因為上址一帶有大約100人集結及開始焚燒物品。其後，由於本小隊前進路線之馬路被設置路障，於是我跟隨本隊成員於源禾路沙田體育館外下車向沙田市中心方向進行掃蕩。當我向沙田市中心推進時，我見到源禾路與鄉事會路交界之行人路及馬路都有人聚集，及不時聽到有人大叫「死黑警」，「時代革命」等口號，而且前方有大量身穿黑色衣服的人士向沙田市中心方向逃跑。其後，我跟隨本隊成員跑過源禾路好運中心外之行人天橋後，我見到上址3條行車線均有雜物堵塞及被縱火，而且不時有人向我前方有警察之位置投擲雜物。其後，當我跑到源禾路與担杆莆交界時，我見到本小隊人員正制服兩名人士（一名男子後稱AP2叫周錦威，CHAU Kam-wai…當時身穿黑色短袖衫，黑色長褲，左腳著深色波鞋（另一邊無著鞋），左右手均穿上深色手袖及手套，戴著藍色泳鏡及藍色面罩，背孭深灰色背囊，胸前孭著一個紅藍色斜孭袋，另一名女子，後稱AP1叫陳樂怡CHAN Lok-yi…而當時我與正處理AP1，2之人員相距約6米。當我上前準備協助制服AP2時，我辨認出正在制服AP2之人員為本小隊2 I/C LAM P.M.及PC11723，而且我見到AP2不斷掙扎反抗及大叫「我係周錦威」。於成功制服AP2後，我聽到SIP LAM P.M.講AP2是曾參與非法集結之人士後，於同日1751時我拘捕了AP2「非法集結罪，經警誡後，AP2頭向下望，無講任何野。由於現場我見到不時都有身穿口罩及黑色衣物之人士靠近，於是我用手扣（S/N No. 23510）將AP2雙手鎖於AP2 背後，因為我擔心AP2逃走或有人過來搶走AP2。當我與PC19811帶AP2離開上址返回源禾路沙田體育館外警車停泊位置期間，AP2不斷向附近的人士嗌「我叫周錦威」，及一堆相信為電話號碼的數字，而旁邊不時有身穿反光背心拎著相機的人士靠近問AP2姓名，電話…

於同日1838時，由我於接見室T04號房內向AP2執行Pol. 1123之程度一搜身，並由PC19811見證下進行。於同日1839時，我於AP2之深灰色背囊（後證物45）大格內搵到一把藍色手柄既鐵鎚（後知約33cm長，後稱證物27）；而於證物 45之前格內搵到一枝綠色間條手柄既一字螺絲批（後知約18cm長，後稱證物29）及一把紅色手柄既鉗（後知約29cm長，後稱證物28），隨即我向AP2作出拘捕，罪名為「藏有工具可作非法用途罪」，經警誡後，AP2講：「啲工具因為工程所需先袋响袋度。」於同日1843時，搜查完畢後，並無發現其他利器。」

17.2019年9月22日，控方第五證人警長52059（PW5）以軍裝當值。同日下午約5時30分，PW5正於沙田區候命。約下午5時46分，PW5從對講機知悉源禾路，好運中心外的馬路上發生非法集結及縱火。他接獲命令上前作掃蕩後便沿源禾路向好運中心前進。他目睹源禾路上有三排路障，中間的一排路障正在燃燒，而前方有約100名人士，大部分穿著黑色衣服；該批人士亦佔據馬路，有人大叫「黑警」。PW5繼續上前。當他走近最前的一排路障（近担杆莆街）時，示威者仍站在路障後面，面向警方，不但與其對峙，還向警方投擲雜物，例如水瓶及石頭等。於是PW5便急步向前衝，衝過最前一排的路障後（近担杆莆街），PW5看見第三被告。當時第三被告站在示威者的最前方，身旁有一名穿著黑衣黑褲的男子；該男子手持一支約一米長的金屬棒。警方到場後，第三被告仍面對警方，站著不動。PW5聽見同僚大叫：「go！go！go！」，於是他便衝上前作驅散，期間大叫：「即刻走開！你哋即刻走！」。這時才有示威者轉身逃走。因第三被告站在最前，最接近PW5，PW5便用手捉著第三被告近肩膊位置的衣物，大叫：「唔好走，停低！」。可是第三被告作出反抗，PW5作出口頭警告無果後，便用警棍敲打了第三被告的大腿一下。第三被告仍繼續反抗，用手推PW5。因此，PW5再作警告及再用警棍敲打第三被告的大腿。可是第三被告仍在掙扎，於是PW5警告後再用警棍敲打第三被告的大腿。這時第三被告終於停止掙扎，坐在地上。PW5將第三被告交予其他同僚後便衝前追截手持金屬棒的男子，但無果。

18.控方向PW5播放新聞片段，展示警方到場前所發生的事情。辯方不爭議片段顯示，示威者堵路前，第三被告於新城市廣場外的空地。當時第三被告穿著綠色T恤及黑長褲。後來示威者步向担杆莆街，有部份示威者推著可伸縮鐵欄。此時，第三被告也向著同一方向走，期間將頸上的頸箍拉起，遮蓋口和鼻。後來示威者於源禾路上以鐵欄、垃圾桶及屏風等築起三排路障。用伸縮鐵欄築起路障後，有數名示威者將路旁小巴站頭的站牌翻倒在地上，繼而合力將站牌搬向中間的一排路障。原本，第三被告只與另一名男子站在一旁。數秒後，第三被告步出馬路，彎下身子，用雙手握著地上的小巴站牌，與數名示威者一同將小巴站牌搬往中間的一排路障。不久後便有示威者將黃色液體淋在中間的一排路障上。後來，警方便到場，PW5亦如上文所述，拘捕第三被告。

辯方證供

19.第三被告選擇作供。他現年45歲，已婚，育有一名女兒，與家人同住馬鞍山。他現職一間地產公司的區域經理。他有健身的習慣；每天早上8時便離家，前往沙田連城廣場的Physical健身中心做運動。

20.案發當日，第三被告如常於早上8時離家，帶備健身所需物品，前往沙田連城廣場的Physical健身。出門時，他穿著黑色Nike T恤及深灰色褲，而運動所需的物品則放在一個黑色的背囊內。同日上午約11時，第三被告做完運動後，於健身室淋浴，換上被捕時穿著的綠色T恤和黑褲，並於約11時20分離開健身室。雖然當日是星期天，但有樓盤在下午2時開始，於金鐘舉行展銷會，因此他仍需工作。同日下午約4時，展銷會完結後，第三被告便乘巴士，打算往沙田購買健身奶粉。他於下午約5時15分到達沙田廣場，並於沙田中心的BC Shop購買奶粉。單據顯示，購買的時間為下午5時29分。該單據呈為辯方第一號證物（D1）。

21.購物後，第三被告打算回馬鞍山與妻女吃晚飯。他平日會乘坐馬鞍山鐵路，但案發當日港鐵已封站；於是他便想前往大涌橋路乘搭專線小巴。他通常會經新城市廣場、源禾路、沙田鄉事會路，再過橋往小巴站。當他步出新城市廣場時，突然聞到一陣刺鼻的味道，令他感到不適；於是他便拿出健身用的頸箍，遮蓋口鼻。之後，他沿著担杆莆街到達源禾路。

22.第三被告承認新聞片段顯示他協助示威者將小巴站牌搬往源禾路。他解釋到達源禾路時，看見數人將小巴站牌翻倒在地上。他要求這一群人將站牌放回原位，但不果。第三被告指他正想離開時，突然聽見遠處傳來「砰」一聲。這時站在小巴站牌頂部，頭戴黑帽的男子忽然「彈一彈」。第三被告看見該男子應該是被小巴站牌搌到或絆倒，之後有人叫：「小心睇腳！」。當時有人正將小巴站牌向前拉，而站牌在地上滾動。第三被告認為情況危險，猶豫了一會後便上前將小巴站牌「逗一逗」。搬運站牌的一群人繼續向前走，但又突然急轉彎。第三被告勸喻這群人別再拖行小巴站牌，但他們並沒理會。再前行數步後，該群人士便停低；第三被告亦立即放開小巴站牌，更向這群人說：「有冇搞錯呀你哋！」。

23.之後，第三被告便離開，沿著源禾路步向鄉事會路方向。當他到達源禾路和鄉事會路交界時，一名婆婆突然不停大叫：「防暴警嚟啦！」。該婆婆隨即一面大叫，一面用手推向第三被告，着他離開。第三被告轉身，看見他前面有約30人正在狂奔；他的後方及兩旁均有人走過，更撞到他。當時他十分驚慌，出於自然反應便開始急步走向大會堂附近的小巴站，期間他被身旁的人推撞，於是便與他們一起奔跑。突然，有人連續及快速地打了他的膝蓋三下。之後有人從後推他，結果他便倒地。這時，他才看見他身後的人是防暴警察。他立即表示不會反抗，警方亦將他的頭按在地上。有人問：「叫咩名？幾多號電話呀？」，他便說出自己的名字及電話號碼。當時亦有一名女子說：「佢已經話唔反抗啦，你係咪想殺人？」。第三被告向警方解釋他剛購買奶粉，並説：「你唔信，睇吓我個袋啦」；可是警員好像聽而不聞。第三被告否認參與那天的集結；他稱其實他並不認同示威者的作為；協助示威者搬運小巴站牌只是因擔心有人會受傷。當日是他首次遇上社運事件，因驚慌而不知所惜，又因被婆婆推撞，才轉身走向担杆莆街。

指引

24.此乃刑事法庭，舉證責任在於控方；控方必須在毫無合理疑點下證案。如有任何合理疑點，疑點利益歸予三名被告人。

25.三名被告人均無刑事定罪紀錄。本席謹記，他們犯案的機會較低，說出真相的機會較高。

26.本案的其中一項爭議是首兩名被告的身份。本席明白誠實的證人也可能會認錯人；認錯人的證人也可能很具說服力。因此，本席謹記R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224一案內的原則及指引。雖然衣著及裝扮可協助法庭作辨認，本席謹記其他人也可能有相同的服飾及裝扮。

27.控方指警方採取行動時，三名被告人均有嘗試逃走。本席明白只有在法庭能肯定他並非因“與犯罪無關的”理由而逃走時，他的逃走行動才可以被視為支持控方指控的證供。

證供的分析

A. 控方的證供

28.本案中，辯方爭議於新城市廣場外空地的一對男女是否第一及第二被告。PW1作供期間曾於新聞片段（P2A）中指出新城市廣場外空地的一對男女，及其特徵，並表示這些特徵與首兩名被告相似。辯方援引AG’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 21 321; R v Clare & Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333及Grant v The Queen [1982] 2 SCR 819，指法庭若要接納PW1的身份辨認證供呈堂，控方必須在毫無合理疑點下證明PW1是一名特設專家（expert ad hoc)，擁有特別知識（special knowledge）。大律師指該特別知識是事實裁斷者沒有的；而PW1並沒資格成為一名特設專家，就辨認首兩名被告給予意見證供。因此，大律師要求法庭完全無視PW1對P2A片段所作出的「辨認」證供。

29.於AG’s Reference (No.2 of 2002)一案中，英國上訴法院引用R v Clare & Peach，裁定透過影片所作的辨認證供可在特定的情況下獲接納：—

“16. Clare and Peach, to which we have referred, is authority for the proposition that a witness who has spent a great deal of time viewing and analysing a video film of an incident, acquires a “special knowledge that the court does not possess” and is entitled to give the court the benefit of that knowledge. By comparing good quality still photographs taken on the day, which were undoubtedly of the defendants, with images on the video recording, evidence was given that the person on the still photograph was the same person shown on the video film. This Court upheld the admissibility of such identification evidence. The special knowledge was required only because the witness did not know the defendant and because the basis of his identification was the many hours of intensive viewing of the film which he had carried out…

19. In our judgment, on the authorities, there are, as it seems to us at least four circumstances in which, subject to the judicial discretion to exclude, evidence is admissible to show, subject to appropriate directions in the summing-up, a jury can be invited to conclude that the defendant committed the offence on the basis of a photographic image from the scene of the crime:

(i)  where the photographic image is sufficiently clear, the jury can compare it with the defendant sitting in the dock (Dodson and Williams);

(ii)  Where a witness knows the defendant sufficiently well to recognise him as the offender depicted in the photographic image, he can give evidence of this (Fowden and White, Kamala v Noble, Grimer, Caldwell and Dixon and Blenkinsop); and this may be so even if the photographic image is no longer available for the jury (Taylor v Chief Constable of Chester);

(iii)  Where a witness who does not know the defendant spends substantial time viewing and analysing photographic images from the scene, thereby acquiring special knowledge which the jury does not have, he can give evidence of identification based on a comparison between those images and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the defendant, provided that the images and the photograph are available to the jury (Clare & Peach);

(iv)  A suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills can give opinion evidence of identification based on a comparison between images from the scene, (whether expertly enhanced or not)  and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the defendant, provided the images and the photograph are available for the jury (R v Stockwell (1993)  97 Cr App R 260; R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 and R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750).”

30.於Clare & Peach一案中，英國上訴法院引用其他司法管轄區的案件後裁定：—

“ …The phrase “expert ad hoc” seeks to put witnesses like Detective Parsons and P.C. Fitzpatrick into the traditional category of those qualified to give opinion evidence. Whether or not the tag is appropriate, we are clearly of the view that P.C. Fitzpatrick had “special knowledge that the Court did not possess”, to quote the Canadian judgment cited above. P.C. Fitzpatrick had acquired the knowledge by lengthy and studious application to material which was itself admissible evidence. To afford the jury the time and facilities to conduct the same research would be utterly impracticable. Accordingly, it was in our judgment legitimate to allow the officer to assist the jury by pointing to what he asserted was happening in the crowded scenes on the film. He was open to cross-examination, and the jury, after proper direction and warnings, were free either to accept or reject his assertions.”

31.於Grant v The Queen，加拿大最高法院的Dickson J提及： —

“If the court is being told that which it is in itself entirely equipped to determine without the aid of the witness on that point then of course the evidence is supererogatory and unnecessary. It would be a waste of time listening to superfluous testimony.”

32.沒爭議的是，當日並沒警員在新城市廣場外的空地。事實上，控方亦沒要求PW1認人。PW1只是指出新城市廣場空地的一對男女，及指出控方希望法庭留意的特徵。他從沒將該對男女「認出」為首兩名被告，可是他的確曾用兩名首被告的相片與P2A的片段作出比對，並指出首兩名被告與片段中男女相約的特徵（簡稱意見證供），而控方亦沒任何證供證明PW1曾花大量時間觀看及分析P2A的片段，從而獲得法庭沒有的知識。因此，法庭同意不能接納上述的意見證供。

33.PW1的證供清晰直接，在盤問下沒動搖。事實上，除了上述的意見證供，他絕大部份的證供不受爭議；相反來說，辯方大律師對PW1差不多沒有盤問，只是向PW1指出，警方制服第一被告時，第二被告沒有嘗試拉走第一被告及被捕時，第二被告沒有掙扎。如上所述，法庭不會接納上述的意見證供。除此之外，本席裁定PW1為誠實可靠的證人，接納他餘下的證供。

34.控辯各方根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》將PW2及PW4的證人供詞納為證供。本席亦於上文贅述供詞的內容，現不再重覆。

35.控方應辯方的要求傳召PW3作供，但其實她的證供不受爭議，辯方亦沒有任何盤問。本席裁定她為誠實可靠的證人，接納她的證供。

36.PW5的大部份證供不受爭議；首兩名被告的大律師沒有任何盤問，而第三被告的大律師只向PW5指出：—

(1)  他拘捕第三被告前，在完全沒有警告下，用警棍連續打了第三被告三下；

(2)  PW5衝前拘捕前，第三被告正背向警方，步向担杆莆街，而非與示威者一同站於最後一排路障，面向警方。

37.PW5的證供清晰直接，在盤問下沒動揺。本席裁定他為誠實可靠的證人，接納其證供。

辯方的證供

38.本席已小心考慮證供及代表第三被告大律師的陳詞。本席認為第三被告的證供違反常理、自相矛盾，與不爭的新聞片段不脗合，最明顯例子如下：—

(1)  第三被告指於新城市廣場外突然聞到一陣剌鼻的氣味，令他十分不舒服。因此才用頸箍遮蓋口鼻。後來，第三被告到達源禾路（即已離開新城市廣場），但他仍以頸箍遮蓋口鼻；

(2)  第三被告指聽見「砰」一聲及看見站於小巴站牌頂部的男子「彈一彈」，認為該男子可能被搌到或絆到；因憂心會有人受傷才出手相助。如果第三被告認為該名男子被小巴站牌所傷，自然反應是上前慰問及察看傷勢。可是，盤問下，第三被告承認不但沒有慰問或查看傷勢，連望也沒望該男子一眼，對其視若無睹，只顧出手搬運小巴站頭；

(3)  第三被告指認為站在站牌頂部的男子可能被搌到或絆到。根據新聞片段，第三被告指稱擔心的男子從沒跌倒；相反地，第三被告上前搬運小巴站牌前，該男子已走往站牌的另一邊，繼續搬運；

(4)  第三被告指上前「逗一逗」小巴站牌前，他並不知悉站牌底部由水泥造成，更不知站牌如此沉重。小巴站牌放在路上，如沒重量，根本不能抵受風吹雨打。況且，示威者將站牌翻倒在地上後，第三被告正站在路邊，面向站牌的底部。另外，當時已有3至4人在搬運小巴站牌，但也不能將站牌抬起。如果第三被告並不知道或認為站牌很重，他又為何會擔心有人會受傷？他的證供自相矛盾；

(5)  第三被告稱，上前協助搬運小巴站牌，是因擔心會有人受傷。盤問下，第三被告指上前協助時，曾問示威者想將站牌「拖」到那裏。很明顯，將站牌拖行而引致身體受傷的機會極微；

(6)  主問時，第三被告稱，看見示威者將小巴站牌翻倒，上前勸喻他們將站牌放回原位。盤問下，他卻稱上前時詢問示威想將站牌「拖」往哪裏，隨即便出手相助。首先，他的證供前後矛盾。另外，他自稱不認同示威者的所作所為，但他於新聞片段內的行為卻與他所述的意見或立場南轅北轍；

(7)  新聞片段顯示，示威者搬運小巴站牌時，一名女子大叫：「拖呀！拖呀！睇腳！」。第三被告稱只聽見「睇腳」，但沒聽見「拖呀！」。可是他又稱上前協助時，問示威者要將站牌「拖」往哪裏。新聞片段顯示，第三被告上前協助搬運小巴站牌後，上述女子才大叫「睇腳」；

(8)  第三被告稱上前時，詢問示威者要將小巴站頭「拖」往那裏。新聞片段顯示，當時示威者已用伸縮鐵閘及其他雜物築起三個大型路障，意途顯而易見；

(9)  第三被告稱搬運完小巴站牌後便離開。可是，不爭議的是，警方到場後，第三被告仍在現場，即源禾路近担杆莆街；

(10)  第三被告指他離開示威現場，但到達源禾路與鄕事會路交界時，有一名婆婆大叫：「防暴警嚟啦！」。主問時，他稱因首次遇上社運事件，不知所惜，婆婆又不斷推他，他才轉身向担杆莆街走。盤問下，欲指他並不害怕防暴警察、婆婆或其他行人；但否認是因為婆婆不斷推他才轉身走向担杆莆街。覆問下又改說走回頭路是因被婆婆不斷推撞；

(11)  第三被告指每天均會健身，更服食健身的高蛋白質奶粉。沒有爭議的是第三被告的體型十分健碩。他指稱因被婆婆推撞而前往源禾路及担杆莆街交界令人難以信服；

(12)  盤問下，第三被告承認源禾路有不只一條路可通往大涌橋路小巴站；他沒有前往小巴站，而是轉身往担杆莆街。最初，他解釋前路有障礙。當他無法說出是什麼障礙時，又改說是因心情亂。

39.本席裁定第三被告並非誠實可靠的證人，拒納他的證供。

身份

40.如上述，第一及第二被告否認他們是新聞片段內的一對男女。兩名被告的大律師雖然反對PW1作辨認身份的證供，亦反對PW1將新聞片段的一對男女與首兩名被告作比較，但他承認，作為事實裁斷者，法庭有絕對權利自行觀看有關片段，並自行作比對及辨認，以裁定片中人是否首兩名被告。

41.本席同意大律師的陳述。Archbold Hong Kong 2021，第14-85段指出：—

“ Murphy, held that the trial judge was correct in using a film for his recognition of the appellants and to decide if other witnesses’ identification from the same film was correct. There had been a submission that a judge sitting alone could not decide on his or her perception of a film recognition of an accused… This submission was contrary to Murphy on Evidence, ibid at 513. Kelly LJ…so reasoned and held the trial judge’s perception of the film was real evidence and admissible… The conclusion of the Court in Murphy were that the trial judge could use his judgment of the film to identify and understand what it showed and for the correctness of other witnesses’ identification.”

42.大律師續指，法庭要利用有關片段自行作比對及辨認的話，大前提是有關片段必須要足夠清晰（sufficiently clear）。他指： —

(1)  有關片段的畫面質素低，影像並不清晰；

(2)  部分片中人的影像不清晰，不能被依賴作有意義及公平的分析及比對；原因是有關片段均不能清晰顯示片中人的特徵，包括但不限于五官、面形、頭髮、性別、實際身高、身材和步姿等；

(3)  就算將有關片段的影像放大，清晰度只會更差；

(4)  部分有關片段的鏡頭及片中人一直在移動，進一步降低片中人於影像中的清晰度；

(5)  有關片段中的物品和實物可能存在色差的問題。

43.本席對大律師大部份的陳述不敢苟同。本席同意攝錄者遠距離拍攝新城市廣場外空地情況時，控方所依賴影像內的一對男女比較細小（見相簿1，第1及2頁），而將影像放大，令影像變得模糊。可是，由相簿1，第3至23頁，控方所依賴影像的一對男女清晰可見。控方已將其依賴的畫面截圖，不存在因片中人移動而影響法庭觀察的元素。辯方大律師似乎忘記了控方是要求法庭用首兩名被告被捕時拍攝的相片（而非實物）與片段的截圖作比對。相片與片段均經過鏡頭拍攝，沒有片段與實物出現色差的問題。

44.當時新城市廣場外空地的一對男女用口罩、頸箍及泳鏡遮蓋面容，無論片段何等清晰，法庭根本沒有可能看見他們的面容。控方要求法庭留意的是片段中一對男女的身形、髮型、衣物及身上的袋和背囊。

45.Archbold Hong Kong 2021，第1053頁，第14-16段指： —

“Identification by clothing

The recognition of apparel can be supportive of an identification. The judge should clarify that the fact that someone wore particular clothing did not preclude the probability that someone else was dressed similarly: R v Hickin [1996] Crim L R 584, CA.”

46.本席明白首兩名被告身上的衣物均為普通的衣物，其他人亦有可能穿著類同，甚至相同的衣物。因此，以衣物作辨認基礎時，法庭須特別小心。

47.本席已小心地用首兩名被告被捕時的外型比對新聞片段2A內的一對男女。第一被告被捕後，於警署拍攝的照片顯示：—

(1)  她的身型比較嬌小，肥瘦適中；

(2)  長髮，束馬尾；束馬尾的橡根近後頸位置；

(3)  她身上的物品包括一個粉藍色的醫學口罩、黑色的泳鏡、深藍色背囊及一對灰黑色手套；

(4)  上身穿著黑色圓領短袖 T 恤、T 恤在褲外，T 恤長度過盤骨位；雙臂穿著一對黑色手袖；

(5)  下身穿黑色貼身的長褲。

48.第二被告被捕後，於警署拍攝的照片顯示：—

(1)  他的身型修長高挑；

(2)  中等長度髪型；

(3)  上身穿著黑色圓領短袖T恤；

(4)  下身穿著黑色長褲；

(5)  從他身上檢獲的物品包括一個灰色背囊、黑藍色的頸箍、一個藍色透明泳鏡、一對黑色手袖、一支藍色手柄的錘子；錘子上有螢光黃色的標籤及一個藍紅色的肩背袋。

49.片段內的女子的身形、髮型、口罩、泳鏡（包括顏色及形狀）、手袖、手套、T 恤（包括領口、袖長及身長）、背囊、長褲均與第一被告完全脗合。當時，該名女子與一名男子同行。同行的男子無論身型、髮型、頸箍（包括顏色及花紋）、泳鏡（形狀）、背囊、手袖、T恤、長褲均與第二被告完全脗合。

50.片段中的男子於步行期間手持一個錘子。該錘子的手抦是藍色的，而錘子上有螢光黃色的標籤。該錘子與從第二被告身上檢取的錘子亦完全脗合。片段中的女子向著担杆莆街方向步行時，手持一個藍紅色肩背袋，並將該袋子交給同行的男子；該肩背袋與從第二被告身上檢獲的肩背袋脗合。另外，片段中男子的灰色背囊內有一瓶水，瓶蓋白色，瓶身上有紫白色標籤。第二被告被制服期間，有一瓶水從其背囊掉出，該瓶水的蓋子和標籤均與片段中的瓶子脗合。

51.本席明白首兩名被告的身形、髮型、衣物及身上的物品均為普通的日常用品。可是要於同一日、同一時段和同一地段找到有齊上述特徵的女子或男子的機會已經是微乎其微；要找到一對同行男女，而該男女各自有齊首兩名被告上述特徵，更是沒有可能。唯一及不可抗拒的推論是，新聞片段中的一對男女便是第一及第二被告。

控罪一

52.根據香港法例第245章《公安條例》第18條：—

「(1)  凡有3人或多於3人集結在一起，作出擾亂秩序的行為或作出帶有威嚇性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行為，意圓導致或相當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧，或害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧，他們即屬非法集結。

(2)  集結的人如作出上述般的行為，則即使其原來的集結是合法的，亦無關重要。

(3)  任何人如參與憑藉第(1)款屬非法集結的集結，即犯非法集結罪

(a)  一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁5年；及

(b)  一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第2級罰款及監禁3年。」

53.根據《公安條例》第19條：—

「(1)  如任何參與憑藉第18(1)條被定為非法集結的集結的人破壞社會安寧，該集結即屬暴動，而集結的人即屬集結暴動。

(2)  任何人參與暴動，即犯暴動罪

(a)  一經循公訴程序定罪，可處監禁10年；及

(b)  一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第2級罰款及監禁5年。」

54.控辯雙方對上述控罪的原素、法律原則及法庭須裁決的事項似乎有爭議。

控方立場

55.控方指，「非法集結罪」和「暴動罪」可被視為層遞性質的罪行。當中「暴動罪」需要是有人（但不一定是被告）已經作出破壞社會安寧的作為。因此：—

(A)  「暴動罪」的元素如下：—

(1)  關鍵時間存在一個非法集結；

(2)  參與非法集結的人（可以是，但不一定是被告）破壞社會安寧，從而令該非法集結成為暴動；及

(3)  該暴動仍然進行期間，被告作出了參與暴動的作為，及意圖參與該暴動。

(B)  至於「非法集結罪」的罪行元素則分列如下：—

(1)  在控罪所指的時間及地點，有3人或多於3人集結在一起，而這些集結的人有「共同目的」；

(2)  這些集結的人（可以是，但不一定是被告）在上述共同目的下：

(a)  作出了擾亂秩序的行為；

(b)  作出帶有威嚇性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行為（下稱「訂明行為」）；

(3)  該些集結在一起的人在作出一或多項「訂明行為」時，他們（可以是，但不一定是被告）： —

(a)  意圖導致任何在場的人（主觀的準則）

(i)  合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧，或

(ii)  合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧；或

(b)  訂明行為相當可能導致任何在場的人（客觀的準則）：—

(i)  合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧；或

(ii)  合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧。

(4)  該非法集結進行期間，被告作出了參與該非法集結的作為，及意圖參與該非法集結 [詳見：林文瀚法官（當時官階）在Secretary of Justice v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556 (CFI)  （香港特別行政區 訴 梁國華 HCMA 54/2012，未經𢑥編，2012.10.19）（「梁國華案」）一案第16段列出了《公安條例》第18(1)條下「非法集結」的組成元素。]

56.經控方在聆訊中展示相關證供後，辯方表示不會爭議案發當日在現場有暴動。因此，就控罪一，控方只集中於有關首兩名被告的「身分」爭議及三名被告如何「參與」暴動的法律原則。

57.控方指，有關條文採用「參與」的字眼，因此控方需要證明被告「參與」了有關非法活動。什麼構成「參與」的作為是一個事實的問題。考慮這個議題時，也必須考慮被告人的「認知」（knowledge）。倘若一名被告人不知道面前有一個暴動，他是不可以被視為「參與」了該場暴動。若證供顯示他是構成暴動的人士（即作出破壞社會安寧的行為的人），那自不然是知道有暴動發生。問題通常出現在暴動仍然存在，但當刻暴動場面沒有在被告人面前出現；這時候是否「知情」將變得更為重要。

58.控方援引上訴法院於Secretary for Justice v Tong Wai Hung & Others [2021] HKCA 404，CASJ 1/2020，（未經𢑥編），2021.3.25（湯偉雄案），第50段，指出「暴動罪」及「非法集結罪」的控訴要旨，在於他們聚眾行事，以人多勢眾來達到他們的共同目的：—

“50. The gravamen of unlawful assembly and riot, whether as common law or statutory offences, lies in the participants of the unlawful assembly or riot acting in large numbers and using those numbers to achieve their common purpose: Wong Chi Fung, supra, at [123]-[127] referring to R v Caird (1970)  54 Cr App R 499; R v Gilmour [2011] EWCA Crim 2458; R v Blackhawks [2012] 1 Cr App R(S)  114; HKSAR v Tang Ho Yin [2019] 3 HKLRD 502, at [24]; Leung Tin Kei, supra, at [78].”

59.控方指上訴法庭於湯偉雄案亦考慮了何謂旁觀者或路人。上訴法院明確指出，當和平示威淪為非法集結或暴動，和平的參與者或旁觀者應在合理切實可行的情況下盡快離開現場。雖然參與者或旁觀者如純粹基於一些合理理由或因現場的實際情況而繼續留在現場，無須負上法律責任，然而一旦參與使用暴力或威嚇使用暴力，便須負上法律責任（見第77至81段）。套用共同犯罪計劃的原則於暴動罪及非法集結罪時，上訴庭在湯偉雄案中提及，下列的環境證據可以供法庭推論被告與參與暴動的人仕有一個共同犯罪的計劃：—

(1)  與參與暴動人士的距離接近；

(2)  與參與暴動人士身穿相似的衣著裝備；

(3)  管有可以用作通訊的器具；

(4)  被警方發現時企圖逃離現場。

60.相關判詞（第27段）：—

“27. Mr. Pun’s reliance on the findings by the judge is misplaced. For the Questions do not stem from the judged findings but from the undisputed circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution, such as the fact that the respondents were found in close vicinity soon after the police took action to disperse the protestors; that they wore black outfits with gear similar to other protestors taking part in the riot; that, in the case of the 1^st and 2^nd Respondents, they were each in possession of a radio transceiver without licence; and that they attempted to flee when found by the police. Those undisputed facts are capable of proving inferentially their participation in the riot or unlawful assembly on Des Voeux Road West based on the doctrine of joint enterprise, if applicable as a matter of law.”

首兩名被告的立場

61.首兩名被告的大律師指，根據香港特別行政區 訴 梁天琦及另二人 [2020] 1 HKLRD 1246第78段，要證明被告人參與了非法集結，控方需證明：—

(a)  在控罪所指的時間及地點，被告人與2人或多於2人集結在一起；及

(b)  被告人當時與該些人集結在一起的共同目的；及

(c)  被告人當時與該些集結在一起的人在這個共同目的下，故意地：—

(i)  作出擾亂秩序的行為，或

(ii)  作出帶有威脅性、侮辱性或挑撥性的行為（下稱「訂明行為」）；及

(d)  被告人與該些集結在一起的人在作出一或多項「訂明行為」時：—

(i)  他們意圖導致任何在埸的人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧，或合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧；或

(ii)  相當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧，或合理地害怕他們會藉以上的行為激使其他人破壞社會安寧（「知道或罔顧」的要求已被HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus [2021] HKCFA 24第60段推翻。

62.大律師指法庭需要為何時一個集結演變成非法集結或暴動，作出事實的裁決。於湯偉雄案及香港特別行政區 訴 陳起行及另三人 [2021] HKDC 808 （陳起行案）內，區域法院法官亦裁定非法集結何時才演變為暴動。

63.大律師援引湯偉雄案，原審法官判詞的第54段 [2020] HKDC 588，指在考慮參與非法集結的人實際做了什麼行為破壞社會安寧而令非法集結成為暴動時，一般針對的都是那些「蓄意使用暴力」的行為。大律師續指，並非所有的行為都會被視為符合「暴動」嚴重性。於湯偉雄案內，區域法院法官於第55至62段內分析不同的行為，在考慮客觀因素，包括在場市民的反應後，裁定架設路障和堵塞交通最多只是非法集結的行為，不屬於暴動的程度；暴動行為當時所產生的威脅必須是相當及即時的，例如示威者展示或揮舞攻擊性武器，如「開山刀」或手持燃點了的「氣油彈」。因此，即使當時早在5時許已有路障和堵塞交通的程況，區域法院法官裁定在7時02分，「當警方防線向前推進，示威者向警方投擲雜物的那一刻」開始，該集結才演變成暴動。

64.就「共同目的」，首兩名被告的大律師指，根據SJ v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556第16至22段，非法集結罪（以及暴動罪）具有集體性質。他亦援引R v To Kwan Hang [1995] HKCLR 251，第254頁10至15段，指有3人或以上集結在一起並作出訂明行為時，構成非法集結的是該些人，而非其他也集結在一起，但沒有作出訂明行為的人。他指有3人或以上集結在一起並作出訂明行為時，法庭仍必需考慮該些人在作出訂明行為時，是否仍可被視為集結在一起；被告人們的行為之間必須有足夠連繫，例如共同目的，法庭才可一併考慮他們。

65.至於「參與」的元素，大律師援引「陪審團指引（2020年就特選課題作修訂的版本）第101-4及5頁，關於參與方面的法律：若一個人身在犯罪現場，但沒有參與干犯該罪行，則他是沒有犯下該罪行的；另外：若一個人身在犯罪現場，而故意地憑藉他的在場或言語或行為，鼓勵另一人干犯該罪行，則他同樣是有犯下該罪行的，唯控方必需指出被告如何給予鼓勵或給予了甚麼鼓勵… 除此之外，大律師援引Leung Kwok Hung v SJ [2020] 2 HKLRD 771的第225至226段，指法庭要基於一個人繼續身在未經批准集結現場，這一點去使他負上刑責，必先確保該人知道該集結是未經批准的，以及獲給予合理機會離開現場。大律師亦依賴SJ v Tong Wai Hung [2021] 2 HKLRD 399，上訴法院判決第80段，指當和平示威演變成非法集結甚至暴動時，和平示威者或旁覲者應在合理可行的情況下盡快離開現場：一方面，如他因合理理由不如此做，或因現場的實際情況而無法如此做，則他的在場本身並不會使他干犯非法集結或暴動罪；另一方面，如他變成牽涉在暴力或暴力威脅之中，則他越過了受法律保護的合法集會和示威，和受法律制裁和限制的非法活動之界線；根據實際情況和證據，他可能以主犯，從犯或共同犯罪者的身份，而牽涉在暴力或暴力威脅中。

66.換句話說，大律師的論點是，控方除證實被告身在暴動現場，而未能證明其他元素，法庭便不應將被告人定罪。大律師援引香港特別行政區 訴 林子浩[2020] HKDC 394，區域法院法官考慮到證據只顯示被告是在警方追捕曾經堵路和投擲物品的人群時被制服，以及他管有防毒面具、眼罩、手套、背包、黑色 T 恤、黑色褲、黑色襪和黑色運動鞋，認為合理的可能性是他剛巧路經該處而遇上警察，而與該懷疑暴動無關。大律師亦依賴HKSAR v Nanik [2018] HKCA 500 第31至34段，有關「純粹在場不足以構成協助及教唆罪責」。另外，大律師亦指於香港特別行政區 訴 余德穎及另七人 [2020] HKDC 992 一案中，區域法院法官考慮到沒有證據顯示被告人被捕前身在何處、在做什麼，認為無法推斷他們憑藉身在現場鼓勵其他人。另外，該案的法官認為不應把穿著黑衣和帶備防護裝備的人視為參與暴動，理由是這做法有可能冤枉無辜，因服飾顏色是個人喜好，穿著其他顏色衣服的人也可參與暴動，而且合理的可能性是有人希望見證難得的歷史時刻，遮蓋容貌以免為誤認為參與暴動者，並帶備防毒面具，口罩和眼罩等以備在催淚煙或暴力場面中保護自己。大律師續指，於陳起行一案內，區域法院法官考慮到沒有證據顯示第一及第二被告身處暴動的核心範圍多久，供法庭推論他們知道暴動的情況，亦沒有證據顯示他們在言行上直接或間接參與暴動，認為即使第一被告衣著裝備包括黑色上衣、黑色長褲、護目鏡、防毒面具和3M手套及隔熱手套，而第二被告的衣著裝備包括黑色上衣、黑色長褲和保鮮紙，而兩人均在暴動的核心範圍附近被捕，雖有合理定罪機會，但不至毫無合理疑點。大律師提及湯偉雄案，第113段，指區域法院法官裁定即使將控方案情推至最高，配戴裝備頂多顯示被告有意圖參與集結，卻無法推論被告必然已經實際參與非法集結或暴動。被告人亦有可能來到現場後，來不及參與就被捕，這個可能性在現有證據下無法被合理排除。[就純粹身在現場不足以構成犯法的案例，亦見R v Cook (1994)  74 A Crim R 1 及Boxer v The Queen (1995)  14 WAR 505]。

67.綜合以上論點，首兩名被告的大律師指，雖然一個人可以以從犯的身份干犯暴動罪，包括夥同犯罪或協助及教唆他人參與暴動，唯一會令一個人足夠透過親身參與而干犯非法集結或暴動罪的方法，是他身處現場，且作出暴力行為或威脅使用暴力。

第三被告的立場

68.就犯罪意圖（mens rea），第三被告援引終審法院於HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus FACC 2/2021 就非法集結罪的判決：—

“20. The offence under the intended limb expressly requires mens rea, specifying explicitly that it requires proof of intention. The actus reus requirements in section 18(1)  are: (1)  for there to be 3 or more persons; (2)  assembled together; and (3)  who conduct themselves in the prohibited manner, i.e. in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner. Since “intended” here can only be understood to mean “intended by the assembled persons”, the intended limb lays down as part of the mens rea requirements of the offence that the assembled persons conducting themselves in the prohibited ways must intend to “cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace”. Thus, construing the intended limb, there is no need to embark on the exercise envisaged in Hin Lin Yee or Kulemesin since the statute is neither silent nor ambiguous as to the state of mind required. The offence created by the intended limb expressly spells out the required mens rea in relation to the consequence of causing a reasonable fear of a breach of the peace.

21. The likely limb stipulates the same three actus reus elements, namely: (1)  for there to be 3 or more persons; (2)  assembled together; and (3)  who conduct themselves in the prohibited manner, i.e. in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner. But at this point, a crucial difference from the intended limb arises. The words which then follow, “likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace…”, do not address the mental state of the assembled persons. Instead, they refer to the quality or likely consequences of the prohibited conduct by the assembled persons as observed externally. Thus, the prohibited conduct must be of such a nature as to be likely to result in any person reasonably apprehending a breach of the peace by the assembled persons.

59. In answer to the certified question of law:

(1)  The actus reus elements of the likely limb of section 18(1)  of the POO are: (I)  there must be “3 or more persons”; (ii)  they must be “Assembled together”; (iii)  they must “conduct themselves in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner”; and (iv)  their conduct, viewed objectively, must “cause any person reasonably to fear that [they] will commit a breach of the peace…or provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace”.

(2)  The prosecution will need to prove full mens rea on the part of the defendant in respect of each of elements (i)  to (iii)  above. No mens rea is required in respect of element (iv).

(3)  The prosecution must also prove the defendant took part in the unlawful assembly within section 18(3)  of the POO.”

69.大律師指除了上述元素，控方必須證明被告是故意參與暴動。他續指根據第三被告的證供，第三被告並不認同示威者的所作所為，因此第三被告與示威者沒有共同的目的。

適用的法律原則

70.本席對辯方的陳述不盡苟同。本席同意舉證責任在於控方，控方必須在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪的每一個原素。因此，如控方只能證明控罪的某一個或某些（但並非所有）元素，被告人便不應負上刑責（例如控方只能證明被告人純粹在現場或被告人的裝扮與示威者類似，而未能證實控罪的其他元素）。這是香港法律的基石。

71.可是，首兩名被告的大律師不斷「援引」一些區域法院的判決，將它們升華為案例。眾所周知，區域法院的判決並非案例，對同級法院並無約束力。況且，每一件案件均有其獨特的案情；法庭須根據每一件案件的證供而作出裁決（Each case must be decided on its own facts）。

72.首兩名被告的大律師多次提及湯偉雄案內區域法院法官的裁決。其實本案聆訊時，湯偉雄案內就「共同犯案」的裁決已被上訴法院推翻，辯方所指的「模糊暴動與非法集結兩者的分別及將暴動罪的門檻大為降低」（over charging）的裁決亦被上訴法院否決。

73.事實上，控方的立場十分清晰；控方的指控是三名被告 「參與」暴動。終審法院已於HKSAR v Leung Tin Kei, Lo Kin Man & Wong Ka Kiu FACC No 6 of 2021 [終審法院稱之為盧建民案] 及Secretary for Justice v Tong Wai Hung & Others [湯偉雄終院上訴案] 清晰及詳細解釋「非法集結罪」及「暴動罪」的元素及法律原則（包括「參與」的意思）。另外，終審法院亦清楚解釋何謂「共同目的」。因此，本席會根據終審法院所述的法律原則考慮本案，不打算逐一處理辯方的陳述。因首兩名被告大律師所述的法律原則與終審法院的裁決相差太大，而且終審法院於本案陳詞後才作出判決，本席去信首兩名被告的大律師，要求作進一步陳詞。法庭於12月16日接獲大律師的進一步陳述。基本上，大律師指沒有足夠證供顯示首兩名被告參與暴動。第三被告大律師的法律陳述切合終審法院的判決，但本席於判決前亦邀請大律師作進一步陳述。

74.終審法院指：—

“4. The questions raised in the two Annexes concern a proper understanding of the structure and elements of the offences created by sections 18 and 19 and their relationship with certain common law doctrines. In particular, issues arise as to (i)  the existence and nature of a requirement (if any)  for proof of a “common purpose” shared by the defendant and other persons assembled; (ii)  the applicability of the doctrine of joint enterprise to the two statutory offences and whether that doctrine enables liability to be established without the defendant being present at the scene; (iii)  whether a defendant can be found guilty under sections 18 and 19 on the basis of “encouragement through [the defendant’s] presence”, without committing acts specifically prohibited by those sections…

8. As was done in HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus, it is convenient for the purposes of exposition to divide up and number (in square brackets)  the elements making up the two offences as follow:

Unlawful Assembly (section 18)

[1] When 3 or more persons,

[2] assembled together,

[3] conduct themselves in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner,

[4] intended or likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace,

[5] they are an unlawful assembly, [section 18(1)]

[6] it is immaterial that the original assembly was lawful if being assembled, they conduct themselves in such a manner as aforesaid, [18(2)]

[7] Any person who takes part in an assembly which is an unlawful assembly….[section 18(3)]

Riot (section 19)

[8] when any person taking part in an assembly which is an unlawful assembly by virtue of section 18(1),

[9] commits a breach of the peace,

[10] the assembly is a riot and the persons assembled are riotously assembled [section 19(1)]

[11] any person who takes part in a riot shall be guilty of the offence of riot…[section 19(2)]

A.2 Unlawful Assembly

9. Elements [1] to [4] are the constituent elements of an unlawful assembly. Where they are established, the assembly is…an unlawful assembly. Element [1] requires there to be 3 or more persons [2] assembled together, who conduct themselves in the disorderly manner specified in [3], with the intended or likely consequences stated in [4]. Those persons will be referred to as “the constituent offenders” and their conduct specified in [3] and [4] as the “prohibited conduct”. The true construction of element [4] is dealt with in detail in HKSAR v Leung Chung Hang Sixtus. Notably, the “likely” limb is an aspect of the actus reus requiring the objectionable conduct, objectively assessed, to be likely to produce the reasonable fear of a breach of the peace specified.

10. Element [6] reflects the scheme of graduated liability. An assembly might start off as lawful, then turn into an unlawful assembly and then become a riot. The time such a transformation may take will vary according to the circumstances. An unlawful assembly could develop almost immediately into a riot.

11. Element [7] is the offence-creating provision. Any person who “takes part” in an assembly which is an unlawful assembly commits the section 18 offence. The actus reus is “taking part “. This may or may not involve the same acts as, and should not be confined with, the prohibited conduct of the constituent offenders referred to in [3] and [4].

12. If the defendant was one of the constituent offenders, by engaging in the prohibited conduct, he or she will (along with the other constituent offenders)  have taken part in the unlawful assembly that they will together have brought into being. But the defendant need not be one of the constituent offenders and can “take part” by joining in later. This is clear from element [7] which provides that the offence is committed by any person who takes part in the unlawful assembly…

13. What then constitutes “taking part” in an unlawful assembly? What acts must the defendant perform? The sections do not spell out the meaning of those words. As a matter of textual analysis, it is implicit that if the defendant is one of the constituent offenders whose conduct falls within [3] and [4] he or she would “take part” since it is by such acts that the unlawful assembly is established, being of the essence of the offence. And if the defendant was not among the constituent offenders, but joined in and similarly did acts also prohibited by [3] and [4], he or she would also be found to have “taken part”.

14. However, the offence is not confined to such conduct. As a matter of language, “taking part” is a broad expression. In our view, those words also embrace conduct which does not itself fall within [3] and [4] but which involves the defendant facilitating, assisting or encouraging the performance of such conduct by others participating in the assembly. Such conduct would traditionally give rise to accessorial liability, but, by offering such facilitation, assistance or encouragement, the defendant acts in furtherance of the prohibited conduct and may thus also be regarded as “taking part” in the unlawful assembly. In so doing, he or she may attract liability as a principal offender under section 18 or an aider and abettor.

15. An important feature which emerges from the statutory language is that unlawful assembly is what might be called a “participatory offence”. Thus, the offence requires the constituent offenders who are “assembled together” to “conduct themselves” in the prohibited manner so that the intended or likely fear of a breach of the peace is fear of what “the persons so assembled” will do. Element [6] draws the line between lawful and unlawful assemblies by reference to persons who “being assembled” engage in the prohibited conduct. The offence is committed by someone “taking part “in the unlawful assembly.

16. The defendant must therefore be shown not merely to have been engaging in disorderly conduct alone, but to have acted as part of an assembly with others who were also participants. The offence is “participatory” in that sense. Such participation is a requirement recognised by Lam JA (as Lam PJ then was)  in SJ v Leung Kwok Wah, holding that the defendant’s conduct has to be assessed to see if a sufficient nexus with other participants exists to justify regarding them as acting together. His Lordship held that their conduct has to justify the inference that they had what he called “a common purpose in acting in the statutorily prescribed manner”; ie, a shared objective of engaging in the “prohibited conduct” forming elements [3] and [4].

17. The defendant must accordingly intend to take part in, that is become part of, the unlawful assembly, being aware of the related conduct of other participants and intending, while assembled together with them, to engage in or act in furtherance of the prohibited conduct. The defendant must, in other words, have what we will call a “participatory intent”.

18. It follows (leaving aside for now accessory and inchoate liability (especially regarding liability for conspiracy and incitement)  that may be incurred by a person who is absent), that to be guilty under section 18 as a principal offender, the defendant has to be present as part of the assembly together with other participants.

A.3 Riot

19. The offence of riot builds on that of unlawful assembly. It’s starting point is that an unlawful assembly exists, ie, that elements [1] to [5] are established. Element [8] specifies that when any person taking part in the unlawful assembly [9] commits a breach of the peace, the assembly [10] becomes a riot and the people assembled are riotously assembled. The actus reus of the offence of riot under section 19 is committed [11] when any person “takes part” in the riot.

20. Thus, as with unlawful assembly, the offence of riot has its initial constituent elements which are distinct from the actus reus of “taking part in a riot”. Any person taking part in an unlawful assembly may turn that assembly into a riot by committing a breach of the peace. That person does not have to be one of the constituent offenders who initially constituted the unlawful assembly, but he or she has to be a participant in the unlawful assembly. Any person who “takes part” in a riot which has come into existence commits the offence of riot [11]. Such a person does not have to be the person responsible for the initial constituent breach of the peace. Neither does he or she have to have taken part in the unlawful assembly prior to it turning into a riot. Any person may take part by joining in after the unlawful assembly has become a riot.

21. Mirroring the analysis regarding unlawful assembly, the defendant’s conduct amounting to “taking part” in the riot must involve acts in furtherance of the riot. It must involve committing breaches of the peace or doing acts facilitating, assisting or encouraging breaches of the peace by others, making the defendant guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor. We will return below to consider what committing a breach of the peace entails.

22. The offence of riot is also participatory in nature. The constituent act involves a breach of the peace by a person who was taking part in an unlawful assembly. When that occurs, the “persons assembled” are declared by element [10] to be “riotously assembled”. The person who first committed a breach of the peace would thus be taking part in an assembly which has become a riotous assembly. Any other person who commits the offence by “taking part” in the riot, does so as part of the “riotous assembly”. Such person must have a participatory intent, intending to take part in the riot by committing, or acting in furtherance of, breaches of the peace together with other participants engaged in riotous activities.

23. As with unlawful assembly, it follows that liability for the offence of riot as a principal implicitly requires the defendant to be present and acting with the others riotously assembled. Again, this is subject to what is said about accessorial and inchoate liability incurred by persons who are absent, discussed below…

B. “Common Purpose”

25. In the Lo Case, the appellant’s propositions on “common purpose”, reflected in Annex 1, Questions 1a-1d, may be summarised as follows:

(a)  The offences of unlawful assembly and riot were common law offences. At common law, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove against the defendant all the elements of the unlawful assembly which then became a riot. These included the prohibited disorderly conduct and a shared intent to engage in such conduct (what we have called a “participatory intent”).

(b)  Additionally, so the argument runs, it was necessary to prove that the assembled persons had a “common purpose” which they jointly intended to pursue, such as to wreck a dinner or cause a work stoppage. Such a purpose may be referred to as an “extraneous common purpose” which is distinct from and goes beyond the participatory intent to engage in the prohibited conduct or to commit breaches of the peace. It is “extraneous” in that it is not a purpose which relates to any element of the offences but involves an external objective motivating the offenders. Lo’s submission is that the common law required such an extraneous purpose, which might or might not be lawful in itself, to be shared in common by those taking part in the unlawful assembly or riot.

(c)  It is argued that an extraneous common purpose continues to be required by the POO as a necessary element of both unlawful assembly and riot. The Judge, it is said, erred in failing to recognise, and give directions on, this additional element.

26. The prosecution’s position, adopted by the Judge in her directions to the jury and upheld by the Court of Appeal, is that the prosecution has to prove that the defendant, assembled together with other persons, acted with a participatory intent, intending together with others assembled to behave in the prohibited manner or to commit or further the commission of the prohibited acts or breaches of the peace, but that there is no extraneous common purpose to be proved…

B.2 “Common purpose” and sections 18 and 19

38. In our jurisdiction, statutory changes were introduced somewhat earlier by the Public Order Bill 1967 (“POB”)

39. The Objects and Reasons of the Bill make it clear that sections 18 and 19 “replace the common law” as part of the codification exercise. In particular, the intention is to eliminate any requirement for proof of a “common purpose”…

40. …as we have seen, a common purpose - in the sense of an extraneous common purpose - is not one of the elements of either offence as presently enacted. The Objects and Reasons indicate that this was a deliberate feature of the codification. Thus, it is preferable not to refer to “common purpose” but to recognise instead the requirement of a participatory intent, reflecting the participatory nature of the two offences. It is in any event clear that no requirement for proof of an extraneous common purpose exists.

41. As previously noted, that was the approach to section 18 adopted by Lam JA (as Lam PJ then was)  in SJ v Leung Kwok Wah. His Lordship held that the elements of the offence reflected what he called the “corporate” nature of the offence:

“…the conduct of the defendants had to be assessed together to see whether this criterion can be satisfied. There must be a sufficient nexus between the conduct of these defendants to justify having them considered together. And the fear required is that such persons so assembled, viz acting together, will commit a breach of the peace.”

42. He added:

“…if three persons in a lawful assembly committed acts of the prescribed nature at different purposes, sparking off different incidents, involving and affecting an entirely different mix of persons, there would not be a sufficient nexus to turn these independent acts into an unlawful assembly of those three persons.”

43. His Lordship was thus concerned with identifying the participatory requirements of unlawful assembly as a matter of statutory construction and held that the “corporate nature” of the offence entailed proof of a “common purpose” in the sense of what we have called a participatory intent”. This is how his statement that “the requirement of having a common purpose in acting in the statutorily prescribed manner remains good law in dealing with a charge under S 18” should be understood. He was certainly not suggesting that an additional element involving proof of an extraneous common purpose is required…

45. The Court of Appeal endorsed Lam JA’s approach stating (in translation):

“According to the true construction of S 18(1), the actus reus that constitutes unlawful assembly must have corporate nature to satisfy the requirement of offenders being jointly responsible. The offenders must have assembled together and conducted themselves in the manner prescribed in the ordinance when assembling. The offenders must have a common purpose so that the court can regard them as assembling to act together. Therefore, the requirement of having a common purpose is still applicable to S 18(1). In other words, the common law requirement of having a common purpose remains an ingredient of the offence of unlawful assembly under S 18(1)”.

46. The “common law requirement of having a common purpose” is clearly a reference to a participatory intent. The Court made this clear by adding: “…if the offenders just had the common purpose of conducting themselves in the prescribed manner, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of common purpose under S 18(1).” The Court of Appeal was not endorsing an “extraneous common purpose”. Indeed, the submission that such a purpose is required was rejected as “completely wrong in law”.

47. The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the offence of riot. A defendant committing the offence must have a participatory intent. He or she must intend to take part in the riot along with other participants in the riotous assembly. No extraneous common purpose has to be shown…

C.6. The taking part point

66. This point, which concerns the applicability of the joint enterprise doctrine where the defendant is present at the scene, also flows from recognising the centrality of “taking part” as the actus reus of both offences. Since, as we have just seen, the offences under sections 18 and 19 require proof of the defendant taking part in the disorderly or riotous conduct in common with the other persons assembled, it is otiose and confusing to introduce as a requirement, a prior layer of common intention and collective conduct which merely mirrors the statutory requirement of “taking part”.

67. As noted above, a BHE involves the co-adventurers agreeing to carry out and then executing a planned crime. With the offences of unlawful assembly and riot, proving that the defendants executed their plan would provide proof of their “taking part” in the unlawful assembly or riot and thus establish guilt of the statutory offences, without any need to pray in aid the doctrine of joint enterprise. Their participatory intent would be inferred from their prohibited conduct while assembled together…

C.8 Presence and the location and scope of the assembly

74. The Court noted in Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive in Council, that at the height of the disturbances in 2019:

“The frequency of outbreaks of violent protests increased and the locations at which they took place also spread from one or two areas to become a phenomenon described colloquially as ‘blossoming everywhere’ in which multiple outbreaks of violence happened simultaneously on Hong Kong Island, in Kowloon and in the New Territories.”

75. And as Poon CJHC observed in the Tong Case: “…unlawful assemblies and riots nowadays are highly fluid in nature.” He pointed to participants assuming different roles and communicating with each other using their phones and in social media. Offenders could not be expected to be assembled as a stationary group with a fixed membership in a single location. Participants would move around in varying groups along main thoroughfares, running into side streets and buildings, spreading out and re-coalescing whether in response to action by the police, in pursuit of different targets or for other reasons. Violence would periodically flare up and die down. Participants would often be in communication with each other, coordinating their activities.

76. It will be necessary in each case for the tribunal to determine where and when an unlawful assembly or riot took place and whether a defendant, if charged as a principal, was present and took part. However, the above mentioned fluidity should be taken into account and an overly rigid view should not be taken of what constitutes the assembly, it’s location and duration. Evidence regarding the geographical area affected, the conduct of and communications maintained among the participants and the duration of the disturbances should be considered as a whole. The defendant’s role in the assembly, if any, should be considered for the purposes of assessing his or her potential principal, accessorial or inchoate liability.

77. A realistic view should be taken of the duration of the unlawful assembly or riot. So long as three or more participants remain actively engaged in the criminal assembly (not necessarily including the constituent offenders establishing the unlawful assembly nor the person or persons whose breach or breaches of the peace transformed the unlawful assembly into a riot - they may have left), the unlawful assembly or riot remains in being as a matter of law. Such an assembly remains in being as long as the participants remain at the scene even if, in the case of a riot, the violence ebbs and flows. Any person taking part in such a riotous assembly commits the offence.

78. The focus should be on whether the evidence directly proves or supports an irresistible inference that the defendant had taken part in the unlawful assembly or riot. Evidence which might support such an inference could include such matters as the time and place of arrest and items found on the defendant, such as a helmet, body armour, goggles, a respirator, a radio transceiver, plastic ties, laser pointers, weapons and materials to make weapons such as petrol bombs which might have been used by those taking part in the criminal assembly. Such fluidity and the basis of the defendant’s alleged liability should also be borne in mind in the drafting of the charge, catering for alternative possibilities.

D. Encouragement

79. Question 2d in Annex 1 asks whether a person can be found guilty of riot “without specific conduct on his part falling under the prescribed conduct provided in sections 18 and 19”, but “merely by virtue of alleged encouragement through his presence”…

81. It is obviously important to avoid treating innocent passers-by who find themselves caught up in an unlawful assembly or riot as guilty of an offence just because they were present at the scene. Presence at the scene in itself is not enough to constitute “taking part” or aiding and abetting. As the Queensland Court of Appeal held in R v Cook, at common law, mere presence in an unlawful assembly or riot is generally insufficient to found liability. It has traditionally been considered necessary that there be some intentional activity in furtherance of the riot.

82. That is not to say that the bar is set high. It does not take a great deal of activity on the defendant’s part to move the case from the “mere presence” to the “encouragement” category. Thus in 1810, Mansfield CJ stated in Clifford v Brandon:

“The law is, that if any person encourages or promotes, or takes part in riots, whether by words, signs, or gestures, or by wearing the badge or ensign of the rioters, he is himself to be considered a rioter, and he is liable to be arrested for a breach of the peace”.

83. This was echoed more recently in Caird, where Sachs LJ said:

“It is the law… that any person who actively encourages or promotes an unlawful assembly or riot, whether by words, by signs or by actions, or who participated in it, is guilty of an offence which derives its great gravity from the simple fact that the persons concerned were acting in numbers and using those numbers to achieve their purpose.”

84. And as Byrne J stated in R v Cook:

“Generally, mere presence at the scene of a crime does not involve criminal responsibility. But presence to facilitate the commission of an offence by others has every potential to attract criminal responsibility under s 7 [of the Criminal Code (Qld)]. And so those present to ‘lend the courage of their presence to the rioters, or to assist, if necessary’ may be guilty with the active participants.”

85. Whether a defendant has done enough to constitute “taking part” especially if by way of encouragement, is a matter of fact and degree, taking all the circumstances into account.

86. Question 2d contains certain rolled-up propositions. Aiders and abettors or counsellors and procurers may obviously perform acts which are not themselves acts of disorderly conduct or breaches of the peace but which offer encouragement or assistance to others in the commission of such acts, thus founding secondary liability (or, as previously explained, possibly also liability as principals for “taking part”). Thus, if the defendant’s presence occurs in circumstances qualifying it as “encouragement” of the prohibited conduct by others, then the answer to Question 2d would be in the affirmative. But mere presence without more is not treated as encouragement, whether for the purpose of “taking part”, or accessorial or inchoate liability.

E. Breach of the peace

88. As we have seen, breaches of the peace are the distinguishing feature of a riot. In this jurisdiction, R v Howell has often been cited as authority for what constitutes such a breach. Watkins LJ there stated:

“…there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affront, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant.”

89. With its focus on an act which actually harms a person, or in his presence, harms his property, or is likely to cause such harm, etc, this appears to be a markedly narrow formulation. In recent experience, rioters have often engaged in wanton damage to property which is not privately owned and not done in the presence of the owner - such as tearing down road railings to make barriers, digging up bricks to use as projectiles, smashing traffic lights, damaging CCTV cameras, throwing Molotov cocktails into Mass Transit Railway stations and vandalising shops identified with persons of opposing political views. Such acts often occurred in the middle of the night when the premises were closed and no owner was present. Plainly, such conduct also constitutes breaches of the peace.

90. In R (Laporte)  v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire, Lord Bingham of Cornhill put the proposition derived from Howell more widely, stating that “the essence of the concept was to be found in violence or threatened violence”. We would adopt that as a general approach to the phrase ‘breach of the peace” in the context of section 19. Someone who commits or threatens an act if violence against another person or another person’s property or acts so that such violence may reasonably be apprehended, commits a breach of the peace.

91. As is apparent from the passage cited above, Watkins LJ’s statement in Howell was made in affirming the existence of a common law power of arrest without warrant. …

92. Thus the power of arrest, asked on an apprehended breach of the peace, was held to arise so that such situations could be prevented from deteriorating into public disorder involving provoked retaliation by persons present and feeling threatened in respect of their persons or property.

93. In POO sections 18 and 19, policy consideration is covered by element [4]. Conduct prohibited under section 18(1)  includes conduct which would “provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace”. Thus, the concept of a “breach of the peace” in sections 18 and 19 includes, but is not confined to, situations which might give rise to provoked retaliation as envisaged in Howell. In cases involving actual or threatened violence to property, the owner of such property need not be present for there to be a breach of the peace…

G. Conclusions and disposition of the appeals

109. We summarise our conclusions as follows:

(a)  POO section 18 defines the elements which constitute an unlawful assembly and makes “taking part” in the unlawful assembly so constituted the actus reus of the offence. The constituent elements are for three or more persons assembled together to conduct themselves in the prohibited disorderly, etc, manner intended or likely to cause a reasonable apprehension that the persons so assembled will commit or provoke a breach of the peace. Any person who takes part in an unlawful assembly commits the offence.

(b)  POO section 19 builds on section 18, making the existence of an unlawful assembly one of the constituent elements of the offence of riot. A riot comes into being when any person taking part in an unlawful assembly commits a breach of the peace, turning the assembly into a riotous assembly. The offence is committed by any person who takes part in a riot so constituted.

(c)  Both offences are participatory in nature. The defendant must be shown not just to have been acting alone but to have taken part in the unlawful assembly or riotous assembly, acting together with others so assembled, being aware of their related conduct and with the intention of so taking part, ie, with a participatory intent. There is no requirement for the persons taking part to share some extraneous common purpose.

(d)  To “take part” in the relevant criminal assembly, the accused must perform the acts prohibited, ie, by behaving in the prohibited disorderly, etc fashion (section 18); or committing a breach of the peace (section 19); or acting in furtherance of such prohibited conduct by facilitating, assisting or encouraging those taking part in the criminal assembly.

(e)  Mere presence at the scene of an unlawful or riotous assembly does not give rise to criminal liability. However, if the accused, being present, provides encouragement by words, signs or actions, he or she, any be held to be “taking part” and guilty as a principal or held to be an aider and abettor. In deciding whether a defendant was present at the scene, the court should take into account the possible fluidity of the criminal assembly and the communications maintained by participants with each other in ascertaining the time, place and scope of the assembly in question.

(f)  …

(g)  The common law doctrine of joint enterprise in its basic form cannot operate in a manner inconsistent with the statutory language… Even in cases where the defendant is present at the scene, the basic joint enterprise doctrine is inapplicable, being otiose and liable to cause confusion, since the actus reus of each of the statutory offences already involves “taking part” with others assembled together.

(h)  …

(i)  “Breach of the peace” in the context of sections 18 and 19 includes, but is not confined to, situations which might give rise to provoked retaliation. It extends to cases involving actual or threatened violence to persons or property, without any need for the owner of such property to be present.

(j)  …

111. The Tong Case comes to this Court via a reference under CPO section 81D to the Court of Appeal on two questions of law. Since, by virtue of section 81D(4), such a reference does not affect Tong’s acquittal, the issues before this Court are confined to the questions of law set out in Annex 2. It is unnecessary and would be inappropriate to conduct a review of the trial Judge’s finding of fact…”

討論

75.本席現將終審法院所解釋的法律原則應用於本案。

76.首先，首兩名被告的大律師於本案開審前，向法庭確認辯方不爭議當日於源禾路發生了暴動。可是於結案陳詞中，他似乎又推翻該說法指：—

「本案爭議

7. 就控罪一「暴動」罪而言，法庭須裁定：

a. 案發當日2019年9月22日香港新界沙田源禾路好運中心外是否發生暴動；

b. 如(a)的答案為「有」，該暴動發生的實際時間及地點…

c. …

d. 如(a)的答案為「沒有」，在有關範圍是否發生了非法集結；及

e. 如法庭裁定在有關範圍發生了非法集結，第一被告及第二被告有否與非法集結者集結在一起，並參與了該非法集結。」

77.所有被告人均應獲得公平的審訊，而公平的意思是指審訊對控辯各方都要公平。於是，法庭去信要求大律師澄清其立場及解釋。12月16日，大律師確認不爭議當時於源禾路發生暴動，但似乎爭議暴動何時發生。

78.既然首兩名被告對當日在源禾路上何時發生「暴動」有爭議，本席便先處理該課題。不受爭議的新聞片段顯示當日下午約5時30分，有一大群示威者（不少於100人）在新城市廣場外。他們大多穿著黑色衣物、以防毒面罩、口罩或以其他衣物（例如頸箍）蒙面，亦戴上其他防護裝備（例如手套、泳鏡、眼罩、手袖等）。同日約下午5時40分，這群示威者由新城市廣場外的空地出發，向担杆莆街及源禾路方向進發；其中一些示威者帶備伸縮鐵閘，亦有示威者沿途擅自拿用路上的大型垃圾桶、屏風和其他雜物。示威者到達近好運中心外的一段源禾路後，便隨即以伸縮鐵閘、索帶及上述雜物築成3排路障，令源禾路上的交通完全癱瘓。有部份示威者更於源禾路擅自取去街上物品（包括小巴站站牌及枯樹葉等）加築路障。很明顯，當時源禾路上有超過3人集結在一起，作出擾亂秩序的行為，而該行為相當可能導致任何人合理地害怕如此集結的人會破壞社會安寧。換句話說，示威者一到達源禾路，該集結已構成非法集結。

79.架設路障期間，有示威者將疑似易燃液體灑在路障上，更有示威者多次大叫「魔法師」；隨即有示威者用點火器燃點中間的一排路障。根據終審法院於湯偉雄終院上訴案，「破壞社會安寧」是指使用暴力或威脅使用暴力，而故意損毀他人的物品，無論是私人物品或公物，均屬「破壞社會安寧」。於這類集結中常遭毀壞的公物包括道路上的鐵欄、街上的地磚、交通燈、閉路電視、地鐵站設施及被指持不同政見的店舖；毀壞的手段包括扯破（tearing down）、挖掘（digging up）、打碎（smashing）、損毀（damaging）、投擲氣油彈（throwing Molotov cocktails）及毀爛（vandalise）。顯而易見，「縱火」切合「破壞社會安寧」的定義。換句話說，由縱火的一刻開始，該「非法集結」已演變為「暴動」。

80.首兩名被告否認他們是新聞片段中，於新城市廣場外的一對男女。本席於上文已裁定，第一及第二被告正是該對男女。大律師指，就算法庭裁定首兩名被告便是該對男女，也無關宏旨，因為「暴動」的地點並非新城市廣場外的空地。他指，根據PW1的證供，警方到場時，首兩名被告只是站在示威者的最前，沒有證供顯示他們有任何動作，以支持「參與」暴動的指控。大律師亦指法庭無法從首兩名被告的衣著、裝備、身上物品或被捕時的反應，推斷首兩名被告有「參與」暴動。最後，大律師指沒有證供顯示首兩名被告何時到達現場，他們途中可能坐下休息、去了別處、不知道現場情況、無法走避等。

81.大律師於陳詞中，聲稱覆述控方證人的證供。於陳詞中，大律師扭曲證供，混淆視聽。於陳詞的第36段，大律師指：「證據上，PW1聲稱他一路沿著源禾路向前進時，觀察到有約一百人。當PW1越過著火的障礙物後，PW1看見人群掉頭離開，這時他留意到一男一女於示威者人群中手拖手離開，而該名女子為第一被告。PW1聲稱他其後於距離示威者大概20米時向示威者作出警告不要逃走，但示威者掉頭便由源禾路往担杆莆街走。隨後，PW1便開始跑去追截示威者…」。因此，大律師指首兩名被告最多也是站在人群當中。事實上，這並非PW1的證供。PW1 指他到達現場時便留意到一群超過100名的示威者；當時有一男一女與示威者站在一起，而該對男女站在示威者群的最前方，貼近路障。這方面的證供從沒受到質疑。當PW1與示威者相距約20米時，他大叫，警告示威者他準備執法。此後，PW1向前衝；這時示威者（包括首兩名被告）才轉身逃走。追截期間，上述男女最接近PW1；PW1亦留意到他們手牽著手逃走。

82.本席完全不同意大律師的陳述。新聞片段顯示，事發前首兩名被告與其他穿著黑色衣物，佩戴裝備的人士於新城市廣場外的空地聚集，期間，首兩名被告曾與該群黑衣人士站在一起，亦有溝通。聚集時，首兩名被告除了穿著黑色衣物，還戴上手袖、手套、口罩（第一被告）、頸箍（第二被告）。示威人士起行時，首兩名被告亦跟隨，即步向担杆莆街及源禾路，沿途與其他一些示威者一起；另外，首兩名被告輪流手持一把鎚子。於新城市廣場外，第二被告一直戴著泳鏡，而起行時，第一被告亦立即戴上泳鏡；兩人完全遮蓋面目。示威者到達源禾路後便隨即架起路障，癱瘓源禾路上的交通；期間有示威者於路障上灑上疑似是易燃液體，亦有人大叫「魔法師」，有示威者更燃點路障上的雜物。此時，燃燒物冒出濃煙，新聞片段顯示濃煙從遠處也清晰可見。警方到達現場時，該群示威者並沒散去，反而在大叫口號，有人更向警方投擲雜物。PW1指，他到達現場時已看見首兩名被告人。當時兩人與約100名示威者一起，站近最前的一排路障，橫跨源禾路的行車線；首兩名被告更站在示威者的最前排，面向警方。當PW1與示威者相距約20米時，他宣佈開始執法。直至警方衝前作拘捕，首兩名被告及其他示威者才轉身逃走。當PW1截停第一被告時，她大叫及掙扎。第二被告則突然從花圃的樹叢中跳出，嘗試拉走第一被告。PW1截停第二被告時，第二被告亦不斷大叫和掙扎。被拘捕後，警方不但從首兩名被告身上檢獲一系列防護裝備，亦於第二被告的身上檢獲鎚子、鉗子及螺絲批。

83.大律師指第一被告身材矮小，可能沒看見現場情況。示威者燃點路障上的物品，引致濃煙密佈，從遠處也可看見。雖然示威者於路上架設路障，但所用的鐵閘是躺在地上，而首兩名被告於暴動核心，站在示威者的最前排，無論是甚麼高度，首兩名被告的視線都沒有阻擋。換言之，第一及第二被告均清楚現場的情況。

84.大律師指沒有足夠證供顯示第一或第二被告何時到達現場，亦沒證供證明他們任何一位參與暴動。本席亦不同意。終審法院於湯偉雄終審上訴案內指出，被告可以不同的方式「參與」非法集結或暴動。當3個或以上的人集結在一起及作出擾亂秩序的行為，該集結便成為非法集結。而作出擾亂秩序的人已是參與非法集結。如集會演變成非法集結時，被告人並不在場（即發生非法集結後才到場），但被告人到場後亦作出擾亂秩序的行為，該被告人亦干犯非法集結。如被告人是發生非法集結後才到場，又沒有作出擾亂秩序的行為，但以言行舉止促進（in furtherance of the prohibited conduct）、促成（facilitate）、協助（assist）或鼓勵（encourage）其他示威者作出擾亂秩序的行為，他們也可被視作參與非法集結。當有任何非法集結者作出破壞社會安寧的行為時，該集結便成為暴動，而參與該集結的人亦成為暴動者。「參與」暴動的方式與參與非法集結一樣。

85.於上述案例中，終審法院亦表示由「純粹身在現場」變為暴動者的門檻並不高，任何鼓勵或支持暴動的言、行或舉止均可將「純粹身在現場」的人變為暴動者（例如佩戴代表暴動者的襟章或標誌）。

86.第一及第二被告於新城市廣場外已與其他黑衣人士站在一起。他們均穿著黑色衣物及防護裝備，與示威人士一同走向暴動現場。就算根據大律師的陳述，警方到達現場時，集結已演變為暴動。可是第一及第二被告不但沒有嘗試離開，還於暴動核心，與其他暴動者站在一起，更站於最前，面向警方。暴動罪及非法集結罪的控訴要旨，在於他們聚眾行事，以人多勢眾來達到他們的目的。唯一及不可抗拒的推論是，首兩名被告及其他示威者是與警方對峙，顯示人多勢眾的實力。此乃促進及鼓勵其他暴動者的行為。

87.當示威者向源禾路出發時，第三被告亦步往同一方向，期間用頸箍掩面。示威者到達源禾路後便隨即以伸縮鐵閘及其他雜物堵路，令路上交通完全癱瘓。該集結已演變成非法集結。新聞片段顯示第三被告站在行人路上，明顯看見堵路行為，他卻上前協助搬運小巴站頭站牌。後來有人縱火，集會演變成暴動。警方到場時發現第三被告與其他示威者站在一起，面對警方。第三被告站在最前排，身旁的示威者穿著黑色衣褲，手持金屬棒。唯一及不可抗拒的推論是，第三被告及其他示威者是與警方對峙，顯示人多勢眾的實力。此乃促進及鼓勵其他暴動者的行為。

88.三名被告無論是參與暴動的意圖（participatory intent）或舉止都昭然若揭。本席裁定，控方在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪一；三名被告均罪名成立。

控罪二

89.沒有爭議的是，警方在第二被告的背囊內檢獲一個鐵錘、一把鉗子和一把螺絲批。控方以香港法例第245章《公安條例》第33(1)及(2)提控。該法例的第33(1)條訂明：—

「在公眾地方管有攻擊性武器

(1)  任何人如無合法權限或合理辯解而在任何公眾地方攜有任何攻擊性武器，即屬犯罪…」

90.法例的第2條訂明：—

「釋義

攻擊性武器（offensive weapon）指任何被製造或改裝以用作傷害他人，或適合用作傷害他人的物品，或由管有或控制該物品的人擬供其本人或他人作如此用途的任何物品」

91.Archbold Hong Kong 2021第25-119段列出「本身」為攻擊性武器（Offensive Weapon per se）的例子：—

“In R v Simpson (C)  78 Cr App 115, CA, Lord Lane (considering the definition of offensive weapon in s 1(4)  of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953)  gave as instances of weapons offensive per se a bayonet, a stiletto or a handgun. A police truncheon has been held to be offensive per se. Houghton v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 84 Cr App R 319, CA (Civ Div). So have a sword stick (Davis v Alexander 54 Cr App R 398, DC; R v Butter [1988] Crim LR 696, CA), and a rice flail (Copus v DPP [1989] Crim LR 577, DC…

It has also been held that a flick-knife is an offensive weapon per se (R v Lawrence (1971)  57 Cr App R 64; R v Allamby and Medford 59 Cr App R 189, CA; and Gibson v Wales [1983] 1 WLR 393). The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held in Simpson, above, that trial judges are entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that a flick-knife is an offensive weapon per se. Weapons which are manufactured for an innocent purpose are not offensive per se, eg a razor (R v Petrie 45 Cr App R 72, CA); a pen knife (R v Humphrey’s [1977] Crim LR 225, CA). Not all knives are offensive weapons per se… Where an article has no readily apparent use except to cause injury to the person, it is submitted that judicial notice may well be appropriate…

Where the article is a weapon offensive per se, there is no requirement on the prosecution that it be proved that the person having it with him also had an intention to use it to cause injury.”

92.於R v Chong Ah Choi [1994] 2 HKCLR 263一案內，警方於凌晨時分看見眾上訴人與一名男子於一個卡拉OK酒吧外。首兩名上訴人當時各手持一支鐵棒；第三名上訴人手持金屬管而第四名男子則手持木板。查問下，第一上訴人指一時貪玩，拾獲鐵棒；第二上訴人稱鐵棒並非屬他所有，而第三上訴人保持緘默。他們三人被控管有攻擊性武器，違反香港法例第228章《簡易程序治罪條例》第17條。上訴法庭裁定：—

“Section 33 of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245), which creates the offence of possession of an offensive weapon in a public place, was referred to by both counsel in the course of the argument…

That submissions makes it necessary for us to consider s.33 even though no charge preferred under it is before us.

Sub-section (1)  of s. 33 provides that any person “who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon” shall be guilty of an offence…

A complication may arise out of the definition of the term “offensive weapon” given in s. 2 of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245). We pause to mention that the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228), contains no definition of the term “offensive weapon”. The courts have, when dealing with cases under s.17 of that Ordinance, generally borrowed the definition of “offensive weapon” given in s. 2 of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245). Anyway, that section defines the term “offensive weapon” to mean “any article made, or adapted for use, or suitable, for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use by him or some other person.” The inclusion of the formula “or suitable” casts that definition very widely indeed.

It may be noted in passing that the comparable English legislation, s. 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, does not include that formula. Sub-s.(4)  of that section defines “offensive weapon” to mean “any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or some other person.”

A possible solution to any problem under the Bill of Rights created by that formula may be one along these lines. If s. 33 would come within R v Edwards (supra)  situation but for the inclusion of that formula in the legislative scheme in question, then it is not the whole of the scheme, which is to be taken as having been Bill repealed, but only that formula. The result of that would be to leave the statutory definition of “offensive weapon” in this form: “any article made, or adapted for use, for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use by him or some other person.”

93.於HKSAR v Lo Kok Leung（HCMA 167/2006, [2007] HKEC 682）一案內，杜麗冰法官指出，法例內的「適合用作」傷害他人的物品，已被上訴法庭於R v Chong Ah Choi內裁定不適用。因此，如涉案工具本身並非攻擊性武器，控方必須舉證被告人有意圖用該工具傷人 [見Hong Kong Archbold 2021, 第25-118段]。

94.本案涉及的工具本身並非攻擊性武器，亦並無證供顯示它們為改裝以用作傷人的器具。雖然法庭懷疑第二被告管有涉案工具作非法用途，但控方並無任何證供證明第二被告打算使用涉案工具傷人；因此無法證案。本席裁定控罪二，第二被告罪名不成立。

控罪三

95.大律師援引終審法院於HKSAR v Tam Lap Fai (2005)  8 HKCFAR 216一案內對「故意阻撓在正當執行職務的警務人員」罪元素的解釋，但指本案內並沒足夠證據證實第二被告阻撓警務人員。他指根據PW2的證供，他制服第一被告時感到「前方有其他不是警方的人正干擾警方」，但他並沒提及第二被告拉第一被告的手。PW1指第二被告從樹叢跳出後用手嘗試拉走第一被告。大律師指當時PW1正在制服第一被告，應專注於第一被告，沒可能看見第二被告拉第一被告。況且，從新聞片段中亦沒看到第二被告拉第一被告的手。

96.本席不同意。大律師的陳述再次是基於完全扭曲的證供。根據PW1的證供，他制服第一被告後，正要將第一被告交予PW2時，第二被告才從樹叢跳出，嘗試拉走第一被告。因有警員阻擋鏡頭，所以新聞片段中看不到首兩名被告的動作。本席接納PW1及PW2的説法。

97.大律師指，即使法庭接納PW1的證供，第二被告的手曾拉過第一被告的手，控方並無證供顯示第二被告的想法；第二被告可能只是想了解第一被告的狀況。PW1指當時第二被告是嘗試拉走第一被告。大律師於陳詞中已不只一次完全漠視及扭曲證供，混淆視聽，強詞奪理，要求法庭作出全無根據的揣測。本席不接受大律師的陳述，裁定控方在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪三，第二被告罪名成立。